

PERIPATETIC RHETORIC AFTER ARISTOTLE

Edited by
William W. Fortenbaugh
and David C. Mirhady

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY STUDIES IN CLASSICAL HUMANITIES Volume VI

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Preface

Some fifty years ago, Friedrich Solmsen published an article, "The Aristotelian Tradition in Ancient Rhetoric," in which he underlined the importance of Aristotle for the history of rhetoric. During the intervening half century, interest in ancient rhetoric and its relevance to modern society has increased dramatically. In North America, departments of speech and communications have experienced a noticeable renaissance. The journal *Philosophy and Rhetoric* is widely read, and George Kennedy has produced a series of volumes that trace the theory and practice of rhetoric well beyond antiquity. In Europe, a Seminar für Allgemeine Rhetorik has been established at Tübingen, the series *Rhetorik-Forschungen* has now appeared and the *Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik* is well under way. In addition, both sides of the Atlantic have responded enthusiastically to the establishment of the International Society for the History of Rhetoric and to the publication of its journal *Rhetorica*. Throughout all these developments, Aristotle's central role has been kept clearly in focus. Moreover, there is a growing awareness of the contributions made by Theophrastus and subsequent Peripatetics. It seems, therefore, an opportune moment to reassess the words of Scaevola in Cicero's *De oratore* 1.43: the Peripatetics claim rhetorical instruction as their own and say that "Aristotle and Theophrastus wrote not only better but also at greater length on those subjects than all the teachers of rhetoric."

In response to this awakening interest in rhetoric generally and Peripatetic theory in particular, a conference was held at Rutgers University in the fall of 1991. The theme of the conference was "Peripatetic Rhetoric after Aristotle" and discussion ranged from the early Hellenistic period to the present day. Revised versions of the papers presented at that conference as well as several additional contributions have been collected in this volume. They are arranged roughly in chronological order. Individually they provide new insights into Peripatetic influence on different periods and different cultures: Greece and Rome, the Syriac- and Arabic-speaking worlds, Europe in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, and the international scene today. Taken together, the papers provide an overview of an enduring Peripatetic tradition—one extending from the fourth century B.C. to the present day.

We wish to express our gratitude not only to all those persons who attended

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the conference at Rutgers but also to the several funding agencies that either supported the conference or facilitated the editing of the papers collected in this volume. We mention by name the Offices of the Provost and of the Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences of Rutgers University, The J.C. Kellogg Foundation, The Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung, The Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and The Killam Memorial Trust. In editing individual papers, we have received welcome assistance from Lowell Edmunds, Dimitri Gutas, Peter Kussmaul and Eric Kylo. Camera ready copy was prepared by Diane Smith, who has ably assisted us not only with this volume but also with several earlier projects.

W.W.F. & D.C.M.

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***Ta asteia* in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*: The Disappearance of a Category**

Dirk M. Schenkeveld

1. In *Rhetoric* 3.10-11, we seem to have the climax of Aristotle's views on rhetorical style. At the beginning, he states his subject: "The sources of *asteia* which are well thought of." Contrary to his procedure in previous chapters, he does not immediately begin his discussion. Instead, he makes a new start, which marks off this section from the foregoing, and prefaces his treatment with the "basic premiss of his aesthetic theory ... that by and large human beings positively enjoy learning or understanding or realizing things."¹ After this remarkable start,² it turns out that *asteia*³ fulfill the following requirements: these expressions are neither dull nor obscure, they provide knowledge and are, therefore, pleasing, have a connection with an important type of argument, the enthymemes, are put in the favourite form of antithesis, contain the best kind of metaphors and make an impression by their vividness (1410b11-1411b24). Further on, the activity of making metaphors is compared to that of the philosopher (1412a9 ff.). At the end, Aristotle formally closes this section, after which follows an addendum on hyperboles (1413a18 ff.).

In this section Aristotle uses elements which he has discussed or mentioned before, like enthymeme, antithesis, metaphor and *eikōn*.⁴ New is the introduction

¹ Margaret E. Hubbard in D.A. Russell and M. Winterbottom, *Ancient Literary Criticism: The Principal Texts in New Translations* (Oxford 1972) 86. I use Hubbard's translation throughout.

² One may compare 1359b2 ff., the start of the discussion of the symbouleutic genus, the first of the three kinds.

³ From the whole discussion it appears that there is no essential distinction between τὰ ἀστεῖα and τὰ εὐδοκμοῦντα: what is *asteion*, is successful and highly esteemed at the same time. One might say that καὶ has an explanatory function. For brevity's sake, therefore, I speak of *asteia* only but shall make use of occurrences of the verb εὐδοκμεῖν to trace links with other parts of the *Rhetoric* (ἀστεῖον not occurring outside 3.10-11).

⁴ *Eikōn* covers both simile and comparison in English.

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of *πρὸ ὀμμάτων ποιεῖν* ('to bring before the eyes') or *ἐνέργεια* ('activity'), which notion is duly explained and illustrated in 1411b24-1412b9. For the rest, everything is well-known. Aristotle, one is inclined to say, now brings all strands together and weaves a new cloth: that of clever and brilliant expressions which get approval.

However, despite all these favourable characteristics, the *asteia* get no mention in the summation at the end of the whole part on *lexis* at 1414a18-29, nor does Aristotle ever refer or allude to them in the rest of the *Rhetoric* or elsewhere. From this point of view, the whole section on *asteia* looks like an isolated part in the discussion of *lexis*. It is also remarkable that as a category the *asteia* disappear almost totally from later rhetoric, that the related word *ἀστεϊσμοί* gets a less general load and that only parts of this section seem to have been taken over by later writers.

On the whole, scholars merely mention this Aristotelian group as being discussed in the *Rhetoric*,⁵ or they see it as some precursor of the later categories of tropes and/or figures (see § 9). One notable exception is the extensive treatment by Morpurgo-Tagliabue,⁶ and from a completely different point of view the shorter one of Sprute.⁷

In the first part of my paper (I), I shall discuss the meaning of *asteia*, look at contemporary usage and analyze 3.10-11 for their main points, and then come back to the status of these chapters within the larger framework of 3.2-12. In the second (II), I shall go into later developments.

I

2. The plural and the article (*τὰ ἀστεῖα*) point to a definite and well-known class of expressions⁸ (cp. 1411b21, 1412a18 and 22, 1412b3 and, finally, 1413a18). At the same time, any utterance can be said to be (*οὐκ*) *ἀστεῖον* (1412b27f., cp. 1410b16, 1412b30),⁹ whereas *εὐδοκμεῖν*, "to be highly esteemed, to be successful,"

⁵ Fr. Solmsen, "The Aristotelian Tradition in Ancient Rhetoric," *AJPh* 62 (1941) 35 ff. and 169 ff. (repr. in R. Stark ed., *Rhetorika: Schriften zur aristotelischen und hellenistischen Rhetorik* = *Olms Studien* 2 [Hildesheim 1968] 312-349) only mentions *ἀστεῖα* in one breath with *ψυχρόν* and *ὄγκος* as stylistic categories (p. 44 = repr. p. 321).

⁶ G. Morpurgo-Tagliabue, *Linguistica e stilistica di Aristotele* (Roma 1967).

⁷ Jürgen Sprute, *Die Enthymentheorie der aristotelischen Rhetorik* (Göttingen 1982).

⁸ Several scholars interpret *asteia* as "liveliness," as if it were a qualification of style, but Aristotle does not use the singular coupled with the definite article. Moreover, they then restrict the meaning of the word to the third aspect of "bringing before the eyes." Thus, e.g., Marsh H. McCall Jr., *Ancient Rhetorical Theories of Simile and Comparison* (Cambridge, Mass. 1969) 44. Morpurgo-Tagliabue (above, note 6) 287 says: "Aristotle ... non enumera in modo classificatorio i diversi tipi di *ἀστεῖα*, ma analizza in generale l'*ἀστεῖον*. Per far ciò ne isola i caratteri."

⁹ Different is the superficially similar use of *τὰ ψυχρά* in c. 3, for these are a qualification which occur in compounds, epithets, and metaphors, whereas metaphors and

is said of persons (e.g. 1372b21 and 1411b33), and laws (1375b9), but more often of metaphors, *eikones*, riddles and enthymemes (8 times in these chapters and, further, in 1394b20, 1400b25, 1405b1, 1407a12, 1408a27 and 1418b2). Aristotle does not use ἄστεϊος as a qualification of style (λέξις), and that marks a difference between his use of ἄστεϊος and, e.g., σαφής.¹⁰

In the Greek of the 5th and 4th century the word ἄστεϊος in connection with language and speaking denotes refined speech which may be also, or exclusively, witty = full of humour. It is one of the characteristics of the well bred citizen, who may also be described as χαρίεις, εὐχαρις ("charming") etc. Like its opposite, ἄγροικος ("rustic"), our word can lack any connection with the city and mean anyone who is refined and has a quick intelligence, or even anything which is good, e.g., tastes well. Used substantively, ἄστεϊον means "a clever and bright remark," although it may also be interpreted as "a witty = funny expression."¹¹

In rhetorical theory we have ἄστεϊα λέγειν in Anaximenes, *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* 22 1434a33 ff. There it is put next to other means, such as anticipations, questions, repetitions, lengthening the speech, brevity etc. Those means are common to all kinds of speech. There are two ways to achieve this specific means:¹² one is to express ἐνθυμήματα only half "in such a way that our audience can guess the other half";¹³ the other is to use γνῶμαι, for which see c. 11. An orator may use this device in any part of his speech but should avoid similarity in phrasing.¹⁴ Thus there is a connection with brevity, but this means gets a separate discussion in combination with those of "lengthening a speech" and "speaking at moderate length" (22 1434b1-26). At the end of c. 22 we are advised to adapt the character of a speech to that of the audience, "if you wish to compose a speech which will be *asteios*," but the connection with the foregoing is obscure.¹⁵ At any rate, it is clear that for Anaximenes ἄστεϊα λέγειν has nothing to do with pleasantries and jokes but everything with concise expressions, which will be admired by the

antithesis are the material from which *ta asteia* are made. Translators tend to obscure this aspect.

¹⁰ Therefore, one should not say with Th. Herrle *totam elocutionem urbanam esse necesse est* (*Quaestiones rhetoricae ad elocutionem pertinentes* [Diss. Leipzig 1912] 11). This interpretation seems to be derived from the use of *urbanitas* as colouring a whole speech, for which see § 7.

¹¹ See LSJ s.v. and, especially, Eva Frank, *De vocis urbanitatis apud Ciceronem vi atque usu* (Diss. Berlin 1932) 10-18 and 56-63.

¹² Cp. 15 1431b22.

¹³ Tr. W. Rhys Roberts, in W.D. Ross (ed), *The Works of Aristotle translated into English*, vol. xi (Oxford 1924). As to the meaning of ἐνθύμημα in this work see Sprute (above, note 7) 140 ff. ("Thesen, die einen Gegensatz aufzeugen"); but they function "not as a scheme of argumentation, but as a device meant to shore up what has been said" (Thomas M. Conley, "The Enthymeme in Perspective," *QJS* 70 [1984] 173).

¹⁴ Such is the purport of the corrupted phrase in 22.2 1434a37-9.

¹⁵ See M. Fuhrmann *ad loc.* in his Teubner edition (1966).

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audience.¹⁶ In view of later developments, I add that Anaximenes often recommends putting *gnōmai* and enthymemes at the end of the parts of a speech, as a kind of confirmation or closure.

Aristotle's theory of *asteia* evidently is a development of that of contemporaries like Anaximenes. Here is a survey of the points Aristotle discusses in 3.10-11.

1410b6-9 prefatory phrase

I. 1410b10-36 general exposition of sources of *asteia*

1. b10-19 choice of words: metaphors and *eikones*
2. b20-26 *dianoia*: enthymemes
3. b27-35 *lexis*-part of *asteia*: by use of antithesis, metaphors and *energeia*
4. b35-36 summary.

II. 1410b36-1413b2 particulars

1. 1410b36-1411b23 metaphors: the proportional ones are the best; list of examples (from 1411a25 the aspect of *energeia* keeps cropping up, therefore:)
2. 1411b24-1412a9 *energeia*
 - a. b24 introductory phrase
 - b. b25-12a6 *energeia* in relation to metaphors
 - c. 12a6-9 id. in relation to *eikones*.
3. 1412a9-b32 more about metaphors
 - a. a9-17 general rule about transference
 - b. a17-12b1 characteristic of *προσεξαπατῶν*, demonstrated on various items, which brings about a comparison with verbal puns.
 - c. b1-32 role of fitting application, especially in the case of homonyms, concluded by a repetition of the summing up in I.4.
4. 1412b32-1413a14 more about *eikones* as metaphors
5. 1413a14-18 proverbs as metaphors
6. 1413a18-19 concluding phrase of the whole discussion.
- (7. 1413a19-b2 addendum on hyperboles as metaphors).

This survey shows that metaphor gets much more attention than all other aspects of *asteia*. *Energeia* ("to bring before our eyes") is not known from elsewhere and is therefore discussed, but the knowledge about enthymeme and antithesis seems

¹⁶ See Frank (above, note 11) 57-8 (her notes refer to earlier interpretations, such as that of Spengel, who wrongly connects this chapter with that of Cicero on *risus* (*de or.* 3.216-289)).

taken for granted—though this is not said explicitly. As to metaphor, Aristotle does not explain why proportional metaphors are the best, but this follows from his reference in 3.2 1405a3-6 to the discussion of metaphor in the *Poetics*, and our author can therefore limit himself to a long list of examples. Later the novel feature of ἐξουσιάζειν ("to deceive" 1412a17 ff.) will be discussed and this part is being prepared for by the general rule of transference. Despite this preponderant role of metaphor, which is also brought to the fore by the "reduction" of *eikōn*, proverb, and hyperbole to this ὄνομα, one should not say that Aristotle's main concern here is metaphors.¹⁷ They are still an aspect, be it a very important one, of *asteia*, and these are Aristotle's subject throughout the whole section.

3. As to individual points, I first select the ἐνθύμημα for discussion. Having said that among words metaphors give the most pleasure, more even than *eikones*, Aristotle continues by saying: "So necessarily wit will be found in expressions and inferences that produce immediate understanding" (1410b20-1); he then explains this statement (1410b22-7). We have here the same argument as before when Aristotle discussed why metaphors are the most pleasing of all words. The discussion returns in 1410b32-3: "Clever enthymemes" are neither superficial nor obscure but quickly convey new insight. Already in 2.23 (1400b25 ff.) Aristotle has said that among enthymemes the refutative ones have a greater reputation (εὐδοκιμεῖ) than the demonstrative ones (cp. 1418b1-4), but also that irrespective of this distinction those enthymemes "[finden] den grössten Beifall, deren Gang die Hörer gleich zu Anfang der enthymematischen Argumentation voraussehen, ohne dass die betreffenden Enthymeme jedoch banal seien" (Sprute 134). In 1410b24-6 we have the same idea. In the foregoing chapter (9) on the loose and periodic styles Aristotle had discussed the form of antithesis, spoken of it as "giving pleasure" and used the same wording as when talking about refutative enthymemes. Thus there appears to be a close connection between the discussion of clever enthymemes at 1410b20 ff. and other passages in the *Rhetoric* on the enthymeme.

In the *Rhetoric* enthymemes are first and foremost concerned with syllogistic argumentation and reasoning, but it is well-known that in 2.23-4 Aristotle uses a notion of enthymeme that does not involve syllogistic structure. This notion comes from a theory of the enthymeme such as we find in Anaximenes' handbook.¹⁸ There ἐνθύμημα, being a species of proof, is "eine These, die einen Gegensatz [aufzeigt]" (Sprute 142) and often functions as a kind of capping, in order to shore up what

¹⁷ This was first done by the anonymous ancient commentator (CAG vol. 21.2, p. 202.5). Morpurgo-Tagliabue (above, note 6) ends up by equating *asteia* and metaphors (see my review *Mnem.* 35 [1972] 201); K.V. Erickson in the introduction (p. 7) to his anthology *Aristotle: The Classical Heritage of Rhetoric*, says outright in regard to W.J. Jordan's contribution to this publication ("Aristotle's Concept of Metaphor in *Rhetoric*," 235 ff.): "Aristotle next discusses metaphor."

¹⁸ Sprute (above, note 7) 138-46.

has been said (Conley 173). Moreover, Isocrates uses the word in the sense of "smart sayings, well-turned phrases."¹⁹ Thus, it is no wonder that in *Rhetoric* 2.23 too scholars, e.g. Conley (171), have interpreted ἐνθύμημα in the same way, viz. not "the rhetorical argument that constitutes the speech, but rather nicely turned sentences or questions raised at climactic points in the course of the speech." It is true that Aristotle's theory of the enthymeme is partly embedded in that of his own time but it is not necessary to accept Conley's watering down of the Aristotelian notion of enthymeme and to neglect the aspect of argumentation. Apart from this, we cannot be sure which type of enthymeme (syllogistic or non-syllogistic) Aristotle has in mind in c. 10. One may adopt either interpretation.

At any rate, in Aristotle's view enthymemes have to do with thought (*dianoia*) rather than with expression in language, important though this is.²⁰ Therefore he can say that "diejenige Ausdrucksweise (*lexis*) und diejenigen Enthymeme *asteia* [sind], die den Zuhörer rasch Erkenntnis gewinnen lassen" (1410b20-1, Sprute 133). However, in order to be understood enthymemes must be expressed in language. At this point Aristotle drops the subject of clever enthymemes and concentrates the whole discussion on the *lexis*-side of *asteia*.²¹ This part has three facets: form, choice of words, and *energeia*. Having said this about the *lexis*-part, Aristotle concludes this paragraph (1410b35-6).

4. In the part on metaphors we must first notice that none of the examples is a "pleasantry." They are pleasing because they link together notions and thus offer new insight, not because they raise laughter or are humorous. I say this because of later developments and because many modern scholars think that Aristotle discusses humorous expressions; thus in their commentary Cope and Sandys (3. p. 107) typify *asteia* by "lively, pointed, sprightly, witty, facetious sayings."²²

Most examples adduced here by Aristotle do not require comment in the framework of this paper, except the very first one (1411a1-4): "So Pericles said

¹⁹ Conley (above, note 13) 172; cp. William M.A. Grimaldi, S.J., *Studies in the Philosophy of Aristotle's Rhetoric* (Wiesbaden 1972) 71-2.

²⁰ This distinction will remain problematic, for metaphors convey knowledge, just like enthymemes do, but one belongs to *lexis*, the other to *dianoia*.

²¹ In b27-34 Sprute (above, note 7) 133 ff. takes it that τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων governs not only εὐδοκμεῖ but also εἶν ... λέγεται; consequently he thinks that Aristotle advocates the use of metaphors in enthymemes. The same view is implied in the translations of Hubbard and others, and had been anticipated by the ancient commentator (above, note 17) 203.23. But none of the following examples of successful antithesis and metaphors have the characteristic form of an enthymeme, for which see 1357a19-22 and 94b4-6. Moreover, the verb form λέγεται is continuously used in connection with *asteia*. Therefore, we should supply from the first clause τὸ λεγόμενον as the subject of the sequel.

²² Cp. E.M. Cope, *An Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric* (London 1867) 321 and R. Janko, *Aristotle on Comedy* (London 1984) 184 ("The main account of metaphor in the context of humor is *Rhet.* III 10-11').

that the young men lost in the war had vanished from the city *as if* (ὥσπερ εἰ) one were to take the spring from the year." This image recurs in almost the same wording in 1.7.34 (1365a31-3). Why is this expression a metaphor, and not an *eikōn*? According to Stanford²³ Pericles had said "the spring has perished from the year," but then he neglects the words ὥσπερ εἰ. McCall (42 f.) calls attention to a similar expression in 3.11 (1411b27-9) from Isocrates, *Phil.* 127 "but you, *like* a free-ranging creature should consider all Hellas your fatherland." He explains the classification of both quotations as metaphors as due to a lack of interest on Aristotle's side in the exact "form of his metaphors so long as they achieve the desired stylistic end," which lack he had also noticed in the treatment of *eikōn* in 3.4.²⁴ This seems strange in view of Aristotle's insistence on the difference between metaphor and *eikōn*, indicated at e.g. 1410b17-18 and 1406b20-2, but I cannot think of a better explanation.

The third aspect of the linguistic side of *asteia* is "to bring before our eyes," also called *energeia*, "actuality." This factor is continuously kept apart from that of metaphor,²⁵ although they come very close in 1411b2 ff. Therefore we are not allowed to say that *energeia* is a facet, a quality of good metaphors.²⁶ This discussion of *energeia* needs no further comment; I only point out the very interesting statement on "attributing life to inanimate things" (1411b31 f.), for this will lead to a famous distinction of metaphors in Hellenistic times (see § 10).

5. At 1412a9 Aristotle turns away from *energeia* and again underlines the importance of making metaphors "from things that are akin and not obvious." This brings him to a related subject (1412a17 ff.) viz. that "most clever expressions depend not only on metaphor but also on rousing a false expectation (ἐκ τοῦ προσεξαπατῆν), as that makes it more obvious that one has learnt something because of the contrariety." Aristotle now briefly mentions as *asteia* certain apophthegms, riddles and what a certain Theodorus called "saying something strange." As a footnote he adds examples of verbal puns and the like, which also cheat expectation. These are not examples of *asteia* for at 1412b3 he continues with "Thus too the *asteia*" and then discusses cases of homonyms etc. in *asteia*. What he wants to stress in this passage and its sequel (1412b3-32) is that one can express thoughts in similar ways but that "the more succinctly and antithetically they are expressed, the better

²³ W. Bedell Stanford, *Greek Metaphor: Studies in Theory and Practices* (Oxford 1936, repr. New York 1972) 11.

²⁴ Cp. the somewhat different case (McCall [above, note 8] 43 f.) of the classification of a Homeric passage as an *eikōn* in 1412a7-10.

²⁵ See the wording μεταφορὰ καὶ πρὸ ὁμμάτων ποιεῖν (11a26, 28, 35, 11b6 [supplied by Thurot]) and cp. the discussion in 11b26 ff. of an expression which contains a metaphor but not yet *energeia*.

²⁶ Thus e.g. Morpurgo-Tagliabue (above, note 6) 256 ff., who speaks of "metafora icaistica."

thought of they are" (1412b21-2). Once again he explains this fact by a reference to acquiring knowledge which occurs better because of the antithesis and faster because of the brevity.

I fail, therefore, to see how Aristotle can be said to discuss here a third form of metaphor, now a purely verbal kind, next to those of logical or lexical nature, as Morpurgo-Tagliabue wishes us to interpret.²⁷ If he were right, we would not expect the repetition of the three aspects of *asteia* in 1412b29-32. Nevertheless the Italian scholar makes an interesting point. He connects the notion of "false expectation" with the ἀσάτης of Gorgias, which Aristotle would have converted into an intellectual pleasure. He then links the example with those of apparent enthymemes in 2.24 1400b35 ff., where the first type depends on verbal play. There too Aristotle says that apparent enthymemes are also obtained by "a compact and antithetical utterance, such language being the proper province of enthymeme." Another type depends on the use of homonyms (1401a13). Of course, Aristotle is not saying that what he discusses in 11 1412a17 ff. are in reality apparent enthymemes, for several times he stresses that these *asteia* are such if they have a correct application (e.g. 1412b3, cp. b11, 13, 25). But the linking makes us aware of the closeness between *asteia* discussed in c. 11 and enthymemes.²⁸

After this section comes a short discussion of successful *eikones*, in which Aristotle attributes their success to the fact that they are comparable to proportional metaphors. In the same way proverbs are metaphors, be it of the species-to-species kind. At 1413a18 Aristotle finishes his discussion of *asteia*, as has been said above, and then adds as a corollary that clever hyperboles are metaphors too.

6. So far individual points. We now have a good understanding of (the sources of) *asteia* but do not yet know when to use them. Unfortunately Aristotle does not mention them in his next chapter (12) on the characteristics of the individual kinds of oratory. In view of the examples and the context they come from—as far as we can ascertain—it appears that Aristotle does not think that *asteia* are to be used as capping material. If that is right we have a contrast with Anaximenes' view concerning the use of enthymemes. Nor would Aristotle have an orator use enthymemes everywhere at all times. At least, in 1418a5 ff. he advises against strings of enthymemes and even against their use when one tries to produce pathos or ethos.

Until now I have omitted to discuss the first phrase of Aristotle's preface, "though producing *asteia* is a task for a person of natural talent (εὐφροσύνη) or practised skill (γυμνασμένοιο), showing how to is a proper subject for this inquiry" (1410b7-

²⁷ Morpurgo-Tagliabue (above, note 6) 245-50 and 287 ff.

²⁸ A main point of difference seems to be that none of the examples of these *asteia* is followed by an explanatory phrase (cp. note 21). In 2.21 Aristotle makes that the difference between γνώμη and ἐνθύμημα. See Sprute (above, note 7) 130 ff.

8). In *Poetics* 22 1459a5-8 Aristotle had said "by far the most important point (in *lexis*) is the facility with metaphor. This alone is a sign of natural ability, and something one can never learn from another."²⁹ This point of view is repeated in *Rhet.* 1405a9-10. Accordingly, we can understand why in cc. 10-11 metaphor gets the most attention. On the other hand, the insistence on the ability of the person of natural talent or practised skill to produce *asteia* and the justification for their treatment in *Rhetoric* look out of place. The best solution for this problem seems to be that Aristotle defends his treatment here because he is aware that the *asteia* form a subject which is not restricted. They have a wider reach in social life and have much in common with "pleasantries, jokes," as is shown by the discussion in *Eth. Nic.* 4.8 1127b33 ff. on "passing the time with amusement" (διοργωγὴ μετὰ παιδιᾶς). What the εὐτράτελος ("the man of a nimble mind," also called "charming") does, reminds one of the part on *asteia*. If this connection is to the point, we have more reason to see cc. 10-11 as a section isolated from the rest on *lexis* in cc. 2-12.³⁰

II

7. After Aristotle and Anaximenes the *asteia* as a distinct group of clever expressions disappear almost totally from rhetorical theory. Their specific name is replaced by ἀστεϊσμοί, which very soon gets a restricted sense and parts of Aristotle's theory are incorporated in different categories.³¹

First, we may consider the term *asteia*. It is replaced³² by ἀστεϊσμοί, which first appears as the title of a book by Neoptolemus of Parium.³³ The book was presumably a collection of clever sayings—witness the quotation of two lines of poetry which by means of an antithesis praise death. In his *On Style* §§ 128 ff. Demetrius makes a distinction between more stately and dignified forms of charm (χάριτες) and those more lowly and more suited to comedy. Both forms he calls *asteismos*. Later (§ 163) Demetrius marks off the graceful charm from τὸ γελοῖον ("the ridiculous"), thus showing that *asteismoi* still have a wide meaning of "clever sayings," which may come close to provoking laughter. One thinks of what Aristotle has said in *Eth. Nic.* (see § 6).

²⁹ Transl. S. Halliwell, *The Poetics of Aristotle* (London 1987).

³⁰ In this way one understands why Ingemar Düring, s.v. "Aristoteles" *RE* 11 (1968), col. 227 calls these chapters a μέθοδος of its own ("eine besondere Vorlesung"). It should now be clear that I do not endorse the interpretation of Morpurgo-Tagliabue (above, note 6) 239 ff. of the structure of cc. 2-12 and the role of *asteia* therein.

³¹ Suggestions of André Laks, who commented on an earlier version of this paper, have stimulated me to rethink my views about the later developments and to rewrite the following sections to a certain extent.

³² The adjective ἀστεῖος continues to be used in various context.

³³ Stobaeus, *Anthol.* 4.52.24 = vol. v, p. 1080 Hense, in the section on *laus mortis*.

A next step is taken by Philodemus, who in his *Rhetorica* (vol. I, 181, 18 ff. Sudh.) criticizes the views of some unknown author on ἀλλογορία (= *inversio*), because though distinguishing *aenigma*, *eironeia* and *paroimia* he failed to mention the further types of *griphos* and *asteismos*. From this time onwards the connection between *eironeia*, *allegoria* and *asteismos* is a fixed one: Greek technographers put *asteismos* under *eironeia*, and their Latin counterparts do so under *allegoria*.³⁴ Midway between the usage by Demetrius and that of Philodemus stands that of Longinus, *On Sublimity* 34.2, who praises Hyperides' "innumerable ἀστεϊσμοί," which words are coupled with "sarcasm, good breeding, irony, humour" and with charm.³⁵ Outside rhetorical literature ἀστεϊσμοί are "witticisms,"³⁶ which may be full of humour.

The change in *asteismoi* from a wider sense of "clever sayings" to that of "neat, ironical expressions" will be due to the wish of technographers for sharper distinctions, which at the same time included restricting the wider sense of the words involved.³⁷ In this connection it is interesting to see that Aristotle's example of ἀστεῖα ἀποφθέγματα, which, as he says (1412a21 ff.), "are derived from not meaning what one says," is to Demetrius (§ 99 f. and 243) and Quintilian (8.6.44) one of *allegoria*. One might say that later authors have analyzed Aristotle's views and taken these as their basis for further developments.

Moving from the Greek terminology to the Latin side, we have the word *urbanitas*. One is tempted to see this word as the Latin equivalent, but that is true only to a certain extent.³⁸ In rhetorical treatises the word corresponds to the Greek *asteismos* and is always closely connected with laughter and amusing expressions. Therefore, as we shall see (§ 8), Quintilian can vituperate Domitius Marsus for incorporating serious expressions in his notion of *urbanitas*. But *urbanitas* is never classified as a trope. Another difference is that *urbanitas* can indicate the all pervading tone of a speech, just like the Greek ἀττικισμός, and may have connotations which are absent from its Greek counterpart. Outside the rhetorical framework Cicero combines *urbanitas* and *humanitas*. It looks therefore

³⁴ Greek authors: e.g. Trypho, *Rhet. gr.* (Spengel III, 206, 11 ff.); Latin authors: e.g. Quintilian 8.6.57. More references in my article on *Asteismus*, to be published in *Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik*, vol. i (Tübingen 1992/3).

³⁵ Cp. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *De Demosthene* 54 and the interpretation of this (corrupted) text by J.D. Meerwaldt, *Studia ad generum dicendi historiam pertinentia* (Diss. Amsterdam 1920) 75-81.

³⁶ E.G. Heliodorus, *Aethiop.* 10.25.2.

³⁷ A similar thing happened to χαριεντισμός, which word first means "the style of charm" (Demetrius § 128) and ends up as a type of the trope *eironeia*. Cp. Frank (above, note 11) 61.

³⁸ See Frank (above, note 11) 37-51; E.S. Ramage, *Urbanitas: Ancient Sophistication and Refinement* (Oklahoma 1973) 59 ff. and E. Rabbi, *Cicero über den Witz. Kommentar zu De Oratore* ii, 216-290 (Diss. Amsterdam 1986) xxxii ff.

as if the notion of *urbanitas* has a history of its own with only a few links to that of *asteia/asteismos*.

8. However, there is one section in Quintilian (6.3.102-12) with a strong reminiscence of Aristotle's *asteia*.³⁹ In the third chapter of book 6, Quintilian first discusses *risus* at length and uses the terms *urbanitas* and *urbanus* frequently. The connection between laughter, refined humour, and *urbanitas* is evident. This connection also appears at the end of the chapter, where (102-112) Quintilian adds a criticism of the view of Domitius Marsus on *urbanitas*. For this man, *urbanitas* included all clever sayings, whether humorous or not, provided they have brevity. Quintilian has three objections. First, Marsus' definition is too general, for it embraces all virtues of speech if one takes away the requirement of brevity. Second, brevity should not be restricted to *urbanitas*, which Quintilian regards as a characterization of a whole speech or narrative.⁴⁰ Finally, Marsus is wrong in not restricting *urbanitas* to the field of humour.

Similarities to Aristotle's theory are clear. Both Aristotle and Marsus prefer brief and clever sayings, but Marsus expressly includes sayings which raise laughter, something not mentioned by Aristotle, and he does not associate *urbanitas* with the use of metaphors. In addition, he makes distinctions, such as *genera seria*, *iocosa* and *media*, the latter also called by its Greek name γένος ἀποφθέγματικόν. This term reminds one of Aristotle's ἀποφθέγματα ἀστεία (1412a21-3).

It is a pity that this piece on Marsus' notion of *urbanitas* stands completely isolated in post-Aristotelian rhetorical literature. We can now only note its similarities to Aristotle's views.

9. Though the theory of *asteia* as such has almost totally disappeared after Aristotle, parts of it were preserved in a different context, viz. that of treatises Περὶ χάριτος, and (probably) also in Greek treatises on the laughable, which influenced Latin discussions *de risu*. I shall not go into this latter subject, for this would lead us too far away from *asteia*. Here I only point to Aristotle's remarks on false expectation (1412a17 ff.) as one of the sources used by Peripatetic and other theoreticians for elaboration of views on the ridiculous and laughter.⁴¹

We know of treatises Περὶ χάριτος written by Theophrastus and Demetrius of Phaleron (Diog. Laert. 5.48, and 81), but whether these have a rhetorical or an ethical content is not known.⁴² In *On Style*, ascribed to Demetrius, the part on the smooth type of style (§§ 128-85) contains a discussion of χάριτες (§§ 128-

³⁹ See e.g. Mary A. Grant, *Ancient Theories of the Laughable* (Madison 1924) 124; Frank (above, note 11) 61 f.

⁴⁰ Quintilian compares *urbanitas* to the Greek notion of ἀντικλισμός, the all pervading tone, known to him from Cicero, *Brutus* 170-2.

⁴¹ See R. Janko (above, note 22) for rich material.

⁴² Rabbi (above, note 39) xliv with literature.

62), and this looks like a separate treatise *Περὶ χάριτος*, notwithstanding its overt connections with the rest of the book.⁴³

Demetrius' discussion of *χάριτες* shows that *charis* and *charites* are ambiguous terms, much as we have seen for *asteia*, *asteismoi*, and *asteios*. The same is true for the modern terms "witticism" and "Witz." Demetrius distinguishes, I said in § 7, two types of charm: the more stately and dignified and the more lowly. Both are called *asteismoi*. Homer and Xenophon are adduced as authors who sometimes use the *charites* in order to make a passage more forceful (§§ 130-1), but one cannot detect anything really charming and lovely in their examples. Indeed, they look much more like clever and elegant sayings, bordering on jests, in short like witticisms in both senses. Accordingly, I suggest that Aristotle's *asteia* have been incorporated in treatises on elegance and elegant expressions.⁴⁴

Demetrius' discussion shows still more similarities to Aristotle's theory. For example, in the part on the sources of verbal *charites*, the first source is that of brevity (§ 137-8); later on appear metaphor, comparison, allegoria, and hyperboles as sources, but there are many other sources which do not have a parallel in Aristotle's discussion. Therefore, once again, this part of Aristotle's rhetorical theory seems to have given an impulse, but no more, to later distinctions.⁴⁵

10. As a corollary to this discussion I add that according to George Kennedy our cc. 10-11 "are devoted to what would later be called figures of speech, all of which Aristotle treats as metaphors. This is a part of the theory of style which was destined for enormous amplification in the following centuries."⁴⁶ Here Kennedy suggests that cc. 10-11 contain a nucleus for a later theory of figures of speech. I do not think this suggestion right if only because of the wrong characterisation of the subject of these chapters. At the same time, one will be struck by Cicero's use of *lumina*, *stellae*, and *illuminare* in connection with figures

⁴³ See Fr. Solmsen, "Demetrios *περὶ ἐμπνεύσεως* und sein peripatetisches Quellenmaterial," *Hermes* 66 (1931) (repr. in R. Stark (above, note 5) 262-5 (= repr. 306-9), G.M.A. Grube, *A Greek Critic: Demetrius On Style* (Toronto 1961) 30-2 and my *Studies in Demetrius On Style* (Diss. Amsterdam 1964) 19 f. and 54 ff.

⁴⁴ According to G.M.A. Grube (above, note 43) 30-2 and to Morpurgo-Tabliabue (above, note 6) 301 Demetrius never solves the dilemma whether *χάριτες* are either charming sayings or humorous expressions.

⁴⁵ Demetrius' remark that an enthymeme "is as it were an additional comment" (§ 32) and "might be considered a form of epiphoneme, but ... is not, since it is used for proof" reminds us of Anaximenes' statement about the use of enthymemes (see § 2).

⁴⁶ *The Art of Persuasion in Greece* (Princeton 1963) 111. Cp. also his article on Aristotle's *Rhetoric* in G.A. Kennedy (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Literary Criticism*, vol. i *Classical Criticism* (Cambridge 1989) 193, "Aristotle has no terminology for tropes and figures, which is a development of the following centuries, but he does discuss a rather miscellaneous set of techniques, including *asteia*, or 'urbanities', similes, proverbs, and hyperboles."

and metaphor and metonymy.⁴⁷ Perhaps these words have some relation to τὰ εὐδοκμοῦντα of Aristotle.

At one point only Aristotle's discussion seems to have generated a new approach to his theory of metaphor. In *Rhet.* 3.11 1411b31, in the treatment of *energeia*, Aristotle uses the phrase "attributing life to inanimate matters" (cp. 1412a2 and 8-9 and 1411b10). A few centuries later Philodemus of Gadara refers to two fourfold divisions of metaphors, the first being built on the transfer from "animate" to "inanimate" (*Rhet.* vol.1.171.15 ff., cf. 172 col. xiii). This new distinction is taken over by Trypho, and thus by later technographers, and by Quintilian (8.6.10) but rejected by Hermogenes.⁴⁸

The reason why this division became so popular may have been that Aristotle's own division of metaphor, which left a few traces only, was encompassing too much. We have seen that *eikones*, proverbs, and hyperboles all were classified as metaphors because of the element of likeness detectable in each. Aristotle has a predilection for the fourth kind, the proportional metaphor, but proverbs are metaphors of the species-to-species kind. That was all right for the philosopher but must have been lacking precision in the eyes of the professional rhetoricians. For when we look at later sources, we find many types of tropes instead of one metaphor. The process of specification must have started rather soon after Aristotle, for already in the Homeric scholia of Aristarchus καταχρηστικῶς (e.g. Schol. K 258 a Erbse) occurs. A further indication is the so-called Theophrastus papyrus of c. 200 BC.⁴⁹ This text closely follows Aristotle's *Poetics* 20-1, but replaces the Aristotelian metaphor by metaphor in a restricted sense and μετουσίᾳ. Μετουσίᾳ covers what later technographers call *metonymia* and *synecdoche*. As far as we can see the papyrus does not yet show awareness of a distinction of tropes, but this one was introduced at some time in the Hellenistic period. Then τροπικός replaces μεταφορικός and τρόπος gets the special and limited sense of "trope."⁵⁰

11. At the beginning of his famous article "The Aristotelian Tradition in Ancient Rhetoric," Friedrich Solmsen⁵¹ summarizes what happened to Aristotelian theories in the field of rhetoric by referring to the study of J. Stroux, "[whose] conclusions show ... that Aristotle's pupils and successors, while keeping alive the master's ideas wherever they could do so with a good conscience, made it their object to

⁴⁷ Or. 83, 92 etc., *De or.* 3.170.

⁴⁸ Trypho, *De tropis*, *RhGr* 3.191.11. Sp. Cp. Hermogenes, *De invent.* 4.10.199.4 ff. Rabe.

⁴⁹ Pack 1052 = P. Hamb. 128, fr.a (Veröff. Hamb. Staats- und Univ. Bibl., vol. 4 (1954) p. 36-9 Snell = Appendix no. 9 in *Theophrastus of Eresus: Sources*, ed. W. Fortenbaugh et al. (Leiden 1991) vol. 2 pp. 612-17.

⁵⁰ See my "Figures and tropes" in G. Ueding (ed.), *Rhetorik zwischen den Wissenschaften* (Tübingen 1991) 155.

⁵¹ Solmsen (above, note 5) 36 (= repr. 313).

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fill out gaps which he had left (and frequently indicated as such), to arrange the material more systematically under certain basic categories, and to increase the amount of empirical data to be fitted into the framework of these categories." I do not know anything about the "good conscience" of the Peripatetics, but I am convinced that as to the category of the *asteia* they drastically reorganized this material in such a way that the original concept was almost forgotten.

Theophrastus, the *Characters* and Rhetoric

William W. Fortenbaugh

Theophrastus' interest in rhetoric is not in doubt. Both Cicero and Quintilian take notice of his contributions to the field (667-70 FHS&G),¹ and the list of Theophrastean writings preserved by Diogenes Laertius (1) tells us what we have lost. We can be sure that Theophrastus followed his teacher Aristotle in drawing a distinction between deliberative, judicial and epideictic oratory (671). He will have done the same in recognizing several parts of an oration (666 no.15-16). Whether Theophrastus' treatment of rhetorical argument (666 no.5-6) included advances in modal logic is not reported, but is perhaps likely. In regard to expression, we can say that he developed Aristotle's single virtue of style into four virtues (684);² and in the case of delivery, it seems safe to assert that he not only gave the subject recognition but also extended the discussion to include gesture as well as voice (712).³ All these matters could be discussed with profit; in this paper, however, I want to consider a topic which is of especial interest to me. It is the portrayal of character. No ancient source tells us how Theophrastus treated the matter in his writings on rhetoric; but we can, I think, develop the topic and indicate some probabilities, if we consider one of the few surviving works of Theophrastus—namely, the *Characters*.⁴

¹ FHS&G = *Theophrastus of Eresus: Sources for his Life, Writings, Thought and Influence*, ed. W. Fortenbaugh, P. Huby, R. Sharples and D. Gutas, (Leiden 1992).

² For a recent discussion of Theophrastus' treatment of expression, see D. Innes "Theophrastus and the Theory of Style," *Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities* 2 (New Brunswick, N.J. 1985) 251-67.

³ See W. Fortenbaugh, "Theophrastus on Delivery," *RUSCH* 2 (above, note 2) 269-88.

⁴ A connection between the *Characters* and rhetoric has not gone unnoticed in the scholarly literature. See, e.g., O. Immisch, "Ueber Theophrasts *Charactere*," *Philologus* 57 (1898) 193-212, D. J. Furley, "The Purpose of Theophrastus' *Characters*," *Symbolae Osloenses* 30 (1953) 56-60, E. Matelli, "Libro e Testo nella Tradizione dei Caratteri di Teofrasto," *Scrittura e Civiltà* 13 (1989) 329-86, and J. Rusten, *Theophrastus, Characters*, Loeb ed. (Cambridge, Mass. 1993) 17-18, 22.

I. SUPERFICIAL BEHAVIORAL REGULARITIES

The *Characters* is the best known of all the surviving works of Theophrastus. It has influenced English and French literature⁵ and been the basis of a very funny self parody by German philologists.⁶ The work itself is not long. It runs forty-six pages, including critical apparatus, in the edition of Peter Steinmetz.⁷ Its core is thirty sketches of unattractive behavioral patterns. Each sketch is preceded by a definition of the character type.⁸ Eight sketches are followed by spurious epilogues and the entire collection is preceded by a spurious prologue.⁹ The epilogues and the prologue have a moralizing function and show that the *Characters* came to be used for moral instruction. But they do not tell us the original purpose of the work.¹⁰

A special feature of the sketches is the focus on superficial behavioral regularities.¹¹ Theophrastus describes what a given type of person is likely to do, without telling us why the person does what he does. A clear example is the sketch of garrulity (*adoleschia* 3). The trait is defined in terms of behavior: "carrying on long and ill-considered talks" (3.1); and the sketch itself contains a series of sample remarks (3.2-4). We are told that the garrulous man continues to chatter as long as he is tolerated (3.4), but there is no indication concerning what motivates or

⁵ The influence is especially clear in writers of the seventeenth century like Hall and La Bruyère.

⁶ The parody was first published by the Philologische Gesellschaft zu Leipzig in 1897. The Greek text together with a German translation is available in *Klassische Parodien*, ed. K. Bartels (Zürich 1968) 26-9. For the text, an English translation and a short commentary, see my "The Thirty-first Character Sketch," *Classical World* 71 (1978) 333-9.

⁷ P. Steinmetz, *Theophrast, Charaktere = Das Wort der Antike* 7 (München 1960-2) 1.61-106. All subsequent references to the *Characters* make use of the sketch and section numbers in Steinmetz' edition.

⁸ In this paper I accept the definitions as genuine. For arguments in favor of acceptance, see, e.g., O. Navarre, *Caractères de Théophraste, Commentaire exégétique et critique* (Paris 1924) xxv-viii and Steinmetz (above, note 7) 2.8-16. Arguments in favor of rejection have been made by Markus Stein in his recent Cologne dissertation (as yet unpublished and unavailable to me).

⁹ The prologue and the epilogues may have been added in the sixth century A.D. See H. Diels, *Theophrasti Characteres* (Oxford 1909) vii. The number of spurious epilogues is problematic. In speaking of eight, I follow Steinmetz (above, note 7) 2.139 and not, e.g., Navarre (above, note 8) xxiii, 70. For the purposes of this paper, the exact number is unimportant and will not be further discussed.

¹⁰ The *Characters* may have been intended for instruction in ethics or rhetoric or poetics. Alternatively, its original aim may have been entertainment. For a recent survey of the several possibilities, see Matelli (above, note 4) 329-35.

¹¹ Since I have discussed the topic in an earlier article "Die Charaktere Theophrasts: Verhaltensregelmäßigkeiten und aristotelische Laster," *Rheinisches Museum* 118 (1975) 62-82, my remarks in the rest of this section will be comparatively brief. On garrulity and loquacity, see pages 64-5 of the earlier article.

drives the garrulous man to chatter incessantly. This indifference to explanation is, of course, a matter of emphasis. Theophrastus is well aware that behavioral regularities do admit explanations, and in two definitions he provides one. Advantage is referred to in the definition of flattery (*kolakeia* 2.1), and belief in widespread injustice is mentioned within the definition of distrust (*apistia* 18.1). These definitions are, however, exceptional. Theophrastus' overriding interest is in behavioral patterns. He stays on the surface and portrays the kinds of conduct that make people socially unattractive.

To make the point clearer, I give in translation the sketch of loquacity (*lalia* 7). For the sake of readable English, the formula *toioutos tis hoios* plus infinitive (literally, "someone such as to ...") is rendered by repeated use of the future tense.

(1) Loquacity would seem to be, should someone wish to define it, incontinence in speech.

(2) The loquacious man is one who will tell the person, who happens to come along and say anything at all to him, that he is saying nothing and that he himself knows everything and if he will listen to him he will learn. And in the middle of a reply he will set upon him saying "Don't you forget what you are going to say" and "At least it is good that you reminded me" and "How useful loquacious chatter is" and "What I omitted" and "At least you have understood the matter quickly" and "For a long time I was observing you to see whether you had come to the same view as myself." And he will provide himself with other such openings, so that the person who happens to come along fails to catch his breath.

(3) And when he has disarmed people individually, he is apt also to move against them in groups as they stand together and to put them to flight in the middle of doing business.

(4) And entering the schools and wrestling places, he will keep the children from further learning; so loquaciously will he chatter with the trainers and teachers.

(5) And those who say they are going to depart he is apt to accompany and to deposit at home.

(6) And having learned news from the assembly, he will announce it, and in addition he will narrate the battle of rhetoricians during the archonship of Aristophon [and the battle with the Spartans under Lysander]¹² and those speeches whose delivery once brought him renown among the people. And while narrating he will hurl criticism at the masses, so that his listeners either become forgetful or nod sleepily or leave in the middle and escape.

(7) And serving on a jury he will prevent a judgment from being reached, and being with others in the theater (he will prevent) their watching the play, and joining with others in a dinner party (he will prevent) their eating, saying that it is difficult for the loquacious man to be silent and that his tongue is lubricated and that he could not be silent even if he should seem to be more loquacious than the swallows.

(8) And he will endure being mocked even by his own children, when they, being already intent on sleep, urge him to talk: "Daddy, chatter to us and put us to sleep."

This sketch, like that of garrulity, concerns uncontrolled chatter. That is clear both

¹² I follow Steirmetz (above, note 7) 74, who deletes the words in square brackets.

in the definition (7.1) and throughout the body of the sketch. We are shown the loquacious person in action with an individual (7.2) and then with groups of people (7.3). The effect he has on his audience is repeatedly noted,¹³ as is a certain self-awareness on the part of the loquacious man (7.7). What we are not offered is a clear explanation for the endless babble. There is, of course, the suggestion that the loquacious man feels the need to establish his own worth. He says that he knows everything (7.2), and he makes reference to the renown which he himself gained as a speaker (7.6). But Theophrastus does not say explicitly that loquacity is attributable to a need for recognition, and he certainly does not suggest that such a need is the sole explanation. Rather he concentrates on superficial behavior and leaves open the matter of deeper lying explanations. That may result from a simple desire to compose funny sketches and therefore to ignore troubling motives. But I think there is more to the story, and in the last section of this paper I shall suggest that Theophrastus' interest in behavioral regularities is an important feature of his work in ethics and poetics, as well as rhetoric. For the moment, however, I want to develop the connection between the *Characters* and rhetorical practice.

II. THE CHARACTERS AND RHETORICAL INSTRUCTION

During the Byzantine period, rhetoricians incorporated Theophrastus' *Characters* within a collection of rhetorical writings whose principal authors are Hermogenes and Aphthonius.¹⁴ What attracted these rhetoricians seems clear enough. The sketches can be used to elucidate what Hermogenes and Aphthonius say about *ethos* and *ethopoia* (Herm., *Id.* 2.2 [*RhGr* 6.320.16-322.3 Rabe]; Aphth., *Progymn.* 11 [*RhGr* 2.44.20-46.13 Spengel]).¹⁵ That is a matter of some interest and crucial for understanding the transmission of the Theophrastean text. My concern, however, is neither with the history of Byzantine rhetoric nor with the textual tradition of

¹³ Only 7.5 makes no explicit reference to a negative effect on the listener.

¹⁴ The incorporation of the *Characters* within this collection may have occurred in the eighth or ninth century. See O. Immisch in *Theophrasts Charaktere*, hrsg. von der philologischen Gesellschaft zu Leipzig (Leipzig 1897) xxxv-vi, and cf. O. Regenbogen, "Theophrastus," *Paulys Realencyclopädie*, suppl. vol. 7 (1940) 1502 and Steinmetz (above, note 7) 1.54-6. The matter is, however, complicated. The earliest manuscript (= col. Par. Gr. 1983) documenting the incorporation of the *Characters* in a collection of Hermogenean and Aphthonian texts and commentaries dates from the end of the 10th or beginning of the 11th century. An earlier manuscript of the 10th century (= cod. Par. Gr. 1741) indicates that the *Characters* were also included in an "alternative" rhetorical collection which contained Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and *Poetics*. But this combination appears to have found little acceptance in comparison with the Hermogenean corpus. See D. Harlfinger and D. Reinsch, "Die Aristotelica des Parisinus Gr. 1741," *Philologus* 114 (1970) 30-6, Matelli (above, note 4) 359-77 and Thomas Conley, "Notes on the Byzantine Reception," in this volume, Chapter 12, section VIII.

¹⁵ See Matelli (above, note 4) 347-8 and 376-7.

the *Characters*. Rather it is with an earlier period; and in the rest of this section, after touching on Libanius, I want to consider connections between the *Characters* and Plato's *Phaedrus*.

I begin by mentioning three features, which relate Theophrastus' work to rhetoric. First, the sketches are marked by a well defined style. Each combines the rhetorical figure of *synathroismos* with a heavy dose of polysyndeton: i.e., the sketches are composed of a string of different actions brought together under a single heading and linked by the conjunction "and."¹⁶ Next—and here I am developing the connection already pointed out in regard to Byzantine rhetoric—the content of the sketches has an immediate relationship to the portrayal of character. A pupil or teacher interested in depicting, say, an overly religious person could consult the Theophrastean sketch of superstition (*deisidaimonia* 16), select pieces of behavior he found especially apt and allow the collected pieces to stimulate his own creative imagination. Finally, the humorous nature of the sketches will have appealed not only to pupils but also to professional rhetoricians whose declamations often aimed more at entertainment than at instruction. A single well-known example will serve to make the point. Libanius' twenty-sixth declamation is a carefully composed display piece in which an ill-humored husband condemns himself before the Council, hoping through death to escape the incessant chatter of his wife. The narrative portion of the declamation (26.5-23) is very funny and has obvious affinities with Theophrastus' sketch of loquacity.¹⁷ When the husband tells the Council that he left home while his wife was still speaking (26.15), we are reminded of the loquacious man losing his audience in the middle of his speech (7.6). When the husband allows that a word on his part only stimulates his wife and brings on non-stop chatter (26.16), we may compare Theophrastus' depiction of the loquacious man getting his start when someone comes along and says something to him (7.2). Subtler but no less important is a shared interest in metaphor. Theophrastus introduces words suggesting battle (7.2 and 3); Libanius has the loquacious wife return from the baths and shower her husband with words (26.19). Most striking is the way in which both Theophrastus' sketch and Libanius' narrative end on a clever note. Theophrastus has the children of the loquacious man make fun of their father. They want to go to sleep and so urge him to start talking and help them fall asleep (7.8). Similarly Libanius focuses on sleep, but he treats chatter as an impediment. The distraught husband complains that even at night when the rest of his wife's body is asleep, her tongue keeps going and so causes him more grief than mosquitoes (26.23).

The rhetorical display piece is, of course, much older than Libanius (4th c. A.D.).

¹⁶ Cf. Alexander, son of Numenius, *On Figures* 1.9 (*RhGr* 3.17.12-26 Spengel), quoting Demosthenes, *On the Crown* 71. The Alexander text can also be found in H. Lausberg, *Handbuch der literarischen Rhetorik* (München 1960) 341.

¹⁷ See D. A. Russell, *Greek Declamation* (Cambridge 1983) 91-6.

It developed among the Sophists and rhetoricians of the fifth and early fourth century B.C. Especially interesting in connection with the *Characters* is the speech which Plato attributes to Lysias (c. 459-380 B.C.) at the beginning of the *Phaedrus*. Whether the attribution is serious or playful (correct or incorrect) need not concern us.¹⁸ For whoever the author may be, the speech neatly illustrates the way in which the *Characters* relates to an established rhetorical tradition. The imagined speaker is a non-lover, a dispassionate but sexually interested man who seeks to persuade a youth that he should not surrender his favors to someone who loves him; instead he should prefer a cooler person, i.e., the speaker himself. The speech, then, is more than a simple character sketch,¹⁹ but it does anticipate the work of Theophrastus both in its structure and in its portrayal of the man in love. A series of points are strung together by repeated formulae (*eti de* 231A6, B7, 232A6, 233D5; *kai men de* 231D6, 232B5, E3, 233A4, D8),²⁰ and with three exceptions each point involves reference to the behavior of the lover.²¹ The Theophrastean phrase *toioutos tis hoios* is not used, but the generality of the description is emphasized through a consistent use of the plural ("they" = lovers in general). Bringing together and occasionally shortening the descriptive material, we get the following sketch.

(1) Lovers regret their good deeds, once their passion subsides (231A2-3).

(2) And they weigh up all the pains they have suffered on account of their love and good deeds (231A6-8).

¹⁸ The attribution to Lysias is much discussed in the literature. See now S. Döpp, "Der Verfasser des Erotikos in Platons *Phaedrus*," *Glotta* 61 (1983) 15-29, who counters arguments against the attribution, and H. Görgemanns, *Rheinisches Museum* 131 (1988) 108-13, who argues for Lysianic authorship. If the attribution is accepted, then we must, I think, recognize that Plato's criticism of the speech is either misguided or deliberately capricious. I prefer the latter, for while the criticism presupposes a whole speech, the text presented by Plato is clearly part of a larger demonstration speech/argument. (See Görgemanns 109-10). It is possible that Plato failed to recognize that, but such an error seems incredible. Indeed, Plato may be guarding against such an interpretation, when he 1) has Socrates picture Phaedrus focusing on matters of especial interest (228B2) and then 2) makes Phaedrus say that he will report all the ways in which the situation of the lover differs from that of the non-lover (228B2, D3-4). In other words, Phaedrus announces an exhaustive account of the part that most interests him, and that is what we are subsequently offered, albeit read rather than spoken live.

¹⁹ It is not a simple sketch of an overbearing lover, for the lover is repeatedly compared with the non-lover—of the nine characterizations of the lover set forth below, seven are accompanied by a comparison: no.1 231A3-6, no.2 231B2-7, no.5 232A4-6, no.6 232B2-5, no.7 232D4-E2, no.8 233A1-4, no.9 233B6-C6—and this comparison is made the basis of an extended argument for preferring the non-lover to the lover.

²⁰ Not repeated are *kaitoi* 231C7 and *toionun* 231E3.

²¹ The section 231D6-E2 contains no clear characterization and therefore is not represented in the sketch constructed below. The same is true of 233D5-8 and 233D8-E5. At 233E5 the speaker begins to conclude his speech, and in the course of this conclusion he mentions some typical pieces of behavior already described in the body of the speech.

(3) And they value a new love more highly, and do injury to the old one (231C4-7).

(4) And they admit that they are sick and unable to control themselves (231D2-4).

(5) And thinking others envious and seeking recognition, they tell everyone that they have not labored in vain (232A1-4).

(6) And they follow their beloved about and are seen talking to him (232A6-B1).

(7) And fearing men of superior wealth, education and the like, they discourage association with other people (232C4-D1).

(8) And they desire the body of the beloved, before they know his character, so that it is unclear whether they will want to remain lovers, once their passion subsides (232E3-6).

(9) And they praise the words and deeds of the beloved without regard to what is best, sometimes because they are frightened of causing displeasure, other times because their judgment is impaired by passion (233A-B1).

Since the argument against the lover is strengthened by mentioning unattractive beliefs and desires, the speaker frequently goes below superficial behavior and offers deeper lying explanations. I have tried to reflect that in the above sketch (see 5, 7 and 9). On the whole the *Characters* ignores such explanations; but it does not rule them out and sometimes provides one.²²

Later in the *Phaedrus*, Plato has Socrates criticize the Lysianic speech on the grounds that it does not begin by defining love (263D7-264A8) and that the points made against the lover are thrown out in a haphazard manner, so that Lysias appears to be writing down whatever thought happens to enter his head (264B3-8). The latter criticism is directed against the overall arrangement of the speech (cf. 236A4). For example, points 1 and 8 are closely related (the qualifying clause "once their passion subsides" is actually repeated verbatim), but one occurs at the beginning of the speech, while the other is found much further along.²³ This criticism might seem equally applicable to the Theophrastean sketches, for generally the material contained in an individual sketch is not marked by careful and clear arrangement. There are, of course, exceptions like the sketch of cowardice (*deilia* 25) and that of fabrication (*logopoiia* 8). The former is neatly divided into cowardly behavior at sea and cowardly behavior among foot soldiers (25.2 and 25.3-6). The latter presents a single scene in such an artful manner that the sketch could easily be used in teaching students how to depict character through simple episodes.²⁴ But if these sketches are exceptional, it does not follow that the rest are open to the

²² See above, section I, where the definitions of flattery (2.1) and distrust (18.1) are mentioned, and a possible explanation for loquacity, the need for recognition (7.2, 6), is discussed.

²³ Cf. 235A3-4, where Socrates says that Lysias appeared to say the same thing two or three times.

²⁴ O. Immisch (above, note 4) 203.

criticism which Plato brings against the speech of Lysias. For this criticism is directed against a finished display piece (or at least a piece presented as finished). The Theophrastean sketches are certainly not that. They are more like open-ended notes which may be useful to the rhetorician and his student when they compose a display piece or any other kind of speech involving the portrayal of character.²⁵

Turning now to the other criticism brought against the Lysianic speech—namely, that it fails to begin with a definition (263D7-264A8)—we can say that Plato thinks it important to define one's topic at the outset, because that will prevent ambiguity and at the same time determine the course of subsequent remarks (cf. 237B7-C5, 263E1-2). He has Socrates make clear that "love" is a disputed or ambiguous term (263C7-9) and that it is this ambiguity which makes possible two opposed speeches (263C9-12). In the first of these speeches, Socrates defines love as an irrational desire for bodily beauty quite distinct from rational consideration of what is best (237B7-238C4); he then offers an argument which is entirely in line with the definition: love is a ruinous passion, so that surrendering to a lover is no less than inviting disaster upon oneself (238D8-241D1). The second speech is far more complicated, but for our purposes it is sufficient to notice that love is conceived of as a kind of divine madness (245C1) and that this very different conception of love permits Socrates to argue that the gifts of love are many and divine (256E3-4). All this suggests a comparison with the *Characters*, for Theophrastus begins each sketch with a definition, after which he lists behavioral manifestations of the trait in question. Since the vast majority of the listed manifestations conform neatly to the preceding definition, one is tempted to say that Theophrastus is proceeding in the manner recommended by Plato and that manifestations which fail to conform are lapses on the part of Theophrastus.²⁶ The trouble here is that we do not know what Theophrastus intended. In particular, we do not know whether he was especially concerned to bring all manifestations into line with the definition. He may, for example, have been more interested in testing the definitions and therefore prepared to include typical pieces of behavior that count against the definition. For the student of rhetoric that, too, would be instructive. He would learn that the words we use to refer to character traits are often not immediately clear and even ambiguous, so that different kinds of behavior can be brought—correctly and confusingly—under the same label.

²⁵ I do not want to overlook the fact that notes, too, can be ordered and that for certain purposes ordered notes are more useful. But in the absence of any programmatic statement by Theophrastus himself (the spurious prologue does not count) we should, I think, only observe, not criticize, the open-ended nature of the sketches.

²⁶ Or faults in the transmission of the text. See, e.g., Navarre (above, note 8) xxvii, who refers to sketches 5, 11 and 19.

III. SIMILARITIES TO A POSSIBLE THEOPHRASTEAN THESIS

Rhetorical instruction in the early Peripatos included theses, i.e., questions of a general nature, which were argued both *pro* and *contra*: e.g. "Does a good man ever lie?" One student argued that there are occasions, while a second argued that there are none; or the same student argued both sides of the question. Aristotle is reported to have trained his pupils in this manner,²⁷ and Theophrastus certainly did the same (Cicero, *De finibus* 5.10 = 672 FHS&G). There is here an obvious connection with dialectic, but it would be a mistake to think that instruction in theses was limited to modes of argumentation. Theses were also a vehicle for instruction in style. Indeed, on one occasion Cicero tells us that Aristotle trained students in theses not for the sake of subtle argumentation but with a view to rhetorical abundance, so that both sides of a question might be stated more ornately and richly (*Orator* 46). This report is an exaggeration and a reflection of Cicero's own concern with eloquence,²⁸ but it does serve to underline the fact that theses could serve two purposes within rhetorical instruction: training in the kinds of argumentation that are useful to an orator and practice in stylistic embellishment.

Both Aristotle and Theophrastus produced theses of their own. It is likely that some were not intended for rhetorical instruction. They will have had, for example, a scientific function and been comparatively free from rhetorical style.²⁹ Others, however, will have had a rhetorical use and been composed with considerable care. In this regard, two texts are of special interest in that they report contemporary reactions to the theses of Theophrastus. One occurs in Diogenes Laertius' life of the Academic philosopher Crantor (*Lives of the Philosophers* 4.27). Here Diogenes lists several clever remarks by Crantor including the statement that the theses of Theophrastus were written with purple coloring (75 FHS&G). The other text is found in Athenaeus (*The Sophists at Dinner* 4.5 130D). It is part of a letter from the Macedonian Hippolochus to Theophrastus' pupil Lynceus. The latter is said to listen to the theses of Theophrastus and to declare them sheer happiness (76 FHS&G). Both texts involve a certain irony, but both also make clear that Theophrastus could compose attractive theses.³⁰

²⁷ Cic., *De or.* 3.80, *Or.* 46, *Tusc.* 2.9; K. Barwick, *Das rednerische Bildungsideal Ciceros* = Abhandlungen der sächsischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig, Philol.-hist. Kl. Bd. 54.3 (Berlin 1963) 16-17, 37-9.

²⁸ See P. Moraux, "La joute dialectique d'après le huitième livre des *Topiques*," in *Aristotle on Dialectic*, ed. G. E. L. Owen (Oxford 1968) 302.

²⁹ See P. Moraux, *Les listes anciennes des ouvrages d'Aristote* (Louvain 1951) 94-5, who suggests that the Aristotelian theses may have had a doxographical slant. For our purposes, it seems important to underline Aristotle's statement that almost all dialectical problems had come to be called theses (*Top.* 1.11 104b35-6).

³⁰ On both passages see M. Schmidt, *Commentatio de Theophrasto rhetore* (Halle 1839) 31 and Regenbogen (above, note 14) 1523.

It is regrettable that no collection of Theophrastean theses survives. Diogenes Laertius lists three such collections (5.44, 49, 46 = 66 no.34-6 FHS&G), and these or other collections were known to philosophers and rhetoricians of the first and second century A.D.: e.g., to Alexander of Aphrodisias, who mentions them in his *Commentary on Aristotle's Topics* 101a26 (CAG vol.2.2 p.27.17-18 = 135 FHS&G) and to Theon, who does the same in his *Preliminary Exercises* 2 (*RhGr* vol.2 p.69.1-4 Spengel = 74 FHS&G).³¹ What interests me here is not the overall history of these collections but a detail: namely, that Jerome's work *Against Iovinianus* 1.47 contains material which may derive from a Theophrastean thesis³² and which certainly exhibits similarities with the *Characters*.³³ Jerome tells us that Theophrastus enquired whether the wise man should marry (*an vir sapiens ducat uxorem* p.388.12 Bickel = 486.7-8 FHS&G). He records briefly the conditions under which Theophrastus would recommend marriage³⁴ and then reports at length Theophrastus' arguments against marriage. The style is highly polemical and in my opinion quite worthy of a rhetorical exercise.³⁵ I give here two excerpts in translation.

(1) The habits of wives require many things: expensive dresses, gold, jewels, money to spend, maid-servants, various utensils, litters and gilded chariots. Further, there are garrulous complaints all night long: "That lady appears in public more elegantly dressed." "This lady is respected by everyone. Poor me, I am despised in the company of women." "Why were you looking at the woman next door?" "What were you saying to the maid?" "What have you brought me from the marketplace?" . . . (2) If you entrust the entire household to her direction, then you must act the servant. If you reserve anything for your judgment, she thinks you have no faith in her and turns to hate and quarreling. And unless you take steps quickly, she prepares poison.

³¹ Since neither Alexander nor Theon mentions a title or titles, we cannot be certain that they knew the works listed by Diogenes. For the purposes of this paper the matter can be left undecided.

³² F. Bock, *Aristoteles, Theophrastus, Seneca de matrimonio* (Leipzig 1898) 41-4.

³³ E. Petersen, *Theophrasti Characteres* (Leipzig 1854) 115.

³⁴ This opening statement concerning favorable conditions (p.388.12-14 B = 486.8-10 FHS&G) functions as a kind of *paromologia* (cf. Rutilius Lupus, *De figuris sententiarum et elocutionis* 1.19 p.23 Brooks) or *concessio* (see Lausberg [above, note 16] 425). In addition, it has an interesting parallel in Libanius' 26th Declamation. When the ill-humored husband turns from self-description to the woman he has married, he begins with a highly positive description provided by a friend (26.9). Within the declamation of Libanius, the description serves the special purpose of excusing the husband (he was misled by his friend), but it also serves a more general purpose: namely, that of providing an ideal in comparison with which the subject will come off badly. Similarly in Jerome's text, the statement of favorable conditions has a double function. It is first of all a kind of sensible concession with which the speaker seeks to establish himself as a reasonable person. But it also provides a high standard which cannot be met.

³⁵ The text together with commentary is also to be found in my *Quellen zur Ethik Theophrasts* (Amsterdam 1984) text L46 and comm. on p.207-12.

The first of these excerpts contains two lists which invite comparison with the *Characters*: namely, the list of things which wives find necessary (388.17-18 B = 486.14-15 FHS&G) and the list of garrulous complaints which a wife utters throughout the night (388.19-22 B = 486.16-19 FHS&G). The latter immediately recalls the sketches of garrulity (*adoleschia* 3), loquacity (*lalia* 7) and faultfinding (*mempsimoiria* 17), and both may be compared with, e.g., the list of tools which the boor has lent (4.14), the list of what the complaisant man possesses (5.9) and the list of disingenuous remarks uttered by the ironical man (1.6). Less obvious but equally significant is the way in which the second excerpt ends on a clever note. We are first told that you cannot retain any control over the household, for the wife thinks you distrust her and becomes quarrelsome. After that comes the unexpected and therefore effective conclusion: "Unless you take steps quickly, she prepares poison" (*parat venena* p.389.8 B = 486.39 FHS&G). As we have already seen in section II,³⁶ such a clever ending is entirely Theophrastean.

It is, of course, true that the *Characters* contains no sketch of a woman, let alone one of a wife. In addition, it is not certain that Jerome (or his source) is drawing on a rhetorical thesis. Jerome speaks of a little golden book on marriage (*aureolus Theophrasti liber De nuptiis* 388.11 B = 486.7 FHS&G), but Diogenes' book list contains no work *On Marriage*, and the introductory question as recorded by Jerome ("Should the wise man marry?") strongly suggests a thesis.³⁷ For our purposes the important point is that the excerpt preserved by Jerome—whatever its source—helps us understand how the *Characters* relates to the rhetorical thesis. The student or teacher engaged in this exercise can draw details from a related sketch, and if his subject happens to be a complex figure like the wife who is not only a chatter-box but also a complainer, then he can consult more than one sketch. And even if there is no sketch closely related to the figure in question, he can still learn something from Theophrastus' method of piling up pieces of typical behavior, introducing lists and adding emphasis through pointed endings.

IV. PRACTICAL ORATORY

It is now time to say something about practical oratory, i.e., about speeches written for actual delivery in the assembly and before a court of law. For not only

³⁶ I.e., when comparing *Char.* 7.8 with Libanius, *Decl.* 26.23. See also the endings of 7.2 and 6.

³⁷ Similarly, the concession that immediately follows the introductory question seems to suggest, or at least would be well suited to a rhetorical thesis (see above, note 33). Furthermore, if Jerome's source is a thesis, it becomes easy to understand how Theophrastus can attack wives so polemically and unfairly. The attack is no more serious than Plato's speech in favor of the non-lover (*Phaedrus* 237B2-241D1). And much as Socrates has Plato deliver a palinode (243B5), so Theophrastus may have argued the other side and expressed himself in a way consistent with remarks attributed to him elsewhere, especially in Stobaeus' *Anthology* 3.3.42 (523 FHS&G = L84 F). See *Quellen* (above, note 35) 211-12, 256-7.

do many of the traits sketched by Theophrastus turn up in such speeches, but also Theophrastus' method of sketching superficial behavioral regularities has an important application. By way of illustration, we may consider the oration *Against Demosthenes*, which is almost certainly the work of Dinarchus, a pupil of Theophrastus (18 no.7 FHS&G) and a speechwriter of some, though by no means superior, merit.³⁸ The speech was written in 324 or more likely 323 B.C. for delivery by an unknown prosecutor who together with nine other men accused Demosthenes of accepting gold from Harpalus, a Macedonian noble, whose behavior in the East had got him into trouble and caused him to seek refuge in Athens. Harpalus had brought seven hundred talents to Athens and appears to have used half of this sum to win the favor of Demosthenes and other leading citizens. Demosthenes proposed that the Areopagus hold an inquiry and even suggested that he himself should be put to death if the Areopagus found him guilty. After six months the Areopagus did find Demosthenes guilty, and the case ended up before a jury of fifteen hundred Athenian citizens. Stratocles spoke first and was followed by the orator who delivered the speech written by Dinarchus.

Since the charge against Demosthenes was one of illegally receiving gold from Harpalus, it was to the prosecution's advantage to portray Demosthenes as one who would do nearly anything for profit. Dinarchus was fully aware of this, and in the speech under consideration he attributes to Demosthenes behavior which Theophrastus associates with avarice (*aischrokerdeia* 30) and meanness (*aneleutheria* 22). For example, remarks about Demosthenes' avaricious character (21, 108) and in particular his concern with money while on a public embassy (80) recall Theophrastus' avaricious man who turns a public trip to his own material advantage (30.7). Similarly, the picture of Demosthenes proposing that others contribute heavily, even to the point of melting down their wives' jewelry, and then personally contributing only fifty drachmas from houses in the Piraeus and in the city (69) seems to be a variation on (or intensification of) Theophrastus' mean man who stands up in the assembly as if to participate in a public contribution and then without saying anything leaves the gathering (22.3). Furthermore, Dinarchus does not hesitate to associate Demosthenes with vices that have no direct connection with money. For he realizes that when jurors think someone generally vicious, they are likely to think him capable of whatever crime happens to be under consideration. Hence Dinarchus emphasizes the cowardice of Demosthenes. His method is on occasion quite artful. He imagines Demosthenes claiming to have martialled the troops at Chaeronea and then retorts that Demosthenes alone deserted the ranks

³⁸ The attribution of the speech to Dinarchus was queried in antiquity by Demetrius of Magnesia (Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *On Dinarchus* 1) but the judgment of Demetrius is hardly decisive and certainly open to criticism. See A. Lesky, *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur*, 2nd ed. (Bern 1963) 657. On the relationship between Dinarchus and Theophrastus, see Immisch (above, note 4) 207-8.

(12, cf. 71). The effect conveyed is that of Demosthenes setting up and inviting his own humiliation. The technique is also known to Theophrastus, who first depicts the boaster bragging about his financial adventures and then adds that the boaster has only one drachma in his account (23.2). Dinarchus also draws an effective contrast between home and abroad. He charges Demosthenes first with deserting his post and making for home and then with offering himself as an envoy and abandoning the city when he should have stayed at home to face impending danger (81). At one point Dinarchus even gives the charge a Theophrastean ring: "Such is the man; among the battle lines he is a stay-at-home, among men at home an envoy and among envoys a runaway" (82). We are invited to think of Demosthenes as a thoroughgoing coward whose behavior varies according to the situation.

Sometimes oscillations in Demosthenes' behavior are explained by reference to cowardice, but on other occasions they are referred to a concern with personal profit. For example, redrafting legislation at each sitting of the assembly is explained by a series of financial deals (42). Similarly greed is introduced to explain Demosthenes' betrayal of the Thebans, whom he had visited and dined with during more fortunate days (21, 24). That suggests a subtle and more fundamental way in which Dinarchus' depiction of Demosthenes relates to Theophrastus' sketches: namely, in presenting typical pieces of behavior which are not tied to any particular deeper lying explanation. Demosthenes had proposed that the Areopagus investigate the Harpalus affair and had promised to abide by its decision, but when he was listed among those who took money, he changed his position and pleaded his case before a popular court. This particular shift is, of course, important to the prosecution (61-3), but it is in fact only one manifestation of a general shiftiness attributed to Demosthenes. According to Dinarchus, he is a *metaballomenos* (17, 94, 97), the sort of man who changes upward and downward (17), or to take a different metaphor, a kind of political chameleon who makes many and varied assertions but never says the same thing (91). All this is very Theophrastean, so that we need not be surprised to find Dinarchus offering a kind of mini-sketch.

For I omit the other instances of his continually changing policy and making unsound speeches;

and at one moment proposing a ban against belief in any god other than the traditional ones, at another moment saying that the people must not hesitate in regard to divine honors for Alexander;

when he is about to be tried before you, then impeaching Callimachon for conspiring with exiles in Megara to overthrow the democracy, and immediately on the spot revoking this impeachment;

at a recent meeting of the assembly, producing and preparing a false witness as if there were a plot against the docks, and on these matters proposing nothing, only furnishing charges for the present trial, for you are witnesses of all these things (94-5).

Dinarchus concludes this mini-sketch with a judgment not unlike the spurious

moralizing epilogues.³⁹ For our purposes, however, the important point is that Dinarchus lists fluctuations in the behavior of Demosthenes. The repeated use of the participle reminds one of Theophrastus' use of the infinitive, and the impression conveyed is that of an open-ended list. Dinarchus has described some typical acts without claiming completeness and without introducing a single motive which explains everything Demosthenes has done.

That is readily intelligible, for shiftiness in political life can be explained in a variety of ways: e.g., greed, cowardice and ambition. A clear understanding of this point will be of use to the rhetorician/orator. For once he realizes that an unattractive behavioral regularity can admit various explanations, he is likely to appreciate the possibility of first establishing a behavioral regularity and then slipping in motives, which may be quite unfair, but which are accepted uncritically because the behavioral regularity has been established and the imputed motives often (but not always) explain the regularity. Take boastfulness as an example. Theophrastus defines this character (*alazoneia*) as laying claim to goods not really possessed (23.1), and he depicts the boastful man as one who makes various exaggerated claims. In other words, he offers a behavioral regularity which is compatible with several different motives, including a concern with reputation, a desire for personal gain, a simple delight in pretension and an urge to make others laugh. The clever rhetorician will realize that the most effective way to blacken a man's character may be first to establish that he is a boaster and then to impute as many unattractive motives (e.g., an excessive concern with reputation and gain) as can be done plausibly.

This point is not made explicitly in the *Characters*, but I can imagine Theophrastus making it in his work *On Slander* (Diogenes Laertius 5.46 = 666 no.13 FHS&G). More cautiously, I can imagine Theophrastus making the point during his lectures on rhetoric and then referring to the *Characters* as a helpful source-book. Perhaps Dinarchus used the book when he studied under Theophrastus. Perhaps he reversed the teacher-student relationship and instructed Theophrastus by practical example. Whatever the truth here, we can I think assert the following. When Dinarchus presents Demosthenes as a *metaballomenos* and associates his alleged shiftiness with cowardice, avarice and in general a vicious character, he is proceeding in a Theophrastean manner.

³⁹ The judgment runs: "He is a juggler, men of Athens, and a brutal man, not entitled to be a citizen either by birth or by virtue of his political acts and deeds" (95). The mention of birth seems to refer to Scythian blood on the side of Demosthenes' mother (cf. 15) and to introduce a particular detail foreign to the spurious epilogues. But the general idea of being a juggler unworthy of citizenship is appropriate to the epilogues. It picks up and concludes the preceding characterization in much the same way that the epilogues attempt to pick up and pass judgment on the several pieces of behavior listed in a Theophrastean sketch.

V. COMPARISONS WITH ARISTOTLE'S *RHETORIC*

The *Characters* have been compared with several portions of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, and similarities have been claimed to support a connection with rhetoric.⁴⁰ The comparison is important and merits consideration. In particular, I want to focus on three portions of the Aristotelian treatise: the account of virtue and vice in 1.9, that of different characters in 2.12-19 and finally that of narration in 3.16.⁴¹ In doing this, I want to make clear that there are not only similarities but also significant differences, and that some portions of the *Rhetoric* are more closely related to the *Characters* than others.

The discussion of virtues and vices in *Rhetoric* 1.9 resembles the *Characters* in that it proceeds without any reference to the ethical doctrine of the mean. In addition, the definitions offered by both Aristotle and Theophrastus may appear hasty and incomplete when compared with corresponding definitions in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Take courage, for example. In the ethical treatise, Aristotle not only defines courage by reference to fear but also makes clear the kind of danger a courageous man endures (3.9 1115a29-35). In the *Rhetoric*, however, Aristotle proceeds more quickly. He does not specify a particular kind of danger, and he disposes of cowardice by merely asserting its opposition to courage (1366b11-13). Theophrastus' definition of cowardice is not very different. Fear is mentioned, but there is neither a specification of danger nor any other kind of qualification (25.1). These points of similarity between *Rhetoric* 1.9 and the *Characters* are real, but there is a striking difference. It is that Aristotle, unlike Theophrastus, argues deductively. He first defines the noble and on the basis of this definition argues that virtue is necessarily (*anankê* 1366a35) noble, for it is both good and praiseworthy. After that virtue is defined, and again the definition becomes the basis of a necessary conclusion: justice and courage are necessarily (1366b3) the greatest virtues, for they are the virtues most useful to others. This emphasis upon necessity is continued in the treatment of things productive of virtue and things which are signs or acts of virtue (1366b25, 29). It gives this portion of the *Rhetoric* a scientific air which is reminiscent of the *Posterior Analytics*⁴² and nowhere present in the *Characters*. Theophrastus works with the convenient but vague formula *toioutos tis hoios* and does not make explicit how the behavior listed in the sketches relates to the definition with which each sketch begins.⁴³

⁴⁰ See, e.g., Immisch (above, note 4) 210-12 and Furley (above, note 4) 56-60.

⁴¹ The account of the speaker's character in *Rhetoric* 1.2 and 2.1 has no close relationship to the *Characters* and therefore will not be discussed here. For a detailed discussion of these chapters, I refer to my article "Aristotle on Persuasion through Character," *Rhetorica* 10 (1992) 207-44.

⁴² See my "Aristotle's *Rhetoric* on Emotions," *Archiv für die Geschichte der Philosophie* 52 (1970) 51-3 and *Aristotle on Emotion* (London 1975) 12-16.

⁴³ S. Trenkner, *The Greek Novella in the Classical Period* (Cambridge 1958) 147,

Closer to the *Characters* seems to be the *Rhetoric's* account of dispositions typical of different ages and fortunes (2.12-19). This is especially true of Aristotle's account of old men, whose relationship to the *Characters* has been called upon to support the idea that Theophrastus' sketches are primarily concerned with men over fifty years of age.⁴⁴ In regard to details a relationship is undeniable. When Aristotle tells us that old men judge everything for the worse and are suspicious on account of distrust (2.13 1389b20-1), we are reminded of distrustfulness (18), which Theophrastus defines as a judgment of injustice against everyone (18.1). Similarly, the assertion that old men are mean or stingy and disdainful of reputation (1389b27, 1390a4-5) recalls meanness (22) and the definition of this trait as an absence of ambition where expense is involved (22.1). When Aristotle tells us that old men are indecisive and always adding words like "perhaps" and "maybe" (1389b18-19), he employs a mode of characterization which may be compared with Theophrastus' sketch of irony. For there the ironical man is presented as one who regularly uses expressions such as "I don't believe" and "I don't understand" (1.6).⁴⁵ But this relationship should not blind us to a significant difference. While Aristotle's remarks concerning indecisiveness are introduced by an explanation in terms of previous disappointments and mistakes (1389b14-16), Theophrastus' account of irony focuses upon surface manifestations and generally ignores such explanations. Similarly, when Aristotle associates old men with garrulity (1390a9-10), we may think of Theophrastus' like-named sketch (3), but while Aristotle ties garrulity to old age by offering a single explanation (old men live by memory and to remember is pleasant 1390a6-11), Theophrastus does not offer any explanation, let alone one tied to old age.

Aristotle's account of young men is of some interest in that it involves a formula suggestive of the *Characters*: namely, *hoioi* followed by the infinitive (2.12 1389a3, 9-10). But in this account, as in that of old men, Aristotle exhibits an unmistakable interest in explaining behavioral regularities. Consider youthful courage, shame and greatness of soul.⁴⁶ Aristotle names these dispositions without offering behavioral

describes the *Characters* as a "scientific, not a literary work." There is nothing wrong with this description, providing we are clear that the *Characters* is not scientific in the way that *Rhetoric* 1.9 is. Theophrastus offers illustrative examples (so Trenkner); he does not draw necessary conclusions. However, I cannot agree with Trenkner, when she says that each sketch "is made up of a number of episodes, any[one] of which would be enough by itself to describe the type." On the contrary many of the episodes (i.e., the pieces of behavior listed by Theophrastus) need interpretation; and in the absence of clear pointers indicating how particular episodes relate to the preceding definition, several illustrative episodes may be necessary to help us focus on the relevant aspect of an especially obscure episode.

⁴⁴ P. Steinmetz, "Der Zweck der Charaktere Theophrasts," *Annales Universitatis Saraviensis*, Phil. Fak. 8 (1959) 215.

⁴⁵ B. Boyce, *The Theophrastan Character in England* (Cambridge 1947) 12.

⁴⁶ The character of youth, like that of old age, is in fact a cluster of traits which

details. Instead, he focuses on the various factors—spirit and good expectation, beliefs and education, inexperience and a strong sense of personal worth—which together make up a more or less complete explanation of the dispositions in question (1389a26-33). Furthermore, in the case of courage Aristotle is prepared to recognize not only psychological but also physiological factors. He explains the courage of young people partly in terms of bodily heat, and he associates the cowardice of old men with the cooling that comes with age (1389b29-32).⁴⁷

Theophrastus' sketch of cowardice (25) has only the most superficial relationship to Aristotle's remarks on the cowardice of old age. Not only does it ignore physiological explanations, but it also depicts someone young enough to serve in the infantry (25.3). More importantly, Theophrastus' sketch is made up of two self-contained episodes. First there is the short account of frightened behavior at sea (25.2) and then the longer, more vivid account of cowardice in war (25.3-6). Both episodes seem ready made for rhetorical narrative, and that encourages relating the *Characters* to Aristotle's discussion of narrative in 3.16—the third portion of the *Rhetoric* on which I wish to focus. Here Aristotle insists that the narrative parts of a speech should depict both character and emotion (1417a15-16, 36). He refers the depiction of character to choice (1417a17-21) and to that which follows character, e.g., the fact that he was walking as he talked, for such behavior reveals rashness and boorishness of character (1417a21-3, cf. 3.7 1408a31-2). The mention of boorishness (*agroikia*) might recall Theophrastus' sketch of the same name (4), but the idea of talking and walking simultaneously has a closer parallel in the sketch of arrogance (*hyperêphania* 24), for there the arrogant man is shown arbitrating a dispute while walking (24.4). Whichever sketch we prefer, it seems clear that the *Characters* could be useful for the study of (or for the actual composition of) narrative passages in which character is depicted.

The *Characters* could also be of use to the rhetorician who wishes to narrate emotional behavior. For example, the sketch of superstition includes both sudden responses (16.8, 14) and manifestations that continue over an entire day (16.10). Such a sketch could enrich the student's understanding of emotional behavior and at the same time make clear that the Aristotelian distinction between narrative depicting character and narrative depicting emotion is not absolute. There are non-emotional characters such as boorishness (4) and lack of sense (6), but there are any number of characters for which the behavioral manifestation involves emotional

occur together in persons of a particular age.

⁴⁷ Similarly in discussing dispositions attributable to fortune, Aristotle is very much concerned with explaining why different sorts of men act the way they do. For example, he treats wealth as a kind of inclusive explanation that invites further specification. He tells us that men are affected by the possession of wealth (2.16 1390b32-4) and that the ostentation of wealthy individuals is attributable partly to the fact that all men busy themselves with what they love and partly to the belief that other men are eager for the same things (1391a4-7).

response. Superstition is one and cowardice is another. The latter is actually defined by reference to fear (25.1) and its two episodes are ready material for narration expressing emotional character. In the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle speaks of narrated actions depicting courage (1416b23-4). Replace this virtue with the opposing vice and we have a direct relation to Theophrastus' sketch of cowardice. The episodes at sea and in war (25.2, 3-6) are materials for the narration of cowardice conceived of as a character tied to emotional response.

VI. ETHICS, POETICS AND RHETORIC

We have now considered the *Characters* in relation to rhetorical instruction, actual practice and the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle. In concluding this paper, I want to suggest that Theophrastus' interest in behavioral regularities apart from motivating beliefs and desires may be part of a larger development within the Peripatos—one that concerns not only rhetoric but also ethics and poetics.

In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle makes clear why he thinks choice important. A poor man fails to make gifts because he lacks the necessary funds (10.8 1178a28-9); in contrast, a rich man may make them for quite selfish reasons. He does what is correct, but he is not generous, for generosity involves making gifts because giving is noble (4.1 1120a24, 4.2 1120a28-9). That is why Aristotle thinks choice a better test of character than action (3.4 1111b6), and why his discussion of virtue and vice includes repeated reference to beliefs and motives. In this regard, it may be instructive to consider obsequiousness (*areskeia*) and flattery (*kolakeia*). These two dispositions are treated together in the *Nicomachean Ethics* and distinguished by reference to motivating beliefs. The obsequious man is said to believe that one should not interact in an unpleasant manner (4.12 1126b12-14); he aims at being pleasant (4.12 1127a7-8), and therefore differs from the flatterer who is said to act for his own advantage (2.7 1108a28-9, 4.12 1127a8-10). This way of distinguishing between two closely related dispositions is in itself unobjectionable, but it is not what we find in either the *Eudemian Ethics* or the *Magna Moralia*. Both works separate obsequiousness from flattery and treat it together with self-will and dignity, of which the latter is a paradigm behavioral regularity.⁴⁸ In the *Eudemian Ethics*, these dispositions are explicitly said to be "without choice" (3.7 1234a25), and the obsequious man is described quite superficially as one who shows regard for another in all matters and is inferior to all (3.7 1233b36-7). In the *Magna Moralia*, there is no clear statement concerning choice. But the status of the three dispositions is questioned (1.32 1193a37), and the obsequious man is characterized without reference to beliefs or desires. He is said to interact with all men in all ways and in all circumstances (1.28 1192b34-5).

⁴⁸ Concerning self-will see my, "Die Charaktere Theophrasts" (above, note 11) 74-5. Much of what I say here is argued more fully in the earlier article.

Theophrastus' sketch of obsequiousness is very much in line with the *Eudemian Ethics* and the *Magna Moralia*. The trait is defined as interaction which provides pleasure without consideration of what is best (5.1) and the subsequent sketch presents a picture of one who greets others from afar, gives compliments, makes contact with both hands, accompanies another on his way and asks when they will see each other again (5.2). We are not told what underlies and explains these actions. Certainly nothing is said that marks off the obsequious man from the flatterer, nor is that to be expected. For Theophrastus is concerned with a behavioral regularity that is compatible with various motives. In this regard, he is closer to the *Eudemian Ethics* and the *Magna Moralia* than to the *Nicomachean Ethics*. It would be hasty to assert that the *Eudemian Ethics* and the *Magna Moralia* are later than the *Nicomachean Ethics* and that both are influenced by the work of Theophrastus including his *Characters*. But it can at least be pointed out that treating obsequiousness together with self-will and dignity found acceptance in the post-Aristotelian Peripatos (Stobaeus, *Anthology* 2.7.25 vol.2 p.146.8-9 Wachsmuth), and that the *Characters* may have encouraged Peripatetics of the second generation to focus on traits that are only loosely or not at all tied to choice.

In regard to poetics, our Aristotelian sources are not so numerous. Instead of three separate works, only one half of a short treatise on *Poetics* survives. That portion does, however, allow us to say that Aristotle associated tragic character with choice (6 1450b8-10, 15 1454a17-19). The association is understandable, for Aristotle not only conceived of the tragic figure as a person of good or better character (2 1448a18, 15 1454b9), but also held that good choice shows good character (15 1454a19). Since the second book of the *Poetics* is lost, we cannot be certain how Aristotle analyzed comic character, but he may well have argued for a connection with choice. Some of his remarks in the first book suggest a treatment parallel to that of tragic character (2 1448a1-18),⁴⁹ and a standard comic figure like that of the miser would encourage a connection with choice.⁵⁰ Nevertheless comedy, especially that of Menander, is full of figures who exhibit behavioral regularities apart from deeper lying beliefs and motives. The cook, for example, is a talkative figure, whose behavior is funny not least because it seems quite unmotivated. Similarly, the excitable soldier exhibits a behavioral regularity,

⁴⁹ In chapter 2, Aristotle works with a division of character into virtue and vice (1448a3-4); but later in chapter 4, he introduces a qualification: comedy is concerned not with all vice, but with the "ugly" (1449a34). The qualification is important and was probably developed more fully in the second book of the treatise.

⁵⁰ I am thinking especially of the miser whose love of money has progressed so far that he has come to value money for its own sake. A clear example is Smikrines in Menander's *Aspis*. He is a lover of money (123), who calls gain through plunder noble (33) and has no other interest than the possession of property (119-20). See my "Theophrast über den komischen Charakter," *Rheinisches Museum* 124 (1981) 249-51, on which I am drawing here.

impetuosity, that may go unexplained.⁵¹ In connection with such characters, it should be noticed that the *Tractatus Coislinianus* elucidates comic character by mentioning buffoonery, irony and boastfulness (p.79.24 Vahlen). The date of this Peripatetic document is debatable, but I think the second or first century B.C. reasonable.⁵² For our purposes, the important point is that the three character traits mentioned in the *Tractatus* are separated from choice in the *Eudemian Ethics* (3.7 1234a25), and two of them, irony and boastfulness, are presented as behavioral regularities in the *Characters* (1 and 23). My suggestion is that a Peripatetic concern with superficial character traits is reflected in the *Characters*, and that this concern not only determined the analysis offered in the *Eudemian Ethics* but also led to a new (or clearer) conception of comic character in terms of superficial regularities. I would like to believe that Theophrastus actually formulated such an notion of comic character in one of his writings on poetics (666 no.20-2 FHS&G) and that his *Characters* influenced the plays of Menander. But it is equally possible, perhaps more likely, that Menander influenced Theophrastus.

Returning now to rhetoric, we can, I think, ask whether the *Characters* might have been a welcome supplement to Aristotle's treatment of narration. For there as elsewhere in the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle tends to associate character with choice (3.16 1417a17-27, cf. 1.8 1366a14-16 and 2.21 1395b13-14). This is not to overlook the fact that he mentions talking while walking and points out a connection with rashness and boorishness (1417a22-3); but his remarks are extremely brief and squeezed between two references to choice. In what precedes, he tells us that choice and the chosen goal give character its peculiar quality (1417a17-21); and in what follows, he distinguishes between speaking from thought and from choice. The former is associated with practical wisdom and considerations of advantage, the latter with moral goodness and what is better and noble (1417a24-7). That is the fundamental dichotomy of Aristotle's ethical thought,⁵³ and it is certainly relevant to a discussion of narration. But it does not exhaust the subject and should not be allowed to obscure

⁵¹ In the third act of Menander's *Samia*, the cook is clearly talkative, but his character goes unexplained. Similarly in the *Perikeiromene*, Polemon is from beginning to end an impetuous person. His character trait may be a matter of temperament, but such an explanation is never clearly stated. On these two figures see "Theophrast über den komischen Charakter" (above, note 50) 248-9; and for a more detailed discussion of Polemon, see "Menander's *Perikeiromene*: Misfortune, Vehemence and Polemon," *Phoenix* 28 (1974) 430-43.

⁵² I am not inclined to follow Richard Janko, *Aristotle on Comedy* (Berkeley 1984) who wants to trace the *Tractatus* back to Aristotle's *Poetics* 2. See my review of Janko in *Classical Philology* 81 (1986) 156-64; on the three traits of character listed in the *Tractatus*, see 163-4.

⁵³ See my "Uno modo di affrontare la distinzione fra virtù etica e saggezza in Aristotle," *Museum Patavinum* 5 (1987) 243-58, reprinted in English translation with some abbreviation as "Aristotle's Distinction between Moral Virtue and Practical Wisdom" in *Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy IV, Aristotle*, ed. J. Anton and A. Preus (Buffalo 1991) 97-106.

other distinctions which may be equally important for instruction in rhetorical narration. One of these distinctions is that between superficial regularities and the deeper lying beliefs which motivate and explain them. It is, I think, quite possible that Theophrastus and other members of the post-Aristotelian Peripatos recognized the importance of this distinction and therefore introduced into rhetorical instruction the study and composition of sketches like those contained in the *Characters*. That would harmonize well with developments in Peripatetic ethics and poetics as I have imagined them. But whatever the truth concerning the Peripatos, we can say that later rhetoricians did well to include the sketches of Theophrastus within their teaching materials. They provided themselves and their pupils with an instructive reference work and at the same time preserved for subsequent generations a series of sketches that continue to make the reader smile and even laugh aloud.⁵⁴

⁵⁴ This paper was written at the University of the Saarland, Saarbrücken, Germany, during a period of research, November 1992 through May 1993, supported by the Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung. I am grateful to the Stiftung for its support and to both the faculty and staff of the University for exceptionally warm collegiality. Earlier versions of the paper were read in Paris, Ravenna and Bologna on March 20 and May 11 and 12, 1992 respectively. I want to thank Professors Bernard Besnier, Gualtiero Calboli and Lucia Calboli-Montefusco for inviting me to read my paper and also for comments and criticisms made on those occasions. I would also like to thank Drs. Robert Sharples and David Mirhady, both of whom read and commented on versions of this paper.

3

Period and Colon: Theory and Example in Demetrius and Longinus

Doreen C. Innes

I investigate here some aspects of the use of quotations and comparisons in the theory of the period and colon in post-Aristotelian rhetoric.¹ I examine an author who shows the evident influence of Aristotle, Demetrius, *On Style*,² and an author on whom Peripatetic influence will be no more than that inevitable in any later critic, Longinus, *On the Sublime*.³ Theoretical analysis of period and colon is often rather vague; some important specific terminology may in itself be imprecise (e.g. does *katestrammenē* describe a 'twist off' or a 'turn back' on itself at the end of the period?), and even key ideas such as 'completion' and 'rounding' may be more exactly illuminated by the choice of example. I look particularly at ways in which quotation and comparison serve to amplify and replace rather than merely illustrate the theory. These seem methods of criticism which arose later than Aristotle, though within a general tradition of the use of quotations which was probably established by him.

¹ Texts on colon and period: esp. A. *Rh.* 3.9; Demetrius, esp. 1-35; *Ad Her.* 4.19.26 ff.; Cic. *De Or.* 3.171 ff. and *Orat.* 164 ff.; D.H. esp. *C.V.* (scattered refs., esp. 7-9, 18-19, 22-6); Long. 40; Qu. 9.4.22 and 122 ff. (strongly influenced by Cicero), and 11.3.35 ff.; Hermog. 173-83 Rabe; *R.G.* 3.27-8 Sp. (perhaps influenced by Demetrius, as is 3.110 ff.); and 1.395 Sp.-H.; in general Lausberg 912-47, D.M. Schenkeveld, *Studies in Demetrius On Style* (1964), pp. 23-50. See also my unpublished Oxford D. Phil. thesis, 'Introduction and Commentary on the *Peri Hermēneias* ascribed to Demetrius of Phaleron,' 1967, esp. pp. 54-83.

² I abbreviate as D. Note his praise of Aristotle's definition (11); save in allowing more than two cola (34-5), D. considers himself in agreement with Aristotle. He also shows Peripatetic influence elsewhere in the work, e.g. 116.

³ I abbreviate as L. He has only one reference to Aristotle and Theophrastus—a traditional point on the simile (32.3).

I: ARISTOTLE

I shall not investigate here in any detail Aristotle's theory of the period (he shows little interest in the colon). It has been the subject of much debate, but I support the view that he defines the period in *Rh.* 3.9 not by rhythm (in the form of identifiable metrical rhythms at its beginning and end; this is the subject of *Rh.* 3.8), but by specific patterned structures of thought: 'a syntactic structure with an inner cohesion produced by the logical pre-planned arrangement of its parts according to the requirements of the whole' (R.L. Fowler).⁴

To summarise, Aristotle follows his favoured method of *diæresis*: he successively offers two divisions, only one of which is of real interest to him, the second of those I list. He first divides speech into the archaic unperiodic style (*eiromenē*), and the periodic style (*katestrammenē*), which has a beginning, an end and a size which is easily grasped; it has number, *arithmos*⁵, and thought and periodic form end together (unlike the ambiguous enjambment which he presents in an example from tragedy). Secondly, he subdivides the period into the single-colon period and the two-colon 'divided' period (*diëirēmenē*), which he then thirdly subdivides into what is merely divided (*diëirēmenē*), and into what is also antithetical. Only now are positive examples introduced (I accept that Hdt. 1.1 illustrating the unperiodic style is an interpolation at 1409a27-8⁶), but Aristotle's preference for the antithetical period is clear from the fact that there is only one example of the merely divided in contrast to a whole series illustrating the antithetical. He begins

⁴ R.L. Fowler, 'Aristotle on the Period', *C.Q.* 32 (1982) 89-99 (similarly my thesis, *l.c.*, pp. 66 ff.). Scholars in favour of rhythm: J. Zehetmeier, 'Die Periodenlehre des Aristoteles', *Phil.* 85 (1930) 192-208, 255-84, 414-36, supported by Schenkeveld, *l.c.* The examples are a prime indicator: they have obvious structure, and no conspicuous paeonic rhythm (no example of paeon at both beginning and end, only a few at beginning or end). T. Adamik, 'Aristotle's Theory of the Period', *Phil.* 128 (1984) 184-201, indicates support for Zehetmeier and Schenkeveld, but sees a combined need for rhythm and structure; he usefully emphasises the need to examine Aristotle's examples closely.

⁵ *Arithmos* of symmetrical proportion, not metrical rhythm: see Fowler, *l.c.*, p. 92. The term itself has a wide definition, cf. *A. Met.* 1020a13 *plēthos men to peperasmenon arithmos*, 'number is delimited plurality'. *Rhuthmos* can be similarly used also of structure—see Demetrius 6, 20, 245, Hermog. 178 Rabe—as can other vocabulary of metre, e.g. *hedrai hedraios*.

⁶ A single colon cannot illustrate the unperiodic 'strung together' style; if the quotation is genuine, Aristotle includes the succeeding clauses, yet these do in fact fit together. Moreover in Demetrius 17 the same single long colon illustrates the single-colon period (see note 40). Peripatetics might and did re-use quotations to different purposes—good instance in Eur. *Fr.* 515 Nauck, used to illustrate misleading enjambment in *A. Rh.* 1409b10, inappropriate emotional interjection in Praxiphanes (*Fr.* 13 Wehrli = Demetrius 58)—but the same example used for contradictory purposes would be surprising, especially in view of D.'s close following of Aristotle. Elsewhere he re-uses an example from Aristotle for a different but compatible point (divided period in *Rh.* 1409b34, assonance in Demetrius 25).

with a sequence of examples from Isocrates, *Panegyricus*, and he identifies symmetrically parallel clauses with antithesis and assonance (*parisa* and *homoioteleuton*).

On this interpretation the theories of later rhetoric are essentially in accord with Aristotle in emphasising the importance of thought (*dianoia*). But there are differences and amplifications: Aristotle recognises only symmetrically paired structures, later critics find these tedious if used continuously (and may prefer to classify them under figures, the so-called Gorgianic figures); hyperbaton or suspension of thought becomes more central,⁷ the favoured exemplar becomes Demosthenes⁸ and the number of cola goes beyond Aristotle's maximum of two (usually up to four⁹); the single-colon period is a historical curiosity preserved only by its recognition in Aristotle; there is greater interest in the colon itself, and to a minor degree the comma (not identified by Aristotle), including attempts to quantify their length metrically or in syllabic or word count; types of period are further identified according to their greater or lesser degree of concentrated compression (e.g. the triad of philosophical, historical and rhetorical periods in Demetrius 19-21); and there is new terminology, such as the 'circle', *kuklos*.

In his use of quotations Aristotle almost always quotes from existing authors, and models invented by him are rare.¹⁰ Cope/Sandys contrast Anaximenes (only 18.15, 1433b12, Eur. *Phil. Fr.* 797 Nauck), so Aristotle may well have been crucial in establishing the usual later tradition of selecting rather than inventing examples. Later critics also similarly use quotations from a variety of authors, including poetry.¹¹ It also remains usual to quote very brief examples, and some of Aristotle's specific examples became traditional.¹² One major difference, however, is that

⁷ See further II (ii) below, on the period in D.

⁸ The implications of the change of model from Isocrates to Demosthenes are far-reaching and outside the limits of this paper. But note that Demosthenes is already a model for all styles by at least the mid 1st century B.C., as we see from Cicero (e.g. *Orat.* 6).

⁹ Maximum of four: Demetrius 16, Cic. *Orat.* 221-2; implicitly or as regular maximum cf. Hermog. 180 Rabe. Explicitly more than four: Qu. 9.4.125 (but four is the ideal mean for *plena comprehensio*), Aquila, *R.L.M.* 28 Halm; one, two, three or more *R.G.* 2.507 Sp.

¹⁰ See E.M. Cope, *An Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric*, 1867, p. 414 and Cope-Sandys, Vol. III, pp. 56-7, on 1407a26 ff. Add that Aristotle's invented examples also seem generalised *types* of arguments, lacking specific detail. In an apparent exception, 1417a3-4, the detail of children is required to lead up to the following reference to Hdt. 2.30.4.

¹¹ See Helen North, 'The Use of Poetry in the Training of the Ancient Orator', *Traditio* 8 (1952) 1 ff.; cf. Caplan, Loeb ed. of *Ad Herennium*, p. 242: 'The theory and practice of presenting examples from a variety of sources were doubtless Peripatetic.' He also rightly links the dispute on whether to present a single or varied models (e.g. Cic. *De Or.* 2.90-3) to the concern with *imitatio*—not a concern of Aristotle and barely present in D. (though note 112-13).

¹² E.g. anaphora of Nireus in Hom. *Il.* 2.671 ff.: see *Rh.* 1414a3-7, Demetrius 61-2, Hermog. 424 Rabe, *R.G.* 3.21 Sp., Ps.Plut. *Vit.Hom.* 33 (cf. also scholia and Eustathius

Aristotle freely quotes from contemporaries (all the more significant, therefore, that he neglects Demosthenes), while later critics under the influence of classicism almost always cite recognised authorities from the past.¹³ We have little in the way of ancient evidence evaluating the use of quotations,¹⁴ but an interesting exception is the Preface to *Ad Herennium* IV, where the author polemically defends his own intention to use new (Roman) examples¹⁵ contrary to the Greek custom which was to rely on *auctoritas antiquorum*, citing from a variety of authors in prose or poetry but from someone already tried and tested. Latin critics are at first a partial exception to this classicising, but the strength of the Greek tradition is seen in the endemic aim to establish equivalent 'classic' models in Latin—e.g. Cicero cites himself, or Quintilian quotes Cicero and Virgil, just as Greek critics quote Demosthenes and Homer. Given this homogeneous tradition, no specific Peripatetic use of quotation is likely. What we may hope to find are modifications to Aristotelian practice in new or amplified ways of using examples, in general use or idiosyncratically within a particular author. For example, in discussions of word-arrangement later critics make much greater use of the tool of metathesis, the re-writing of passages,¹⁶ and Dionysius unusually offers some very lengthy extracts, some with detailed analysis (e.g. of Pindar and Thucydides in *C.V.* 22).

As far as the use of comparisons is concerned, Aristotle in his *Rhetoric* and *Poetics* already follows the tradition of the textbook generally, where they are a regular tool of criticism, chosen from familiar and usually traditional material. In later literary criticism we can merely distinguish critics who follow Aristotle in using them for their primary purpose of clarity (e.g. Demetrius, *Ad Herennium*), from those with more stylistic polish, who intend a decorative as well as didactic function (e.g. Cicero, Dionysius, Longinus).¹⁷ Demetrius, as a writer in the plain 'textbook'

ad loc.). Inevitably the later dominance of Demosthenes in prose examples means that most of the examples inherited from Aristotle are from poetry, especially Homer.

¹³ The Second Sophistic adds some later examples: Hermogenes and Menander Rhetor cite *hoi neōteroi*, Aristides, Dio, and Nicostratus. Long. 12.4 unusually includes Cicero, presumably stimulated by Caecilius' earlier comparison of Demosthenes and Cicero (Plut. *Dem.* 3).

¹⁴ For concern (*en passant*) against over-reliance on examples, see Long. 1.2 (attacking Caecilius), Hermog. 222 Rabe.

¹⁵ In practice many of the examples are translations or close equivalents of standard Greek examples, e.g. 4.25.34 the figure *klimax* from Dem. 18.179, as in e.g. Demetrius 270, Qu. 9.3.54-5 (*exemplum ex Graeco notissimo*), R.G. 3.72 Sp. Other instances in Loeb footnotes.

¹⁶ See N.A. Greenberg, 'Metathesis as an Instrument in the Criticism of Poetry', *T.A.P.A.* 89 (1958) 262-70.

¹⁷ Comparisons: see on Cicero, *De Oratore*, E. Fantham, *Comparative Studies in Republican Latin Imagery*, 1972, 137 ff.; on Dionysius, H. Greilich, *Dionysius Halicarnassensis quibus potissimum vocabulis ex artibus metaphoricis ductis in scriptis rhetoricis usus est*, 1886; on Quintilian, G. Assfahl, *Vergleich und Metapher bei Quintilian*, 1932.

style, is perhaps unusual in the sheer number of his comparisons.¹⁸

II: DEMETRIUS

I turn now to some 'hidden' theory implied by the quotations and comparisons in the account of sentence-structure in D. I take this to be a deliberate method of anticipation or amplification. Alternatively he is simply reproducing material from a source which had a fuller account, where my supposed 'hidden' theory was explicit. This approach convicts D. of ineptness, yet he is an author who elsewhere shows care in the selection of apt quotations¹⁹ and comparisons, and though D. does not himself seem to use it, we do have firm evidence in other critics for another form of 'hidden' allusion, in which the theory is also itself the example.²⁰ I hope to show sufficient evidence for a deliberate tool of criticism in at least some of my examples—and one whose use in at least one other earlier literary critic²¹ gives

¹⁸ Comparisons in textbook style critics:

A. *Rh.* III.1-12 (on style) dominant analogy with poetry, e.g. III.1; add also music (esp. III.8), painting (once, 1414a8), racing (1409a32 ff., 1409b21 ff.), wine (1404b21), purple clothing (1405a8);

If we add III.13-19 (on structure), note again poetry and music (III.14), also roads (1414b21), and the body (1415b8, 1419b22).

Demetrius: poetry (e.g. 1, 204, 251), sculpture (14), painting (76), architecture and building (12-13, 14, 33, 55, 108), music (71, 74), acting (58), mythology (189), religion (101), morality (114, 119), roads (11, 47, 202, 246), running (11, 197, 248), food and drink (15, 62), clothes (100, 2108), the body (2), animals and plants (8, 9, 55, 261, 296), wax (296).

Ad Herennium IV: other than in the Preface only four examples, all of the body: 4.10.15 (tumours of swollen style), 4.19.26 and 4.28.38 (repeated wounding), 4.45.59 (he can select no example, because it is like blood spread over the whole body).

Hermog. *De Id.*: rare, but note examples of poetry, body, and a general like an orator (166, 296-7, 369 Rabe).

¹⁹ For the need of skill in the selection of examples, cf. *Ad Her.* 4.2.3 (in rebuttal of the claim). Note also the unusual range of authors quoted in D., and for evidence of skill in deploying material to fit his own context and needs, note cross-references to his theory of four styles (36 ff.) in his preliminary account of sentence-theory (1-35), e.g. grandeur of long cola (5), forcefulness of short cola (7).

²⁰ See note 44 below.

²¹ Keeping to textbook style critics, I have trawled very few further 'punning' examples of the type discussed in II. (ii) below.

A. *Rh.* III: deliberate 'pun' at end of whole work, an epilogue example which is also his own epilogue: a probable adaptation of the end of Lysias 12 to its new context (there are omissions and substitution of *krinate* for the now inappropriate *dikazete*, 'judge as jury'; obviously a special case).

Ad Her. IV: no example?

Hermog. *De Id.*: perhaps a few: the most likely, in 244 Rabe, is discussed in note 37 below, and a further two are more probably coincidence: in 278 Rabe whole and part are illustrated by Dem. 19.217, which begins 'but a whole'; in 270 Rabe *trachutēs*, harshness

some precedence for its more ambitious manipulation by Longinus.

II. (i) *Colon and comma.*

The triad of comma (phrase), colon (clause) and period is standard in later critics (already Phldm. *Rh.* 1.165 Sudhaus, *Ad Her.* 4.19.26), but the comma is of little conceptual interest, differing from the colon in length, not nature.²² D. therefore logically begins with the colon (1-8), adding (9) the comma in what is explicitly a traditional definition, 'shorter than a colon'. Compare D.H. *C.V.*, where Dionysius first identifies colon and period (*C.V.* 2, 7 U-R), but then later uses the term comma, *C.V.* 26, 136 U-R 'commata ... shorter than cola'.

D. does, however, already allude to the comma implicitly in 1-8 by his use of quotation and comparison. He begins with a comparison to poetry (1): prose is articulated by cola as poetry is by metres such as hexameters and half-metres, *hēmimetrois* (cf. 180 'whole or half-metres', also below on examples in 5). Spengel conjectured *trimetrois*, accepted by Zehetmeier and Primmer.²³ This is unnecessary: the meaning is natural, even though it elsewhere describes a liquid half-measure (Suda, rest. *I.G.* 4.523). It is also more pointed, adding a neat allusion to the comma, which is sometimes defined as *half* a colon.²⁴ Add that D. recognises the criterion of metrical length for cola when he recommends use of 'trimeter lengths and sometimes commata' (205)—implying that the comma is less than a trimeter. His quotations of long and short clauses also fit a recognition of metrical criteria, and he develops the parallel of cola and metres in 5: the long clause is compared to the hexameter, the maximum metrical length, while short clauses are like short metres, the quotations being a hemiepes (= *half*-hexameter) and two dimeters. So elsewhere the longest colon is a hexameter²⁵ and the comma is delimited by

of style, is illustrated by 'a fearsome (*deinon*) disease ...' (Dem. 19.259): but Hermogenes does not here use *deinos* of style (it would conflict with his own later definition of *deinotēs*): contrast Demetrius 280, for the same quotation where it can aptly illustrate also *deinotēs* of style (cf. B.(ii).(A)).

²² Definition of comma: cf. Hermog. 184 Rabe 'an arrangement of thought smaller than a colon', *R.G.* 3.28 Sp. 'what is less than a period and colon', *R.G.* 1.193 Sp.-H. 'the smallest part of a period', *R.G.* 2.507 Sp. 'part of a colon'. According to Qu. 9.4.122 most called it *pars membri*. In D. it may, since it is a short colon (cf. note 27), be either an independent sentence (as in the examples in 9) or part of a complex (as in 10, 208): for explicit recognition of the two kinds, cf. *R.G.* 2.507 and 3.28 Sp.

²³ If *hēmimetrois* were rejected, Spengel's *trimetrois* has attractions: it would give hexameter and trimeter not as any two standard metres (as e.g. Pl. *Leg.* 810e) but implicitly the maximum and minimum lengths for the colon (see notes 25 and 26 below)—and imply a different term (comma) for what is less than the trimeter.

²⁴ Cf. *R.G.* 1.193 Sp.-H. (the comma is 2 or 3 words) 'and the colon is double that, with, as it were, a share in two limbs'.

²⁵ Longest colon a hexameter: e.g. Cic. *Orat.* 222, Hermog. 184 Rabe, *R.G.* 3.113 Sp.; cf. period as maximum of four hexameters (e.g. Cic. *Orat.* 221).

maximum of three feet, dimeter or epode.²⁶

This covert inclusion by *hēmimetrois* of the comma in 1 is almost immediately reinforced. The colon (2) is 'a complete whole or complete part of a whole'.²⁷ We are asked to compare the hand, which is itself a whole with its own subsidiary whole parts such as fingers and wrist—and these parts themselves have their own subsidiary whole parts (no example is given). Again, the text is acceptable, and the last subdivision, unnecessary for D.'s present argument, implies the comma, the parallel but unstated subdivision of the colon.

Since colon is literally 'limb' (cf. Lat. *membrum*), comparison to parts of the body is apt and traditional, esp. Qu. 9.4.123 'membrum autem est sensus numeris conclusus, sed a toto corpore abruptus et per se nihil efficiens ... ut per se manus et pes et caput'.²⁸ It is elsewhere clearer than in D. that the hand is itself a part (of the body). Outside sentence-theory we find recognition that such parts incorporate still further parts, like the finger (*R.G.* 7.1033 Walz), and the still further subdivision that the finger itself has parts, e.g. Qu. 7.10.7 'ut pars hominis est manus, eius digiti, illorum quoque articuli'—and here we should note that Latin *articulus*

D. implies this limit by comparison of long cola to Homer's *Iliad* (i.e. hexameter) in contrast to the short metres of Archilochus and Anacreon (5): compare comma in metrical theory (e.g. *G.L.* 6 607 Keil, of Archilochus). The two examples from Archilochus aptly illustrate invective, so they also silently parallel and anticipate the aptness of short prose cola for forcefulness (7-8). D.'s skill in (silently) selecting varied examples may be further seen: of the two from Archilochus, one is covert, the other open invective; and the contrast of long heroic and short metres comes to its climax with the third example, a sympotic dimeter from Anacreon: Archilochus may have resemblances with Homer (*Long.* 13.3), but Anacreon's dissolute image as the drunk old man gives a neat polar contrast to the Homeric hero in battle.

²⁶ Cf. Cic. *Orat.* 222 'singulis ... plerumque binis, et utrisque addi pars pedis potest, non fere ternis amplius'; Hermog. 184 Rabe 'the comma ... or colon equal to an epode'. Some critics define by syllabic count, but this to a large extent coincides with metrical count: cf. Hermog. 182-3 Rabe, distinguishing colon from comma solely by number of syllables, so that the colon is seven or more syllables 'approaching already the trimeter' (cf. Apsines in *R.G.* 7.931 Walz).

We also find definition by number of words, 2 or 3 words, as in *R.G.* 1.193 Sp.-H. quoted in note 24 above. This criterion can also fit D.'s examples, but metrical criteria are what he explicitly uses (esp. 208).

²⁷ No exact parallel for this definition, but it is neatly concise and logical rather than original. The bifurcated type of definition may be Peripatetic: Archedemus 'improves' Aristotle to define the colon as 'a whole or part of a period' (Demetrius 34). Elsewhere it is defined either as a completed thought (but the examples make it clear that it includes colon as part of a period, e.g. Hermog. 180 Rabe) or as part of a period, as in the Latin tradition and presumably a product of preoccupation with the period, e.g. *Ad Her.* 4.19.26, Qu. 9.4.123. Comutus, *R.G.* 1.395 Sp.-H. defines it as part of a period, then adds: 'or, as some say, the colon encompasses (is the *perigraphē* of) a thought.'

²⁸ Body/speech analogy: so already Pl. *Phdr.* 264c; cf. *Long.* 40.1 discussed in detail in III below.

= comma (e.g. Cic. *De Or.* 3.186 *articulis membrisque*)—and Sext. *Emp. Adv. Gramm.* 1.137 'parts of a man are hands, of hands fingers and of fingers fingernails.'

D. may well therefore be dealing with traditional material, and we may 'fill out' his schema: I: 'comma = fingernail', II: 'colon = finger'. Since D. refers to the hand, and the period is a complex of cola, it would similarly logically follow that there is another suppressed comparison, III: 'period = hand'. Finally, if the hand too is a whole part of a whole, we may continue the equation, IV: 'prose = body', since the initial premiss is that it is prose (1) which is divided by cola.

Note finally the potential value of the quotation: the example of the colon as a complete whole part (3) is Xen. *Anab.* 1.1, which has two cola: (a) 'Darius and Parysatis had children', (b) 'the older Artaxerxes, the younger Cyrus': it is probably no accident that the second colon breaks into two *half*-cola or commata. The comma is silently included. The same sentence thus illustrates comma, colon and period (in 19 it illustrates the historical period). D.'s models for the colon in 2-3 are in fact peculiarly apt: the opening sentence of two very contrasting historians, the archaic, unperiodic Hecataeus (cf. 12) and the classical, periodic Xenophon (cf. 19): in the former the colon is an isolated whole (so in sequence fittingly unperiodic), in the latter two complete whole parts (which in combination form a period).

One final detail on the Xenophon: D.'s quotation (also his paraphrase) omits *duo*, the final word of the first colon. It is correctly quoted in *R.G.* 2.541 Sp., but note Luc. *Hist. Conscr.* 23, all the right words but in the wrong word-order, the result of a memory slip. Here too in D. there may just be a memory slip, but it is a rare case where there may be deliberate misquotation to make the quotation fit the theory better. The first colon is said to illustrate a complete thought, and the thought is indeed complete at 'had children'. The inclusion of 'two' introduces a forward pointer to the second colon, which identifies the two.²⁹ Another comparable example of what may be deliberate omission appears in the example of the period (in 10, 20, 245), Dem. *Lept.* 1.1, where the opening isolated phrase, 'gentlemen of the jury' is lacking, though it is known to D. since it appears in the version which is rewritten to be unperiodic (11): the omission reinforces the stress on the fact that from the beginning the period has signals of complexity of structure—as a sentence beginning *malista men heineka* conspicuously does.

²⁹ Cf. H.V. Apfel, *Literary quotations and allusions in Demetrius Peri Hermēneias* and Longinus *Peri Hypsous*, 1935, p. 37.

The preparatory 'two' produces what Hermog. 238 Rabe terms 'what is limited collectively', so that the reader 'knows in advance that the second will follow', cf. 279 Rabe with example from Dem. 18.3.

³⁰ The vocative phrase appears in Hermog. 99 Rabe, *R.G.* 2.507 Sp, but may be deliberately omitted in 287 Rabe, where it is quoted to illustrate a type of anticipation of complex structure. See further below note 38 on this quotation as an example of period.

II. (ii) *Period and Colon*:

D. on occasion makes deliberate choice of a quotation which includes vocabulary reflecting the theory, so that the example to some extent becomes also a punning image. I suggest some applications to illuminate his view of the period.

(A) *Preliminaries*:

But first a word of warning. This kind of echo may arise accidentally from appropriate subject-matter in the quotation. For example, words of fierceness, such as *deinos*: a certain object or action may be recommended as fearsome, and the adjective 'fearsome' may appear in the accompanying quotation, as in D.H. C.V. 16 where two examples include *deinos* (and another two similarly *smerdaleos* and *obrimos*). So it is only if D. can be shown to use the procedure deliberately elsewhere that we may recognise it also when (208) a quotation including 'a fearsome disease', *nosēma deinon*, illustrates *deinotēs* of style,³¹ and perhaps when (129, 136) two examples of the charm of dignified beauty include *kalos*, and (89) a 'noble hound' is described in an example of grandeur. But it would be perverse to argue that in 61 the triple anaphora of Nireus in Hom. *Il.* 2.671 ff. is linked to a 'punning' reference that we remember him though he has only *three* ships.³²

But some examples are less easy to explain away: in Long. 10.3 we are told to admire the previous Sappho quotation ('do you not *marvel?*', *ou thaumazeis*). It is followed by a contrastingly unsuccessful example from the epic Arimaspeia, beginning 'A *marvel* it was' (*thauma*). L. has at least partly chosen this unusual example for the pointed irony of the juxtaposition: the writer begins by inviting admiration, but fails. This interpretation is confirmed by the tight interlocking of vocabulary linking example and theory in the series of storm examples (10.3-6): unlike the Arimaspeia, Homer successfully raises terror: in the quotation the gale is 'fearsome', *deinos*, and L. comments that Homer does not limit to *deinon*. Aratus by contrast does put limits on his storm, and L. has another 'pun': Aratus makes his idea petty, *mikron*, and 'little', *oligon*, aptly appears in the condemned example, 'a *little* bit of wood kept death away'. So too (3.1) a description of Boreas illustrates bombast (faulty exaggeration of the sublime), and the quotation aptly concludes 'but now I have not yet shouted forth the *noble* song'; and (9.5) the sublime 'height'

³¹ See note 21 above on Hermogenes.

³² The emphasis is on Nireus' 'smallness': he and his possessions are small (*mikros*) but made great (*megas*). It is not on 'three ships' as such. Note reference to his 'two or three possessions' at the end of the analysis, and the way D. even in the paraphrase glosses 'three ships' with the amplifying 'and few men'.

of a cosmic leap of horses is reflected in the quotation, 'the gods' high-sounding horses', *hupsechees*.³³

So too in D.: it is too much of a coincidence that so many of the examples of grandeur include the actual word *megas* (also *brachus* or *mikros* of the opposite). D. recommends grandeur for themes such as big military battles (cf. 237), heaven and earth (75); war-horses in contrast to small birds or flowers (76); and big versus small rivers (121).³⁴ Many of these subjects then aptly occur in the quotations illustrating grandeur of diction or word-arrangement—battling heroes, big mountains, crags and rivers abound. But *megas* itself appears in quotations describing heaven (83), Zeus (55), storm (29),³⁵ warrior Ajax (48, with explicit reference that the style matches the *megethos* of the hero), and rivers (6, 121); and in the revamped 'grand' version of an example (10).

(B) *Period and colon*:

So we have here a deliberate technique, and I turn now to the less obvious and more allusive instances within D.'s analysis of sentence-structure. I begin with a few simple examples, to prove that he does use this punning technique of points of style: (a) The 'beginning' paeon is illustrated by 'it began', *erxato de* (38-9). (b) 'Purple flower' illustrates the epiphoneme (106): 'purple' fits what is a 'luxury' ornamentation of style, and anticipates the later image of 'purple bands of colour' (108). Whether this comparison is from architecture or clothes, compare in any case 'the purple patch', a traditional example of extra ornamentation: cf. Luc. *Hist. Conscr.* 16 *ten porphuran epikosmounta*, Hor. *A.P.* 15-16 *purpureus ... pannus*. (c) A sequence of short cola (5), is illustrated by the aphorism beginning 'life is short', and a short colon (6, cf. 121) fits a short river which is termed 'not grand but lovely', *megas men ou, kalos de* (Xen. *Anab.* 4.4.3).

Now the period. It is defined as 'a combination of cola and commata which has brought the underlying thought to a conclusion with a well-turned ending' (10).³⁶

³³ The verbal link straddles a deliberately surprising juxtaposition: L. moves from the unexpected, Sappho on love, to the very traditional, storms in epic. L. typically cuts across genre and traditional expectations, as most famously when he cites *Genesis* between two examples from Homer (9.9).

³⁴ On themes of natural grandeur such as cosmic phenomena, storms and battles see D.C. Innes, 'Gigantomachy and Natural Philosophy', *C.Q.* 79 (1979) 165-71.

³⁵ This example has grandeur of expression, not to fit grandeur of subject but in witty play (cf. 120 on playful grandeur).

³⁶ The definition, as in the case of the colon, has no exact parallel, but is traditional in its focus on completion and rounding (cf. Schenkeveld, *l.c.*, pp. 31 ff.), e.g. *R.G.* 3.93 Sp. 'speech completing an independent thought in an arrangement of cola which is well-rounded (*euperigraphōs*). *Eukatastrophōs* is unique but shows the influence of Aristotle's *katestrammenē*, the periodic style (cf. 12, 21); compare also D.H. *C.V.* 22, 110 U-R, of

This last, *eukatastrophōs*, is the key to the crucial question: *how* do thought and structure end together? Compare related ideas that the period makes a 'turn' or 'bend' (*kampē*) and forms a circle, *kuklos* (11). The terminology indicates only that the structure is not rectilinear but has pointers forward and backward, and it is the examples and analogies which are more helpful, indicating a sequence of syntactically linked clauses (or phrases), often with the promise of subordination (e.g. 'on the one hand') and given an 'ending' by hyperbaton or completion of a pattern such as antithesis. The completed sentence thus 'bends back' at the end as it completes a structured pattern. For example, even in the loosely structured philosophical period (21) there is an 'ending' in the example (the opening of Plato's *Republic*), as the participle *agontes* 'bends the sentence back' at the end to pick up its comparatively distant grammatical object, 'celebrating the festival'.

Some of the examples suggest puns. The example (5) of a long colon (Pl. *Pol.* 269c) ends 'assists the cycle', *sunkuklei*: compare *kuklos* of the period (30, 31; *kukloeides* 11, *kuklikos* 20). The use of *sunkuklei* represents the way in which the verb in final position makes a circle, 'rounding off' the whole colon by 'bending back' to its object in initial position, *to pan*, 'the whole'). More speculatively: 'the whole' is not yet fully complete in sense or structure, and recognition of the punning technique may implicitly point us forward to the period (not explicitly introduced till 10): this long colon is necessarily part of a longer complex (*men* points forward to a second colon which will resume the initial *to pan*, 'the whole'), and Plato's sentence continues with vocabulary, the *periodoi* of heaven, which might suggest the periodic form of the whole sentence.³⁷

a straggling structure without a proper beginning and end, *akoruphos kai akatastrophos*. It could just mean 'twisted off sharply', but in Aristotle's binary period it fits well the notion of 'bent back to the start', and this meaning also fits the later idea of a 'circle', *kuklos*. It is glossed *kampēn te kai sustrophēn*: *kampē* too is rare but cf. 17, also Max. Tyr. 25.3 'eukampeis periods', perhaps Long. 34.2 [see note 59 below]. The image is of a bend in a road, not the turning-point of a race (an image, derived from Aristotle, introduced only in 11). Compare *periagōgē* (19, 45, 202, 244, verb 19, 30) and similar clusters of vocabulary to indicate a lack of directness in speech and method in Plut. 408f. (*kampē*, *kuklos*, 818f. (*kampē*, *periagōgē*). The road image picks up period, *periodos* itself, as D. notes in 11; compare also the analogy with roads in 47.

³⁷ Pl. *Pol.* 269C 'the whole universe on some occasions the god himself as it travels along escorts and assists in its cycle.' Plato continues 'but on other occasions he lets it free, whenever the cycles (*periodoi*) ...'.

Note the details of text: (a) D.: *to gar dē pan tote to men autos ho theos poreuomenos podēgei kai sunkuklei*; (b) Plato OCT: *to gar pan tote tote men autos ho theos sumpodēgei poreuomenon kai sunkuklei*. Read *tote* and *poreuomenon* in D. But his *dē* adds grandeur (cf. 55), and the different word-order assists 'rounding': is this (subconsciously?) deliberate? [cf. notes 29 and 30 above]

It is not known to be a standard example. Perhaps note a similar example, which may similarly 'pun' on the *periodos* of the universe, Pl. *Tim.* 58a in Hermog. 244 Rabe, where again the vocabulary fits sentence-theory. But Hermogenes cites it for grandeur of thought,

A *sun-* compound verb in emphatic final position, *sunerein* ('to speak in support'), is also found in the example of the period (10, cf. 11, 20, 245).³⁸ Here too a pun is possible since the sentence ends with a word whose literal meaning is 'to express together': this may suggest that both thought and structure are indeed 'expressed together'. The sense ends only at the end, and the words are closely bound together. A *sun-* compound fits well with the other *sun-* words which surround the quotation in the analysis of the period (*suntithemenon*, *sunistanai*, *sustēma* in the preceding definition of the period, and *sustrophēn echei kata to telos* in the subsequent comment). The sentence has a double subordination signalled from the beginning phrase (*malista men heineka*), and the final verb, *sunerein*, is emphasised by its isolation (there is a preceding parenthetic colon) and hyperbaton. Contrast the initial position given to the verb, *sunerō* ('I shall speak in support'), in the rewritten unperiodic version (11).

Finally, the single-colon period (17), defined as a long clause which has a twist, *kampē*, at the end.³⁹ The first example (Hdt. 1.1) has hyperbaton, ending on a forward-pointing *hēde*, 'The result of the enquiry of Herodotus of Halicarnassus is this',⁴⁰ but the second has caused puzzlement, 'Clear expression provides great light to the listeners' thoughts', *hē gar saphēs phrasis polu phōs parechetai tais tōn akouontōn dianoiais*.⁴¹ But note the symmetry: it begins with 'clear expression' and ends on 'thought', producing a pun on expression/style (*phrasis*) and thought/content (*dianoiais*), and (as in the complex period) expression and thought end together. The final phrase, itself tersely compact, 'rounds off' the thought, 'bending us back' to the initial contrasting words of the period, just as *sunkuklei* (5) 'makes a circle' of the long colon, returning us to the beginning, *to gar pan*. It has no strict hyperbaton but it completes a satisfactory patterning of words, the contrast of *phrasis* and *dianoia*. The two examples of the single-colon period thus show the variety characteristic of D., and they parallel the variety found also in the period of more than one colon: (a) strict hyperbaton and (b) looser forms with balanced patterns of structure.

with no reference to its structure (and he cannot be proved to use such puns elsewhere: cf. note 21 above).

³⁸ Dem. *Lept.* 1.1 'Especially on the one hand because ..., then too because ..., I agreed, to the best of my ability, to speak in their support'. Cf. note 30 above.

³⁹ Cf. esp. Qu. 9.4.124 *cum sensus unus longiore ambitu circumducitur*; he and D. both contradict their definition of the period as a combination of cola, a sign of the marginal interest in this type. It derives from A. *Rh.* 1409b13. Length and hyperbaton are demanded in Hermog. 180 Rabe (but the example is scarcely one of a single-colon; the text seems further corrupt since the two-colon gnomic period is more aptly an example of the single-colon period, as it is in *R.G.* 2.507 Sp.: so transpose?).

⁴⁰ Cf. note 6 above on its interpolation in Aristotle.

⁴¹ Cf. Schenkeveld, pp. 27 (noting the compactness of the final phrase) and 33.

III: LONGINUS

Examples and theory may overlap so that the example prefigures, embodies or amplifies the other in a 'hidden' allusive manner. More often the theory is formulated so that it itself provides also the illustration, and sometimes there is 'trespass' of 'vehicle' (theory) and 'tenor' (quotation/comparison). At a sophisticated level such 'trespass' in classical authors has been more often investigated as a device of poetry, but it is also found in prose.⁴² In analysis of style some 'trespass' between theory and illustrative comparison is particularly likely, given the metaphorical origin of most technical vocabulary and the consequent easy revival of a normally 'dead' metaphor. I explore from L. some perhaps less familiar and more complex instances of fusion of theory and example.

L. is an author whose style is far removed from the textbook and is ambitiously elaborate. He may well throughout *On the Sublime* present himself as a hidden model of the sublime (in Pope's words, 'And is himself the great Sublime he draws').⁴³ On a smaller scale, in the narrower context of specific devices, he exploits a familiar trick, where theory is presented in a form which illustrates the point being made, for example rhetorical questions in 18.1.⁴⁴ He also often alludes to rather than overtly uses strictly technical terminology and vocabulary.⁴⁵

He moves freely between theory and comparison, as in the following three examples where the simile formally recurs in the apodosis:

(a) 41.2, a simple case of musical analogy, 'Just as songs ... so ... as in a dance', where the image re-appears within the apodosis; (b) 21.2, a revival of the 'dead' metaphor of binding in the use of connectives, *sundesmoi* (literally 'binders'), in the traditional image of the race: first the image, hobbling in a race ('If you were to bind ...'), then the apodosis, the parallel loss of drive in sentences with polysyndeton, neatly including vocabulary which continues the suggestion of a race

⁴² Poetic technique: e.g. on Roman poets see R.O.A.M. Lyne, *Words and the Poet*, 1989, p. 41; G. Williams, *Figures of Thought in Roman Poetry*, 1980, esp. Ch. V, pp. 95 ff., 'Thematic Anticipation'. Prose: e.g. Plut. *Quaest. Conv.* 621d, see F. Fuhrmann, *Les Images de Plutarque*, 1964 pp. 26-7.

⁴³ See esp. H.D. Blume, *Untersuchungen zu Sprache und Stil der Schrift Peri hupsous*, 1965. Too speculative for my purposes but similarly exploring L., as self-illustration: G.B. Walsh, 'Sublime method. Longinus on language and imitation', *ClAnt.* 7 (1988) 252-69.

⁴⁴ See Russell ad loc., Blume *passim*, J. Marouzeau, 'La leçon par l'exemple', *R.E.L.* 14 (1936) 58-64 and 26 (1948) 105-8. Some further examples in L.: 10.7 use of *sun-*compounds to mark the focus on structural unity; 11.1 use of *epi-* (i.e. ἐπι-) compounds to mark the focus on amplification; 21 polysyndeton 'Come now, add the connectives, if you like'; 32 use of metaphors/imagery in analysis of multiple metaphor.

⁴⁵ Note the apology in 29.2 for the overly technical treatment of figures: he has amplified beyond his requirements into rhetorician's *technologia*.

('impeded he frets'⁴⁶ ... the freedom of the race'), and again the image re-appears at the end, 'as if catapulted at the start';⁴⁷ (c) 17.2, an elaborate image of light and shade: a successful figure is 'hidden by its very light'; the metaphor is richly amplified in two successive similes of light and shade,⁴⁸ and then the application follows, in both cases with a verb which is not technical and deliberately repeats the image of shade, 'dims (*examauroi*) ... overshadows' (*episkiazei*); the latter ends with a further formal appearance of the dominant image, 'as if eclipsed'.

I turn now to L.'s fifth and final source of sublimity, his account of sentence-theory (39-41), and the way in which he combines the two features of self-illustration and fusion of image and apodosis. He is deliberately brief since he has already published two books on it, but he covers the three standard topics of rhythm, period and collocation, and he includes examples of rhythm and collocations of words (39, 40.2-4)—as indeed we expect, given L.'s regular and dominant use of illustrative passages ('proving' through examples his thesis that we naturally recognise sublimity, and that it is by its impact that sublimity is identified). So it is at first sight curious that there is no quotation to illustrate the period in 40.1. Answer: he himself is the hidden model. As in 41.3 and 42 on short cola, he fails to give the expected accompanying quotation because he is himself the example.

It is no accident that L. had already introduced his analysis of word-arrangement in 39.2-3 in a form which provides an immediate example of a particularly complex period. Form fits content. The sentence emphasizes the powerful impact of the patterned blending of elements, a mixture even more potent in verbal than in musical structures. It has immediate complexity, an elaborate initial double subordination ('It is not the case that the *aulos* on the one hand ... but that word-arrangement on the other hand' ...), and its careful patterning ends in a short final colon (with verb in hyperbaton) which encapsulates the key idea that the intellect itself is overpowered.⁴⁹

⁴⁶ *Aganaktei*: the bold personification of P's reading (so Vahlen, Russell, Brandt) seems overbold, and what we in any case expect is a verb for loss of energy which fits the overall image of the race, e.g. *atonei* (Cumanudes, cf. 11.2), *apaktazei* (Richards, cf. 9.15 *apaktne*). We need not look for close similarity of sound if *aganaktei* has come in from *aganaktountes* a few lines below (22.1).

⁴⁷ *Aphiesthai*: cf. Demetrius 11 'like runners *aphethentes*'; as metaphor Hermog. 251 Rabe to *apheton*.

⁴⁸ The two similes of sunshine and painting are examples from nature and art respectively (cf. e.g. Prop. I.2.9 ff.), an apt illustration of the tight organic unity of L.'s whole analysis, since the main theme of Ch. 17 is the kinship of nature and art, itself a major theme of the whole work. Organic unity over the whole work is similarly reinforced by recurrent patterns of imagery. Thus light is found not only here but in a pervasive image of natural sublimity, e.g. the light of Creation, Homer as the sun (9.9 and 13), or the heavenly bodies for which we instinctively feel awe (35.4).

⁴⁹ Cf. Blume, p. 45 'die längste Periode unserer Schrift'; on resumptive *ara* in the *de complex*, see W. Bühler, *Beiträge zur Erklärung der Schrift vom Erhabenen*, 1964, pp. 148-9.

It seems immediately likely that the same method of self-illustration explains the apparent lack of quotation to exemplify the theory of the period in 40.1, defined in traditional terms as a unity formed from parts and compared to limbs of the body.⁵⁰ We find successive clauses presenting inset *men/de* and hyperbaton (cf. 39.2-3, cited above). There are also parallel and neatly 'punning' examples of word-order (I underline the puns): (a) the first inset *men/de* complex moves from an isolated ineffective single clause (*hen men ...*) to a combination of *all* elements (*panta de ...*), which then 'ends' in a unified *complete structure* (*teleion sustēma*); also in the first *men* clause *tmēthen* 'cuts off' *ouden* from *axiologon* in hyperbaton; (b) the second inset *men/de* complex contrasts *scattered* disunity (*skedasthenta men ...*) with *unity* (*sōmatopoioumena de ...*); and in the *de* part the opening two participial clauses are themselves 'framed' by initial *sōmatopoioumena* and the 'rounded closure' of the finally placed *perikleioumena*; and then the final main clause produces a 'rounding off' which explicitly refers to the *kuklos* of the period.

So on the assumption L. is writing periodically, I re-examine the punctuation of this passage. Russell argues for a loose single-sentence structuring that compels an anacolouthon. But a period by definition avoids anacolouthon to bring its structure to a neatly shaped conclusion. He argues against the traditional earlier punctuation (with stop after *episunthesis*, so e.g. Roberts) that it causes a double impossibility: firstly, *kathaper ... houtōs* are not parallel; and secondly *melōn* must, unnaturally, refer to cola, not limbs of the body. I argue for two formal parallel periods, the second closely linked to the first with resumptive *houtōs*.

Clearly *kathaper ... houtōs* is a possible sequence in L. (cf. 7.1; also 38.6, though it is not there part of an image), but for comparisons of any length with formally introduced comparison and apodosis, L. elsewhere uses *hōsper/hōs... houtōs* (2.2

⁵⁰ Cf. Blume, pp. 32-4, for analysis of what he terms 'stilistisch nun selbst ein Musterbeispiel' (p. 34). I give some parallels for the traditional theory and technical or quasi-technical vocabulary: (a) Colon: as segment of whole and in comparison (apparently post-Aristotelian) to limbs of body see II.(i) above and note 28. Note also Long. 10.1, compact selection of detail to form 'as it were a single body'.

(b) *Sustēma* of the period: cf. Demetrius 10, verb commonly, e.g. Demetrius *l.c.*, Hermog. 180 Rabe and *R.G.* 2.507 Sp., cf. Lat. *constare*, e.g. *Ad Her.* 4.19.26, *Cic. Orat.* 221; For *sustēma* of an organised complex, cf. *Arist. Qu. Mus.* 1.23 metre as *sustēma podōn*, *R.G.* 2.60 Sp. history as *sustēma diēgeseōs*, *Dio Chrys.* 36.29 a city as *sustēma anthrōpōn*.

(c) *Tmēthen*: see note 52 below.

(d) *Ekplēroi*: cf. e.g. *D.H. C.V.* 22, 97 U-R *hin' ho kuklos ekplērothei*, for the simple verb, Demetrius 3.

(e) *Perikleioumena*: cf. *katakleiein* of the ends of periods in *D.H. Dem.* 18, 167 U-R, the period is *sunodos kai kleis tropon tina*, 'an assembly and sort of lock' in Hermog. 176 Rabe. Note also various 'rounding' *peri-compounds* like *period* itself. Add (8.1): the fifth source, *sunthesis*, 'locking together' (*sunkleiousa*) all the preceding sources.

(f) Compare the whole first *men/de* complex with *Qu.* 9.4.13, quoted above II.(i) on colon and comma in Demetrius.

bis, 17.2, 18.2, 21, 22.1, 28.1, 41.2, 43.3, 44.4); *kathaper* may modify an image or is embedded in the idea to which it is compared: so 10.1, 12.3, 15.8, 16.2, 28.2; and L. can use resumptive *houōs* to begin a new sentence. The example in 13.2 is particularly relevant, since it follows an image ('Many are possessed by another's inspiration in the same way as the Pythia ... *In the same way*' ...), giving a parallel for the sequence of statement, image, then new sentence with resumptive *houōs*. The vocabulary in the resumptive sentence also reintroduces the preceding image (cf. 41.2, 21.2, 17.2, cited above).

On the second objection, it is true that *melōn* fits limbs of the body, not the sentence (contrast *kōlon*, regularly used of both)—but 'trespass' between image and its application is precisely what L. exploits elsewhere.⁵¹ So here with *melōn*, the 'tenor' (the body) invades the 'vehicle' (the period), just as it unambiguously does later within the *houōs* complex (*sōmatopoioiomena*). 'Trespass' is also easy since L. chooses other vocabulary which fits limbs of both body and sentence (Applied to the limbs of the body, as on Russell's punctuation, it mirrors and prefigures the application to the period—in itself perfectly acceptable). Thus body and period are identically a combination of limbs, and each segment⁵² is not complete in itself but in combination completes a *teleion sustēma*.

In 40.1 example, theory and image are thus an indissoluble unity. In 40.2 this fusion of theory and example continues, but this time without imagery—precisely because the point at issue is the power of sentence-structure on its own without any contribution from elaboration of diction. This is expressed in another carefully structured period: it begins with a subordinate clause, which itself contains a series of subordinating participial and dependent infinitive constructions; and it ends with a short final clause with verb in hyperbaton. The absence of imagery continues until L. quotes an example of effective collocation which involves more than word-order (40.4; Eur. *Fr.* 221 Nauck, Dirce dragged by the bull): nobility of thought is now enriched (*hadroteron gegone*) by the slow movement of the words from jarring juxtapositions—and L.'s style is now appropriately enriched also by imagery: the words do not roll on, *hoion en apokulismati*.

One further example involving sentence-structure, hyperbaton (22). Here again

⁵¹ *Melos* of clauses is unusual but cf. Hermog. 296-7 Rabe, alluding to the Platonic origin of the image (Pl. *Phdr.* 264c) and similarly applying *melē* to both body and clauses (*hoion melē kai merē*). For vocabulary reinforcing the notion that the colon is also the limb/leg of a body, cf. Hermog. 178 Rabe for a period which is termed *isoskeles kai isopleuron* (terms familiar in a different technical meaning, in the language of geometry).

⁵² *Tmēthen*: the verb can readily apply to cutting up flesh (as limb by limb in Homer, e.g. *Il.* 24.409 *meleisti tamōn*), but is perhaps overlurid in primary reference to the body and may therefore fit better (in quasi-dead metaphor) if it refers to the sentence, where clauses regularly divide or 'cut up' the thought: cf. Hermog. 315 Rabe, *R.G.* 3.139 Sp., cf. 'tnesis' of words (e.g. *R.G.* 3.139 Sp.); also *diatēnnein* D.H. *C.V.* 26, 136 U-R. But given L.'s richness of style, I would not press this point.

theory and example similarly coincide in L.'s own lengthy hyperbata in 22.1 and 22.2-4:⁵³ note especially how L. introduces into his own sprawling sentences the characteristic ingredient of parenthesis, a feature explicit in the theory (22.1, *mesa tina paremballontes*,⁵⁴ 22.4 *metaxu ... dia mesou*).

L. may again introduce some subtle refinements: (a) periods and hyperbaton have obvious affinities since the period often includes hyperbaton, as is explicitly noted in e.g. *Ad Her.* 4.32.44 *proderit ad continuationes*, Hermog. 178 Rabe (brief hyperbata occur in periods) and 429 Rabe (polemic against their identification).⁵⁵ Given this link, note the deft touch in L. that the hyperbaton forms a circle—hinting at the *kuklos* of the period (40.1): 22.1 *epi ta prōta anakuklountes*,⁵⁶ 22.4 *epeiskuklōn*.⁵⁷

(b) A further example of 'punning' or 'trespass', and this time the theory invades the comparison: note *hōs hyp' astatou pneumatos*, 'as from a veering wind' (22.1),⁵⁸ where *pneuma* suggests not only the surface meaning but also human breath in the theory of the sentence:⁵⁹ so already the requirement *euanapneustos* in *A. Rh.*

⁵³ Russell on 22.1 'L. displays ... a remarkable hyperbaton; on 22.3-4 'The sentence itself with its participial phrases and short final colon is probably meant as an illustration of the point.' See esp. Blume, pp. 22-5, for a detailed analysis.

⁵⁴ *paremballein*: cf. e.g. D.H. *Dem.* 9, 147 U-R (an interesting analysis of the excessive parenthetic complexity and resulting loss of direction in *Dem. Midias* 69), *R.G.* 3.136 Sp. 'Hyperbaton with parenthesis is when a colon or comma is intruded in the middle', *en tōi mesōi paremblēthēi*, severing the beginning from the end.' This example also illustrates the naturally pervasive use of *mesos* vocabulary in discussions of hyperbaton.

⁵⁵ Hyperbaton, he says, is not *periodos kekallōpismenē*, but a structure characterised by the intrusion of causal parentheses—so note L.'s examples include causal parenthetic *gar* clauses.

⁵⁶ *anakaloumena*: text hereabouts corrupt, but Russell's conjecture at the end of 42 is attractive: *num anakukloumena*? [Perhaps on the same lines already but less well, Radermacher suggested *anakuliomena* in his edition of Demetrius, p. 95]. Inappropriately lengthy *kuklos* is to be avoided, as is over-choppy staccato. The section is deliberately abbreviated, to illustrate the dangers of excessive brevity, and the term *anakukloumena* excellently encapsulates and recalls the theory of the period. It may also seem neat that L. ends the whole account of sentence-structure (40-2) with a word recalling 'cyclically' its own beginning, the period formed *autoi tōi kuklōi* (40.1).

⁵⁷ In itself *epeiskuklein* may just mean 'wheel in' in the general sense of 'introduce' (cf. *Luc. Hist. Conscr.* 13), i.e. it is a mere synonym of *paremballein*. But it more exactly means 'wheel into the appropriate position' (cf. 11.1 *kata periodous ... epeiskukloumena megethē* in the context of amplification). The notion of circle also fits the way in which hyperbaton resumes its original structure (cf. *R.G.* 3.197 Sp. *ta teleutaia tois prōtois sunaptei*).

Such an interpretation of *epeiskuklein* goes well with a metaphorical use of *taxis* of a military formation: at the end everyone is in rank.

⁵⁸ Note also *astatos*: the wind is unstable; contrast *sustēma*, the stable structure of the period (40.1, cf. note 50).

⁵⁹ *pneuma*: cf. e.g. D.H. *C.V.* 22, 111 U-R 'apportion according to the breath', Qu. 11.3.53 'collect your breath before uttering long periods'. Hermog. 171 Rabe *pneumatikōs apoteinesthai* (cf. 183 and 185 ff. Rabe for *pneuma* as a type of very long sentence).

1409b14, cf. e.g. D.H. C.V. 23, 113 U-R 'the limit of a period will not exceed a man's full breath'. Hyperbaton particularly requires good breath control, and the image of the veering wind, *pneuma*, prefigures the application to hyperbaton.

(c) It may be significant that the imagery here in 22.1 is not single (as it is in 40, where it fits the tight unity of a period), but keeps changing, parallel to the varying misdirections of the hyperbaton. The ever-changing imagery mirrors the piling up of different elements, *alla ... ep' alla*. So too within the first image the long list of 'innumerable' emotions (to illustrate the emotional impact of hyperbaton) may prefigure the idea of a mass of elements in hyperbaton.

(d) But let me end less speculatively with a point of textual criticism: in 22.4 P reads *metaxu hōs*, Wilamowitz (presumably to avoid hiatus) conjectured *metaxu pōs*.⁶⁰ It is true that *taxis* 'needs no apology' (Russell; cf. e.g. 22.1), but *taxis* is preceded by colourful qualifying adjectives, which awaken the 'dead' military metaphor. We have also seen that L. may close an analysis with a brief formal image (e.g. 17.5, 21.2, 40.4 cited in this paper). Read then *metaxu hōs*, and translate 'and en route, as if into alien and strange positions, wheeling in one parenthetical and extraneous element after the other.'⁶¹

In Long. 34.2, it will refer to Hyperides' smooth narrative flow (Russell) but the vocabulary is also redolent of periodic theory, *en hugrōi pneumatī diexodeusai eukampēs akrōs*: cf. periodic *kampē* (see note 36), and *diexodos*, a very lengthy period (= Hermogenes' *pneuma*), e.g. R.G. 3.28 Sp.

⁶⁰ Vahlen and Blume keep *hōs*, Brandt accepts *pōs*. It is in itself apt, as in Hermog. 310 Rabe *metaxu de pōs dianapauomenēs* (VcBa do not have *pōs*).

⁶¹ I wish to thank especially Donald Russell for his (as always) wise comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

Aristotle, the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* and the *tria genera causarum*

David C. Mirhady

In his enumeration of what is "original and characteristic" in Aristotle's rhetorical thought, Friedrich Solmsen includes the fact that Aristotle distinguishes "three different kinds of speeches, the political speech, the forensic speech, and the laudation."¹ Solmsen goes on to point out that Aristotle associated them with three key Greek values, ἀγαθόν, δίκαιον and καλόν, and suggests that while Aristotle may have arrived at them by a Platonic sort of deductive reasoning (*Rhet.* 1.3 1358b1-13), these *tria genera causarum* could be regarded as "the logical result of the development of rhetorical theory in the course of the fourth century."² Quintilian adds support to the notion of the "Aristotelian" provenance of this tripartition with his observation that those ancient rhetoricians who identify three genera do so on the authority of Aristotle.³ In the following paper I wish to explore Solmsen's thesis, giving special attention to the pseudo-Aristotelian *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*. This treatise is nearly contemporary with Aristotle - its author is likely to have been Anaximenes of Lampsacus - and it can be argued that it too has a claim on the *tria genera* (although a very limited one, as I hope to show). At the end of the paper, I shall also consider Cicero and Quintilian, pointing out that while both clearly recognize Aristotle as the originator of the division into three genera, they appear not fully to have understood Aristotle's teaching.

¹ F. Solmsen, "The Aristotelian Tradition in Ancient Rhetoric" *AJP* 62 (1941) 35-50 and 167-90, 42.

² Solmsen 43. By "Platonic" Solmsen is clearly referring to Aristotle's method of division and not to the fact that Aristotle distinguishes the beneficial, the just and the noble. Plato would certainly disagree with someone arguing that something is beneficial and yet unjust.

³ Quintilian 3.4.1: *nec dubie prope omnes utique summae apud antiquos auctoritatis scriptores Aristotelen secuti...hac partitione contenti fuerunt*. On Quintilian, cf. J. Cousin, *Études sur Quintilien* (Paris 1936) 1.169-71.

I

The *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* is a fourth century B.C. rhetorical handbook found in the modern *corpus Aristotelicum*.⁴ A reference at 8.8 to an expedition of the Corinthians under Timoleon gives a *terminus post quem* for the work of 341. It is reasonable to suppose that the work was composed not long after. On the basis of a papyrus containing portions of thirteen pages of the work, Grenfell and Hunt fix the *terminus ante quem* at 300 B.C.⁵ Attempts to correlate the chronology of the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* and Aristotle's *Rhetoric* are complicated by the fact that parts of the *Rhetoric* show indications of having been composed at different times. Book 3, for instance, appears originally to have been a separate work. However, some points seem clear enough. In a recent discussion, George Kennedy points out that an "early core" of the *Rhetoric*, 1.5-15, requires 1.3-4, in which Aristotle lays out his *tria genera* scheme.⁶ In 1.5-15 there are numerous references to historical events before 350, but none from the period 340-36, which do appear in *Rhetoric* 2.23-4 and date that part of the work later. If we can discount in this instance the notion that there were significant revisions in this part of Aristotle's thinking, Kennedy's calculations put at least the composition of Aristotle's thoughts on the *tria genera* before *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*.

On the other hand, even if *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* was written after Aristotle had worked out his tripartition of rhetorical speeches, in many ways it is a more primitive work, lacking anything corresponding to Aristotle's insights into logic, ethics and psychology.⁷ The two works clearly appropriate material from common sources, even if independently.⁸ They thus worked from the same background of systematic rhetorical thought. But there is hardly any possibility that the author of the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*, whether Anaximenes or someone else, had read

⁴ F. Susemihl, *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur in der Alexanderzeit* 2. (Leipzig 1892) 451-7, argued that it was not written until the third century B.C., but this view was abandoned after the discovery of a papyrus containing several fragments of the work confirmed the earlier date. See B.P. Grenfell and A.S. Hunt, *The Hibeh Papyri. Part I* (London 1906) 114-38.

⁵ Grenfell and Hunt 115.

⁶ G. Kennedy, *Aristotle on Rhetoric, A Theory of Civic Discourse* (New York 1991) Appendix II A. "The Composition of the *Rhetoric*" 299-305. Cf. his discussion in *AJP* 111 (1990) 88-9 and J. Rist, *The Mind of Aristotle. A Study in Philosophical Growth* (Toronto 1989) 85-6 and 136-44.

⁷ This characteristic probably accounts for the lack of attention the treatise receives from scholars today. Since the appearance of the long discussion by E.M. Cope in *An Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric* (London 1867) 401-64, the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* has been largely ignored in the English-speaking world.

⁸ See, for example, my recent discussion of their parallel treatments of the ἀρετῶν/ἐπίθετοι πρῶτοις, "Non-technical *pisteis* in Aristotle and Anaximenes" *AJP* 112 (1991) 5-28.

Aristotle, even though parts of the text, such as the opening sentence, are likely to have been corrupted subsequently by scribes who were influenced by Aristotelian notions (See e.g. 35.2 and 36.1 discussed below).

Sometime after the composition of the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* a prefatory letter was added to the work. It purports to be addressed by Aristotle to Alexander the Great, but is clearly spurious. There is uncertainty (perhaps unresolvable) about who introduced Aristotle's name and what the circumstances of the forgery were.⁹ Several scholars since 1800 have attempted to ascribe the source of the work's thought to various traditions, but without gaining any long-term support for their views.¹⁰ It may be best simply to say that the work represents an amalgam. New studies are clearly needed and will be invaluable helped by the edition and studies of the text by Manfred Fuhrmann.¹¹

II

In Fuhrmann's edition of the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*, the handbook begins with the words τρία γένη τῶν πολιτικῶν εἰσι λόγων and then identifies more or less the same three genera as does Aristotle. (Before Fuhrmann, it was common to follow Spengel's emendation to δύο γένη and delete the initial reference to

⁹ P. Wendland, "Die Schriftstellerei des Anaximenes von Lampsakos" *Hermes* 39 (1904) 499-509, argues that the letter is largely the work of Anaximenes himself, but was later modified to appear to be that of Aristotle. Pausanias relates that Anaximenes was fond of imitating sophists and their speeches and once forged a book in the style of Theopompus that incited anger against the historian (6.18.5).

¹⁰ A. Ipfelkopfer, *Die Rhetorik des Anaximenes unter den Werken des Aristoteles* (Diss. Erlangen 1889) emphasized the parallels to Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and argued that the *Rhetoric* influenced it. Later, while rejecting Ipfelkopfer's view, P. Wendland, *Anaximenes von Lampsakos* (Berlin 1905), saw a common thread between *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* and the fragments of Theodectes, a sophist of the early fourth century. K. Barwick, "Die 'Rhetorik ad Alexandrum' und Anaximenes, Alkidamas, Isokrates, Aristoteles, und die Theodekteia" *Philologus* 110 (1966) 212-45 and 110 (1967) 47-55 reviews many of the possible traditions.

¹¹ M. Fuhrmann, *Anaximenes Ars rhetorica quae vulgo fertur Aristotelis Ad Alexandrum* (Leipzig 1966) and *Untersuchungen zur Textgeschichte der pseudo-aristotelischen Alexander-Rhetorik* (Wiesbaden 1965) 146-50. R. Kassel, *Philologus* 111 (1967) 122-6, O. Zweierlein, *RhM* 112 (1969) 72-84, and D.M. Reeve, *CQ* 20 (1970) 237-41, have contributed further studies on the text. G.M.A. Grube, *A Greek Critic: Demetrius on Style* (Toronto 1961) appendix 2 "The *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* and its Language" 156-63, has studied the text from the point of view of language. The last commentary on the work is that of L. Spengel, *Anaximenes Ars rhetorica*. (Leipzig 1850; repr. Hildesheim 1981). Reading of the text has been complicated by the tendency of scholars before 1966 to cite the pagination of the Spengel text revised and published by C. Hammer in *Rhetores Graeci*, vol. i (Leipzig 1894). I cite the chapter and section numbers that were introduced in the Bekker edition of the *corpus Aristotelicum* (1831).

epideictic.) If this reading is correct, then perhaps Solmsen's thesis ought to be revised. Aristotle would certainly have fashioned the *tria genera* first, if only just, but the independent composition of a handbook promulgating very nearly the same thing shortly afterwards would take some of the shine off Aristotle's achievement.

However, the consequences of the reading go beyond the *tria genera*. For they happen to include also the question of the authorship of the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*. Beginning with Petrus Victorius in 1548, most scholars have identified Anaximenes of Lampsacus as the author of the work.¹² But this identification depends on the belief that the first sentence of the handbook has been corrupted (to make it appear more like Aristotle's) and that the original wording of the opening sentence identified only two genera, demegoric¹³ and forensic. Victorius recognized that both the Anaximenes who was known by Quintilian (3.4.9) and the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* identify the same seven species (εἶδη) of speeches, but Quintilian says that Anaximenes distinguished only two genera (*generales partes*), *iudicialis* and *contionalis*. In fact, Quintilian explicitly presents Anaximenes as a Greek rhetorician who did not share Aristotle's tripartite system. Clearly the question of the authorship of the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* is closely related to whether the *tria genera* are, as Solmsen argues, "original and characteristic" to Aristotle. Vinzenz Buchheit presents the strongest arguments against both the emendation of the manuscripts and the attribution to Anaximenes.¹⁴ Although he has been convincingly

¹² For other sources on Anaximenes see F. Jacoby, *Fragmente der griechischen Historiker* (FGH), no. 72. On Petrus Victorius (Piero Vettori) and the reception of *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* in the Italian Renaissance, see the essay of David Marsh in this volume.

¹³ I resort to this rarely used word to avoid the obvious confusions that are possible in translating the terms πολιτικός, δημηγορικός and συμβουλευτικός. In general, πολιτικός ("political") refers to public speech, as opposed to private conversation. Accordingly, it subsumes all three genera of rhetorical speeches that are recognized by Aristotle, συμβουλευτικός ("deliberative"), on the other hand, which is the word used by Aristotle in his tripartition (*Rhet.* 1.3 1358b7), refers only to the oratory of the assembly or council, where decisions affecting the entire *polis* are debated. To this extent, it is distinct from both δικαστικός ("forensic") and ἐκιδεικτικός ("epideictic") oratory. The semantic field of δημηγορικός ("demegoric") is somewhat at issue in this paper. It clearly includes deliberative and excludes forensic oratory. But it is unclear whether the word, especially in *Rhet. ad Alex.* 1.1, takes in encomium and invective. Cf. *Rhet.* 1.1 1354b22-5.

¹⁴ V. Buchheit, *Untersuchungen zur Theorie des Genos epideiktikon von Gorgias bis Aristoteles* (Munich 1960) 189-98, 205-7. E.S. Forster, in the Preface to his translation of the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, volume XI (Oxford 1923) would agree with Buchheit that Spengel's emendations should be rejected and the manuscript reading accepted: "These emendations are not only unlikely in themselves, but are contradicted by the whole arrangement of Chapters 1-5 and 34-7, where the author clearly deals with three genera, each with two species, and 'inquiry' as an extra species." Fuhrmann in the preface to his edition XXXIX-XLI argues against Buchheit, although in printing the text he follows the manuscripts. G. Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece* (Princeton 1963) 114-15, reviews the history of the scholarship.

refuted by Karl Barwick¹⁵ and by Fuhrmann, before going on to discuss the *tria genera* further, it will be worthwhile to rehearse and clarify the reasons for attributing *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* to Anaximenes.

III

Although Victorius knew only Quintilian, the modern attribution of the text to Anaximenes of Lampsacus is based on the similarity of its opening to descriptions found both in Quintilian and in Syrianus' commentary on Hermogenes:

Rhet. ad Alex.

Τρία γένη τῶν
πολιτικῶν εἰσι λόγων,
τὸ μὲν δημηγορικόν, τὸ δὲ
ἐπιδευκτικόν, τὸ δὲ
δικανικόν. εἶδη δὲ
τούτων ἐπτά,
προτρεπτικόν,
ἀποτρεπτικόν,
ἐγκωμιαστικόν,
ψεκτικόν, κατηγορικόν,
ἀπολογικόν καὶ
ἐξεταστικόν ἢ αὐτὸ καθ'
αὐτὸ ἢ πρὸς ἄλλο.

τρία] δύο Spengel τὸ δὲ
ἐπιδευκτικόν del. Spengel

Quintilian 3.4.9

*Anaximenes iudicalem
et contionalem
generales partes esse
voluit, septem autem
species, hortandi,
dehortandi, laudandi,
vituperandi, accusandi,
defendendi, exquirendi,
quod ἐξεταστικόν dicit;
quarum duae primae
deliberativi, duae
sequentes demonstrativi,
tres ultimae iudicialis
generis sunt partes.*

Syrianus

Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ δύο
γένη φησὶν εἶναι τῶν
πολιτικῶν λόγων
δικανικόν τε καὶ
δημηγορικόν, εἶδη δὲ
ἐπτά, προτρεπτικόν
ἀποτρεπτικόν
ἐγκωμιαστικόν ψεκτικόν
κατηγορικόν
ἀπολογητικόν
ἐξεταστικόν.

In Hermog. comm. II
2.17-21 Rabe

As mentioned above, Spengel's emendation is based on the assumption that copyists, believing the text to have been written by Aristotle, attempted to make it coincide with the *tria genera* scheme attributed to Aristotle. According to Spengel, the letter by pseudo-Aristotle was added to the text sometime after Quintilian (2nd c. A.D.) but before Syrianus (5th c. A.D.).¹⁶ (Athenaeus [3rd c. A.D.], *Deipnosophistae* 11 508A, quotes the prefatory letter to *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* 4 as "Aristotle".) The copyists then made their changes sometime after Syrianus. Fuhrmann refines (complicates) Spengel's thesis by arguing that the beginning of the text under went an initial change even before Quintilian and Syrianus saw it.

¹⁵ See above (note 10).

¹⁶ Spengel defended this thesis in several publications, but see esp. *Συναγωγή τεχνῶν sive artium scriptores* (Stuttgart 1828) 182-91. Spengel 186 postulates whether in the mss. of Syrianus the name "Anaximenes" was changed to "Aristotle."

He suggests that the text, under the name of Anaximenes, originally began simply with the seven *eide*.¹⁷ As Fuhrmann recognizes, his suggestion leaves unresolved why even an interpolator would add mention of two genera and not three. But apparently neither Quintilian nor Syrianus were disturbed by the juxtaposition of two *gene* and seven *eide*.

Buchheit's criticism of this view is based not so much on the initial passages, which agree so well, but on the explanations that follow in each text. For example, what seems distinct in, and peculiar to, the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* is the presence of the seventh *eidos*, the *exetastikon* (investigation). Quintilian groups it under the *genus iudiciale*.¹⁸ Buchheit claims there is no basis in *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* for doing so and infers that Quintilian had read a different text. Spengel and Barwick¹⁹ point to the reference to this *eidos* in *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* 37.1 (μάλιστα πρὸς τὰς ἀντιλογίας χρήσιμον ἔστιν) and claim that it is indicative that the *eidos exetastikon* belongs to the *genos dikastikon*, but their reasoning is not entirely persuasive. There seems no compelling reason to identify ἀντιλογία exclusively with forensic speeches. On the other hand, Buchheit's conclusion that Quintilian must have been reading another text is also unfounded. *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* 36.1, if it is genuine, provides more persuasive evidence: λουπὸν δ' ἔστιν ἡμῖν εἶδος τό τε κατηγορικὸν καὶ τὸ ἐξεταστικόν. ταῦτα πάλιν ὡς ἐν τῷ δικανικῷ γένει συνθήσομεν καὶ τάξομεν, διέλθωμεν.²⁰ Above all, it seems plausible, in fact likely, that Quintilian attempted to rationalize the *gene* with the *eide* by grouping them himself.²¹ Since his discussion of Anaximenes occurs as a comparison with Aristotle, it should not be surprising that Quintilian attempts to reconcile Anaximenes' categorization to that of Aristotle.

Buchheit's second criticism is based on a definition of the *eidos exetastikon* found in one manuscript of Syrianus: τὰ μὲν οὖν ἕξ ἐν τῷ λέγοντί φησι θεωρεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἑβδόμον ἐν τοῖς ἀκροωμένοις οὔτερ τῶν λεγομένων ἕκαστον ἐξετάζουσιν ("he says that six of them are for the speaker to observe, but the seventh is for the listeners, who investigate each of the things said" 11.21-3 Rabe). Another manuscript has the following: ὁ μόνον, τὸ ἐξεταστικόν φημι, ἐν τοῖς ἀκροωμένοις ἔστιν, οὔτερ τῶν λεγομένων ἕκαστον ἐξετάζουσιν ("which alone, the investigative

¹⁷ Fuhrmann (note 11) 156-8. Fuhrmann's proposal suggests that further changes were made, notably with δὲ τούτων, but these seem reasonable in the context.

¹⁸ It is interesting that D.A.G. Hinks, "Tria Genera Causarum" *CQ* 30 (1936) 170-6, does the same thing, but without crediting Quintilian.

¹⁹ Barwick (note 10) 214-5, who cites Spengel, "Die Rhetorica (des Anaximenes) ad Alexandrum kein Machwerk der spätesten Zeit" *Philologus* 18 (1862) 604-46, 608.

²⁰ The exceptional usage of the word γένει in the passage has thrown it into doubt. But if the initial sentence in 1.1, which contains γένη, is retained, then γένει probably ought to be retained here also.

²¹ This view has been supported also by Grube (note 11) 58 and Fuhrmann (note 11) 148.

I mean, is for listeners, who investigate each of the things said" *RhGr* 4 60.12-14 Walz). Clearly the first reading reports a distinction as occurring in the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* that does not in fact occur in the text.²² *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* assigns no particular role to the listeners for the *eidos exetastikon*. This divergence has reasonably been identified by the defenders of the Anaximenes attribution as either a later addition by a copyist (and not a reading of Syrianus himself)²³ or a reference to Syrianus' intermediate source.²⁴ Even if it were a reading of Syrianus, the burden of proof would still be on the side of the critics to show that he is reading another text rather than simply misreading *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*. The description of the seven species, which immediately precedes the disputed passage, as well as the definition of investigation, which follows, coincide with *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* very closely. The text of the second manuscript does not report the distinction as occurring in *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*. Rather, Syrianus appears there to make the distinction himself (φημί). His reason for doing so is unexplained, but Buchheit is wrong that *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* says "just the opposite" of what Syrianus supposed. Given that it is a handbook on how to compose speeches, not on how to listen to them, the three passages of *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* cited by Buchheit, 5.1-4, 36.1 and 37.1-7, do not rule out the possibility that an imaginative interpreter tried to explain the peculiar character of the *eidos exetastikon* by forming the distinction as Syrianus does. The *eidos exetastikon* is clearly different from all the other *eide* of rhetoric.²⁵

Buchheit's further criticisms do not merit special consideration here.²⁶ It must certainly be acknowledged that the link between Anaximenes and the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* has a narrow basis. Quintilian is the only author who connects them, and we can only be satisfied that his identification is correct because of the textual changes that are supported by Syrianus. However, we should neither minimize the agreement of the three texts cited together above nor forget that Anaximenes is identified by other sources both as a teacher of Alexander and as a writer of rhetorical handbooks.²⁷ It seems, therefore, preferable to attribute the

²² Buchheit (note 14) 194.

²³ Barwick (note 10) 215.

²⁴ Fuhrmann (note 11) 148.

²⁵ Fuhrmann 148-9 speculates about the influence of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* on Syrianus, especially its distribution of the roles of speaker and listener.

²⁶ His third criticism focuses on Spengel's deletion of τὸ δ' ἐπιδεικτικόν (the word ἐπιδεικτικόν does not appear elsewhere in the text, but see 35.2, discussed below) and the emendation in 17.3 from τριῶν το ἐπὶ εἰδῶν (cf. 6.3, 28.3 and 5 and 36.15). His fourth attempts to deal with the evidence in the prefatory letter, section 17: περὶ τε τῶν πολιτικῶν καὶ τῶν δικανικῶν παραγγελμάτων. Neither of these issues appears to add much substance in either direction for the attribution question.

²⁷ See *FGH* (note 6) 72 T 1 = *Suda*, s.v. Ἀναξίμενης. . . διδάσκαλος δὲ Ἀλεξάνδρου τοῦ Μακεδόνα, T 8 = Ps. Callisth. 1.13. . . διδάσκαλος (sc. Ἀλεξάνδρου) . . . ῥητορικῶν δὲ λόγων Ἀναξίμενης, T 13 = Dion. Hal., *De Isaeo* 19 καὶ τέχνας ἐξενήνοχεν, ἥπται

work to him rather than to continue the (overly) cautious practice of utilizing the label "anonymous".²⁸

IV

Despite superficial similarities, Anaximenes and Aristotle distinguish kinds of speeches in very different ways. Anaximenes' initial distinction of "political" speeches, between demegoric and forensic, hardly plays a role in the rest of the text, despite the importance Quintilian appears to have seen in it. Fuhrmann is probably correct that Anaximenes himself did not make the distinction, but began the handbook from the discussion of the seven *eide*. The only evidence that appears to group encomium and invective into a demegoric genus, together with exhortation and dissuasion, is the common set of topics given at 1.4 and 3.1 (cf. 10.1). The same list, "just, lawful, beneficial, noble, pleasant, easy," is given for both pairs of *eide*, but not for accusation, defense or investigation. Although Anaximenes does not explicitly label this list of topics as "demegoric" and at 6.1 limits them more narrowly to exhortation and dissuasion alone, both in the *Phaedrus* 261B and in the *Sophist* 222C, Plato divides "political" (πολιτική) speech - as opposed to private (προσομιλητική) - only between demegoric and forensic, which would indicate that for him epideictic was subsumed under demegoric.²⁹ Even centuries later Quintilian thinks it best to limit the division of oratory between forensic and non-forensic (*omne rationis officium aut in iudiciis est aut extra iudicia* 3.4.6).³⁰

With the *gene* playing such a limited role (if any) for Anaximenes, it is necessary to focus attention on the *eide*. At 5.4 Anaximenes suggests that although they are distinct, they may also be used in combination. In chapter 6, as just mentioned, he limits the list of topics "just, lawful, beneficial, etc." generally to exhortation and dissuasion. He says that amplification and minimization are particularly useful for encomium and invective (see also 3.1) and that proofs are used mostly for accusation and defense. Investigation is left out of his recapitulation in chapter 6 - although it was just discussed in chapter 5 - and in 37.1 Anaximenes admits that it is not often used by itself.³¹ The criteria that distinguish the *eide* for

δὲ καὶ συμβουλευτικὸν καὶ δικανικὸν ἀγώνων.

²⁸ Cope (note 7) 413-14 supports the attribution to Anaximenes, but would still print "anonymous" on the title page of the work.

²⁹ Cf. Hinks (note 18) 170.

³⁰ Quintilian appears to introduce Anaximenes' bipartition partly as a confirmation of his own view against Aristotle's tripartition.

³¹ The *eidos exetastikon* is in need of study in its own right. In chapters 9 and 10 Anaximenes gives a peculiar picture of τεχνήρια and ἐνθυμήματα that was perhaps influenced by a previous discussion devoted entirely to ἐξετάσις. Socrates (*Apology* 23C, 38A) refers to there being techniques associated with it, but I am unaware whether it was treated systematically elsewhere.

Anaximenes are thus the forms of argumentation, such as amplification or proofs, as well as the situation, whether the speech is to be delivered, for example, in an assembly or courtroom. As Hinks points out, his approach is largely empirical.³²

The very fluid distinctions among Anaximenes' *eide* do, however, contain elements that relate to the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle. For instance, in 35.2 (if the passage was not inserted later) Anaximenes points out that with regard to encomium and invective "for the most part we speak for the sake not of a contest but of demonstration" (ἐπιδείξεως). Not only does Anaximenes here employ the word *epideixis*, which Aristotle treats as a distinct *genos*, he also puts his finger on Aristotle's initial distinction, which separates the three kinds of oratory by reference to different kinds of listeners: those who judge (a contest) and those who observe a demonstration. The way Anaximenes groups the three pairs of opposing *eide* is clearly also represented in Aristotle, even if (by Aristotle) along much stricter lines.³³

In *Rhetoric* 1.3 Aristotle distinguishes his three kinds of "rhetorical speeches," as has been said, primarily in terms of their listeners, who are in each case related to the purpose of the speech (πρὸς τὸ τέλος). Among the listeners he then makes two distinctions, first between judge (κρίτης) and observer (θεωρός)³⁴ and second between judges of past and future events. As examples of the latter two, he proposes the assemblyman and the dikast. So much seems clear. Since he recognizes three kinds of listeners, he recognizes "from necessity" (ἐξ ἀνάγκης) three kinds of rhetorical speeches, deliberative, forensic and epideictic. Exhortation and dissuasion, accusation and defense and encomium and invective follow simply as parts of the three *gene* (1358b8-11). Aristotle does not use the word *eide* of them. In fact, he seems to use the terms *gene* and *eide* interchangeably in regard to the three generic kinds of speeches (see 1358a36 and b7). Finally, he clarifies the temporal aspect by recalling that deliberative oratory is concerned with the future, forensic with the past, and epideictic mainly with the present, although speakers may make use of past and future events when speaking of the present (b13-20).

Aristotle's categorization of speeches in terms of their differing purposes and temporal foci, as well as the differing roles to be played by the listeners, marks

³² Hinks (note 18) 172.

³³ Anaximenes' *eidos exetastikon* does not appear in Aristotle, but at the beginning of the *Rhetoric* there is a reference to investigation (1.1 1354a4-6 πάντες γὰρ μέχρι τινὸς καὶ ἐξετάζειν καὶ ὑπέχειν λόγον καὶ ἀπολογεῖσθαι καὶ κατηγορεῖν ἐγγειροῦσιν). The arrangement of the passage appears to put investigation into the semantic field of dialectic rather than rhetoric (cf. 1354a1 and *Topics* 1.1 100a20 and 1.2 101b3).

³⁴ The role of the observer has been disputed, notably by Hinks (note 18) 172-3, and emendations proposed to the text at 1358b5-6: (κρίνων) ... ὁ δὲ περὶ τῆς δυνάμεως ὁ θεωρός. Citing Cicero, *Part. orat.* 10, Kassel deletes the passage entirely. The emendation, which I believe to be correct, goes some way to obviating Hinks' objection that the observer may have some function as a judge.

it off significantly from that of Anaximenes. Moreover, his tripartition is clearly not as logical an outcome of the fourth century rhetorical tradition as Solmsen supposes. It was possible - as in the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* - for seven species to be recognized together with two (or three) genera.³⁵ Certainly, as Solmsen points out, Aristotle's method proceeds deductively, but he backs up his view also with empirical observation. At 1358b29-59a6 he points out that speakers in deliberative, forensic and epideictic situations are willing in practice to surrender on all points except the one that corresponds to the purpose of their speeches.

At any rate, the first part of Solmsen's thesis is secure, at least from the challenge of Anaximenes. Aristotle's tripartition of rhetorical speeches appears "original". Whether in the hands of Cicero and Quintilian it remains properly "characteristic" of Aristotle is the matter of the rest of this paper.

V

Quintilian notes that both he himself (3.4.2) and Cicero (*De or.* 2.43-51) have misgivings about delimiting the kinds of rhetoric in the way Aristotle prescribes. In *De Inventione* 1.7, Cicero gives a more or less accurate picture of Aristotle's scheme, of which he approves, but he does not mention the temporal sequence of the three genera or the *telos* of each of them.³⁶ In *De oratore* 2.42-51, however, Cicero mentions several occasions in which rhetorical skill is needed, such as on embassies and in delivering messages to generals in the field. He objects to these occasions being pigeonholed into the sets of rules governing the three genera of rhetoric. Cicero is right and Aristotle would likely agree with him that not all applications of rhetorical skill need occur within the context of rhetorical speeches. Anaximenes mentions at 1.3, for instance, that what he is saying has applications in private, as well as public matters. While this holds true also of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, nevertheless, as George Kennedy has underlined, the subject matter of the treatise is "civic discourse".³⁷

The development of *stasis*-theory in the Hellenistic period, together with an increasing concentration on forensic oratory, greatly complicates the position of Aristotle's tripartite scheme. Cicero in the *De inventione* 1.12-13 recognizes that the Hermagorean notion of *staseis*, which relegated considerations of benefit, justice and honor to the third *stasis*, the *constitutio generalis*, was incompatible with the

³⁵ On the other hand, there are reports in Diogenes Laertius that Plato recognized six *eide* (3.93-4) of rhetoric, while Zeno took it to have three parts (τριμερῇ 7.42). The authenticity of these reports seems dubious.

³⁶ In *De inv.* 1.12 he mentions that each genus has its own end, but he does not specify them.

³⁷ Cf. G. Kennedy (note 6), who subtitles his translation of the *Rhetoric* "A Theory of Civic Discourse."

Aristotelian system. It appears to have more in common with the list of topics used by Anaximenes at 1.4 and 3.1, which are discussed above. Cicero overcomes the difficulty by proposing that there be only two subdivisions in the third *stasis*, the *iuridicialis* and the *negotialis*, which is more or less compatible with what Aristotle says in *Rhet.* 1.13-15 and confines the subdivisions to the forensic *telos*. Yet without a fuller understanding of the methodology of Aristotle's scheme, Cicero's defense is somewhat handicapped and by the time of Quintilian, the scheme appears simply as a confused jumble.

Quintilian's discussion in 3.3.14-3.4.16 is especially interesting, however, because it includes all the important elements from Aristotle, but not in a systematic, or even accurate way. First, Quintilian incorrectly claims that Aristotle uses the term *contionalis* (δημηγορικόν) instead of *deliberativa* (συμβουλευτικόν). The mistake strongly suggests that he is not reporting this aspect of Aristotle's rhetorical theory from direct knowledge of *Rhetoric* 1.3, but knows of it only by report. Second, his description of the three kinds of listeners in 3.4.6 is accurate as far as deliberative and forensic oratory, but he sees epideictic listeners convening for the sake of pleasure, which is not a part of Aristotle's view (cf. Cicero, *Part. orat.* 10). Third, with regard to the temporal aspect of the Aristotelian scheme, Quintilian in 3.4.7-8 directs epideictic not toward the present, but toward past actions about which there is to be certainty. For Aristotle, questions about which there is certainty lie outside rhetoric (cf. *Rhet.* 1.2 1357a1-7). Finally, in 3.4.16 Quintilian accurately presents the *telos* (*materia*) of each of Aristotle's *genera* only to criticize that aspect of the scheme because, e.g., speakers in practice mix considerations of honor and justice into deliberative speeches. This argument almost directly contradicts Aristotle's own empirical claim that, for instance, speakers in epideictic speeches will surrender points about whether an action is beneficial or just so long as they can argue that it is honorable (*Rhet.* 1.3 1358b38-59a6). Clearly Quintilian is aware of all the elements of Aristotle's scheme, but he does not attribute most of them directly to Aristotle. They are attributed instead to nameless defenders of Aristotle's teaching. The result is that in his presentation the parts do not add up to a cohesive whole.

Quintilian senses that Aristotle's view does not coincide with the empirical reality of his time; but he is unwilling to ascribe his difficulties wholly to differences of time and place. Apparently he is misinformed about the methodology of Aristotle's division of the kinds of listeners, between those who judge and those who merely observe. That distinction can hardly be bound by time and place. Quintilian wonders why, for instance, if there is to be a special genus for praise and denunciation, there should not also be genera for complaining, consoling, pacifying, exciting, terrifying, encouraging, etc. (3.4.3). If Quintilian had properly observed Aristotle's methodology, he might have found places for the many forms of speaking he describes, even though many of them hardly belong to public oratory, or even to

the realm of persuasion.³⁸ Those speeches, such as some panegyrics, that appear to cross over from one genus to another are often characterized by an artificiality that ought to disqualify them as true tests of Aristotle's scheme.

That Aristotle does not elucidate his tripartite scheme more fully seems to be the cause of much misunderstanding. Hinks objects to there being two criteria of classification, one by *telos* and one by time.³⁹ There might, for instance, be a speech that concerns a future action, but whose argument is based on justice or honor (cf. Quintilian 3.4.16). Aristotle does not adequately explain this circumstance.⁴⁰ Instead, he simply implies that considerations of future actions are coincident with considerations of what is beneficial, that considerations of the past are coincident with those of justice, and that considerations of the present are coincident with those of honor. Presumably his explanation would stem from his still somewhat deductive view of rhetoric, which imposes a *telos* on a given speech. But he does not present such an explanation. It is true that he thinks that this really is the way that speakers argue (*Rhet.* 1.3 1358b29-59a6). To this extent his deductive reasoning is backed up by empirical observation. On the other hand, Aristotle's strict delineation of each genus and its *telos* corresponds to his commitment that an orator speak "to the point". Unlike Cicero and Quintilian, for instance, Aristotle would insist that there can be only one *telos* for each case at hand (1354b21-4). For the most part Aristotle is faithful to this commitment in the *Rhetoric*. Rarely does he recommend arguments based on what is beneficial (τὸ σὺμφερον), for instance, for a forensic speech.⁴¹

³⁸ Quintilian's list might be handled in the following way. Under deliberative: console, pacify, excite, terrify, encourage, plead for mercy, command. Under forensic: complain. Under epideictic: thank, congratulate, reproach, abuse, express desires and opinions. Activities dealing with teaching are beyond Aristotle's conception of rhetoric. They might be included as belonging to the narrative portion of any of the kinds of speeches, or perhaps they belong within the realm of dialectic.

³⁹ Hinks (note 18) 172.

⁴⁰ See, however, *Nicomachean Ethics* 3.3 1112b17, where Aristotle suggests that practical deliberation may entertain moral considerations: When there are several means to achieve a goal, men consider which way is easiest and best (ῥᾱστα καὶ κάλλιστα). What is best is often very difficult from what is easiest, for the latter may be unjust and generally dishonorable.

⁴¹ But c. 1.15 1376b29.

Aristotle and Cicero on the *officia oratoris*

Lucia Calboli Montefusco

It is well known that Cicero derived from Aristotle and from the later Peripatetic school many precepts.¹ This is certainly true of rhetoric; and in this paper I would like to focus on a problem which, when examined carefully, turns out to be much more complex than it would first appear, namely the doctrine of the *officia oratoris*. That is to say, we must try not only to understand what Cicero meant when he called on the orator to *docere*, *conciliare/delectare*, and *movere*; but also to see whether the alternative formulations, *conciliare* and *delectare*, are based on different elements in Aristotelian rhetorical theory. I shall argue that we face two distinct kinds of "*officia*," expressed by the two triads, which for the moment I indicate "tout court" by the expressions *docere conciliare movere* and *docere delectare movere*. I think that the difference between them can be explained by considering two points in Aristotle's doctrine, enlarged by not insignificant Hellenistic elements.

Everybody is familiar with Aristotle's distinction between three *πίστεις ἑντεχνονοί*: namely, those which are in the *ethos* of the speaker, those which consist of evoking feelings in the audience and finally those which are in the speech itself: *Rhet.* 1356a1 ff. τῶν δὲ διὰ τοῦ λόγου ... πίστεων τρία εἶδη ἐστίν· αἱ μὲν γὰρ εἰσιν ἐν τῷ ᾗθρῳ τοῦ λέγοντος, αἱ δὲ ἐν τῷ τὸν ἀκροατὴν διαθεῖναι πῶς, αἱ δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ λόγῳ διὰ τοῦ δευκνύναι ἢ φαίνεσθαι δευκνύναι, and cf. 1377b20 ff.² Although this distinction has generally³ been considered the origin of the doctrine of the *officia*

Full references for works cited below are given in a bibliography at the end of this paper.

¹ See, e.g., the recent collection of papers in: W. Fortenbaugh-P. Steinmetz, eds., *Cicero's Knowledge of the Peripatos*.

² On Aristotle's doctrine of the *πίστεις* cf. Solmsen, "Aristotelian Tradition" 38 f.; Grimaldi, "A Note on the *πίστεις*" 188 ff.; Buchheit, *Untersuchungen* 129 ff.; Lienhardt, "A Note on the Meaning of *πίστις*" 446 ff.; Hellwig, *Untersuchungen* 22; 234 ff.; Martin, *Antike Rhetorik* 96; 158; Wisse, *Ethos and Pathos* 14 ff.

³ Cf. Hendrickson, "The Origin and Meaning" 260; Solmsen, "Orator's Playing" 398 ff.; Barwick, *Bildungsideal* 77; Kroll, "Rhetorik" 1101; Michel, *Rhétorique et philosophie*

oratoris, it alone is not sufficient to explain the difference in terminology between the *De oratore*, where one finds the triad *docere, conciliare, movere*, and the later works *Brutus*, *Orator* and *De optimo genere oratorum*, where one has the other triad *docere, delectare, movere*.⁴ In my opinion, this difference can be explained only if we take account of the doctrine of the *exordium* as well as that of the *πίστευς*. For I find a significant analogy between the three tasks, *docere, delectare, movere*, and the three functions which Aristotle attributes to the beginning of the speech: namely, winning the goodwill of the audience towards the speaker and influencing it against the opponent, gaining attention or alternatively distracting, and producing readiness to learn: *Rhet.* 1415a34 ff. τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὸν ἀκροατὴν ἕκ τε τοῦ εὖ νοῦν ποιῆσαι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὀργίσαι, καὶ ἐνίστη τὸ προσεκτικὸν ἢ τοῦναντίον ... εἰς δὲ εὐμάθειαν ἅπαντα ἀνάγει.⁵

I have read with great interest William Fortenbaugh's paper "*Benevolentiam conciliare and animos permovere: Some Remarks on Cicero's De oratore 2.178-216*"⁶ and find in it a partial confirmation of my argument. Only partial, however, because the difference in terminology used in Cicero's works complicates the problem. Fortenbaugh can rightly say that *conciliare benevolentiam* in the *De oratore* is derived more from handbook accounts of the introduction than from the *πίστις* διὰ τοῦ ἥθους of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* 1356a4 ff.⁷ It is, however, impossible to say the same for the verb *delectare*, which, referring to the *officia oratoris*, is

chez Cicéron 154 f.; Adamietz, *Quintiliani Liber III* 101; Douglas, *Comm. Cic. Brut.* p. 35; Schotländer, "Der römische Redner" 131; Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion* 292; id., *Classical Rhetoric* 100; 156; May, *Trials of Character* 4; Leeman-Pinkster-Rabbie, *Comm. Cic. De orat.* Vol. III p. 123; Vickers, *In Defence of Rhetoric* 35. Volkmann's opinion (*Rhetorik* 32) is, on the contrary, that Cicero's doctrine derives on the whole from the Stoics and that only the distinction *movere - docere* is to be linked with Aristotle's *πίστις*.

⁴ Cf. *De orat.* 2.115; 2.121; 2.128; 2.310; 3.104; *Brut.* 185; 197 ff.; 276; *Orat.* 69; *Opt. gen.* 3; the differences in terminology inside each triad are insignificant.

⁵ I advanced this hypothesis in 1988, when I was dealing with the doctrine of the beginning of the speech (in *Exordium Narratio Epilogus* 6-8), but I did it intuitively, because only now, after having considered the question more deeply, I realize that this latter relationship concerns only the formulation of the doctrine of the *officia oratoris* which we find in *Brutus*, in *Orator* and in *De optimo genere oratorum*: Cicero's requirement that the orator must be able to *docere delectare movere*. The problem is tied to the proposition, which I want to argue in this paper, that Antonius in *De oratore*, referring to *docere conciliare movere* (2.115; 121; 128; 310; 3.104), means only the devices needed to achieve persuasion and not the *officia oratoris* which are the tasks which the orator must accomplish in order to be considered perfect. For this reason I now think that we must make a distinction and recognize the influence of Aristotle's *πίστις* only in the first triad, even if in regard to *conciliare* this influence has been coupled with the doctrine of the *exordium*. With this latter, in its totality, we must on the contrary link only the second triad. Consequently what I maintained in *Fortunatiani Ars Rhetorica* 477 ff. must be changed in accordance with my new opinion.

⁶ *Rhetorica* 6, 1988, 259-273.

⁷ Cf. pp. 264 f.

found instead of *conciliare* in the three later works of Cicero.

Why Cicero made this change is problematic. Some scholars have not noted any substantial difference between the two verbs and have considered both as equivalents.⁸ Others see in this change an intentional rejection of the verb *conciliare* because it could not express Cicero's new interest in style, which is reflected in the verb *delectare*.⁹ Finally I have found in the recent book of Jakob Wisse, *Ethos and Pathos from Aristotle to Cicero*¹⁰ an interesting idea, even if it is necessary to treat it with care. The idea is that what Cicero means in *De oratore* is not the same as he means in *Brutus*, *Orator* and *De optimo genere oratorum*. The expression *docere conciliare movere* of *De oratore* represents the three *πίστεις* of Aristotle (i.e., it is a division of invention) whereas the later triad *docere delectare movere* belongs "to the analysis of style and especially in *Brutus* the evaluation of the performance, as a whole, of individual orators."¹¹ Consequently the first division is related mainly to the content and the second one to the style and its effect on the audience. Wisse also points out that *docere delectare movere* are said in the *Brutus* and *Orator* to be the *officia oratoris*,¹² and that this expression is nowhere used by Cicero in *De oratore* in reference to the three *res* the orator needs to know to persuade the audience, *docere conciliare movere*. Finally he maintains that "the assumption that the two divisions are only two manifestations of one and the same concept approached from the side of content and from that of style"¹³ must be rejected, and in this way he denies that the difference in terminology corresponds to a difference in emphasis, in accordance with Cicero's sliding, between 55 and 46 B.C., towards questions of style because of his controversy with the Atticists.

Of Wisse's thesis I share only the first idea, namely that the two triads, *docere conciliare movere* and *docere delectare movere*, are different: the first one tells us how the orator can achieve persuasion (*De orat.* 2.115 *omnis ratio dicendi tribus ad persuadendum rebus est nixa: ut probemus vera esse quae defendimus, ut conciliemus eos nobis qui audiunt, ut animos eorum ad quemcumque causa postulabit motum vocemus*; cf. 2.121; 2.128; 2.310; 3.104), the second one tells

⁸ Cf. for instance Volkmann, *Rhetorik* 32; Solmsen, "Orator's Playing" 399; id., "The Aristotelian Tradition" 178; Kroll, *Comm. Cic. orat.* p. 72; Douglas, "A Ciceronian Contribution" 24 f.; id., "Intellectual Background" 118; Leeman, *Orationis ratio* 151; Quadlbauer, "Die genera dicendi" 86 ff.; Adam, *Docere delectare movere* 108 ff.; Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion* 292; id., *The Art of Rhetoric* 207; 255; id., *Classical Rhetoric* 80 f.; 100; Gill, "The Ethos/Pathos Distinction" 157; May, *Trials of Character* 4 f.; Vickers, *In Defence of Rhetoric* 35.

⁹ Cf. Michel, *Rhétorique et philosophie* 155 f.; Fantham, "Ciceronian conciliare" 274; Desmouliéz, *Cicéron et son goût* 440 f.

¹⁰ Cf. p. 212 ff.

¹¹ Cf. p. 213.

¹² Cf. *Brut.* 197; 198; *Orat.* 69.

¹³ Cf. p. 214.

us which tasks the orator has to perform to be considered *optimus orator* (*Opt. gen.* 3). What Cicero means is evident from the example he gives in *Brutus* 194-198: it is the famous *Causa Curiana*, in which Scaevola, the well known jurist, was opposed by Crassus, the orator "par excellence."¹⁴ *Quis ex populo*, Cicero asks, hearing Scaevola speaking *perite* and *scienter* and *breviter* and *presse* and *satis ornate* and *pereleganter*, could think of or look for something better?¹⁵ But after Crassus had spoken, *ille de populo iudex, qui separatim alterum admiratus esset, idem audito altero, iudicium suum contemneret*. Why? Because during the speech Crassus, not Scaevola, accomplished the three tasks of the perfect orator: *initio ... delectavit animosque omnium qui aderant in hilaritatem a severitate traduxit; quod est unum ex tribus quae dixi ab oratore effici debere. deinde ... fidem faciebat; quod est ex tribus oratoris officiis alterum. deinde ... cum graviter tum ab exemplis copiose, tum varie, tum etiam ridicule et facete explicans eam admirationem ad sensionemque commovit, dixisse ut contra nemo videretur; — hoc erat oratoris officium partitione tertium, genere maximum* (*Brut.* 197 f.). Therefore it is only by comparison that the judge *indoctus* can understand the superiority of Crassus over Scaevola,¹⁶ because it is not only the ability to persuade that is in question — that had obviously been achieved by Scaevola — it is also the much greater ability to apply the speech to the minds of the jurors as a hand on the strings of a cithara: only the true orator can *animis iudicum admoveere orationem tamquam fidibus manum* (*Brut.* 200; cf. 199 *ut enim ex nervorum sono in fidibus quam scienter ei pulsi sint intellegi solet: sic ex animorum motu cernitur quid tractandis his perficiat orator*).¹⁷

But let me return to the first triad of *De oratore*, i.e. *docere conciliare movere*. The influence of the three *πίστεως*, which many scholars think to be the basis of this triad, was first suggested by Martianus Capella: 166,4 ff. *Willis fides autem tribus fit modis: conciliando, docendo, permovendo. illa prior ethica, sequens*

¹⁴ The *Causa Curiana* has been a paradigmatic juridical case of *scriptum et sententia* (on this kind of trial see my discussion in *La dottrina degli status* 153 ff.) and Cicero reminds us of it often; cf. the passages quoted by Bretonne, *Tecniche e ideologie* 111 n. 30. The bibliography in this regard is very rich: cf. for example Kaser, *Privatrecht* I² 236; 690; Stroux, *Römische Rechtswissenschaft* 42 ff.; Wieacker, "The 'Causa Curiana'" 151 ff.; Wesel, *Scriptum et sententia* 351 ff.; Vonglis, *La lettre et l'esprit de la loi* 126 ff. From not only a juridical standpoint, but also a rhetorical one, the *Causa Curiana* has been studied by Vaughn, "Law and Rhetoric in the *Causa Curiana*" 208 ff.

¹⁵ On the juridical and rhetorical skill of Scaevola cf. the judgement of Cic. *De orat.* 1.180 and Leeman-Pinkster-Nelson, *Comm. Cic. de orat.* Vol. II p. 69 f.

¹⁶ The effect of comparison on the *iudicium vulgi* had been pointed out by Cicero himself just a little before (*Brut.* 193); cf. in this regard Schenkeveld, "*Iudicia vulgi*" 296 ff. Often Cicero in his works considers the problem of the coincidence between popular and informed judgement: cf. Desmouliez, *Cicéron et son goût* 225 ff.

¹⁷ Cf. also Fantham, "Ciceronian *conciliare*" 275.

apodictica, tertia pathetica nominatur.¹⁸ But already in Martianus Capella's following words we see the statement that *conciliare* is more suitable to the functions of the beginning of the speech: 166,6 f. *Willis conciliatione licet in tota causa uti conveniat, tamen in principiis uberius insistendum*. This is important, for the correspondance between Aristotle's πίστις and the triad *docere conciliare movere* finds a considerable obstacle in that Aristotelian ἦθος τοῦ λέγοντος lacks a connection with the *captatio benevolentiae* which is the aim of Cicero's ethos. Aristotle ascribes to the ἦθος τοῦ λέγοντος a rational effect on the hearers, who believe μᾶλλον καὶ θάρσυνον the orator ἐπεικῆς (*Rhet.* 1356a6 f.), i.e., the honorable speaker who through his speech appears credible (ἀξιόπιστος).¹⁹ Cicero's *conciliare*, on the contrary, is linked with the arousal of feelings, because its goal is to win the audience's goodwill through the portrayal of ethos (*Cic. Orat.* 128 *quod Graeci ἠθικόν vocant, ad naturas et ad mores et ad omnem vitae consuetudinem accommodatum ... come iucundum ad benevolentiam conciliandam paratum*).²⁰ Moreover Aristotle doesn't say in which style the ἦθος τοῦ λέγοντος²¹ should be expressed, whereas Cicero ties *conciliare* to the description of the ethos in a mild way, as opposed to the violent one which is needed to arouse the pathos: *Cic. De orat.* 2.128-9 *tres sunt res ... una conciliandorum hominum, altera docendorum, tertia concitandorum. harum trium partium prima lenitatem orationis, secunda acumen, tertia vim desiderat*. This *lenitas* in the description of the ethos, which besides the *elocutio* also involves the *actio* (cf. *De orat.* 2.182; 2.184; 2.200; 2.211; 2.212; 2.216), helps the speaker in the attainment of the goal of ethos, which is to win the goodwill of the hearers.

This problem, interesting but very complex, was considered many years ago by Elaine Fantham.²² Starting now from an analysis of her paper I would like not only to focus on some points which, in my opinion, confirm the idea expressed by Fortenbaugh — namely, that the doctrine of the *exordium* plays a decisive role

¹⁸ Cf. Fischer, *Untersuchungen* 61; Lausberg, *Handbuch* 140; Calboli Montefusco, *Exordium Narratio Epilogus* 7.

¹⁹ *Rhet.* 1356a5 ff. διὰ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ἠθους, ὅταν οὕτω λεχθῇ ὁ λόγος ὥστε ἀξιόπιστον ποιῆσαι τὸν λέγοντα; cf. 1366a28 and Fortenbaugh, "*Benevolentiam conciliare*" 262; id., "The Composition" 155; id. "Aristotle on Persuasion" 225-8.

²⁰ On this distinction cf. Fortenbaugh, "*Benevolentiam conciliare*" 260 ff.; Wisse, *Ethos and Pathos* 234 ff.; Leeman-Pinkster-Rabbie, *Comm. Cic. de orat.* Vol. III p. 128. Gill, "The Ethos/Pathos Distinction" 153 and 157, does not see any difference and therefore ascribes also to Aristotle's ethos the function of winning the goodwill of the hearers and of arousing their feelings. Fantham, "Ciceronian *conciliare*" 269, thinks that the meaning of Ciceronian *conciliare*, namely the *captatio benevolentiae*, is "the underlying motive of the πίστις διὰ τοῦ ἠθους," but explains the shift in the use from Aristotle to Cicero as a shift from an "unstressed motive of Aristotle's proof" to a Ciceronian "actual method". Completely unfavorable to Fantham's opinion is Wisse, *Ethos and Pathos* 235 n. 56.

²¹ The λέξις ἠθική of *Rhet.* 1408a25 ff. is a quite different thing.

²² Cf. "Ciceronian *conciliare*" 262 ff.

in the origin of *conciliare* in the triad of *De oratore* — but also to make clear that this doctrine must be seen not in substitution, but in combination with the influence of the *πίστεις* to explain the true meaning of Ciceronian *conciliare*. Fantham's paper deals with Cicero's modifications of the *πίστις διὰ τοῦ ἡθους* and why he made them.²³ The first difficulty which Cicero met, as she says, was due to the need for him to apply to Roman forensic practice precepts which Aristotle had been chiefly applying to deliberative oratory. In Rome the defendant usually did not speak in the court himself; instead an advocate spoke for him. This duality of *patronus* - *cliens*²⁴ further complicates the relationship with the Aristotelian source. This problem, however, is not as important as the difference between deliberative and judicial oratory, because the most effective influence on the audience depends on the *ethos* of the speaker, not on the *ethos* of the defendant. This can be confirmed by the victory of Antonius in the defence of Norbanus: *De orat.* 2.201 *petebam a iudicibus, ut illud aetati meae, ut honoribus, ut rebus gestis, si iusto, si pio dolore me esse adfectum viderent, concederent, praesertim si in aliis causis intellexissent omnia me semper pro amicorum periculis, nihil unquam pro me ipso deprecatum.*²⁵ There is here no hint of Norbanus's *mores* — a deliberate choice, because the defence of a man *sediciosus* and *crudelis*, as Norbanus actually was, could appear to have been undertaken *vix satis honeste* (*De orat.* 2.198).²⁶

²³ Cf. May, *Trials of Character* 5, who, moving from Fantham's statements, synthesizes: "it is an *ethos* concerned primarily with judicial, not deliberative oratory; it is an *ethos* that deals with the emotions (*affectus*), closely related to *pathos* but involving the milder feelings ... it is an *ethos* attentive to and more intricately associated with style".

²⁴ On this relationship and on the more complex identity *patronus* - *orator*, cf. the fundamental study of Neuhauser, *Patronus und orator*, Innsbruck 1958. From a strictly rhetorical standpoint this splitting of persons, which sometimes was reabsorbed into a single identity combining defendant and speaker, could have particularly effective results during the speech: cf. examples from Cicero's speeches in Kennedy, "The Rhetoric of Advocacy" 429 ff. and in May, "The Rhetoric of Advocacy" 308 f. For a recent analysis of the speech *Pro Sextio Roscio Amerino* examined by both Kennedy and May, cf. also Stroh, *Taxis und Taktik* 55 ff.; and for the speech *Pro Flacco* considered only by May, cf. Classen, *Recht, Rhetorik, Politik* 180 ff.

²⁵ On the *conciliatio benevolentiae* towards Antonius himself and not towards his client, cf. Kennedy, *The Art of Rhetoric*; Fantham, "Ciceronian *conciliare*" 266; Wisse, *Ethos and Pathos* 280.

²⁶ Cf. Cic. *De orat.* 2.124 *cum hominem sediciosum furiosumque defenderet*. Norbanus, *tribunus plebis* in 103 B.C. together with L. Appuleius Saturninus, had charged Q. Servilius Caepio with the waste of the army after the defeat he and Mallius had suffered in Arausium. On this occasion Norbanus *egit de Caepione turbulentius* (Cic. *Part.* 105), because the attempted intercession of the two tribunes Didius and Cotta had been hindered by force and Scaurus himself, *princeps senatus*, had been hit by a stone. Because of this violence against Caepio, Norbanus was prosecuted and accused on a charge *de maiestate* by Sulpicius. He was defended by Antonius, who was tied to him with a relationship of *sodalitas*, for Norbanus had been his questor in Cilicia. This trial, a paradigmatic case of *status definitivus* (Cic. *De orat.* 2.107; *Part.* 105) is frequently quoted by Cicero (cf. also *De orat.* 2.89;

After having said that three *res*, namely *docere conciliare movere* (*De orat.* 2.115-128), are necessary to achieve persuasion, and at the end of his lengthy explanation of *docere*, Antonius himself emphasizes the importance of the *ethos* of the speaker: if the orator not only knows the *loci argumentorum*, but is also able to appear *talis ... qualem se videri velit* and to play upon the feelings of the jurors, so that he can *trahere* and *rapere* them wherever he wants to, then he *nihil profecto ad dicendum requireret* (*De orat.* 2.176). Antonius's victory in the trial of Norbanus was, as he tells us, the result of his appearing *et acerrimus in Caepionis invidia renovanda et in meis moribus erga meos necessarios declarandis mansuetissimus*. Therefore, if the speaker wishes to persuade, he must appear in such a light that he obtains credibility. This had also been maintained by Charmadas when, in polemic against Menedemus, he accused the *rhetoires* of not having given precepts about it: *De orat.* 1.87 *caput enim esse arbitrabatur oratoris, ut et ipsis apud quos ageret talis qualem se ipse optaret videretur; id fieri vitae dignitate, de qua nihil rhetorici isti doctores in praeceptis suis reliquissent; et uti ei qui audirent sic adficerentur animis ut eos adfici vellet orator.*²⁷ Thus we must be careful to keep the *ethos* of the speaker quite distinct from the *ethos* of the defendant. Appearing honest and honorable gains not only goodwill but also *auctoritas*²⁸ for the speaker, and in particular it renders him credible, whereas presenting the defendant as a honorable man helps only to win the goodwill of the judge. This *captatio benevolentiae* is most evident in the doctrine of the beginning of the speech: *De orat.* 2.321 *aut ex reo aut ex adversario aut ex re aut ex eis, apud quos agitur, sententias duci licebit. ex reo ... quae significant bonum virum, quae liberalem, quae calamitosum, quae misericordia dignum, quae valeant contra falsam criminationem.*

This distinction between the *ethos* of the *patronus* and the *ethos* of the *cliens* is an important one, and Quintilian acknowledges it when he deals with the precepts

2.124; 2.164; 2.167; 2.188). For these historical and political events cf. Calboli, *Rhetorica ad Herennium* 227; id., "L'oratore M. Antonio" 153 ff. (with bibliography); Badian, "The Silence of Norbanus" 156 ff.; Wisse, *Ethos and Pathos* 270; Leeman-Pinkster-Nelson, *Comm. Cic. De orat.* Vol. II p. 300; Leeman-Pinkster-Rabbie, *Comm. Cic. De orat.* Vol. III pp. 47; 130 f.

²⁷ On a possible academic "Mittelquelle," cf. Leeman-Pinkster-Rabbie, *Comm. Cic. De orat.* Vol. III p. 125.

²⁸ For the deliberative genre of rhetoric this was especially important: Quint. 3.8.13 *valet autem in consiliis auctoritas plurimum. nam et prudentissimus esse haberi et optimus debet orator, qui sententiae suae de utilibus atque honestis credere omnes velit*; cf. Cic. *De orat.* 2.333. The influence of Arist. *Rhet.* 1377b25 is evident: cf. Adamietz, *Quintiliani Liber III* 177; Calboli Montefusco, "L'auctoritas nella dottrina retorica" 52 ff. Douglas, "A Ciceronian Contribution" 25 and May, *Trials of Character* 9, point out, however, that this Ciceronian image of an *auctoritas* attained by portraying virtuous *mores* represents a quite remarkable modification towards Aristotelian *ethos* which didn't consist of a previous good reputation of the orator, but of the impression he gave of himself through the speech; cf. also Wisse, *Ethos and Pathos* 245 f. This detail is not considered by Michel, *Rhétorique et philosophie chez Cicéron* 155 f.

of the *exordium*. For he adds the *actor causae* to Aristotle's threefold distinction between the speaker = defendant, the opponent and the judge: 4.6.1 f. *sed personarum non est, ut plerique crediderunt, triplex ratio, ex litigatore et adversario et iudice: nam exordium duci nonnumquam etiam ab actore causae solet. quamquam enim pauciora de se ipso dicit et parcius, plurimum tamen ad omnia momenti est in hoc positum, si vir bonus creditur.*²⁹ It is evident that Quintilian is distinguishing between *patronus* and *cliens*.³⁰ Often, however, rhetorical texts ignore the distinction, because they are derived only from rhetorical sources. That is the case in *De inventione* and in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, where the threefold distinction of the *persona*, in the doctrine of the *exordium*, concerns only *nostra persona*, besides the *persona* of the opponent and the *persona* of the judge (*Inv.* 1.22 *benivolentia quattuor ex locis comparatur: ab nostra, ab adversariorum, ab iudicum persona, a causa; Rhet. Her.* 1.8 *benivolos auditores facere quattuor modis possumus: ab nostra, ab adversariorum nostrorum, ab auditorum persona, et ab rebus ipsis*). It is evident that *nostra persona* corresponds to ὁ λέγων of Aristotle's προοίμιον, and there is no clarification whether *nostra persona* means the speaker or the man for whom the speaker is speaking.³¹ Similarly, all the good qualities, which Cicero in *De orat.* 2.321 refers to the person of the defendant (*ex reo*), are in the *Partitiones oratoriae* referred to *nostra persona*: *Part.* 28 *initia benevolentiae conciliandae comparantur aut meritis nostris, aut dignitate aut aliquo genere virtutis et maxime liberalitatis officii iustitiae fidei*. It is evident that here the *ethos* of the speaker is not distinguished from the *ethos* of the defendant because the two *personae* are virtually the same. In Cicero's more technical works, then, as *De inventione* or *Partitiones* are, the doctrine of the *exordium*, which is derived from Aristotle's precepts, even if through Hellenistic handbook accounts, fails to draw any distinction between speaker (*patronus*) and defendant (*cliens*), because defendant and speaker are coincident. In *De oratore*, on the contrary, where Cicero prefers to draw attention to the person of the orator rather than to school precepts, the distinction appears in its reality: the *reus*, the defendant, has his own ethical description which is different from the orator's: the *ethos* of the defendant aims only at *captatio benevolentiae*, the *ethos* of the speaker aims also at credibility.

²⁹ Cf. Calboli Montefusco, *Exordium Narratio Epilogus* 19 f.; id., "L'auctoritas nella dottrina retorica" 54. The importance of the *ethos* of the speaker in addition to that of the defendant is pointed out once more by Quint. 6.2.18 *denique ἥθος omne bonum et comem virum poscit. quas virtutes cum etiam in litigatore debeat orator, si fieri potest, adprobare, utique ipse aut habeat aut habere credatur. sic proderit plurimum causis, quibus ex sua bonitate faciet fidem.*

³⁰ Cf. Quint. 4.1.45 f. and Kennedy, "The Rhetoric of Advocacy" 435 f.

³¹ Cf. Kennedy, "The Rhetoric of Advocacy" 433, who, however, recognizes an allusion to the real practice of advocacy in the statements on the *persona* inside the topic of conjectural trials (Cic. *Inv.* 2.35 *defensor autem primum, si poterit, debet vitam eius, qui insimulabitur, quam honestissimam demonstrare...*; cf. *Rhet. Her.* 2.5).


There is indeed no doubt that in the two passages of *De oratore* quoted above (*De orat.* 1.87; 2.176), where Cicero is talking about the need for the orator to appear as he would like to appear, the stress is on the image he must project in order to be considered credible and thus achieve persuasion in accordance with the true meaning of Aristotelian ἥθος.³² When on the contrary Cicero deals with the doctrine of the *exordium* (*De orat.* 2.321), where winning goodwill depends on portraying the ethos of the *reus* (defendant) it is clear that he doesn't want to identify defendant and speaker. When finally he explains at length the value of the ethos of both speaker and defendant, when trying to win (*De orat.* 2.182 ff.), the distinction between the two persons seems to be lost and winning the goodwill of the judge appears as the only goal of the presentation of the *mores* of the defendant and of the speaker, but, as far as the orator is concerned, also of his *lenitas* of style and delivery. In this way *conciliare*, referring to the speaker, becomes the result not only of a specific ethical content but also of a specific style (*lenitas*). Later I will single out some important remarks on this point. What now I would like to stress is that it is in this duality of aims, being believable to the audience and winning its goodwill, that the ethos of the orator combines Aristotle's πίστις διὰ τοῦ ἡθους with the theory of the *exordium*.

The second difficulty discussed by Fantham concerns Cicero's choice of the verb *conciliare*: because this verb is "too general" it "prevents him from distinguishing between the descriptive role of the 'ethical' proof, with its emphasis on ποῖόν τινα φαίνεσθαι τὸν λέγοντα ... and the emotive role of the πίστις διὰ τῶν ἀκροατῶν" (272). This is an important point. If we agree that the πίστις διὰ τοῦ ἡθους has been coupled together with the *captatio benevolentiae* of the *exordium* we can consider the triad of *De oratore*, *docere conciliare movere*, as a combination of two divisions: one in which the rational element is opposed to the arousal of feelings (cf. Cic. *De orat.* 2.114; 2.178³³) and a second where this

³² The persuasive power of ἥθος is often pointed out by Aristotle: *Rhet.* 1356a4 ff. διὰ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ἡθους, ὅταν οὕτω λεχθῇ ὁ λόγος ὥστε ἀξιόπιστον ποιῆσαι τὸν λέγοντα; cf. 1366a25 ff.; 1378a6 f.; Hellwig, *Untersuchungen* 252 n. 4. It was, in Aristotle's opinion, the most effective πίστις and this represented a new standpoint when compared with technicians before him: *Rhet.* 1356a10 ff. οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ ἔνιοι τῶν τεχνολογούντων τιθέασιν ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ τὴν ἐπιείκειαν τοῦ λέγοντος ὥς οὐδὲν συμβαλλομένην πρὸς τὸ πιθανόν, ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν ὥς εἰπεῖν κυριωτάτην ἔχει πίστιν τὸ ἥθος. Cf. *Rhet. Alex.* 1445b29 ff. and Hellwig, *Untersuchungen* 251. To be noted is the confusion of Volkmann, *Rhetorik* 177, who, considering the πίστεις ἡθικαὶ mainly in the *prooimion*, seems to misunderstand the function of Aristotelian ethos.

³³ The simple distinction between *res* and *affectus*, which we find in Quint. 3.5.2 and which Apsines later considers to be the two εἶδη (τὸ τε πρακτικὸν καὶ τὸ παθητικόν) of each λόγος (*RhG* I 297.2 ff. Spengel-Hammer), appears at doctrinal level more than once in Cicero himself: cf. for instance *Brut.* 89; *Part.* 4 f.; Hendrickson's opinion ("The Origin and Meaning" 260) is that already Aristotle's threefold distinction can be considered as a first division between πίστεις inside the content itself and πίστεις outside it, which are then subdivided into ἥθη and πάθη.

arousal of feelings is itself divided into a mild arousal (ethos) and a vehement one (pathos):³⁴



Again the description of Norbanus's defence by Antonius clarifies this point: he won because of the arousal of feelings rather than because of rational persuasion: *De orat.* 2.202 *ita magis adfectis animis iudicum quam doctis tua, Sulpici, est a nobis tum accusatio victa*. But the minds of the jurors had been *adfecti* by a clever coupling of *commendatio* and *concitatio* (2.201), that is the two components (ethos and pathos) of irrational persuasion. Actually the peculiar subject, which clearly belongs to the *genus admirabile*, had obliged Antonius to use an *insinuatio*³⁵ and therefore to minimize his use of *docere* (2.201 *ut de lege Apuleia dicerem, ut quid*

³⁴ Cf. how clearly this difference in intensity is described in Quint. 6.2.8 f. *duae sunt species: alteram Graeci πάθος vocant, quod nos ... adfectum dicimus, alteram ἥθος, cuius nomine ... caret sermo Romanus: mores appellantur ... adfectus igitur hos concitatos, illos mites atque compositos esse dixerunt: in altero vehementes motus, in altero lenes, denique hos imperare, illos persuadere, hos ad perturbationem, illos ad benivolentiam praevalere*. Solmsen, "Aristotelian Tradition" 179, considers also Cicero's ethos "a lesser degree of πάθος," for it "denotes the *leniores adfectus*." This interpretation of the Ciceronian ethos has been shared by Kennedy, *The Art of Rhetoric* 222; id., *Classical Rhetoric* 100; Fantham, "Ciceronian conciliare" 267 f.; Leeman-Pinkster, *Comm. Cic. De orat.* Vol. I p. 63; Leeman-Pinkster-Rabbie, *Comm. Cic. De orat.* Vol. III p. 128; Gill, "The Ethos/Pathos Distinction" 157. It is on the contrary contested by Wisse, *Ethos and Pathos* 223; 234 ff., who points out that the *leniores adfectus* which are tied to ethos are only the *adfectus* moved through the description of *mores* (cf. on this already Fortenbaugh, "Benevolentiam conciliare" 268 f.). The consequence of this is, in Wisse's opinion, the impossibility of considering violent and mild emotions under the sole label of *movere*, as Fantham, "Ciceronian conciliare" 267, wants to affirm. I think, on the contrary, that she is right; cf. also Gill, "The Ethos/Pathos Distinction" 157 n. 41.

³⁵ Cf. also Calboli, "L'oratore M. Antonio" 159. According to the doctrine of the *insinuatio* — which probably was developed in the period after Hermagoras but before the source common to *De inventione* and *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, where we find it for the first time — there were three situations in which it was necessary to use this particular kind of introduction: *si aut inest in ipsa causa quaedam turpitudine aut ab iis, qui ante dixerunt, iam quiddam auditori persuasum videtur aut eo tempore locus dicendi datur, cum iam illi, quos audire oportet, defessi sunt audiendo* (Cic. *Inv.* 1.23; cf. *Rhet. Her.* 1.9 f.). Here, because of the subject and because of the fact that the jurors, as it seems to be possible to argue from Cicero's description, had already been deeply influenced by Sulpicius, we have the coupling of the first and the second point. For more information about the *insinuatio* see my *Exordium Narratio Epilogus* 11 ff.

esset minuere maiestatem explicarem, perquam breviter perstrinxi atque attigi). *Serpere occulte coepisti*, Sulpicius told him (*De orat.* 2.203), because Antonius, in accordance with the precepts of the *insinuatio*, didn't talk about Norbanus's sedition, but about the justifiable anger of the Roman people.

In Cicero's description of the tone of Antonius's speech we can see another interesting matter. The *captatio benevolentiae* is associated in this case with a kind of *vehemens atque atrox* speech after which the description of the ethos was done in a mild and quiet style: *De orat.* 2.200 *quod ubi sensi me in possessionem iudicii ac defensionis meae constitisse, quod et populi benevolentiam mihi conciliaram, cuius ius etiam cum seditionis coniunctione defenderam, et iudicum animos totos vel calamitate civitatis vel luctu ac desiderio propinquorum vel odio proprio in Caepionem ad causam nostram converteram, tum admiscere huic generi orationis vehementi atque atroci genus illud alterum ... lenitatis et mansuetudinis coepi*. E. Fantham sees here a "non technical use of *conciliare*" which, on the contrary, should have "the theoretical role" of "presenting the mores of the defendant in a favourable light" (267).³⁶ Now it is true that generally *conciliare* is linked with ethical content and mild style (*lenitas*), but we should not forget that we are here in an *insinuatio* and that consequently the *captatio benevolentiae* cannot be explicit. Therefore I believe that when Antonius says that he realized that he could master the situation because he had the people's goodwill and because he had won over the jurors by arousing their vehement feelings, he lets us know that his *insinuatio* has achieved the normal aim of any *exordium*, which is winning the favour of the audience towards himself.³⁷ It is only in the second phase, when Antonius is presenting his *mores*, that the *πίστις διὰ τοῦ ἥθους*, which we have seen as a component of the wider Ciceronian *conciliare*, plays its role. When trying to extinguish the *incendium* excited by Sulpicius with his prosecution speech (*De orat.* 2.197) Antonius has to take advantage of the one thing the jurors will accept from him, which is that the defence of Norbanus is necessary because of the particular relationship of *sodalitas* between Norbanus and himself, for Norbanus had been his quaestor (*De orat.* 2.198 *vix ut mihi tenuis quaedam venia daretur excusationis, quod tamen eum*

³⁶ The widespread idea that *conciliare* has to be seen as a technical term for portraying ethos (cf. Solmsen, "Orator's Playing" 399; id., "The Aristotelian Tradition" 178; Gill, "The Ethos/Pathos Distinction" 157; May, *Trials of Character* 4 f.; Fortenbaugh, "Benevolentiam conciliare" 26 ff.) is on the contrary firmly, and in my opinion rightly, rejected by Wisse, *Ethos and Pathos* 235.

³⁷ It is true, as Wisse, *Ethos and Pathos* 276, points out, that we must not confuse the goodwill of the people and the goodwill of the jurors, upon whom, in the end, depends the result of the speech, but I think that it is possible to speak in general of *captatio benevolentiae* of the audience, because the trial had as its jurors the *equites Romani*, but their judgement could well be influenced by the reaction of the people present in the forum; cf. Cic. *De orat.* 2.198 *erant optimi cives iudices, bonorum virorum plenum forum* and Kennedy, *The Art of Rhetoric* 16 f.

defenderem, qui mihi quaestor fuisset; this is confirmed by Sulpicius's words, *De orat.* 2.202 *quod tibi unum ad ignoscendum homines dabant ... te pro homine pernecessario, quaestore tuo dicere*). To defend him, therefore, was a matter of duty.³⁸ But before he could take advantage of this factor, which involved his ethos and consequently also the use of a suitable tone of speech (*lenitatis et mansuetudinis*),³⁹ Antonius had to pave the way. As Sulpicius reminded him by saying *quam tibi primum munisti ad te audiendum viam* (*De orat.* 2.202), this was done through his clever *insinuatio*. On the one hand it allowed him to speak of the anger of the Roman people instead of the sedition of Norbanus and in this way he got the goodwill of the people.⁴⁰ On the other hand it allowed him to arouse the feelings of the jurors against Caepio so that he won them over to himself. The whole passage, in which Antonius talks about this (*De orat.* 2.200 *quod ubi sensi ... ad causam nostram converteram*), therefore, has the same meaning as Sulpicius's wording *munire viam*, which is the purpose of the *insinuatio*.⁴¹

I am convinced that both Antonius and (after him) Sulpicius, are analysing the beginning of Antonius's speech⁴² and that Antonius's allusion to his victory obtained through *adficere animos* and not through *docere*, makes no reference to the conclusion. Antonius wants to emphasize the greater power of irrational persuasion in comparison with rational persuasion, which in the case of Norbanus and because of the subject had to be understated. Here the ethos of the orator — appearing to be good, virtuous, honorable and old, obliged by his loyalty through the *sodalitas* with Norbanus to defend him — is combined with the pathos aroused by the hatred of Caepio; and through this clever coupling of elements Antonius is able to appear *talis qualem se esse velit*, namely *acerrimus in Caepionis invidia renovanda et in*

³⁸ Cf. Thompson, "The Relationship" 339 ff.; Kennedy, *The Art of Rhetoric* 82.

³⁹ Even if the reconstruction of Antonius' speech is hardly easy because the attention of both Antonius and Sulpicius is concentrated on the persuasive effect of *docere conciliare movere* more than on the single parts of the speech, I cannot share the opinion of those who see in this part of Antonius' presentation the conclusion of his speech: cf. the interpretation of Scholz, *Der Redner M. Antonius* 69 f.; Wisse, *Ethos and Pathos* 276 f.; Leeman-Pinkster-Rabbie, *Comm. Cic. De orat.* Vol. III p. 131. A conclusion founded only on ethos and not also on pathos would be too great a departure from the rhetorical rules which were always employed, even if not always as strictly as handbooks said.

⁴⁰ The *captatio benevolentiae* of the people is not then the result of pathos (as Fantham, "Ciceronian conciliare" 266 argues), but as Leeman-Pinkster-Rabbie, *Comm. Cic. De orat.* Vol. III p. 157, point out the result of the reasoning about seditions; cf. also Fortenbaugh, "Benevolentiam conciliare" 267.

⁴¹ In my opinion *munire viam ad audiendum* means not only Antonius' skill in getting the jurors to listen to him (as Scholz, *Der Redner M. Antonius* 60 and Fortenbaugh, "Benevolentiam conciliare" 266 f. argue), but also the tricks which let his *insinuatio* win the most important goal of each introduction, the *captatio benevolentiae*.

⁴² I cannot therefore agree with Leeman-Pinkster-Rabbie, *Comm. Cic. De orat.* Vol. III p. 131, who argue that the substance of Antonius' speech has been so divided by Cicero that only Antonius speaks about the conclusion and only Sulpicius about the introduction.

meis moribus erga meos necessarios declarandis mansuetissimus: we have here the Ciceronian version of ἡθὺς τοῦ λέγοντος, by which persuasion is achieved through the arousal of feelings and not through reason as in Aristotle. In conclusion it seems to me to be very important that Cicero does not restrict *captatio benevolentiae* in the beginning of the speech to the description of the *mores*, and consequently to a mild and *lenis* kind of speech. Depending on the situation, as in the case of an *insinuatō*, it may also involve a vehement arousal of feelings.⁴³ He is concerned to demonstrate that both elements, the vehement and the mild, skilfully coupled and mixed (*De orat.* 2.111 f.⁴⁴), obtain the goal of persuasion; and therefore he insists on giving for both kinds of speech some suggestions for the composition of introductions and conclusions: *De orat.* 2.213 *in utroque autem genere dicendi et illo, in quo vis atque contentio quaeritur, et hoc, quod ad vitam et mores accommodatur, et principia tarda et exitus tamen spissi et producti esse debent*. Right at the end of this excursus, where Cicero contrasts the swiftness with which one can pass from one argument to another when using *docere* with the length of time one needs for presenting introductions or conclusion, which, as he himself says, are devoted *ad impellendos animos* (*Part.* 4), we can see that he considers mild and strong feelings to be opposed as a whole to rational persuasion: *De orat.* 2.215 *quare qui aut breviter aut summis dicunt, docere iudicem possunt, commovere non possunt; in quo sunt omnia*. And *commovere* once more appears to be inclusive of both kinds of feelings in Cicero's statement that *illa autem quae aut conciliationis causa leniter aut peremotionis vehementer aguntur, contrariis commotionibus auferenda sunt, ut odio benevolentia, ut misericordia invidia tollatur* (*De orat.* 2.216).⁴⁵

⁴³ To use an *exordium dicendi vehemens et pugnax* was actually allowed by Antonius himself (*De orat.* 2.317), but not often, for generally a mild beginning of a verbal battle seemed to be more natural and more like the first skirmishes which in a real battle are a precursor to the more violent engagement of the two contestants; referring to a psychological interpretation of this style cf. von Albrecht, "Cicéron" 22 f.

⁴⁴ This passage, said by Fantham, "Ciceronian conciliare" 267, to be a sign of Cicero's embarrassment, because of the overlap of the two categories, *conciliare* and *movere*, has been reexamined by Fortenbaugh, "Benevolentiam conciliare" 268 f., who rightly points out that when Antonius in *De orat.* 2.200 talks of *admiscere* two kinds of speech, one *lenis* and one *vehemens*, or Sulpicius in 2.203 uses the same image, they do not want to refer to a mixture where the two kinds of emotions are confused, but to a combination where they maintain their identity. About this cf. also Wisse, *Ethos and Pathos* 238 f.

⁴⁵ It is significant that in *Brutus* 322 we do not have any explicit mention of the skill of *conciliare benevolentiam*: when Cicero opposes himself to the orators of his time and points out that none of them was able to do what a true orator must do, he doesn't distinguish between the two components of the emotional effect (*ethos* and *pathos*), but *conciliare* is once again absorbed by *movere*: *Brut.* 322 *nemo, qui ad iracundiam magno opere iudicem, nemo, qui ad fletum posset adducere, nemo, qui animum eius, quod unum est oratoris maxime proprium, quocumque res postularet impellere*.

The third matter discussed by Fantham is that Aristotle himself in *Rhet.* 2.4 when speaking about *φιλία* gives raw material (a) to create *φιλία/εὖνοια* in the hearers and (b) to represent the *εὖνοια* of the orator.⁴⁶ this could justify Cicero's confusion in his use of *conciliare* which in the description of Norbanus's trial has become the "keyword for both ἠθικόν and part of παθητικόν" (273). Actually twice Aristotle reminds us of the need for the orator to appear *εὖνους*: in *Rhet.* 1366a11 referring to the λόγος ἠθικός, which is characteristic of the orator who appears ἀγαθός or εὖνους or both, and in *Rhet.* 1378a6 ff. when he tells us that three qualities make the speaker credible, φρόνησις, ἀρετή and εὖνοια. Thus the speaker must not only have the rational ability to recognize what is good (φρόνησις)⁴⁷ and the ἀρετή⁴⁸ which prevents him from withholding it because of wickedness (*Rhet.* 1378a10 ff. ἡ γὰρ δι' ἁπλοσύνην οὐκ ὀρθῶς δοξάζουσιν, ἡ δοξάζοντες ὀρθῶς διὰ μοχθηρίαν οὐ τὰ δοκοῦντα λέγουσιν),⁴⁹ but he must also be εὖνους, in order to give the best advice (τὰ βέλτιστα συμβουλευεῖν).⁵⁰ The εὖνοια is therefore

⁴⁶ Even if in the chapter where Aristotle deals with *φιλία* we don't find a word about εὖνοια, scholars generally agree that *Rhet.* 1378a18 f. hints of it (Fantham, "Ciceronian *conciliare*" 269). Actually the definition of *φιλεῖν*, to wish for someone what he thinks is good for himself (*Rhet.* 1380b35 f. ἔστω δὴ τὸ φιλεῖν τὸ βούλεσθαι τινὶ ἃ οἴεται ἀγαθὰ, ἐκείνου ἕνεκα ἀλλὰ μὴ αὐτοῦ, cf. 1361b36 f. ὅτι ἐστὶν ὁ τοιοῦτος φίλος ὅστις ἃ οἴεται ἀγαθὰ εἶναι ἐκείνῳ) may theoretically mean also the orator's goodwill towards the audience. But about the difference which Aristotle drew between εὖνοια and *φιλία* cf. Hellwig, *Untersuchungen* 254 and the passages she quotes. Particularly expressive among them is for example *EE* 1241a10 ff. ἀλλὰ τοῦ εὐνοοῦντος βούλεσθαι μόνον ἐστὶ, τοῦ δὲ φίλου καὶ πράττειν ἃ βούλεται. Similar emotions are the Latin *amicitia* (Cic. *Inv.* 2.166 *amicitia voluntas erga aliquem rerum bonarum illius ipsius causa, quem diligit, cum eius pari voluntate*; cf. Wisse, *Ethos and Pathos* 111 and 287), *amor* or *caritas* (Cic. *De orat.* 1.206 *sentimus amorem conciliari si id iure videre quod sit utile ipsis apud quos agas defendere; aut si pro bonis viris aut certe pro iis, qui illis boni atque utiles sint, laborare. namque haec res amorem magis conciliat, illa virtutis defensio caritatem*; cf. Fortenbaugh, "Benevolentiam conciliare" 261), besides of course *benevolentia* itself. Only *amicitia*, however, like the Aristotelian *φιλία*, is considered by Cicero in an academic sense and not as a one way feeling, from the audience to the speaker.

⁴⁷ Cf. Cic. *Brut.* 23 *dicere enim bene nemo potest nisi qui prudenter intellegit*. But this "rational" quality is not part of the Ciceronian ethos: cf. Wisse, *Ethos and Pathos* 235.

⁴⁸ The importance of ἀρετή as part of ἦθος and therefore of the credibility of the speaker is quite evident also for epideictic rhetoric: cf. Arist. *Rhet.* 1366a25 ff. and Hellwig, *Untersuchungen* 252; Buchheit, *Untersuchungen* 129 ff. Wisse, *Ethos and Pathos* 29 n. 98, does not share, on the contrary, this opinion.

⁴⁹ About the definition of φρόνησις cf. *Rhet.* 1366b ff.; about that of ἀρετή cf. *Rhet.* 1366a36 ff. Also in *Rhet. Alex.* 1431b10-19 rational knowledge is represented by δόξα τοῦ λέγοντος (cf. Hellwig, *Untersuchungen* 253), which however does not have an ethical meaning. About the importance of lifestyle and of δόξα ἐπιτεκνής as tools useful to achieve persuasion, cf. on the contrary *Rhet. Alex.* 1445b30 ff.; cf. Kroll, "Rhetorik" 1058; Barwick, "Die Rhetorik ad Alexandrum" 224.

⁵⁰ Cf. Hellwig, *Untersuchungen* 251 ff.; Classen, "Principi e concetti morali" 7 ff.; Sprute, "Ethos als Überzeugungsmittel" 282 f. For a comparison between this triad of

a "goodwill" of the speaker towards the audience,⁵¹ and this in the deliberative genre of rhetoric referred to in the passages just quoted contributes to his ἦθος and increases his credibility. This "goodwill" of the speaker towards the audience is lacking in Cicero, but that is, I believe, quite natural, for Cicero is dealing with forensic rhetoric, where what is most powerful is arousing the feelings of the jurors, including therefore their goodwill. Aristotle himself makes the point when he tells us that appearing in a favourable light is more important in the deliberative kind of rhetoric (*Rhet.* 1377b28 ff. τὸ μὲν ... ποῖόν τινα φαίνεσθαι τὸν λέγοντα χρησιμώτερον εἰς τὰς συμβουλὰς ἐστίν) than in the forensic kind, in which, even if it can be helpful, the most effective thing is the emotional effect on the audience (*Rhet.* 1377b30 f. τὸ δὲ διακεῖσθαι πᾶς τὸν ἀκροατὴν εἰς τὰς δίκας). Someone who feels love or friendship will have a different point of view than if he felt hatred, and he would modify his judgement in accordance with these feelings (*Rhet.* 1377b31 ff.). Cicero is also well aware of this and he considers emotional appeal the best way to win over the jurors.⁵² This is the reason why Cicero's orator, even if he doesn't have εὐνοία in the Aristotelian sense, must know the human mind to be able to move it.⁵³ This psychological ability, which Plato in the *Phaedrus* (271cd) had Socrates consider to be indispensable for the achievement of persuasion, can help the orator in the arousal of the right feelings, but it is not a quality which makes him worthy of credibility. In conclusion, the ethos of the Ciceronian orator

Aristotle and the three qualities (ἐπιστήμη, εὐνοία, παρρησία) which Plato in *Gorg.* 487 refers to, see Hellwig, *Untersuchungen* 280 ff. and Fortenbaugh, "Aristotle on Persuasion" 217-20.

⁵¹ We must remember Aristotle's distinction between this kind of εὐνοία, which is characteristic of the ἦθος τοῦ λέγοντος and the other kind of εὐνοία, which the orator must arouse in the audience towards himself through the introduction (cf. also Wisse, *Ethos and Pathos* 30). The second kind of εὐνοία must not be confused with the first one and so be considered part of the ἦθος τοῦ λέγοντος. This confusion (which we find in Fantham, "Ciceronian conciliare" 269; Hellwig, *Untersuchungen* 255 f.) depends therefore upon the modification which Cicero made to the πίστις διὰ τοῦ ἠθους by coupling it with the doctrine of the *exordium* (Fortenbaugh, "Benevolentiam conciliare" 264 f.). The εὐνοία of the speaker in Aristotle's meaning contributes only to make him πιστός (*Rhet.* 1378a6 ff.), and does not have the intention of winning εὐνοία in return. In my opinion, this kind of εὐνοία cannot be identified with either of the two kinds Hellwig, *Untersuchungen* 255 and 284, distinguishes in the Aristotelian chapter on φιλία, because both combine in the end to produce εὐνοία in the audience.

⁵² Cf. *De orat.* 1.17; 1.30; 1.53; 1.60; 2.178; 2.215; 3.105; *Brut.* 89; 190; 198; 200; 279; 322; *Orat.* 69; 128. See for example Cicero's criticism towards Calidius, who, although having a great skill in *docere* and *delectare*, was not able to *movere*: *Brut.* 276 *sed cum a nobis paulo ante dictum sit tria videri esse quae orator efficere deberet, ut doceret, ut delectaret, ut moveret: duo summe tenuit, ut et rem illustraret disserendo et animos eorum qui audirent devinceret voluptate; aberat tertia illa laus, qua permoveret atque incitaret animos, quam plurimum pollere diximus.*

⁵³ Cf. *De orat.* 1.17; 1.53; 1.60; 1.87; Solmsen, "Orator's Playing" 395; Wisse, *Ethos and Pathos* 251.

can be sufficiently summarized in the image of a *vir probus, bene moratus* and *bonus* (*De orat.* 2.184) which is the result not only of moral qualities, but also of a suitable *elocutio* and of an *actio lenis* (*De orat.* 2.184).

This *lenitas* of style and delivery, Fantham says — and this is her last argument — “can indeed *effingere mores oratoris* but barely *exprimere mores* of the client, as Cicero seems to maintain in 2.184”⁵⁴ Here, I think, it is important to remember that in the Roman speaker/client split and in its consequent double portrayal of ethos we see the coupling of the Aristotelian ἦθος τοῦ λέγοντος with the *captatio benevolentiae* particular to the *exordium*. When Cicero begins his discussion of *conciliare* he tells us that to win *valet ... multum ... probari mores et instituta et facta et vitam et eorum qui agent causas et eorum pro quibus ... animosque eorum, apud quos agetur, conciliari quam maxime ad benevolentiam cum erga oratorem tum erga illum pro quo dicet orator* (*De orat.* 2.182). To achieve this goal, he goes on, *non ... fortis oratio quaeritur, sed ... placida summissa lenis, quae maxime commendat reos ... horum ... exprimere mores oratione iustos, integros, religiosos, timidos, perferentes iniuriarum mirum quiddam valet* (*De orat.* 2.183 f.). But the desired effect on the audience is not yet accomplished: if this expression of good and virtuous *mores* of the client is done *suaviter et cum sensu* its power is so strong that often *plus quam causa valet. tantum autem efficitur sensu quodam ac ratione dicendi, ut quasi mores oratoris effingat oratio* (*De orat.* 2.184). Therefore the *lenitas* of the speaker in the *exprimere mores* of the client has as its final result the *effingere mores oratoris*, i.e., it portrays him as a *vir probus, bene moratus* and *bonus*.⁵⁵ *Exprimere mores* of the client and *effingere mores* of the speaker are indeed two very different things, but it is just the *lenitas* of the speaker which gives room for an overlap: when the orator portrays with a *lenis* speech his client's *mores*, which are really good and virtuous or at least seem to be so, and consequently by themselves win goodwill,⁵⁶ he appears as a *vir probus, bene moratus* and *bonus*, so that he wins goodwill, not only towards himself, but also towards the defendant,

⁵⁴ Cf. p. 273. It is actually, as Wisse, *Ethos and Pathos* 230 f. points out, a larger *lenitas*, which involves not only style, but also *actio* and the whole tone of the speech.

⁵⁵ See the importance of the *actio* in this regard: *Brut.* 142 *nulla res magis penetrat in animos eosque fingit format flectit talisque oratores videri facit quales ipsi se videri volunt*. For the relationship between the orator's style in portraying the *mores* of the client and his own *mores* see also Gill, “The Ethos/Pathos Distinction” 156 f.

⁵⁶ See Cicero's precepts concerning *captatio benevolentiae* in *Off.* 2.32 *benivolentiae praecepta videamus: quae quidem capitur beneficiis maxime; secundo autem loco voluntate benefica benivolentia movetur, etiamsi res forte non suppetit; vehementer autem amor multitudinis commovetur ipsa fama et opinione liberalitatis, beneficentiae, iustitiae, fidei omniumque earum virtutum quae pertinent ad mansuetudinem morum ac facilitatem*. Hellwig, *Untersuchungen* 255, recognizes in this passage of Cicero the two kinds of εὐνοία which she distinguishes in Aristotle's treatment of this matter in *EN* 1167a14 ff. (1. die durch die ἀρετή und ἐκτελέχεια eines anderen allgemein ausgelöst wird; 2. die eine Reaktion auf eine empfangene Wohltat ist).

because the goodwill he wins increases the goodwill won through the description of his client's good *mores*.⁵⁷

After having argued that Ciceronian *conciliare* combines Aristotle's πίστις διὰ τοῦ ἥθους with winning favour in the *exordium*, I want to point out that the Aristotelian accounts of the introduction have also been modified. If we can agree that the Aristotelian ἥθος τοῦ λέγοντος has the sole aim of making the orator worthy of belief (*Rhet.* 1356a5 ff. διὰ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ἥθους, ὅταν οὕτω λεχθῇ ὁ λόγος ὥστε ἀξιόπιστον ποιῆσαι τὸν λέγοντα), because the image he projects brings the listeners to believe him both more and more quickly (*Rhet.* 1356a6 f.),⁵⁸ then we must say that in Aristotle's doctrine of the beginning of the speech the task of ὁ λέγων is only a rational one, which is to say he must dissipate any suspicion: *Rhet.* 1415a30 ff. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀπολογούμενον, ὅταν μέλλῃ εἰσάξειν αὐτόν, ἀναγκαῖον ἀνελεῖν τὰ κωλύοντα, ὥστε λυτέον πρῶτον τὴν διαβολήν. This means that also in the accounts of the introduction, the ἥθος of the speaker, namely τὸ ἐπιεικῆ φαίνεσθαι, has the rational function of increasing the εὐμάθεια of the audience, because appearing to be virtuous renders the speaker worthy of belief and therefore worthy of attention (*Rhet.* 1415a39).⁵⁹ Aristotle deals with πάθος only whilst referring

⁵⁷ Fantham's discussion ("Ciceronian *conciliare*" 264-267, 273) of the whole Ciceronian passage of *De orat.* 2.182-184, has been criticized in detail by Wisse, *Ethos and Pathos* 224 ff., who proposes a partially different interpretation. His accounts are summed up and shared by Leeman-Pinkster-Rabbie, *Comm. Cic. De orat.* Vol. III p. 127 f. I think, on the contrary, that except for the right reading, in 2.182, of *adiuvant* presented by the family of the *mutuli* (M) instead of *adiuvant* offered by the *integri* (L), Wisse's interpretation makes the text of Cicero appear more complicated than it is. Actually I would argue that after the first part of section 182, where everybody acknowledges a double allusion, namely to the ethos of the speaker and to the ethos of the defendant, the *sed* sentence has the single aim of telling us that there is a quite remarkable difference between speaker and defendant. This is, the defendant can play *ad vincendum* just one card, that of his virtuous ethos. The speaker, on the contrary, can play two cards, that which concerns his good *mores* (*dignitas, res gestae, existimatio vitae*) and that which only he can play, because he is the speaker. It consists, so to say, in a formal ethos, that is in his ability to demonstrate *lenitas* of delivery and of style, magnanimous behaviour, liberal, not greedy, besides all the qualities which are characteristic of mild and not litigious men, and which by themselves win goodwill and alienate it from people doing the opposite. Cicero wants to insist on the idea that, in order to win goodwill, the defendant must only be a virtuous man (or at least appear to be so), whereas the speaker can increase the goodwill won through his ethos when demonstrating particular qualities of style, delivery and general behaviour in the description of the virtuous *mores* of the defendant. From this broad *lenitas* derives an image of *vir probus, bene moratus* and *bonus* which can be compared with Aristotle's ἥθος (= the impression the speaker gives of himself διὰ τοῦ λόγου) and which must be considered to be an addition to the Ciceronian version of an ethos linked with orator's *dignitas*, with his *res gestae*, with his life's *existimatio*.

⁵⁸ Cf. Fortenbaugh, "*Benevolentiam conciliare*" 260 ff.; id., "The Composition" 154 f. and Wisse, *Ethos and Pathos* 234.

⁵⁹ Cf. Fortenbaugh, "Aristotle on Persuasion" 234-5.

to the ἀκροατής. He does it in the doctrine of the πίστεις and in the doctrine of the introduction as well. In the case of the πίστεις Aristotle makes clear the effective role that arousing emotions in the audience has in regard to judgements (*Rhet.* 1356a14 ff. διὰ δὲ τῶν ἀκροατῶν ὅταν εἰς πάθος ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου προαχθῶσιν· οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἀποδίδομεν τὰς κρίσεις λυπούμενοι καὶ χαίροντες ἢ φιλοῦντες καὶ μισοῦντες). Referring to the introduction, he again relates emotional appeal, like arousing εὐνοια and ὀργή, only to the hearers (*Rhet.* 1415a34 ff. τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὸν ἀκροατὴν ἔκ τε τοῦ εὖνουν ποιῆσαι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὀργίσαι). Ethos, therefore, in the Aristotelian doctrine of the beginning of the speech is not an instrument of pathos. In Cicero's accounts, on the contrary, portraying the *mores* is the way feelings are aroused. The *captatio benevolentiae* in Cicero's introduction involves not only the *persona* of the judge, but also the *personae* of the defendant (whether identified with or distinguished from the speaker) and of the opponent (*Inv.* 1.22; *Part.* 28). This is, of course, an important difference, which arose in the elaborations of the Hellenistic period, and which we must remember when we say that the Ciceronian ethos, being the instrument of *conciliare*, has been influenced by the doctrine of the *exordium*.⁶⁰

If we pass now to the analysis of the second triad, *docere delectare movere*, which we find in works later than the *De oratore*, we must acknowledge that the doctrine of the πίστεις becomes unsuitable to explain its origin. I would like to stress, on the contrary, the influence of the precepts of the *exordium*, which play, in my opinion, a decisive role. Already Aristotle, referring to the ἀκροατής, had spoken about the opportunity not only of arousing his feelings, but also of capturing his attention or, on the contrary, of distracting him and finally of making him ready to learn: *Rhet.* 1415a34 ff. τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὸν ἀκροατὴν ἔκ τε τοῦ εὖνουν ποιῆσαι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὀργίσαι, καὶ ἐνίοτε τὸ προσεκτικὸν ἢ τούναντίον ... εἰς δὲ εὐμάθειαν ἅπαντα ἀνάξει. Similarly, even if with some later elaborations, this threefold function remained for centuries characteristic of Greek and Latin rhetorical accounts of the introduction. Consider, for example, the text of *Inv.* 1.20 *exordium est oratio animum auditoris idonee comparans ad reliquam dictionem: quod eveniet si eum benivolum, attentum, docilem confecerit*. Arousing emotions, as we have already seen, is the way to attain *benevolentia*; raising the interest of the audience for things *magna, nova, incredibilia* or related to arguments of special importance produces *attentio*; and finally *docilitas* can be reached by stating *aperte et breviter summam causae* (*Inv.* 1.22 ff.). Between *benevolentia*, *attentio* and *docilitas* there was, moreover, a kind of interrelation, because *attentio* was, for example, indispensable to *docilitas* (*Inv.* 1.23 *cum docilem velis facere, simul attentum facias oportet. nam is est maxime docilis, qui attentissime est paratus audire*; cf. *Rhet. Her.* 1.7), and *docilitas*, in turn, facilitated *benevolentia* (*De orat.* 2.82 *ego mihi benivolum iudicem*

⁶⁰ I intend to make an allusion to Hellenistic school accounts of the doctrine of the *exordium*, as they appear in Cicero's more technical works; cf. also *Rhet. Her.* 1.8.

facilius facere possum, cum sum in cursu orationis, quam cum omnia sunt inaudita).

An important element of this doctrine was the fact that these three aims, even if characteristic of the *exordium*, were often considered necessary for all parts of the speech. This was Aristotle's precept about *attentio* (*Rhet.* 1415b9 f. ἔτι τὸ προσεκτικὸς ποιεῖν πάντων τῶν μερῶν κοινόν). On the other hand, when considering all three aims together, we find not only the very explicit statements of Antonius in *De oratore* (on both occasions he deals with the doctrine of the introduction: *De orat.* 2.81 *quae enim praecepta principiorum ... ea in totis orationibus sunt conservanda*; cf. 2.322 f.),⁶¹ but also, before him, the evidence given by the author of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*: *Rhet. Her.* 1.11 *verum hae <res> utilitates tametsi in tota oratione sunt comparandae, hoc est, ut auditores sese perpetuo nobis aditentos dociles benivolos praebeant, tamen id per exordium causae maxime comparandum est*. That is of special significance, because in both *Rhetorica ad Herennium* and *De oratore* the doctrine of the *officia oratoris* (*docere delectare movere*) is absent. In this expansion of the three aims of the introduction to the entire speech, I see the "trait d'union" with Cicero's claim in *Brutus*, *Orator* and *De optimo genere oratorum* that the perfect orator has a threefold ability: *docere, delectare* and *movere*.⁶² This is the reason why I am convinced that the doctrine of the *exordium*, which had an important role in the change from Aristotle's ἦθος τοῦ λέγοντος to Cicero's *conciliare*, also had a decisive effect in regard to the tasks of the orator, *docere delectare movere*. The three aims of the introduction correspond to the three tasks of the orator, so that *docere* could be considered the "pendant" of making the audience *docilem*, *delectare* of making it *attentum* and finally *movere* of making it *benivolum*. The first of these correspondences seems straightforward: it is the rational way of persuasion, which is always present in theoretical distinctions and opposed to arousing emotions. Even the differences in terminology (*docere*: *Brut.* 185; 200; 276; *Opt. gen.* 3; 5; 16; *probare*: *Orat.* 69; *fidem facere*: *Brut.* 197) are irrelevant, because we know that argumentation was an aspect of *docere* (*Brut.* 89 *cum duae summae sint in oratore laudes, una subtiliter disputandi ad docendum, altera graviter agendi ad animos audientium permovendos*; cf. *Part.* 4).⁶³ In regard to the correspondence between the *captatio benevolentiae*, to which the *exordium* is addressed, and the task of *movere*, we must remember what we said about *conciliare* in *De oratore*: not only the mild emotions aroused by portraying a good moral ethos win goodwill, but the same effect can be attained also through strong feelings, as we have seen in Antonius's description of his defence of Norbanus.

Less evident, but equally significant, is the relationship between *attentio* and *delectare*. First, it is necessary to understand what Cicero means by the wording

⁶¹ Cf. Quint. 4.1.5 and Leeman-Pinkster-Nelson, *Comm. Cic. De orat.* Vol. II p. 293.

⁶² Cf. Calboli Montefusco, *Exordium Narratio Epilogus* 8.

⁶³ Cf. Hendrickson, "The Origin and Meaning" 263.

delectare animos (Brut. 82). If we consider the different situations in which *delectare* and *delectatio* occur, we see that the constant element is the pleasure of the audience produced by listening to the orator. But it is not only the *voluptas aurium* which an actor also stirs up; it is also a *voluptas* resulting from careful style and interesting content. This is indeed the difference between an orator and an actor. Antonius tells us: the actor, *si paulum inrauserit*, is hissed, because of the decrease of the *voluptas aurium* which is the sole thing required of him; the orator, on the contrary, is often listened to *attentissime* even if hoarse, because in eloquence *multa sunt quae teneant* and primarily *necesse est ea ipsa, quae sunt, mirabilia videri* (De orat. 1.259). This attention, stirred in the audience by means of astonishing content, combines with the attention which is stirred through style: *genus igitur dicendi est eligendum, quod maxime teneat eos, qui audiant, et quod non solum delectet, sed etiam sine satiety delectet*. These words of Crassus (De orat. 3.97) remind us how difficult it is to balance the *voluptas* produced by a speech well adorned in style with the *satiety* and the *fastidium* produced by a too florid style (De orat. 3.100).⁶⁴ If we now compare the words of Antonius with those of Crassus we can understand the meaning of "holding an audience." It is an enchantment, the result of pleasure and interest, which keeps the jurors fascinated throughout the speech like birds listening to a song: Brut. 200 *ut avem cantu aliquo sic illos ... oratione quasi suspensos teneri*. This is nothing else than *delectare*. We can verify it by thinking about the consequences of *delectare*, as Cicero describes them: Brut. 188 *delectatur audiens multitudo et ducitur oratione et quasi voluptate quadam perfunditur*. We must, however, be careful: *delectare* is not only the result of a simple attention to style; a special kind of content is also involved. Philosophers who speak *docendi causa* aim at *delectatio* (Orat. 63) and that *delectatio* is also the goal of epideictic rhetoric,⁶⁵ which attains it not only through using words that have *plurimum suavitatis* (Part. 72) and stirring the *voluptas aurium* of the hearers

⁶⁴ Cf. in this regard already *Rhet. Her.* 4.32 and Fantham, "Varietas e satiety" 283. Barwick, *Bildungsideal* 45, sees the whole passage (De orat. 3.97-103) as a "besondere Form des πρέπον." This was quite a fine distinction which the *vulgus* often could not discern: the best example is what happened during the *Causa Curiana*, when *ille de populo iudex* was completely satisfied by the speech of Scaevola; only after comparing it with Crassus' speech was he aware of the difference between them and therefore of the superiority of Crassus. When focusing on the need for the orator to be approved by both *docti homines* and *populus* (Brut. 184 *necesse est, qui ita dicat, ut a multitudine probetur, eundem doctis probari*) Cicero reminds Atticus *tenet enim auris vel mediocris orator, sit modo aliquid in eo; nec res ulla plus apud animos hominum quam ordo et ornatus orationis valet* (Brut. 193). In the case of Scaevola's speech only the judge *intellegens et doctus* felt that the *genus dicendi* which he had employed was too florid: Brut. 198 *at vero intellegens et doctus audiens Scaevolam sentiret esse quoddam uberius dicendi genus et ornatius*.

⁶⁵ Cf. De orat. 2.341; Part. 10 ff.; 71 ff.; Orat. 37 f.; 207 f.; Vickers, *In Defence of Rhetoric* 57 f.

with a particularly *numerosa elocutio* (*Orat.* 208),⁶⁶ but also by using *loci* which must be suited to awaking *expectationem*, *admirationem*, *voluptatem* (*Part.* 58). This kind of rhetoric, because it consists of a speech which arouses mild feelings (*Part.* 71 *ad animi motus leniter tractandos*), is suitable also for Sophists, whose goal is *non perturbare animos sed placare potius nec tam persuadere quam delectare* (*Orat.* 65).⁶⁷

What conclusions can we now draw from all this? I believe that, despite Cicero's new interest in style, it is nevertheless evident that in the triad *docere delectare movere* which we find in Cicero's later works, the task of *delectare* is not a substitution for *conciliare*. Between the two concepts there is a big difference: *conciliare* is winning goodwill through the portrayal of good qualities; *lenitas* in *elocutio* and in *actio* also contributes towards this goal. *Delectare*, on the contrary, takes advantage not only of *suavitas* of style, but also of astonishing content, so that the resulting *voluptas* holds the attention of the hearers throughout the speech.⁶⁸ It is necessary to emphasize the importance of content in the attainment of *delectatio*, for too often the meaning of *delectare* is coupled only with accuracy in style. When in *Orator* we see the link between *suavitas* and *delectatio* (*Orat.* 69 *probare necessitatis est, delectare suavitatis, flectere victoriae*), we must remember what Cicero says in *Partitiones*, when dealing with *suavitas*. He tells us that it derives not only from *elegantia* and from *iucunditas* of *verba sonantia* and *levia* and from their careful *coniunctio* (*Part.* 21), but also *cum aliquid aut inusitatum aut inauditum aut novum dicas* (*Part.* 22).⁶⁹ This is exactly what Crassus did when, in the *Causa Curiana*, he employed a "boutade" to obtain the effect of *delectare*. He began his speech with a comparison and told the story of an *adulescens delicatus* who, having found a *scalpus* while walking on the beach, wanted to construct a whole ship starting from this piece. In the same way Scaevola, who had spoken before him, *ex uno scalmo captionis* thought that he could win the *iudicium centumvirale hereditatis*.⁷⁰ With these words and many other *sententiae* of this kind Crassus *delectavit animosque eorum qui aderant in hilaritatem a*

⁶⁶ Cf. the allusion to Isocrates' *Panathenaicus* in *Orat.* 38 *ad voluptatem aurium scripserat*. For the *voluptas aurium*, which is the more general aim of each rhetorical speech cf. *De orat.* 3.177; *Orat.* 58; 160; 162; 208; 237 and also Desmouliiez, *Cicéron et son goût* 563 ff.

⁶⁷ For this contrast between *delectare* and the arousal of emotions cf. *Brut.* 37 on Demetrius Phalereus: *delectabat magis Athenienses quam inflammabat*; cf. *Orat.* 92.

⁶⁸ I do not agree with Michel, *Rhétorique et philosophie* 156, who distinguishes sharply and associates *delectare* with an "expression parfaite," and *conciliare*, on the contrary, with the "matière même du discours." In my opinion both *conciliare* and *delectare* take advantage of the two components of the speech, style and content.

⁶⁹ This coupling of style and content also concerns *suavitas* and therefore *voluptas* and *delectatio* in epideictic rhetoric: cf. *Cic. Part.* 72 and D. Innes, "Theophrastus and the Theory of Style" 259.

⁷⁰ Cf. Vaughn, "Law and Rhetoric in the *Causa Curiana*" 218 ff.

severitate traduxit (Bruil. 197).⁷¹ By paying attention to what was being said the jurors felt pleasure and passed from a serious mood to a light one. We can now understand why Cicero, speaking in *De optimo genere oratorum* about the two components of eloquence, that is style and content, tells us that the *verba* must be chosen not only with regard to *Latinitas*, but also with regard to *elegantia* of *verba propria* and *verba translata*, and that the *sententiae* must comply with the requirements of the three *officia oratoris*. They must be *acutae* to *docere*, *graves* to *commovere* and *argutae* to *delectare* (*Opt. gen.* 4 f.). For instance, the speech of the Sophists, which aims at *delectatio*, is rich in these *argutiae*: *Orat.* 42 *dulce igitur orationis genus et solutum et fluens, sententiis argutum, verbis sonans ... proprium sophistarum*.⁷²

Turning now to the doctrine of the introduction, we see that in Aristotle's accounts the attention which must be aroused in the audience is the result of arguments *μέγιστα, ἴδια, θαυμαστά* and *ἡδέα* (*Rhet.* 1415b1 f.). It is a question of interest, wonder, pleasure: nothing different from the ways of *delectare*. To this clear coincidence we should add a further observation by Aristotle: the audience must be made attentive not only in the *exordium*, but everywhere throughout the speech, even more later on than at the start, because the hearers naturally pay more attention to the speaker when he begins: *Rhet.* 1415b9 ff. *ἔτι τὸ προσεκτικὸς ποιεῖν πάντων τῶν μερῶν κοινόν, ἔαν δέη· πανταχοῦ γὰρ ἀνιδῶσι μᾶλλον ἢ ἀρχόμενοι· διὸ γελοῖον ἐν ἀρχῇ τάττειν, ὅτε μάλιστα πάντες προσέχοντες ἀκροῶνται*. This is an important point, which can help us understand the origin of Cicero's doctrine of the three *officia oratoris*, *docere delectare movere*. Why does Cicero repeat this important remark of Aristotle only in *De oratore*? He even extends it to all three functions of the *exordium*. The answer is that Cicero has Antonius polemicize against the teaching of the *rhetoires*, who wanted the *exordium* to be treated in a certain way, the *narratio* in another and so on for all parts of the speech, everyone of which was seen as a separate piece of the mosaic of rules which constitutes the art of rhetoric. We have in *De oratore* a different situation from the more technical works such as *De inventione*, *Partitiones* or *Topica* in which Cicero, because his interest is directed to the *ars*, gives us a doctrine which has been transmitted through the Hellenistic school. In *De oratore*, on the contrary, he is considering an *orator* who needs to be taught, but who also goes beyond this teaching

⁷¹ Cf. Cic. *De orat.* 2.221 *nam haec perpetua contra Scaevolam Curiana defensio tota redundavit hilaritate quadam et ioco*. I cannot agree with Fantham's opinion "Ciceronian conciliare" 274) that in the *Causa Curiana* the choice of the verb *delectare* depends on the situation: "since the issue in the court was more academic and less provocative; *conciliare* was not an urgent need". I think, on the contrary, that *conciliare* was an "urgent need" and so urgent that Crassus, obliged by the previous speech of Scaevola to use an *insinuatio*, employs the particular expedient of humour, which at the same time could *delectare* and *conciliare benevolentiam*.

⁷² Cf. also Adam, *Docere delectare movere* 115 n. 19.

and, like *Roscius*, does nothing *nisi perfecte*, nothing *nisi cum summa venustate*, nothing *nisi ut deceat et uti omnis moveat atque delectet* (*De orat.* 1.130). For this reason he employs the three indispensable tools of persuasion, *docere conciliare movere*. He has got that ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία which enables him to speak about everything in general and in particular, and finally he substitutes for an uncritical application of the rules a critical one, which gives him the power to hold attention, to arouse goodwill and to implant a readiness to learn. And he exercises this power not only in the introduction but throughout the whole speech. That is not yet the formulation of the three tasks, *docere delectare movere* (which we find for the first time in *Brutus*⁷³), but it seems evident that all three tasks are implied in Cicero's claim that the three functions, which the school was still teaching only for the *exordium*, must be accomplished in all parts of the speech.

Why, then, doesn't Cicero repeat this claim later in *Orator*, where just as in *De oratore* he is dealing with the *orator* and not with the *ars*? I think that the answer is that when in *Orator* Cicero hints at the rules of the *exordium* the doctrine of the three *officia oratoris* has already been announced in its complete formulation, which is the coupling of the three tasks to the three styles⁷⁴ and their convenient

⁷³ Not suggested as *officia oratoris*, but as characteristics of any rhetorical speech, these three concepts had already been dealt with in a very interesting passage of *De oratore* (2.159), in which Cicero is criticizing the dialectics of the Stoics and their kind of speech, which was completely unsuitable to an orator, whose *oratio* is on the contrary *multitudinis ... auribus accommodanda, ad oblectandos animos, ad impellendos, ad ea probanda, quae non aurificis statim, sed populari quadam trutina examinantur*. This contrast between dialectic discussion and the tasks of an orator is emphasized again by Quint. 12.2.11; cf. Leeman-Pinkster-Rabbie, *Comm. Cic. De orat.* Vol. III p. 99.

⁷⁴ Cf. Iul. Vict. 93,15 ff. Giom.-Celent.; Isid. *Orig.* 2.17.1. For a personal Ciceronian contribution in this formulation cf. Douglas, "A Ciceronian Contribution" 18 f.; 25; id., "Intellectual Background" 118 f.; Michel, *Rhétorique et philosophie* 155; Russell "Longinus" XXXVI n. 2; Hubbel, "Cicero on Styles" 185; Desmouliéz, *Cicéron et son goût* 297 f.; Calboli, *Catonis Oratio pro Rhodiensibus* 23; 72; Calboli Montefusco, *Exordium Narratio Epilogus* 7; Vickers, *In Defence of Rhetoric* 81. Quadlbauer, "Die genera dicendi" 86 n. 234, is doubtful. Adam, *Docere delectare movere* 108 n. 11 does not agree, but he does not offer any other solution to the question. Leeman, *Orationis ratio* 189, believes that it is possible to detect here a preceeding Hellenistic doctrine. Because I now think that the two triads *docere conciliare movere* and *docere delectare movere* concern different meanings I cannot share the opinion of many scholars, who want to see in *De orat.* 2.128 f. (*tres res ... una conciliandorum hominum, altera docendorum, tertia concitandorum. harum trium partium prima lenitatem orationis, secunda acumen, tertia vim desiderat*) a first allusion to the relationship between the three *officia oratoris* and the three styles: cf. for instance Lausberg, *Handbuch* 521; Vickers, *In Defence of Rhetoric* 81; Gill, "The Ethos/Pathos Distinction" 157 (even if with some hesitation). In my opinion therefore the passage of Quint. 12.10.59 is of special interest, because the only time he mentions the alternative *conciliare/delectare* is when he couples the doctrine of *De orat.* 2.128 with that of *Orat.* 69. Though the *lenitas* with which the ethos must be described can be seen as one of the stylistic components of *delectare* (*Part. 22 delectat etiam quidquid est admirabile*

mixture in accordance with the dominant criterion of κρέκον: *Orat.* 69 f. *erit igitur eloquens ... is qui in foro causisque civilibus ita dicet, ut probet, ut delectet, ut flectat. ... sed quot officia oratoris, tot sunt genera dicendi: subtile in probando, modicum in delectando, vehemens in flectendo. ... magni igitur iudici, summae etiam facultatis esse debet moderator ille et quasi temperator huius tripartitae varietatis; nam et iudicabit quid cuique opus sit et poterit quocumque modo postulabit causa dicere ... ut enim in vita sic in oratione nihil est difficilius quam quid deceat videre.*⁷⁵

What Cicero wants to point out is the ability of the orator to recognize *quid deceat*, and that is again his intention when he later gives us the rules of the *exordium* during a quick overview of the precepts of rhetoric: *Orat.* 122 *has partis quem ad modum tractet singulas difficile dictu est hoc loco ... quoniam autem non quem doceam quaero, sed quem probem, probabo primum eum qui quid deceat viderit.*

Leaving *Orator* and returning to *Brutus*: nowhere in his history of oratory does Cicero appear interested in dealing with technical rules. A knowledge of them is assumed and what he is focusing on here is only the effect which the orator is able to produce on the audience, because this is the measure of his skill. And this effect is that *ei qui audiunt ita afficiantur ut orator velit* (*Brut.* 185).

If we now compare once more the two triads, *docere conciliare movere* and *docere delectare movere*, we can understand how different they are even though there is a partial overlap between them. *Docere* and *movere*, the two *summae laudes* of the orator (*Brut.* 89), are indispensable to the attainment of persuasion, but they also contribute to the performance of the perfect orator, who attains his full skill and *honor* only if also able to *delectare*: *Opt. gen.* 3 *optimus est enim orator, qui dicendo animos audientium et docet et delectat et permovet. docere debitum est, delectare honorarium, permovere necessarium.* In conclusion I believe that it may even be possible to explain why after *De oratore* we do not again meet the triad *docere conciliare movere*: it has become a component of the second triad, *docere delectare movere*, but it is viewed from a different standpoint.⁷⁶ Cicero's

maximeque movet ea quae motum aliquem animis ciēt oratio quaeque significat oratoris ipsius amabilis mores; cf. Part. 71), we cannot and we must not identify it with the middle style, whose main characteristic is the suavitas: Cic. Orat. 91 f. hoc in genere nervorum vel minimum, suavitatis autem vel plurimum; cf. Quadlbauer, "Die genera dicendi" 79 ff.

⁷⁵ Cf. *De orat.* 3.210 f. For a relationship with Arist. *Rhet.* 1408a10 cf. Quadlbauer, "Die genera dicendi" 62 f.; Adam, *Docere delectare movere* 108.

⁷⁶ It is interesting what Schottiländer, "Der römische Redner" 136 f., pointed out: even if he does not distinguish between the two different doctrines related to the two triads, he does not consider *conciliare* and *delectare* synonyms, but sees *delectare* as a fourth element; in his opinion Cicero was obliged by the school tendency to use threefold distinctions to compress a fourfold one into a threefold scheme. This idea perhaps appears in Quintilian, when he says that the *pronuntiatio* must not only *conciliare, persuadere* and *movere*, but also *delectare*: Quint. 11.3.154 *tria autem praestare debet pronuntiatio, <ut> conciliet persuadeat moveat, quibus natura cohaeret ut etiam delectet; cf. Fortun. 158.3 ff. Calb.Mont.*

intention now is not to point out how the orator can achieve persuasion, as was the purpose of the Aristotelian *πίστεις*, but to point out the wider effect on the audience, which needs not only to be persuaded but also to be fascinated. When *vulgi iudicio et doctorum* (Brut. 186) the orator is able to speak in such a way that *doceatur* is *apud quem dicitur*, ... *delectetur*, ... *moveatur vehementius* (Brut. 185),⁷⁷ then and only then can he be considered the perfect orator.

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⁷⁷ An indisputable echo of the three *officia oratoris* is represented by the tasks of the poet: Horace not only considers *movere* the most effective way to win the reader (*Ars* 99 ff. *non satis est pulchra esse poemata; dulcia sunt / et quocumque volent animum auditoris agunt. / ut ridentibus arident ita flentibus adflent / humani vultus*), but also sees in the coupling of *delectare* and *monere* (= *docere*) the achievement of the poetical function (333 f. *aut prodesse volunt aut delectare poetae / aut simul et iocunda et idonea dicere vitae*; 343 f. *omne tulit punctum qui miscuit utile dulci / lectorem delectando pariterque monendo*). This Horatian debt to rhetoric has been focused on by Vickers, *In Defence of Rhetoric* 49 ff., who rightly complains that Brink's Commentary contains no hint of this relationship.

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Non-Logical Means of Persuasion in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and Cicero's *De oratore*

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My main concern in this paper is the role assigned to *ethos* and *pathos* after Aristotle; I am especially interested in Cicero's *De oratore* and in the relationship between Cicero and Aristotle. However, it will be helpful to begin with Aristotle and to clarify his fundamental distinction between technical and non-technical means of persuasion. I shall do that in Section I. Later, in Section II, I shall consider Cicero in relation to Aristotle, arguing that Ciceronian *inventio* is not found in Aristotle and that Aristotle's understanding of non-technical proofs is not that of Cicero. Finally in Section III, I shall point out that Cicero's account of emotional appeal is largely Platonic and not Aristotelian.

I. TECHNICAL AND NON-TECHNICAL MEANS OF PERSUASION IN ARISTOTLE

At *Rhetoric* 1.1 Aristotle states that the previous authors of rhetorical handbooks concentrated mostly on playing on the feelings of the audience (1354a11 ff.). It is difficult to assess whether Aristotle's statement is an exaggeration. In any case there are clear indications that both in rhetorical practice and in rhetorical handbooks¹ *pathos* played an important role before Aristotle. For example, Plato in the *Phaedrus* refers to the power of Thrasymachos² to arouse anger in the audience and then

¹ Cf. Gorg. *Hel.* 14 ... τῶν λόγων οἱ μὲν ἐλύπησαν, οἱ δὲ ἔτερψαν, οἱ δὲ ἐφόβησαν, οἱ δὲ εἰς θάρσος κατέστησαν τοὺς ἀκούοντας ... For the treatment of emotions in rhetorical handbooks see A. Hellwig, *Untersuchungen zur Theorie der Rhetorik bei Platon und Aristoteles*, *Hypomnemata* 38, (Göttingen 1973) 158 n. 167.

² Plato represents Thrasymachos as master of οἰκτρογῶν λόγοι, *Phaedr.* 267C7. It is in character that Aristotle *Rhet.* 3.1.7, 1404A14 refers to Θρασύμαχος ἐν τοῖς ἑλέοις (cf. Quint. *inst. or.* 3.1.12), thereby confirming that in his technical treatises on rhetoric (*Phaedr.* 271A4; C1) he dealt with this very issue.

to calm their anger down again.³ In exactly the same way, Thucydides ascribes to Pericles the ability to change the emotional attitude of the Athenians: "Whenever he realized that they were unreasonably and insolently audacious he would through speaking reduce them to fear, and when they fell victim to groundless fear he restored their boldness".⁴ And in the *Apology*, Plato has Socrates refuse to engage in the widely used practice⁵ of moving the jury to pity.⁶

On the other hand, in the very same introductory chapter of *Rhetoric* 1 Aristotle passes over ethos in silence.⁷ Was it less important in rhetorical handbooks, or was it completely absent there? At *Rhet* 1.2, 1356a10⁸ Aristotle refers to the opinion of some authors of rhetorical technai who did not regard ethos as contributing to persuasion. This passage shows that these authors of rhetorical technai did deal with the role of ethos, and the opinion that it was of little significance was not shared by all.⁹

³ 267C8 τὸ τοῦ Χαλκηδονίου σθένος, ὀργίσαι τε αὐ πολλοὺς ἅμα δεινὸς ἀνὴρ γέγονεν, καὶ πάλιν ὀργισμένοις ἐπάδων κηλεῖν ...

⁴ ὅποτε γοῦν αἰσθητό τι αὐτοὺς παρὰ καιρὸν ὕβρει θαρσύνοντας, λέγων κατέπλησεν ἐπὶ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι, καὶ δεδιώτας αὐ ἀλόγως ἀντικαθίστη πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ θαρσεῖν (2.65, 9)—θάραρος is the opposite of fear, Arist. *Rhet.* 2.5, 1383a16 ff. Plato at *Rep.* VI 493 in his critical account of rhetoric as practiced by the sophists mentions as one feature: ... καὶ οἷας (φωνάς) αὐ ἄλλου φεγγομένου ἡμεροῦνται τε καὶ ἀγριαίνει (scil. the crowd), B4 f. He refers to the same power of arousing opposite emotions as in the other texts discussed (in most of the Ciceronian passages quoted below in n. 70 the same power of rhetoric is asserted). Emotion is only one element of rhetoric which shows that it can be used for opposite purposes: cf. for this Anon. *Iambl.* 3,1 (DK B 89; II 401); cf. Plat. *Gorg.* 456C8 ff.; *Phaedr.* 261C4; Arist. *Rhet.* 1.1, 1355a29 ff.; b2 ff. This possibility of being used for opposite purposes characterizes every episteme: Plat. *Charm.* 171A9; *Rep.* 1.334A5; Arist. *Top.* 1.10, 104a15 f.; *Met.* Θ 2, 1046b4 f., cf. H. Bonitz, *Index Aristotelicus* 247a12-18.

⁵ Cf. the description of such a practice Lys. *or.* 20.34. On pathos used by orators, see Hellwig 235 n. 8.

⁶ 34C ὁ μὲν ... ἀγωνιζόμενος ἐδεήθη τε καὶ ἱκέτευσε τοὺς δικαστὰς μετὰ πολλῶν δακρύων, παιδία τε αὐτοῦ ἀναβιβασάμενος ἵνα ὅτι μάλιστα ἐλεηθῇ, cf. 35B7; 38D9. The judges at Plat. *Polit.* 305B7 f. are not supposed to be overpowered by emotions.

⁷ Cf. W. W. Fortenbaugh, "Persuasion through Character and the Composition of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*," *RhMus* 134 (1991) 153.

⁸ The text is doubtful at a11-12. R. Kassel, *Aristotelis Ars Rhetorica* (Berlin 1976), with reference to Vahlen, retained the transmitted text. According to the reading of the ms Aristotle assesses the role these authors of textbooks assigned to ἐπείκεια within the technē, namely as contributing nothing to bringing about persuasion (this interpretation is supported by Hellwig 251 n. 1), whereas the addition of οὐ by Ross goes beyond this, denying ἐπείκεια a role in the technē. The version transmitted by the ms is more of a paradox. I prefer Ross' conjecture. G. Kennedy, *Aristotle On Rhetoric. A Theory of Civic Discourse* (New York - Oxford 1991), translates ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ (a11) "in their treatment of the art," however one would rather expect plur., cf. 1.1, 1354a12. Cf. R. Kühner - B. Gerth, *Ausführliche Grammatik der Griechischen Sprache*, Zweiter Teil: Satzlehre (Hannover und Leipzig 1898, repr. Darmstadt 1966) I 19 n. 3.

⁹ For ethos in speeches, in the context of eikos, cf. Hellwig 235 n. 8, where add

Here the assertion must suffice that the concepts of *ethos* and *pathos* are not original in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. However, for the theory of rhetoric, it seems to have been completely his accomplishment to place *ethos* and *pathos* together with rational argument to form the three technical means of persuasion.¹⁰ As for *ethos* this arrangement means that Aristotle does not focus on the qualities an orator has, as previous rhetoricians had done,¹¹ but on the ability of an orator to convey by means of his speech¹² the appearance¹³ of possessing the qualities in question.

Although the three *pisteis* are grouped together, they are not perceived by Aristotle to be on the same level.¹⁴ *Rhetoric* 1.1 clearly places *pathos* below logical proof, while in 1.2 *ethos* is claimed to have *σχεδὸν ὡς εἰπεῖν κυριωτάτην* ... *πίστιν* (1356a13).¹⁵ *Ethos* is intrinsically related to the issues which come up for example in a court case in a way *pathos* as the emotion of the audience¹⁶ can never be.¹⁷ A prosecutor or a defendant might refer to his own¹⁸ or his opponent's character

Herodotus 3.81, 3 ἀρίστων δὲ ἀνδρῶν οἶκός ἄριστα βουλευόμενα γίνεσθαι. I will argue elsewhere that Arist. in his concept of *ethos* followed very closely a well known tradition of the fifth cent.

¹⁰ F. Solmsen, "The Aristotelian Tradition in Ancient Rhetoric," *AJP* 62 (1941) 42; Hellwig (above n. 1) 251; A. D. Leeman - H. Pinkster - E. Rabbie, *M. T. Cicero. De oratore libri III*. 3. Band: Buch II, 99-290 (Heidelberg 1989) 123.

¹¹ Cf. Hellwig 280 with n. 2 where one could add the fragment of the anonymous comedian: *τρόπος ἐστὶ ὁ κειθῶν τοῦ λέγοντος, οὐ λόγος* (Plut. *Mor.* 33F5 = IV 209 Meineke). We have no means to determine the date of the author.

¹² Cf. *Rhet.* 1.2, 1356a8 f. on *ethos*: *δεῖ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο συμβαίνειν διὰ τοῦ λόγου* ..., cf. *al τῶν διὰ τοῦ λόγου κοριζομένων πίστεων*, cf. below n. 42. This aspect is rightly stressed by Hellwig 280. It is no coincidence that in his treatment of *διάνοια* at *Poet.* 19, 1456a36 f. this same idea is expressed: *ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου δεῖ παρασκευασθῆναι* cf. b6 f.

¹³ φαίνεσθαι *Rhet.* 1.8, 1366a10; 2.1, 1377b 26; b29-31; 2.1, 1395a22.

¹⁴ Differently J. Wisse, *Ethos and Pathos from Aristotle to Cicero* (Amsterdam 1989) 15.

¹⁵ Cf. 2.1, 1377b24 ff.: *ethos* is more effective in deliberative meetings.

¹⁶ Different is of course *pathos* as the cause of actions, cf. 1.10, 1369a14-24.

¹⁷ This might be the reason that in *Rhet.* 1.1 *ethos* is not dealt with. The contrast is between logical argumentation on the one hand and rhetorical devices *ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος* on the other.

¹⁸ According to Aristotle *Rhet.* 1.9, 1366a27 ff.; 2.1, 1378a17 f. one uses the same means to present one's own or someone else's character. The character portrait of the other person can be that of an opponent in a trial (cf. 1.15, 1376a23-29; 3.16, 1417b7 f.; 19, 1419b10 ff.), of the man one undertakes to praise in an encomium (1.9, 1366a24 ff.), or the character of a man the orator portrays in his speech (3.7, 1408a25 ff.).

The primary effect of the presentation of *ethos* is to make the speaker appear trustworthy. This can be achieved among other things by catering to the mentality of the audience since it is most easily persuaded by orations which present its values (2.13, 1390a25 ff.—perhaps quoting Plat. *Gorg.* 513B8 ff.), 1.8, 1366a6 f.

Such a linkage between the quality of the speaker and the audience is made by Plat. *Gorg.* 510C7 ὁμοίῳ; the orator assimilates himself to the audience, presupposed 484D6; in the *Phaedr.* the logos has to correspond to the soul: 271B3 οἷα οὖσα (ἡ ψυχὴ) ὑφ'

and, like *Roscius*, does nothing *nisi perfecte*, nothing *nisi cum summa venustate*, nothing *nisi ut deceat et uti omnis moveat atque delectet* (*De orat.* 1.130). For this reason he employs the three indispensable tools of persuasion, *docere conciliare movere*. He has got that ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία which enables him to speak about everything in general and in particular, and finally he substitutes for an uncritical application of the rules a critical one, which gives him the power to hold attention, to arouse goodwill and to implant a readiness to learn. And he exercises this power not only in the introduction but throughout the whole speech. That is not yet the formulation of the three tasks, *docere delectare movere* (which we find for the first time in *Brutus*⁷³), but it seems evident that all three tasks are implied in Cicero's claim that the three functions, which the school was still teaching only for the *exordium*, must be accomplished in all parts of the speech.

Why, then, doesn't Cicero repeat this claim later in *Orator*, where just as in *De oratore* he is dealing with the *orator* and not with the *ars*? I think that the answer is that when in *Orator* Cicero hints at the rules of the *exordium* the doctrine of the three *officia oratoris* has already been announced in its complete formulation, which is the coupling of the three tasks to the three styles⁷⁴ and their convenient

⁷³ Not suggested as *officia oratoris*, but as characteristics of any rhetorical speech, these three concepts had already been dealt with in a very interesting passage of *De oratore* (2.159), in which Cicero is criticizing the dialectics of the Stoics and their kind of speech, which was completely unsuitable to an orator, whose *oratio* is on the contrary *multitudinis ... auribus accommodanda, ad oblectandos animos, ad impellendos, ad ea probanda, quae non aurificis statera, sed populari quadam trutina examinantur*. This contrast between dialectic discussion and the tasks of an orator is emphasized again by Quint. 12.2.11; cf. Leeman-Pinkster-Rabbie, *Comm. Cic. De orat.* Vol. III p. 99.

⁷⁴ Cf. Iul. Vict. 93,15 ff. Giom.-Celent.; Isid. *Orig.* 2.17.1. For a personal Ciceronian contribution in this formulation cf. Douglas, "A Ciceronian Contribution" 18 f.; 25; id., "Intellectual Background" 118 f.; Michel, *Rhétorique et philosophie* 155; Russell "Longinus" XXXVI n. 2; Hubbel, "Cicero on Styles" 185; Desmouliez, *Cicéron et son goût* 297 f.; Calboli, *Catonis Oratio pro Rhodiensibus* 23; 72; Calboli Montefusco, *Exordium Narratio Epilogus* 7; Vickers, *In Defence of Rhetoric* 81. Quadlbauer, "Die genera dicendi" 86 n. 234, is doubtful. Adam, *Docere delectare movere* 108 n. 11 does not agree, but he does not offer any other solution to the question. Leeman, *Orationis ratio* 189, believes that it is possible to detect here a preceeding Hellenistic doctrine. Because I now think that the two triads *docere conciliare movere* and *docere delectare movere* concern different meanings I cannot share the opinion of many scholars, who want to see in *De orat.* 2.128 f. (*tres res ... una conciliandorum hominum, altera docendorum, tertia concitandorum. harum trium partium prima lenitatem orationis, secunda acumen, tertia vim desiderat*) a first allusion to the relationship between the three *officia oratoris* and the three styles: cf. for instance Lausberg, *Handbuch* 521; Vickers, *In Defence of Rhetoric* 81; Gill, "The Ethos/Pathos Distinction" 157 (even if with some hesitation). In my opinion therefore the passage of Quint. 12.10.59 is of special interest, because the only time he mentions the alternative *conciliare/delectare* is when he couples the doctrine of *De orat.* 2.128 with that of *Orat.* 69. Though the *lenitas* with which the ethos must be described can be seen as one of the stylistic components of *delectare* (*Part. 22 delectat etiam quidquid est admirabile*

the means of persuasion as *provided by the orator* (the terms used are *πορίζω*,²³ *κατασκευάζω*, *εὐρίσκω*) and those available for his use²⁴ (the terms used are *προϋπάρχω*, *χρησθῆναι*). In the *Rhetoric to Alexander* none of the terms used by Aristotle at 1355b35 ff. occurs in a related context.²⁵ The explanation for this seems to be that Aristotle's concept is of a philosophical nature, taken over from Plato who in the *Euthydemus* devotes a lengthy discussion to it; it becomes then an important notion in Aristotelian philosophical analysis.²⁶

Plato in the *Euthydemus* had established a hierarchy between 'providing', *κατασκευάζω* (280C5; C8) and 'using'.²⁷ In Aristotle we find the same terms not only at *Rhetoric* 1.2, 1355b35 ff. but also in *Politics* 1 where the functions within the household are distinguished: *πορίζειν* - *ὑπάρχειν* 1.8, 1256b27 or *πορίζειν* - *χρησθῆναι* 1256a10. This recalls a passage in Plato's *Gorgias* (in particular 517C7 ff.): an activity which serves the needs of others (*διακονική*) by *providing* necessary things is contrasted with *technai* which are in command of the others by *using* their products.²⁸ Aristotle adopts this rank and relationship in the *Protrepticus*,²⁹ *Physics*,³⁰ *Metaphysics*,³¹ *Ethics*³² and *Politics*,³³ e.g. 1.10, 1258a25: the art of weaving does not *supply* wool but *uses* it. In the very same way he describes the task of the master in relation to the slave: 3.4, 1277a34; cf. b29 ff.³⁴

There can be no doubt that Aristotle in *Rhetoric* 1.2 uses this concept in order to describe the contrast between the technical and non-technical means of persuasion. However, it is remarkable that in *Rhetoric* 1.2 the conventional Platonic and

²³ In rhetorical context Plat. *Phaedr.* 269C4; D1.

²⁴ Cf. 1.15, 1375a25 f.; a28.

²⁵ In the *Rhet. to Alex.* *ἐντεχνης* is used only as adverb e.g. "respond in a way appropriate to the *technē*" (1444b7 = 89,8 F; 1445a28 = 92,1 F; 1445b23; b28 = 93,12; 16 F). As a synonym *τεχνικός* is used, again mostly as adverb; 1429a20 = 33,25 F; 1433b11 = 49,2 F.

²⁶ Cf. R. Nickel, *Das Begriffspaar Besitzen und Gebrauchen. Ein Beitrag zur Vorgeschichte der Potenz-Akt-Beziehung in der aristot. Ethik*, Diss. Berlin 1970 (for Plat. *Euthyd.* see p. 60 ff.).

²⁷ *Euthyd.* 280D4 ff.; 288E4 ff.; 291C4 ff.; cf. *Crat.* 390B1 ff.; *Rep.* 10.601C8 ff.

²⁸ *Gorg.* 517E3 ff., cf. *Rep.* 10.601D8 ff.; *Phaedr.* 274E7.

²⁹ B 9 Düring (cf. I. Düring, *Aristotle's Protrepticus. An Attempt at Reconstruction*, Göteborg 1961, 183 f. ad loc.); B 59.

³⁰ 2.2, 1 94b1-7.

³¹ K 8, 1064b19 ff.

³² *EE* 8.1, 1246b11, cf. 2.1, 1219a17, b3; *EN* 1.1, 1094b3.

³³ 3.4, 1277b29, cf. E. Schütrumpf, *Aristoteles Politik Buch II-III*, übersetzt und erläutert, in: *Aristoteles Werke in Deutscher Übersetzung* vol. 9, Part II (Berlin - Darmstadt 1991), note to 1277a33; idem *Die Analyse der polis durch Aristoteles* (Amsterdam 1980) 180 n. 76.

³⁴ Democrit. VS 68 B 270 (II 201); Xen. *Oec.* 9, 16: the slaves have to *supply*, take care and preserve, only the master has the right to *use*, cf. Arist. *EE* 7.10, 1242a18; *EN* 7.13, 1161a35. Plat. describes the activity of god in these terms: *Tim.* 46C7. For the relationship within the soul cf. Arist. *EE* 7.1, 1246b11.

Aristotelian superiority of 'using' over 'supplying' is turned around. In the intellectual process of preparing a speech, providing and supplying the means of persuasion rank higher than using existing pieces of evidence. This change in the rank of the two activities is possible because Aristotle has given up one important element of the Platonic antithesis: namely, that of allocating the two activities to two different abilities or different people, with 'using' being equivalent to ruling and 'providing' to serving. In the context of *Rhetoric* 1.2, it is one and the same person who both provides and uses;³⁵ and on this basis, the distinction in rank, originally associated with the two activities, can no longer be upheld.³⁶

I stress this because some historians of philosophy have the tendency to explain Aristotle's practical philosophy against the background of his first philosophy as we find it in the *Metaphysics*. The passage discussed here proves that Aristotle is able to change completely an important philosophical concept and to make use of it by turning its function into its opposite, if a different context so demands. The intellectual creativity or technical mastery of producing a logical argument,³⁷ of portraying a character and finding ways to stir up emotions in the audience, ranks higher than using readily available means of evidence.

It is true that one of the terms used by Aristotle at *Rhetoric* 1.2, 1355b39 to characterize the *ἔντεχνος* element of the orator's task is *εὐρεῖν*. However, this is not the dominating feature of the orator's activity, and it does not justify speaking of the Aristotelian concept of 'inventio'.³⁸ It should be stressed that here, as at *Poetics* 14, 1453b24, *εὐρίσκειν* contrasts with 'using'. True to the tradition of this concept,³⁹ it contains one *side* of a dialectical relationship and is not an independent concept in its own right, that of organizing the system of the three *entechnoi* means of persuasion in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*.⁴⁰ As far as the task of the orator is concerned, there is only one other passage where the term *εὐρίσκειν* is used. At 2.20, 1394a3, Aristotle tells us that in political deliberations it is advantageous to use fables because *πράγματα μὲν εὐρεῖν ὅμοια γεγεννημένα χαλεπὸν, λόγους*

³⁵ In the *Rhet.* Arist. does not consider the case that an orator writes speeches for others, for this cf. e.g. Plat. *Euthyd.* 305B7.

³⁶ There is an analogy for this in *Pol.* 3.4, 1277b3-7, cf. 7.14, 1333a6-11; cf. E. Schütrumpf, *Aristoteles Politik Buch I*, übersetzt und erläutert, in: *Aristoteles Werke in Deutscher Übersetzung* vol. 9, Part I (Berlin - Darmstadt 1991), note to *Pol.* 1.4, 1254a13.

³⁷ Cf. *Rhet.* 1.2, 1356a33 on dialectic and rhetoric: *δυνάμεις τοῦ κορίσαι λόγους*.

³⁸ Hellwig 261 focuses rather on *κατασκευάζω*, cf. n. 22 referring to 1355b39 "wo *κατασκευάζειν* das *Auffinden* (italics, E.S.), Auswählen und Zusammenstellen der *πίστεις ἔντεχνοι* umfaßt."

³⁹ *Pol.* 1.8, 1256b28 *ὑπάρχειν ἢ κορίζειν*, cf. 7.13, 1332a28.

⁴⁰ In Arist.'s *Rhet.* *εὐρίσκειν* is as little a clearly defined technical concept as *εὔρεσις* in *EN* 3.5, 1112b19 where he analyzes the steps which result in an action. Constitutive for rhetorical *technē* are rather the terms *ἰδεῖν* (*Rhet.* 1.1, 1355b10); *θεωρεῖν* (b25; b32); *κατασκευάζειν* (b38), cf. 2.1, 1377b24; 1378a18; *κορίζειν* 1.2, 1355b36; 1356a1; a33), cf. SE 34, 184a6; s. above n. 38.

δὲ ῥῆγον· ποιῆσαι γὰρ δεῖ ὥσπερ καὶ παραβολάς. Here εὑρεῖν means first the 'finding' or 'discovering' of suitable historical examples, those which can then be used, and only in the second case must εὑρεῖν be understood, in a kind of zeugma, as the 'inventing' of fables; only the verb ποιῆσαι used later is unequivocal. I want to stress that Aristotle does not yet have a concept of *inventio*⁴¹ but has simply adapted for the purpose of rhetoric the contrast of 'supplying' and 'using' which was so prominent in Plato and was applied in the same sense by Aristotle himself elsewhere.

The result of this analysis, namely that we do not have in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* the concept of *inventio* but merely a contrast demarcating the technical accomplishment or creative act of the orator (ἐντεχνος) from his simple use of existing material (ἄτεχνος). Support for this view is provided by *Poetics* 6, 1450b16 f. (cf. 14, 1453b7 f.), where Aristotle identifies the stage presentation as ἀτεχνότατον, adding almost tautologically that it belongs least to the poetic technē; in the same context he states that it is ἀτεχνότερον to try to achieve the dramatic effect by means of stage scenery; rather it should be integrated into the dramatic action (b11-14). In the same way the forms of anagnorisis which merely use existing attributes such as scars are ἀτεχνότεραι (16, 1454b19; b28) than those which are developed from the sequence of events within the plot (1455a15 ff.), because that is the task of the poet (9, 1451b28 f.). This helps us to understand the *Rhetoric*. Rather than defining the scope of invention, Aristotle at the beginning of *Rhetoric* 1 explains the character of the discipline. He does this by describing its purpose, subject matter, and the areas belonging properly to this art as against those means which are not the product of the creative mind or the technical mastery of the orator.⁴²

II. CICERONIAN INVENTIO AND ARISTOTLE

It has been argued that Hellenistic rhetoric contaminated the Aristotelian system,⁴³ and Cicero returned to it.⁴⁴ Aristotle, we are told, included logical argument, ethos and pathos under *inventio* in *Rhetoric* books 1 and 2 and dealt separately with *elocutio* and *dispositio* in *Rhetoric* 3; in doing so, he formed the model for Cicero,⁴⁵ who adopted the same system by including all three factors of persuasion—argument,

⁴¹ Differently Wisse e.g. 128 on *Rhet.* 1.2, 1355b35 ff. "where Aristotle's treatment of invention begins"; or the division of invention "into three *pisteis*" in Aristotle, cf. p. 2.

⁴² Cf. *Rhet.* 1.2, 1356a8 f. on ethos: δεῖ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο συμβαίνειν διὰ τοῦ λόγου, cf. above n. 12. For Arist.'s interest in rhetoric as *technē* cf. *SE* 34, 184a1 ff.

⁴³ Wisse 83 f. with n. 28; A. D. Leeman - H. Pinkster - E. Rabbie, vol. 3, 1989, 124.

⁴⁴ Wisse 105, cf. 2; 50; 77; 85; 92; 133; 248.

⁴⁵ Wisse 127 talks about the difference in the concept of *inventio* in Cic. and school handbooks and claims that Cic.'s concept has a counterpart in Arist.'s *Rhet.*

ethos, and pathos—under *inventio*.⁴⁶ I would object that this reconstruction of the tradition is anachronistic, for it assumes a developed concept of *inventio* in Aristotle.⁴⁷ As we have seen, Aristotle did *not* develop *inventio* as a main category within rhetorical theory.⁴⁸ Moreover, *ἔντεχνος* in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is too narrowly understood if one refers only to the treatment in *Rhetoric* books 1 and 2. One has to take into account the beginning of *Rhetoric* 3 as well.

There can be no doubt that the introduction of *Rhetoric* 3 (1.1403b6 ff.) gives the impression of being an addition to the subjects discussed in books 1 and 2,⁴⁹ and this impression is supported by the likelihood that *Rhetoric* 3 was originally an independent *methodos*.⁵⁰ It seems that at the end of *Rhetoric* 2.26 and at 3.1 Aristotle—or an editor⁵¹—makes clear his intention to place the new objects of study, namely style and disposition, on the same level as the *pisteis* dealt with in books 1 and 2. For my argument it is important to notice that Aristotle emphasizes the inclusion of style and disposition among the subjects of study by using the term *ἔντεχνος*. On analogy with *Rhetoric* 1.2, he uses the term again at 3.1, 1401a16,⁵² this time for the orator's working on style. And again, just as Aristotle speaks in *Rhetoric* 1.2 of the technically competent or creative endeavor of the orator as *ἔντεχνος* and the use of available pieces of evidence as *ἄτεχνος*, so he

⁴⁶ For Cic.'s system see *De or.* 1.142; 187; 279; cf. *Brut.* 215.

⁴⁷ For this reason one cannot represent the different varieties of the conceptions of 'dispositio' and 'inventio' in later rhetorical systems according to whether they agree or disagree with Aristotle, as Wisse (e.g. 92; 133) does; his scheme 1 on p. 86 is evidently wrong.

⁴⁸ W. Kroll, art. "Rhetorik," *RE* Suppl. 7 (1940) 1096 acknowledges that Anaximenes and Aristotle contain "Ansätze" of a system of rhetoric structured according to the *officia oratoris*, but he does not trace the system back to Aristotle. Rather he assumes (following Stroux) that Theophrastos, who was inspired by Aristotle, exerted an important influence on the development of this system. Among the changes which had to be made was the introduction of the category of *inventio* for the three Aristotelian *pisteis*. Cf. Solmsen *AJP* 62 (1941) 47.

⁴⁹ To the best of my knowledge nobody has yet pursued the question that in the *Poet.* λέξις (6, 1449b33 ff.) and σύστασις πραγμάτων (6, 1450a15 ff.; 7, 1450b22 ff. where he discusses this issue in the context of structure, τάξις, b35, b37) are from the very beginning listed as 'parts' of the tragedy whereas in *Rhet.* they are first ignored and only at the end of book 2 introduced or, more correctly, loosely attached as subject matter of his study. The *Poet.* shows inspite of all imperfections in many details from the very start a better and more comprehensive understanding of *all* the necessary conditions which constitute tragedy, the particular kind produced by *technē poetikē*, than the *Rhet.* This is the more remarkable since Plat. *Phaedr.* 269C2 f. stressed that τὸ ὅλον συνίστασθαι is one of the main requirements of true rhetoric.

⁵⁰ I. Düring, *Aristoteles. Darstellung und Interpretation seines Denkens* (Heidelberg 1966) 118; 121.

⁵¹ Düring (see previous note) 118 thinks of Andronicus of Rhodes.

⁵² It seems remarkable that the qualification of certain elements of rhetoric as *ἔντεχνοι* can be found in the *Rhet.* only in the programmatic introductions of the books in question: in 1.2 and 3.1.

distinguishes in 3.1 between the style which has to be mastered as an art (*ἔντεχνος*, 1404a15 f.) and the talent of an actor which is given by nature. In all these cases Aristotle contrasts the things handed to the orator—whether by circumstances (such as witnesses) or by nature (as a talent)—with the things he accomplishes by virtue of his mastery of the *techne* and its rules. This passage confirms what I said earlier about the generally ignored philosophical background of this concept. In *Rhetoric* 3.1, as in *Politics* 1.8, it is nature which supplies things whereas *techne* has to provide or acquire them. There seems, however, to be an objection to the argument proposed here: at *Poetics* 22, 1459a7 and *Rhetoric* 3.2, 1405a9⁵³ Aristotle refers the ability to come up with metaphors to a natural talent; while it cannot be acquired from another person, Aristotle nevertheless takes it seriously and discusses it at some length. However, this is completely in line with his concept of *techne*: the function of every *techne* is to assist where nature is deficient.⁵⁴ Therefore, while Aristotle can concede that metaphor cannot be learned from others because one needs a natural gift for it, there is still room for technical advice, such as how to employ metaphors etc. The objective in the *Rhetoric* is not to deal with all the factors (such as natural talent) which could make a speech effective but to identify those elements falling under the rhetorical *techne* which could be persuasive in each case (1.1, 1355b10 f.; 2, 1355b25 f.).

The creative activity and technical competence of the orator might be of a different kind in the case of employing any of the three *pisteis* on the one hand and in the case of his working on the style (and disposition) of a speech on the other. However, there is no indication that Aristotle separated producing the three means of persuasion as *inventio* from the orator's occupation with style and the organization of the whole, *dispositio*.⁵⁵ If one takes *εὐπεῖν* as an important aspect of *ἔντεχνος*—it is certainly one of its aspects—then one could argue that style, which is *ἔντεχνος*, should be considered a part of *inventio* in Aristotle. However, instead of singling out *εὐπεῖν* it would be more appropriate to speak of the purposeful activity of the orator, *πραγματεύεσθαι*.⁵⁶ The activity expressed by this term (3.1, 1403b6 ff.) includes first producing the three *pisteis* which is *ἔντεχνον*, then working on the style which is *ἔντεχνον* and thirdly structuring the speech, i.e. disposition

⁵³ I am indebted to Prof. Fortenbaugh for calling these two passages to my attention. My point here is that Aristotle concentrates on the importance of technical mastery and subsumes style under *techne* in the same way as he had done for the three *pisteis* in bk. 1, instead of contrasting them as style and 'inventio'.

⁵⁴ *Protr.* B13 (Dü); *Pol.* 7.17, 1337a1; *Phys.* 2.8, 199a15.

⁵⁵ Here I am correcting Wisse who says: "In the stage of invention the orator was meant to think out all possible material to convince his audience, in that of disposition his material was to be divided so as to form the different parts of the speech," 14, cf. 84; 305; 317.

⁵⁶ 2.26, 1403a34; 3.1, 1403b6. Cf. Th. Waitz, *Aristotelis Organon* (Lipsiae 1844) II 415, note to *Anal. Post.* 2.13, 96b15.

which should be considered as ἔντεχρον as well⁵⁷—in the *Poetics* organizing the plot is definitely the most important task of the poet. Those rhetorical handbooks (*Rhetorica ad Herennium*; *De inventione*) which treat the parts of an oration under inventio actually come closer to the spirit of the Aristotelian rhetoric than Cicero. They refer to the leading category of what the orator has to accomplish, πραγματεύεσθαι, by means of his technē, and not to the intermediary or subordinate category, dispositio.

Given the genesis of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*—book 3 very likely dates from a different period than books 1 and 2 and is only loosely connected with them—it seems arbitrary to attach any weight to the sequence as we have it now and to draw from it any conclusion regarding the stages in which an orator prepares a speech: i.e., a process in which inventio precedes work on style and structure.⁵⁸ Moreover, both in book 1 and again in book 3 we have a distinction between the elements which belong to the technē proper and those which do not; that prohibits us from claiming that Aristotle wanted this arrangement understood as a distinction between inventio and later stages in the work of the orator, such as dispositio.⁵⁹

While one finds a broad application of ἔντεχνος in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* which includes style (and by implication structure), the distinction between ἔντεχνος and ἄτεχνος, is, nevertheless, clear cut, so that none of the three technical pisteis (by means of argument, ethos, pathos) is in any way related to the category of ἄτεχνος. This approach contrasts markedly with Cicero *De oratore* 2.116-117 where the equivalent of ἄτεχνος ("rerum earum, quae non excogitantur ab oratore") is employed to characterize the nature of the matter (*materies*) available to the orator: one class of things used by the orator "ad probandum" (which is the means of

⁵⁷ Wisse 83 (cf. 88; 92 f.) points out that in *De inv.* and *ad Her.* (e.g. 1.4) parts of the speech are treated not under disposition but under invention. This is regarded as a contamination of the Aristotelian scheme with the older one of the parts of the speech (cf. Solmsen *AJP* 62 (1941) 49 f.). One could rather argue that here the creative act of the orator was described in terms of inventio, and that—in a very Aristotelian way—even the arrangement of the parts of the speech was referred to this main category, instead of a separate category, disposition (differently Wisse 85 with n. 34). Hellenistic rhetoric classified the five *officia* in such a way that τὸ πραγματικόν included εὐρεσις and τάξις, Kroll, *RE Suppl.* 7 (1940) 1097.

When *De inv.* 2.8 talks about a conflation of the Aristotelian and Isocratean schools ("conflatum genus"), this does not support Wisse's reconstruction since Cic. does not deal here with the parts of speech (pace Wisse 93 with n. 64).

⁵⁸ Solmsen *AJP* 62 (1941) 38 is more cautious when he characterizes the arrangement of Arist.'s rhetorical system by "Proofs (or material content), Style, and Disposition". Kennedy (1963) 87-103 deals with Arist. *Rhet.* books 1 and 2 under the heading "Aristotle on invention" (cf. Kennedy, *The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World 300 B.C.-A.D. 300*, Princeton 1972, 221) but this does not affect adversely his account.

⁵⁹ For a reconstruction of the tradition of rhetoric it should be stressed that the contrast of εὐρεσις and δίδασσις is found in Plat. *Phaedr.* 236A3-6. Aristotle, however, did not structure his system of rhetoric according to this readily available concept.

persuasion which attempts to prove the truth, 2.115) includes private documents, testimonies etc. Such things are introduced as one *part* of the matter employed in logical proofs ('ratione tractantur'). In Cicero, therefore, the 'non-technical evidence' does not constitute a means of persuasion in its own right, as in Aristotle; rather it is classified as subordinate to one of the three means of persuasion⁶⁰ which for Cicero are the *only* means of persuasion (cf. *De oratore* 2.121).

In Aristotle on the other hand, the evidence categorized as *atechnos* forms a *pistis* in its own right,⁶¹ and for this reason he did not introduce *atechnos* evidence as means to be used by one technical proof. It is clear from Aristotle's treatment of *atechnoi pisteis* in *Rhetoric* 1.15 that this sort of evidence was intended to do more than function as objective proof. On the contrary, it is assumed that its nature is controversial,⁶² and Aristotle gives advice how to argue in order to turn this evidence to one's advantage.⁶³ However, he does not address this issue in systematic terms—something one might have wished—and he does not draw Cicero's conclusion: namely that this evidence lacks the quality of being a means of persuasion in its own right and that it should be subordinate as material for the argument. Furthermore, it is questionable whether Aristotle would have agreed with Cicero that this evidence should serve as material only for *logical* proofs, because Aristotle acknowledges that there are witnesses, i.e. ἄτεχνοι means of persuasion, for *character* as well, 1.15, 1376a25. This is to say that in order to corroborate the *ethical* means of persuasion one can adduce external evidence.⁶⁴

Basic assumptions about the scope of rhetoric as a *technē* have changed between Aristotle and Cicero. Ciceronian *inventio* as limited to the three means of persuasion has nothing to correspond with in Aristotle; it is definitely narrower in scope than Aristotelian ἔντεχνος which includes style (and structure). And the Ciceronian equivalent of ἔντεχνος has lost its rank as an independent means of persuasion and becomes subordinate material for just one of the three *entechnoi pisteis*.

⁶⁰ Cf. Wisse's diagram 130. Wisse plays down the differences between Aristotle and Cicero by arguing that there are more serious differences between the two on the one hand and the *stasis* system of the school rhetoric on the other. However, since in Hermagoras νόμοι belonged to ζητήματα νομικά (Wisse 131 with n. 105) and since the *Rhet. ad Her.* "shows similar incorporation of material about laws into a 'legal stasis'" (Wisse 131), they were no longer an 'inartificial' piece of evidence but already related to argumentation in a way we do not find yet in Aristotle. It is in *character*, then, that neither the *Rhet. ad Her.* nor *De invent.* uses the distinction between technical and non-technical means of persuasion which was crucial for Aristotle.

⁶¹ This is overlooked by Leeman - Pinkster - Rabbie, vol. 3, 57, ad 2.116: "Die Übereinstimmung mit Cic.'s Zweiteilung ist fast wörtlich."

⁶² Cf. in particular 1.15, 1376 a17-23 about witnesses, cf. a33 ff. on 'manipulating' contracts to one's advantage.

⁶³ Cf. M. Gagarin, "The Nature of Proofs in Antiphon," *CPh* 85 (1990) 24-25.

⁶⁴ Cf. as well 1.15, 1375b7: the *better* person uses and follows the unwritten laws rather than the written ones.

III. CICERO ON PATHOS; PLATONIC PRECEDENTS

For the last 50 years scholars seem to have agreed on the tradition which Cicero followed in the role attributed to pathos in the *De oratore*. F. Solmsen⁶⁵ has argued that Stoic influence was responsible for the absence of pathos from Hermagoras' system, and that Hermagoras' influence, in turn, explained why pathos was missing from later handbooks. Solmsen traced Cicero's views on emotions back to Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. However, Solmsen discussed only the tradition for *De oratore* 2.185-214; in contrast, scholars after him, such as W. Kroll⁶⁶ and A. D. Leeman - H. Pinkster⁶⁷ see Aristotelian influence throughout *De oratore*. In this final part of my paper, I would like to question whether Cicero's views on pathos in *De oratore* 1 are influenced by Aristotle.⁶⁸

In terms of the literary form, Cicero's dialogue has nothing in common with the Aristotelian treatise.⁶⁹ And the emphasis chosen in the two works contrasts markedly from the beginning. In *Rhetoric* 1.1 Aristotle is very critical of the writers of rhetorical technai because they are preoccupied mainly with one element, the emotions of the audience. Cicero advances a quite different view concerning the importance of emotional appeal. In the prologue (1.17), Cicero himself expresses the view that "omnis vis ratioque dicendi in eorum, qui audiunt, mentibus aut sedandis aut excitandis expromenda est." Crassus' encomium of rhetoric starts by extolling its unequalled power, namely "... posse dicendo tenere hominum [coetus] mentis, adlicere voluntates, impellere quo velit ..." (1.30). Later in his response to Scaevola Crassus returns to the same issue: "quis enim nescit maxumam vim existere oratoris in hominum mentibus vel ad iram aut ad odium ... incitandis" (1.57).⁷⁰ If Cicero knew the *Rhetoric*, he obviously discarded its slant against pathos so clearly expressed at the beginning. That *Rhetoric* 1.1 is considered by some scholars, starting with Solmsen, to be a remainder of an earlier stage in which Aristotle was critical of pathos need not concern us here,⁷¹ unless one tries to argue

⁶⁵ "Aristotle and Cicero on the Orator's Playing upon the Feelings," *CPh* 33 (1938) (390-404) 394 f., cf. "The Aristotelian Tradition in Ancient Rhetoric," *AJP* 62 (1941) (35-50; 169-190) 178.

⁶⁶ *RE* Suppl. 7 (1940) 1088.

⁶⁷ M. T. Cicero. *De oratore libri III. Buch I, 1-165* (Heidelberg 1981) 43; 62; 146; cf. A. D. Leeman - H. Pinkster - E. Rabbie (1989) vol. 3, 123; J. Wisse *passim*.

⁶⁸ I have addressed some of the issues dealt with here in "Cicero *De oratore* I and Greek Philosophical tradition," *RhM* 133 (1990) 310-314.

⁶⁹ Cf. E. Schütrumpf, "Platonic elements in the structure of Cicero's *De oratore* Book I," *Rhetorica* 6 (1988), 237-258.

⁷⁰ Cf. 1.60 quod unum in oratore dominatur; cf. 165; 202; 219; 2.35; 189; 215; 337; 3.118; as well Antonius 2.324 on prologue (cf. Wisse 208 f.), cf. 2.332. Cic. adhered to this principle: cf. *Or.* 69; 128; *Brut.* 279; *De opt. gen.* 3.

⁷¹ Nor did these issues concern Solmsen in his paper on the "Aristotelian Tradition in Ancient Rhetoric" *AJP* 62 (1941) 37 n. 9: "From the point of view of the Aristotelian

that Cicero, if indeed he read Aristotle's *Rhetoric* at the time he was writing the *De oratore*, read it in a form different from the one we have, i.e. without ch. 1.1 at the beginning. But even in this case, the *prominent* role given to pathos by Cicero has no counterpart in the rest of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*.

For an orator's ability to sway the emotions of the audience, Cicero believes that a philosophical study of human nature is a prerequisite (*De oratore* 1.17, cf. 60; 69). What is Aristotle's view on this issue? For him rhetoric is an offshoot of politics in that it deals with human character (*Rhetoric* 1.2, 1356a25 f.). If one pursues this aspect, one could refer to the *Nicomachean Ethics* where Aristotle elaborates on the prerequisites a politician has to meet: he has to study the soul.⁷² In light of this, one could reasonably expect that in the *Rhetoric* Aristotle might advance the claim that knowledge of the soul is a precondition for the orator's ability to apply emotional persuasion effectively, as Cicero required it much later. However, we do not find anything of the kind in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*,⁷³ and in particular, the term ψυχή does not occur in *Rhetoric* 2.2-11,⁷⁴ where Aristotle discusses the pathos in detail.⁷⁵

Cicero's call for a philosophical study of human nature cannot be traced back to Aristotle. It points to a different influence which I believe to be Plato's *Phaedrus*.⁷⁶ For Plato the art of persuasion is psychagogia, which means that an aspiring orator must study the nature⁷⁷ of the soul (270B). First, he has to examine whether the soul in itself is uniform or whether it is a composite consisting of

"tradition" these questions seem irrelevant as there is no evidence that they ever bothered later rhetoricians."

⁷² Arist. *EN* 1.13, 1 102a18 δῆλον ὅτι δεῖ τὸν πολιτικὸν εἰδέναι πῶς τὰ περὶ ψυχῆς; a 23 θεωρητέον δὴ καὶ τῷ πολιτικῷ περὶ ψυχῆς, cf. *Protr.* B46, cf. already Plat. *Gorg.* 464B3 ff.; *Leg.* 1.650B6 ff.

⁷³ Cf. Hellwig 233.

⁷⁴ Cf. Solmsen, *CPh* 33 (1938) 402. At *Rhet.* 2.12-17 it occurs only at 14, 1390b11.

⁷⁵ Nor does it seem possible to trace the three categories of study of pathos used by Aristotle (first introduced 2.1, 1378a22 ff.): πῶς διακείμενοι, τίσιν (i.e. εἰώθασιν ὀργίζεσθαι), ἐπὶ ποίοις back to Plat. *Phaedr.* 270C ff.

⁷⁶ In the *Phaedrus* Plato's criticism of the usage of emotions by orators and their treatment in rhetorical handbooks is based on the absence of a philosophical psychology (269A5-C5). Plato grants that the philosophically trained orator will employ rhetorical devices to stir up emotions, 272A5, cf. Hellwig 178 f. Aristotle falls short of Plato's requirements since he does not analyze or explain the essence of ethos and pathos or the *causes* of its working, Hellwig 237-238.

It should not be overlooked that in Plato's *Phaedr.* one no longer finds emotions reserved for certain parts of the speech as was the case in the system of contemporary rhetorical treatises (references in Hellwig 179 n. 7). Treating the emotions separately from parts of the speech is, therefore, not Aristotle's accomplishment (pace Solmsen). Nor must Cicero have followed Aristotle when in *De or.* 2, 185-211 he kept the treatment of the affectus and partes orationis apart, differently Solmsen *CP* 33 (1938) 396 ff.

⁷⁷ Cf. φύσις 270B4 f.; C9; E4; 271A6 f.; 272A1; 273E1; 277B8 f.; 271A6 πέφυκεν.

many different parts like the body (270C10 ff.; 271A4 ff.); if the soul consists of many parts their number has to be stated.⁷⁸ Then, "after he has classified the (different) kinds of speeches and of men ... and their ways of being affected,"⁷⁹ the (expert) will tell the *reasons* in each case (δείξει πάσας αἰτίας), adapting them to each other ..." (271A10, cf. 277B8). The philosophically trained orator will be able to explain the *reasons* why (δι' ἣν αἰτίαν, B4) a specific soul will necessarily be persuaded by a certain sort of argument. In *De oratore* 1.53 Crassus states that without knowledge of the nature of man and of the "*causas quibus mentes aut incitantur aut reflectuntur*" no orator can be successful, and adds that all this belongs to the field of philosophy.⁸⁰

The second step in Plato's *Phaedrus*, the *adaptation* of a specific way of talking to the psychological condition of the audience, is again prominent in Cicero when Crassus speaks of "*oratio hominum sensibus ac mentibus accommodata*" (1.54). This idea is not absent in Aristotle. However, there it appears in a completely different context, namely in regard to the character of the audience which is most easily convinced by orations which present its values,⁸¹ i.e. accommodate its views. In Aristotle this adaptation of speech to audience is a subordinate part of *ethos*, with its main role being the presentation of the quality of the speaker.⁸² In his system the character of the audience is addressed (and taken advantage of) in the *pathos* parts of a speech, not the *ethical* ones.

The Platonic linkage between philosophical knowledge of the soul and the composition of a speech in accordance with the psychological makeup of the audience is preserved not in Aristotle but in Cicero.⁸³ Crassus is true to the Platonic

⁷⁸ 270D6 ἀριθμησόμενον, cf. 273E1. For this requirement in the context of διαίρεσις cf. as well *Philebus* 16D. A. v. Fragstein, *Die Diairesis bei Aristoteles*, Amsterdam 1967, 79 n. 2, when discussing this passage refers to *Phaedr.* 270D.

⁷⁹ Cf. 271A10: "... what is affected by what according to its nature" ὅτε τί ... ποθεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ πέφυκεν.

⁸⁰ At *De or.* 1.84 Cicero presents Charmadas as holding the view that no one masters the ability of speaking unless he has been instructed properly in philosophy and employs it. In order to affect the audience the way the orator wants to he has to know "*quot modis hominum mentes et quibus et quo genere orationis in quamque partem moverentur*" (1.87). This knowledge belongs to philosophy. Insisting on the complete number of ways to influence men has its correspondence in Plat.'s *Phaedr.*, not in Aristotle.

Charmadas' position comes close to that of Crassus, cf. G. Kennedy (1972), 219 f.

⁸¹ *Rhet.* 1.8, 1366a9 f., cf. 2.13, 1390a25 ff.

⁸² See above n. 18.

⁸³ Solmsen, *AJP* 62 (1941) 190 n. 127 when summing up the results of his study on the Aristotelian tradition in ancient rhetoric and attributing to Cicero the role of reviving Aristotelian ideas states rather unexpectedly: "In stressing the need of philosophical penetration Cicero agrees with Plato's *Phaedrus* ..."

demand that this knowledge has to be philosophical. However, he parts company with Plato by separating the philosopher from the orator: the knowledge of the nature of man and the way it acts is "philosophorum proprius," the "oratio hominum sensibus ac mentibus accommodata" is "proprium oratoris" (1.54)—in this account the knowledge of why a speech is appropriate to a certain audience falls into the domain of philosophers. This is in line with Plato who explains the success of Pericles by referring to his teacher Anaxagoras through whom he received an understanding of the *nature* of the mind (270A5). It confirms the connection argued for here that Cicero repeats this story in *De oratore* 3.138.⁸⁴

Compared with books 2 and 3 of Cicero's *De oratore*, book 1 is more philosophical because it deals in a more fundamental way with the principles of rhetoric.⁸⁵ For this discussion in book 1 Cicero could refer⁸⁶ to Plato's demands for a scientific rhetoric without agreeing with him completely. It is well known that in *De oratore* 1.28 Cicero's description of the scenery involves borrowing from the *Phaedrus*.⁸⁷ However, the influence of this Platonic dialogue clearly goes beyond scenery. As far as the treatment of *pathe* in *De oratore* 2.185-214 is concerned, there is only a single parallel between Aristotle (*Rhetoric* 2.1, 1377b31) and Cicero (*De oratore* 2.178).⁸⁸ The difference between the two is, however, considerable. While Aristotle focuses on the *change* of attitude people experience under the influence of emotion, Cicero contrasts *quantitatively* judgments made under the influence of emotion with those made according to the standards of truth and justice. This is a completely different issue.⁸⁹

To sum up, the same three *entechnoi pisteis* are found in Aristotle and Cicero, but Aristotle did not set them apart from style—and by implication from disposition—in the way Cicero did when he used *inventio* as a subcategory excluding style and disposition. I believe that some scholars have been too eager to see in Aristotle Cicero's source for the system of the three *entechnoi* means of persuasion and that this eagerness has misled them to interpret Aristotle in terms of the *De oratore*: e.g. they wrongly see Cicero's concept of *inventio* in the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle. This approach has not benefitted our understanding either of Aristotle or of Cicero. By recognizing that the philosophical concept of 'using'—'providing' underlies Aristotle's concept of ἐντεχνος - ἄτεχνος in *Rhetoric* 1.2 and 3.1 and

⁸⁴ Hellwig 185 n. 23 assumes that Cicero followed Plato ("in Platons Nachfolge").

⁸⁵ Cf. Cic. *ad Att.* 4.16,2-3: "reliqui libri τεχνολογίαν habent".

⁸⁶ Wisse 317 calls it "a practical turn Cicero gives to some of Aristotle's ideas, referring the orator, e.g., to philosophical discussions of the emotions". However, referring to philosophy in this context goes beyond anything Aristotle considered.

⁸⁷ Cf. W. Görler, "From Athens to Tusculum: Gleaning the Background of Cicero's *De oratore*," *Rhetorica* 6 (1988) 215-235.

⁸⁸ Cf. Wisse 128 f.

⁸⁹ For other aspects cf. A. D. Leeman - H. Pinkster - E. Rabbie, vol. 3 (1989) 129 f.; 132 f.

by referring to the *Poetics* for a related discussion, we have a better basis for explaining Aristotle's perspective and intention. While it might be tempting to link the three Aristotelian *entechnoi* means of persuasion with those of Cicero, one should not ignore the fact that we find them in the Roman author in quite a different systematic framework.

Furthermore, as far as the content of the non-logical means of persuasion is concerned, there is now agreement that Ciceronian winning goodwill (*conciliare*, *De oratore* 2.182) is different from Aristotelian *ethos*;⁹⁰ and for *pathos*, I do not see any way of connecting Aristotle with the passages on *pathos* in *De oratore* book 1, starting with Cicero's own statements in the proem and continuing with the variations of that theme by the interlocutors of the dialogue. If during Hellenistic times the influence of Aristotle's teaching on emotions was missing, the situation had not changed much with Cicero.

⁹⁰ Cf. W. W. Fortenbaugh, "Benevolentiam conciliare and animos permovere: Some remarks on Cicero's *De oratore* 2.178-216," *Rhetorica* 6 (1988) 259-273. Fortenbaugh argues that Cic. is more influenced by the tradition of rhetorical handbooks than by Aristotelian antecedents. Cf. L. Calboli Montefusco, "Cicero and the Peripatos," this volume ch. 5 p. 67 (5). Cf. already Solmsen, *AJP* 62 (1941) 179.

Problems remain concerning εὖνοια for a treatment of which Aristot. at *Rhet.* 2.1, 1378a18 f. refers to his investigation about *pathe*. Goodwill is first and foremost one aspect of the *ethos* of the orator, namely to portray him as well-disposed (1.8, 1366a11; 2.1, 1378a8), secondarily it is the attitude felt by the audience toward the orator: 3.14, 1415a35 f.; b25.

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Epicuro contro Aristotele sulla Retorica

Tiziano Dorandi

Tra le sezioni più interessanti della *Retorica* di Filodemo di Gadara (un epicureo vissuto a Ercolano nel I sec. a.C.) è quella che conserva ampi estratti di una polemica contro il giovane Aristotele accusato di avere abbandonato lo studio della filosofia per dedicarsi a quello della retorica e della politica in competizione con Isocrate.¹ Una sicura lettura di questo lungo brano, che deriva probabilmente dal V libro dell'opera filodemea,² è ostacolata dalla cattiva condizione in cui il testo ci è pervenuto e dalla mancanza di una edizione critica attendibile, dopo quella del Sudhaus,³ riproposta, con troppa fiducia, dal Düring.⁴ Le osservazioni che seguono presuppongono il testo di Sudhaus, ma tengono presenti solo le parti meglio conservate escludendo arbitrarie o troppo estese integrazioni. Va da sé che le mie poche note non hanno né la pretesa di esaurire tutte le questioni né di offrire un rapporto completo dell'intero dibattito, ma solo un primo e provvisorio schizzo di un aspetto almeno della recezione del pensiero aristotelico nella scuola epicurea.

Sono necessarie, innanzitutto, almeno tre premesse:

1. Fonte di Filodemo è, con buona probabilità, Epicuro stesso, il cui nome ricorre, seppure in un contesto gravemente lacunoso, almeno una volta in col. LIV 12 s.⁵

¹ Riprendo con notevoli ampliamenti e ripensamenti quanto scritto in: Dorandi (1989), 201-205.

² Il libro è tramandato dal PHerc. 1015/832. Si tratta di un rotolo spezzato in due: PHerc. 1015 corrisponde alla parte superiore, PHerc. 832 a quella inferiore. Cf. Dorandi (1990), 72 s., 85.

³ Sudhaus (1896), 50-63. Lo studioso indica le colonne del PHerc. 1015 con numeri romani, quelle del PHerc. 832 con numeri arabi. Tra le due parti del papiro mancano talvolta una o due righe di testo.

⁴ Düring (1957), 299-302.

⁵ Cf. Sudhaus (1893), 561 ss. e Bignone (1936) I, 126 ss.; II, 88 ss. = (1973) I, 112 ss., 451 ss. Più cauto Düring (1957), 310.

2. Non ostante sia probabile che Epicuro/Filodemo abbiano volontariamente alterato taluni aspetti della polemica fra Isocrate e Aristotele a favore delle proprie tesi, nel complesso, i dati che il brano ci fornisce appaiono attendibili.

3. L'intero contesto presuppone la polemica fra Aristotele e Isocrate relativa allo statuto di *technè* della retorica.

Quanto all'ultimo punto, questo, nelle linee essenziali, lo svolgimento delle vicende: tra il 360 e il 350 a.C., Aristotele, indignato per l'eccessivo numero di encomi che erano stati scritti per elogiare la figura di Grillo, il giovane figlio di Senofonte morto prematuramente in uno scontro di cavalleria precedente la battaglia di Mantinea (362), e, in particolare, quello pubblicato da Isocrate, compose il suo primo dialogo letterario intitolato: *Sulla retorica o Grillo*. La morte di Grillo fu solo un pretesto per Aristotele per esporre in maniera sistematica le proprie idee sulla retorica, nell'ambito anche del più vasto dibattito che vedeva contrapposti ideali accademici e isocratei. A Aristotele rispose Cefisodoro, un discepolo di Isocrate, che, in difesa del maestro, pubblicò uno scritto *Contro Aristotele* in quattro libri. Né questo fu sufficiente a placare la polemica, che Aristotele aveva continuata nelle lezioni sulla retorica tenute all'Accademia. Nel 353, Isocrate fu, pertanto, costretto a replicare con l'*Antidosis* alle continue accuse di Aristotele che, a sua volta, reagì alla provocazione col *Protrepticus*.⁶

Cerchiamo di seguire, più da vicino, lo svolgimento delle argomentazioni epicuree in Filodemo. Ripropongo, suddivisi in dieci paragrafi, i punti principali del dibattito.⁷

a. "Passiamo ora a quello che riferiscono di Aristotele, l che insegnava retorica nel pomeriggio proclamando: 'turpe è tacere e lasciar parlare Isocrate'.⁸ Egli manifesta a sufficienza il suo giudizio sia con la redazione di trattati retorici sia con il considerare la politica come parte della filosofia e balbetta asserendo che la politica differisce dalla retorica⁹ ..." (col. XLVIII 21 - col. 36).

b. "[Aristotele adduceva diverse ragioni per giustificare la partecipazione alla vita politica: prima], che chi è inesperto degli affari della città non ha niente di amico;

⁶ Per la ricostruzione delle vicende della polemica fra Aristotele e Isocrate, cf. E. Berti, *La filosofia del primo Aristotele* (Padova 1962), 159-185, 548 ss. e Laurenti (1987), 428-433, 459 s. Ulteriore bibliografia in: Dorandi (1989), 204 s.

⁷ In parentesi quadre sono inserite parafrasi di quello che poteva essere lo sviluppo del ragionamento a partire dalle integrazioni finora proposte. Alla fine di ogni paragrafo indico le colonne dei papiri considerate; un trattino verticale segnala l'inizio di una nuova colonna. Traduzioni o parafrasi, più o meno precise, del brano si leggono anche in: Hubbell (1920), 330 s.; Düring (1957), 303-310; Laurenti (1987), 420-423 e Natali (1981), 160-162. Singoli passi hanno interpretato Bignone (1936/1973) e Chrout (1973) II, 37-39.

⁸ Si tratta del riadattamento di un verso del *Filottete* di Euripide: αἰσχρὸν σιωπᾶν, βαρβάρους δ' εἶναι λέγειν (F 796 Nauck² = 1118 Mette). Il verso è attestato in connessione con la polemica Aristotele/Isocrate anche in altre fonti raccolte da Düring (1957), T 32 (cf. 303).

⁹ Cf. Arist., *Rhet.* I 2, 1356a28.

seconda, che la filosofia fa molti progressi¹⁰ qualora si trovi in uno stato ben ordinato; terza, che era indignato con molti politici contemporanei che, in contrasto fra loro, alcuni comandano, altri ritengono di comandare" (col. 37,1-12).

Insieme con il punto h, questo passo riferisce i motivi che Aristotele aveva adottati per indurre i giovani allo studio della retorica in funzione della politica. Sulla questione Aristotele si sofferma, in particolare, nell'ultimo capitolo dell'*Etica Nicomachea* e forse anche nel *Protrepticus*.¹¹ Il concetto fondamentale è quello di *empeiria*: "Non poco sembra che l'esperienza giovi (al successo politico); non si diventerebbe nemmeno uomini politici attraverso la pratica delle cose politiche. A coloro che aspirano a una conoscenza scientifica della politica appare, pertanto, necessaria l'esperienza".¹² Nel punto h, il problema è presentato più rigidamente, forse forzandone i contenuti: chi ha già esperienza politica e si dedica subito alle faccende della *polis* non ha tempo per pensare a una solida preparazione filosofica; chi manca di tale esperienza necessita di un lungo studio prima di potersene occupare. Ne deriva come conseguenza che è difficile, se non impossibile, collocare l'esperienza (*empeiria*) nella vita dell'uomo politico: essa è infatti necessaria per un buon politico, ma anche dannosa perché impedisce una adeguata preparazione al governo della *polis*.¹³ Resta probabile, come vedremo in seguito, che queste argomentazioni derivino da un dialogo perduto di Aristotele.

c. "Uno che capiti fra persone [che disprezzano i doni] l che la filosofia [gratifica] e ammirano la retorica [come loro benefattrice] e inoltre è privo del necessario e apre una certa scuola di retorica per alcuni motivi dovuti alla sua sconsideratezza giovanile, costui può forse, insegnando un po' di tempo, ottenere un numero di discepoli finché non ritorni in luoghi più favorevoli alla filosofia come se fosse stato un maestro di lettere o di atletica o di una di quelle discipline che sono imparate dai ragazzi per desiderio dei genitori" (coll. 37,12 - XLIX 19).

Uno può dedicarsi alla retorica per qualche tempo, spinto dalla necessità e da follia giovanile, ma deve ritornare, appena possibile, allo studio della filosofia. Per primo, il Sudhaus indicò una somiglianza fra le insinuazioni mosse in questa sezione contro Aristotele e la lettera *Peri epistêdeumatôn* di Epicuro.¹⁴ Il Bignone esagerò lo spunto del Sudhaus con illazioni per niente soddisfacenti.¹⁵ Palese il grossolano distorcimento, da parte epicurea, della dottrina aristotelica, esposta nel terzo libro dei *Topici*, secondo la quale una certa dose di beni esteriori (*ta ekstos agatha*) è desiderabile anche se non necessaria per un filosofo: "Filosofare è meglio che

¹⁰ *Pollên epidosisin labein*: cf. Phld., *Acad. hist.* col Y 2-4 Dorandi.

¹¹ Cf. R. Stark, *Aristotelesstudien* (München 1972²), 24-28.

¹² Arist., *Eth. Nic.* X 10, 1181a9-12.

¹³ Cf. Laurenti (1987), 424 s., 458.

¹⁴ Sudhaus (1893), 562.

¹⁵ Bignone (1936) II, 89 ss. = (1973) I, 451 ss.

arricchirsi, ma non è preferibile per colui che manca del necessario".¹⁶

d. "Dal nostro punto di vista (= degli Epicurei) | [bisogna condannare la retorica perché i nostri studi sono superiori] a quelli di cui si occupano coloro dei quali abbiamo parlato e non conviene per libera scelta e per molto tempo dedicarsi alla retorica più di quanto non si debbano fare azioni ritenute troppo sconvenienti" (coll. XLIX 20-38,8).

Il Düring considera una peculiarità dell'insegnamento di Epicuro il rifiuto della retorica nella sua globalità, quale traspare all'inizio del brano; con Filodemo si assisterebbe, invece, al tentativo di salvare almeno la retorica sofistica. Ma la questione dei rapporti Epicuro/Filodemo nei confronti della retorica è più complessa. Il dibattito venne sviluppato da Filodemo nei primi tre libri della *Retorica*: la posizione sia di Epicuro sia di Filodemo sull'argomento è la stessa: soltanto la retorica sofistica, cioè epidittica, può essere considerata un'arte (*techné*) non la retorica politica. Per Epicuro/Filodemo la conoscenza della retorica sofistica niente ha a vedere con quella politica; l'arte sofistica non può essere l'artefice dei politici, essa non può realizzare capacità politica. Contro chi crede che la retorica produce buoni politici, Filodemo risponde che né la filosofia può originare da sé i politici, né tantomeno lo possono i retori che praticano l'arte dei sofisti.¹⁷

e. E, infatti, [occuparsi di retorica] è faticoso per corpo e anima ... | ... [la retorica] è dannosissima per chi vuole raggiungere una salda quiete e spinge, più o meno, a occuparsi di affari ... e (Aristotele) distrasse l'attenzione dei giovani dalla filosofia 'il non leggendario, ma vero corno di Amaltea' e li indirizzò verso la sporcizia sofistica ... | ... Se egli (Aristotele) avesse saputo che non era possibile raggiungere i più alti livelli o diventare un filosofo ... | ... egli (Aristotele) insegnò geometria, grammatica, musica e tattica. Infatti non troviamo neppure una ragione perché uno con un minimo di nobiltà divenga sofista, quale uno potrebbe trovare per occuparsi di retorica pratica (coll. 38,9 - L - 39 - LI).

In queste colonne, a torto tralasciate da Düring,¹⁸ continuava vivace la polemica contro Aristotele¹⁹ accusato di aver trascurato la filosofia per farsi maestro di occupazioni degne dei sofisti (*sophisteuein*), quali geometria, grammatica, musica, tattica (col. LI 8 ss.); e per avere, così, distratto: "l'attenzione dei giovani dalla filosofia 'il non leggendario, ma vero corno di Amaltea' e averli indirizzati verso

¹⁶ Arist., *Top.* III 2, 118a10. Cf. Sudhaus (1893), 562 s., confermato da Düring (1957), 304.

¹⁷ Cf. Dorandi (1990), 68-70.

¹⁸ Düring (1957), 304. Così anche Laurenti (1987) e Natali (1981), ma cf. Bignone (1936) II 88 s. = (1973) I, 451 s.

¹⁹ Da abbandonare la mia precedente ipotesi (Dorandi [1989], 203), che soggetto della frase fosse Isocrate.

la sporcizia sofistica" (col. L 12-19).²⁰ L'estrema incertezza e frammentarietà del passo impedisce, almeno per ora, di ricostruire lo svolgimento del dibattito in tutti i suoi dettagli.

f. "Aristotele dunque neppure si comportò da vero filosofo quando fece ciò che è detto nel verso citato. Perché, infatti, era più turpe tacere e consentire a Isocrate di parlare di quanto non lo sia il vivere in città e lasciare che Manes zappi i campi e restare a terra e lasciare che il mercante fenicio o di Boristene vaghi sui flutti [e trascorrere la propria vita come un privato cittadino] e lasciare che ... ? Queste occupazioni, infatti, non sono superiori a quelle menzionate né sono più utili della filosofia. [Se dunque l'attività di Isocrate era inutile], bisognava lasciarlo dire, se invece giovava effettivamente bisognava parlare anche se quello non esisteva, se non si presentava né l'uno né l'altro caso, Aristotele non si doveva dedicare alla retorica, pur essendoci infiniti retori, per non apparire a alcuni uno che agiva per invidia o un incompetente. Se poi, guidato dalla turpe concezione dei più, ritenne che era brutto non parlare e lasciare dire Isocrate, non guardò al fine naturale della retorica. Se così, perché non avrebbe ritenuto turpe per natura dire dalle tribune cose simili ai retori prezzolati piuttosto che ai divini filosofi?" (coll. 40 - LII - 41,12).

Il Bignone²¹ scorre nell'accenno a Manes, un riferimento allo schiavo omonimo di Teofrasto²² e ne dedusse una ulteriore prova a favore della possibilità che queste critiche risalissero direttamente a Epicuro; anche lo stile dell'intero brano mostrerebbe, a suo avviso, piuttosto affinità con quello del Caposcuola che con quello di Filodemo. In seguito a una obiezione del Pohlenz,²³ lo studioso respinse, comunque, quasi subito, questa bizzarra identificazione.²⁴ Risulta pertanto molto più verisimile che: "in the significant name Manes we have a reference, not to a specific individual, but to a typical character". In un contesto generale si situa anche il richiamo ai mercanti di Fenicia e di Boristene, che non può essere interpretato come allusione né a Fenice di Colofone né a Bione di Boristene.²⁵

g. "Perché (Aristotele) si allontanò dalla esortazione dei giovani e sperimentò il terribile astio e risentimento sia dei discepoli di Isocrate sia di alcuni altri sofisti?

Come non avrebbe potuto ingenerare grande ammirazione delle sue capacità dal momento in cui abbandonò il suo proprio soggetto e si mise a raccogliere insieme con il suo discepolo (Teofrasto) leggi e tante costituzioni e norme giuridiche riguardanti

²⁰ Alla l. 19 leggo, con il papiro, σοφιστικὸν ῥήτων e non σοφιστικὸν ῥυτόν (Edd.).

²¹ Bignone (1936) I, 131 n. 1 e II 93 = (1973) I 117 n. 122, 456. Cf. Laurenti (1987), 456 n. 167.

²² Cf. D.L. V 55.

²³ M. Pohlenz, *GGA* 198 (1936), 527 n. 1 = *Kleine Schriften* (Hildesheim 1965) I, 602 n. 1.

²⁴ Cf. Bignone (1973) II, 275.

²⁵ J.F. Kindstrand, "A supposed testimony to Bion of Borysthenes," *CQ* 79 (1985), 527-529. Citazione da 528. *Contra*, M. Gigante, *Cinismo e Epicureismo* (Napoli 1992), 108.

i territori e le diverse contingenze e tutto quanto [ha a che fare con questo soggetto.] | Preferendo apparire [una persona dotta e impegnata] studiò e insegnò filosofia, retorica, politica, agricoltura, cosmetica, mineraria e per poco anche cose più vergognose ... | ... ²⁶ In breve, secondo Epicuro, egli divenne un oppositore più severo del quieto vivere di quanto non lo fossero coloro che per professione spingono i giovani a occuparsi di politica" (coll. 41,12 - LIII - 42 - LIV 17).

Nelle prime linee, è probabile una allusione al *Protrepticus* di Aristotele. Il motivo del cambiamento di Aristotele (*metepese*) ritorna anche in un luogo del III libro del *De oratore* di Cicerone (*mutavit*):²⁷ "Pertanto lo stesso Aristotele vedendo che Isocrate aveva successo per la nobiltà dei discepoli, poiché aveva abbandonato l'eloquenza giudiziaria e politica a favore di una eloquenza elegante, ma sterile, mutò improvvisamente quasi tutto il suo sistema di insegnamento (*mutavit repente totam formam prope disciplinae suae*) e citò un verso dal *Filottete* un po' modificato. Quello infatti dice: 'è turpe tacere e sopportare che parlino i barbari', Aristotele invece 'sopportare che parli Isocrate'. Perciò diede una forma brillante e elegante a tutto il suo sistema filosofico e congiunse lo studio teorico dei fatti con la pratica dello stile".²⁸

Singolare la testimonianza sul metodo di lavoro di Aristotele in collaborazione con il suo discepolo Teofrasto:²⁹ il riferimento è a raccolte di leggi, ai *Politika pros tous kairous* di Teofrasto³⁰ e alle *Politeiai*. Nelle parole: "insegnò la cosmetica ..." Düring scorse un'eco maliziosa di simili accuse (*pharmakôpolein*) rivolte da Epicuro a Aristotele.³¹ Il desiderio di *polymathia* proprio di Aristotele—concludono gli Epicurei—porta alla irrimediabile rovina del vero fine della vita: *tên kata psychên galênên*.

Il Düring mise altresì in guardia sulla confusione cronologica relativa agli scritti del giovane Aristotele: la polemica di Aristotele contro Isocrate data, infatti, tra il 360 e il 350, il *Protrepticus* risale a ca. il 353, mentre la collaborazione con Teofrasto non può essere posta prima del 340.

h. ... ³² Se infatti egli insegnava questa (= la retorica politica) e non quella didattica parlava in maniera ridicola quando diceva che era turpe lasciar dire Isocrate poiché

²⁶ Tralascio il passo coll. 42,7 - LIV 10 troppo lacunoso.

²⁷ Cic., *De orat.* III 141 = T 32a Düring.

²⁸ Cf. C.M. Mulvany, 'Notes on the legend of Aristotle,' *CQ* 20 (1926), 166 s. e Laurenti (1987), 427 s., 459.

²⁹ Theophr. F 594 Fortenbaugh. Cf. Düring, 306 s. e A.J. Podlecki, "Theophrastus on history and politics," in: W.W. Fortenbaugh (Ed.), *Theophrastus of Eresus. On his life and work* (New Brunswick & Oxford 1985), 234 s., 246.

³⁰ D.L. V 45 = Fr. 589, 4a Fortenbaugh.

³¹ Düring, p. 307. Cf. Epic., Fr. 171 Usener = T 59b Düring, su cui D. Sedley, "Epicurus and his professional rivals," in: *Cahiers de Philologie* 1 (Lille 1976), 125-127, 150-152.

³² Tralascio le coll. LIV 17 - 43,6 troppo lacunose.

non intendeva parlare come lui.

Taccio del fatto che tra coloro che impararono da lui (Aristotele) la retorica | nessuno fu capace di apprendere una delle due arti e di insegnarla a qualcuno, mentre Isocrate, al momento opportuno, progredi; cosicché, pur avendo prima insegnato retorica, ritornò al più quieto e, come diceva (Aristotele) stesso, 'più divino studio' della filosofia. Egli (Aristotele) in maniera strana spingeva (i giovani) verso la (retorica) politica e con motivi ridicoli. Primo, se avevano acquisito esperienza e si davano subito alla politica, a causa dell'impegno che questa richiede, [non avrebbero potuto dedicarsi a uno studio serio e avrebbero mostrato lacune] | nella loro preparazione filosofica. Se invece non avevano esperienza non potevano darsi alla politica senza un lungo periodo di studi e aspettando che si calmasse il disordine e si stabilisse uno stato ben ordinato si sarebbero allontanati molto dalla via che conduce alla tranquillità" (coll. 43,6 - LV - 44).

I rapporti con il punto a ho messi sopra in evidenza. Le parole del § 2: "Taccio del fatto che ... filosofia" contengono una indubbia esagerazione, che risale agli Epicurei. Il riferimento a Isocrate non deve essere interpretato come un elogio, ma piuttosto come "a deliberate misrepresentation designed to belittle Aristotle by making him inferior to Isocrates"³³ né tantomeno è implicito che Filodemo, o la sua fonte, considerassero Isocrate un maestro di filosofia nel senso degli Epicurei.³⁴ Interessanti le considerazioni del Düring a proposito del passo: "pur avendo prima insegnato retorica, ritornò al più quieto e, come diceva (Aristotele) stesso, 'più divino studio' della filosofia". Filodemo cita una frase famosa di Aristotele dove è forse celata una allusione al *Protrepticus*. Sebbene le parole "più divino studio della filosofia" (*daimoniôtera philosophia*) riecheggino molto da vicino la frase iniziale dello pseudo-aristotelico *De mundo*:³⁵ "Spesso, o Alessandro, la filosofia mi è apparsa come un possesso divino e realmente miracoloso (*theion ti kai daimonion ontôs chrêma*)," questo luogo non può essere considerato la fonte di Filodemo. Non resta, pertanto, che supporre, con il Düring, che l'autore epicureo: "wishes the reader to believe that he cite a famous definition of philosophy, formulated by Aristotle".³⁶

i. L'interpretazione delle due colonne seguenti (coll. LVI - 45,9) rimane ancora oscura, pur dopo l'ingegnosa proposta del Gaiser³⁷ fondata, purtroppo, su un testo arditamente ricostruito. Sicura è la presenza dell'esametro anonimo (col. LVI 13-15): "Neppure una donna—dice il poeta—sarebbe così sciocca 'da scegliere il peggio quando il meglio è presente'" già noto da un frammento del *De philosophia* (Fr. 19c Ross).³⁸ Secondo Gaiser il medesimo verso ricorreva anche nel *Protrepticus*

³³ Sudhaus, 561 ripreso da Düring, 307 s. (da cui la citazione).

³⁴ Cf. H.M. Hubbell, "Isocrates and the Epicureans," *CPh* 11 (1916), 405-418: 407 s.

³⁵ Ps.-Arist., *De mundo* 391a1.

³⁶ Düring (1957), 308 s. (citazione da 309).

³⁷ K. Gaiser, "Ein Gespräch mit König Philipp: Zum 'Eudemos' des Aristoteles," in: *Aristoteles. Werk und Wirkung P. Moraux gewidmet* (Berlin/New York 1985) I, 457-484: 465 ss.

³⁸ Da Filone, *De aet. mundi* 41 (VI 85, 18 Cohn): ὥστε χερίων' ἐλέσθαι ἀμεινότερων

e proprio a questo scritto alluderebbe Filodemo nella *Retorica*. La successiva citazione di Filippo (col. LVI 15-19) è così interpretata dallo studioso: Aristotele aveva cercato di esortare il re Macedone allo studio della filosofia, non direttamente, ma con la composizione dell'*Eudemus* (poco dopo il 354/3), un dialogo nel quale Filippo era protagonista insieme con Eudemo. Tale eventualità confermerebbe, conclude il Gaiser, l'ipotesi del Bignone che collocava la composizione del *Protrepticus* e dell'*Eudemus* prima del passaggio di Aristotele agli studi retorici.

J. "Dei motivi con cui (Aristotele) spingeva a occuparsi di filosofia chi avesse capacità di governare | (1) il primo vale per lui stesso più che per uno che non si prende cura delle cose comuni. Se infatti credeva che chi non si occupa delle faccende che accadono in città non avrà un amico, ciò è dovuto al fatto che lui non ne ebbe alcuno oppure avendolo non gli rimase a lungo.

(2) La filosofia non fu impedita di fare ogni progresso come non l'ha impedito a Aristotele; se impedita da qualcuno di progredire, la filosofia non sarebbe mai divenuta oggetto di disprezzo ... |

(3) Egli disse di essere indignato (con le condizioni presenti) ..." (coll. 45,9 - LVII - 46,2).³⁹

L'ultimo capitolo contiene la replica epicurea alle tre motivazioni addotte da Aristotele a giustificazione del suo abbandono della filosofia a favore della retorica e della politica espresse nel punto b. Soltanto delle prime due obiezioni è tramandato il testo integro o attendibilmente ricostruito; il restauro della terza, tentato da Sudhaus, è troppo incerto perché possa essere preso in considerazione.

Filodemo organizza la sua critica in maniera circolare: introduce l'argomento, presenta le ragioni della scelta di Aristotele, riproduce probabili estratti da opere del filosofo, che, in contesa con Isocrate, esortava i giovani a dedicarsi alla retorica politica e, in conclusione, ribatte una per una le tesi dell'avversario.

Il contenuto dell'intera sezione è così ricapitolato dal Düring:⁴⁰ sarebbe futile volere definire la fonte precisa di Filodemo, anche se resta probabile che sia stato Epicuro stesso a fornirgli materiale sulla polemica fra Aristotele e Isocrate. La sezione (b) conserva un frammento di un dialogo di Aristotele, la sezione (f) un violento attacco alla filosofia paideutica di Aristotele, in (g) Aristotele viene criticato per avere abbandonato gli ideali dell'Academia; mentre sia in (f) sia in (h) ci possono essere allusioni al *Protrepticus* e in (j) è evidente una citazione dal *De philosophia*. Non ostanti le apparenti strette somiglianze fra il passo del III libro del *De oratore* di Cicerone e Filodemo, i due autori seguivano fonti diverse: Cicerone si rifaceva

παρεόντων. Leggo χερείον' ἐλέσθαι anche in Filodemo (χερείον ἐλέσθαι Sudhaus): cf. Th. Gomperz, *ZoEG* 16 (1865), 817 e Cohn, *ad loc.*

³⁹ Tralascio la parte conclusiva della col. 46 troppo liberamente restituita dal Sudhaus. Nella prima parte, il testo si ricostruisce in misura abbastanza sicura con il confronto di col. 37,1-12.

⁴⁰ Düring, 310 s.

a una fonte con intento apologetico, Filodemo a una fonte fortemente critica nei confronti di Aristotele.

Resta, a questo punto, da riprendere in esame la questione della presenza, in Filodemo, di tracce dei dialoghi perduti di Aristotele. Qualche accenno è già emerso nelle pagine precedenti. Il Bignone pensava al *Protrepticus* e al *De philosophia*. Il Gaiser ha ritenuto di potere indicare nella sezione j un riferimento piuttosto al *Protrepticus* e all'*Eudemus*. Il Laurenti,⁴¹ a séguito di una suggestione del Chroust,⁴² ha riportato, pur con qualche perplessità, il punto b al *Gryllus*. Il Chroust è giunto alla conclusione, a mio avviso attendibile,⁴³ che in tutto questo brano Filodemo fa esplicito riferimento: "to some arguments which had been made by Aristotle in the *Gryllus* against Isocrates and the kind of rhetoric that had been advocated and practised by the latter. Hence, this part of Philodemus' *De Rhetorica*, with some reservations and alterations, may be included among the genuine fragments of the lost Aristotelian *Gryllus*". Più di recente Gigon ha riportato l'intero brano, purtroppo senza una parola di commento, alla *technôn synagôgê*,⁴⁴ alla quale opera assegna anche altri due frammenti della *Retorica* filodemea.⁴⁵

A favore dell'ipotesi del Chroust può essere addotta la probabile presenza di altri accenni al *Gryllus* nel IV libro della *Retorica* filodemea⁴⁶ messi in risalto dal Moraux.⁴⁷ Le critiche rivolte da Filodemo agli encomi dei sofisti, sulla base anche di analoghe obiezioni mosse da Aristotele a Anassimene di Lampsaco relativamente all'*Encomio di Elena* conterrebbero—sostiene il Moraux—una citazione non testuale, ma libera dal primo dialogo aristotelico. Il dato di fatto più importante che se ne ricaverebbe è che uno degli interlocutori del *Gryllus* era Anassimene. Anche altri elementi del medesimo libro filodemeo potrebbero altresì risalire a quello scritto perduto di Aristotele.

Se per la sezione g parrebbe innegabile un riferimento anche al *Protrepticus*, soprattutto per la presenza della parola *prokopê*; al *Gryllus* negherei invece un ulteriore frammento della *Retorica* di Filodemo⁴⁸ reclamato dal Laurenti,⁴⁹ ma

⁴¹ Laurenti (1987), 378 s. (Fr. 1a), 425 s., 458.

⁴² Chroust (1973) II, 37-39. Citazione da 39.

⁴³ Diversamente giudicavo in: Dorandi (1989), 203.

⁴⁴ O. Gigon, *Aristotelis Opera, III: Librorum deperditorum fragmenta* (Berlin/New York 1987), Fr. 132.

⁴⁵ Fr. 130 = Phld., *Rhet.* VI, PHerc. 1004, coll. LXXII-LXXIII e Fr. 131 = *Ibid.*, col. LXXXVIII (Sudhaus [1892], 361 s., 370). Ma si tratta, in entrambi i casi, di ipotesi azzardate.

⁴⁶ PHerc. 1007, coll. XXXIVa-XXXVa (Sudhaus [1892], 215 s.).

⁴⁷ P. Moraux, "Deux témoignages de Philodème sur Aristote," *REG* 92 (1979), 405-412.

⁴⁸ PHerc. 224, Fr. 15 (Sudhaus [1896], 175).

⁴⁹ Laurenti (1987), 378 s. (Fr. 1b), 425 s., 458.

attribuito dal Ross⁵⁰ al *Politicus*. In questo caso specifico, con il Katsimanis,⁵¹ considererei il passo un frammento genuino di Aristotele, ma eviterei di restituirlo, per la sua genericità, a uno specifico dialogo.

Questo quanto si può dire, al momento, della polemica di Epicuro/Filodemo contro la decisione di Aristotele di dedicarsi allo studio e all'insegnamento della retorica e della politica, quale traspare dalle pagine della *Retorica* di Filodemo. Una auspicata nuova edizione dell'intero libro potrà portare nuova luce sul singolare documento, rimettere in discussione o confermare alcune delle tesi che ho qui tentato di esporre brevemente.

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The Peripatetic Tradition in the Literary Essays of Dionysius of Halicarnassus

Cecil Wooten

Dionysius of Halicarnassus was a Greek historian, literary critic, and teacher of rhetoric who spent much of his life in Rome during the last half of the first century B.C. He himself seems to have considered his early history of Rome, the *Roman Antiquities*, to be his *magnum opus*; however, we know him best as a literary critic. His extant works of criticism include essays on some of the Attic orators and Thucydides, a work *On Literary Composition*, which deals with how words are put together in a sentence, and several letters that deal with stylistic topics. It is these works, and the possible Peripatetic influence on them, that concern me in this paper.

Dionysius' *First Letter to Ammaeus* is an attempt to refute, on chronological grounds, the thesis of an unnamed Peripatetic philosopher that Demosthenes learned the rules of oratory from Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. It seems clear from the first section of this work that the philosopher in question had developed this argument orally and that he had not yet committed it to writing. Ammaeus, in other words, had heard him express this opinion. Dionysius, moreover, expresses the hope that his own treatise might dissuade the man from publishing such erroneous observations. This would seem to indicate that the philosopher in question was a contemporary of Dionysius and that he was occupied at the time in some way with the works of Aristotle. The only known person, to my knowledge, who might fit this description is Andronicus of Rhodes.¹

Whether he is, in fact, the Peripatetic whom Dionysius mentions cannot be proved, of course, since we know very little about the lives of Andronicus and Dionysius. Based on the few facts that we do have, however, a case can be built. We do know that there was a large collection of the writings of Aristotle in Rome in the first century B.C., that these were entrusted to the grammarian Tyrannio, possibly in 46 B.C., and that Tyrannio eventually passed them on to Andronicus

¹ Cf. A. Gercke, "Andronikos," in *Paulys Real-Encyclopädie* 1 (1894) 2164-7.

who edited them and arranged them in the order that Plutarch knew.² We do not know exactly when Andronicus began the work. He is not mentioned by Cicero, who did know Tyrannio, and that has led scholars to believe that Andronicus' editorial activity began after 43 B.C. The date usually given is around 40.³ This was a massive undertaking, and Andronicus' industry was well respected in antiquity.⁴ This led Düring to conjecture that Andronicus was working between 40 and 20 B.C.⁵ Since the largest collection of manuscripts of Aristotle was in Rome, it seems probable that he worked there. Now, there is also a tradition that Andronicus was the eleventh head of the Peripatetic school, succeeding Cratippus, probably sometime in the thirties. The evidence for this, however, is flimsy, and Düring is inclined not to accept it.⁶ And even if he was the head of the Peripatetic school, it is quite possible that he stayed on in Rome since that is where the largest collection of the works of Aristotle was. To me, therefore, the most likely conjecture would be that Andronicus was working in Rome from 40 B.C., and that his work would have taken a couple of decades.

Now, we know that Dionysius came to Rome in 30 B.C. (*Rom. Ant.* 1.7.2-4). Judging from comments in the preface to *On the Ancient Orators* (3) it also seems likely that he wrote this work in Rome, where he lived until about 10 B.C.⁷ Therefore, it seems possible that during the decade of the twenties Dionysius and Andronicus were both in Rome and—as surely would have been the case—knew each other's work. Düring, in fact, thinks that the reference to a third book of the *Rhetoric* in Dionysius' *First Letter to Ammaeus* (8) and in the treatise *On Literary Composition* (25, 198) are the first known references to Andronicus' new edition.⁸ We cannot be sure, however, that Andronicus took a separate work *Περὶ λέξεως* and attached it to two other books to form what we now know as the three books of the *Rhetoric*.

Of course, the unnamed Peripatetic philosopher could be almost anyone involved in the general renaissance of Aristotelian studies in Rome in the second half of the first century B.C. However, Dionysius says that it was someone whose work he respected greatly (*First Letter to Ammaeus* 1), and Andronicus is the most serious Peripatetic scholar whom we know from this period. Moreover, Ammaeus seems to have been particularly interested in Demosthenes (*On Dem.* 13). It is not unlikely that he would have asked someone like Andronicus about Aristotelian influence on the man who was generally recognized in the second half of the first century B.C., especially in Rome, where the influence of Cicero was so strong, to have

² Cf. Strabo, *Geography* 1.54 and Plutarch, *Sulla* 26.1-2.

³ Cf. Gercke (above, note 1) 2167.

⁴ I. Düring, *Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition* (Göteborg 1957) 420.

⁵ Düring (above, note 4) 421.

⁶ Düring (above, note 4) 419.

⁷ Cf. G. Kennedy, *The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World* (Princeton 1972) 342-3.

⁸ Düring (above, note 4) 421.

been the most effective of the Greek orators. This could have been done either in Rome or in Athens where a man like Ammaeus may have frequently traveled, although we do not know much about his life.⁹ In any case, the response, repeated to Dionysius, would have provoked the *First Letter to Ammaeus*. Moreover, if Andronicus was the Peripatetic in question, it is quite possible that he was planning eventually to put these views in writing, possibly as a preface to his new edition of the *Rhetoric*. Also, if Andronicus is the unnamed philosopher and if his editorial work was going on from 40 to 20 B.C., this would be another indication that the *First Letter to Ammaeus* is among Dionysius' earlier works.

All this is obviously very conjectural, and we will probably never know exactly whom Dionysius had in mind here. However, this reference at least makes clear that Dionysius was familiar with contemporary Peripatetic philosophy. It is also clear from this letter that Dionysius was familiar with the works of Aristotle in general. His argument that Demosthenes was not influenced by Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is based, as I indicated earlier, on chronological considerations. By using cross-references in the *Rhetoric* to other works of Aristotle and historical events mentioned in the *Rhetoric* itself, especially the Olynthian War in 349 (9), Dionysius demonstrates that Aristotle wrote this treatise after Demosthenes had already produced some of his most famous speeches. He even attempts, much less successfully, to prove that Aristotle wrote the *Rhetoric* after Demosthenes' delivery of the speech *On the Crown* in 330 (12).

Aristotle, however, as is well known, lectured on rhetoric long before he actually composed a treatise on it, but Dionysius does not consider the possibility that Demosthenes may have been familiar with the ideas developed in these lectures, or with the view of rhetoric in the published dialogue *Gryllus*, since he does not consider what Aristotelian influences, if any, can be found in Demosthenes' speeches.¹⁰ He goes only so far as to say that Demosthenes was familiar with the other works of Aristotle (2). He adds, however, that one must not suppose that all the important precepts about rhetoric were developed in the Peripatetic school and that one must realize that Isocrates and Isaeus, for example, certainly had as much influence on Demosthenes as Aristotle might have. This would seem to indicate a certain ambivalence toward the Peripatetic school of philosophy. However, in order to assess Dionysius' attitude toward the Aristotelian tradition and its importance we must look at specific references and influences in the critical works themselves. That is what I propose to do now, dealing with them in chronological order.¹¹

⁹ Cf. S.F. Bonner, *The Literary Treatises of Dionysius of Halicarnassus* (Cambridge 1939) 3-4.

¹⁰ Kennedy (above, note 7) 346.

¹¹ Kennedy (above, note 7) 344-5.

The essay on Lysias is the critical work of Dionysius of Halicarnassus most indebted to the Aristotelian tradition. It is also probably the earliest. The essay as a whole is quite systematic, very much like Aristotle's *Rhetoric* itself, and fairly mechanical, somewhat reminiscent of works such as Cicero's *On Invention*. It is only in the discussion of Lysias' charm, or χάρις, a fairly indefinable trait, that one sees the sort of intuitive, aesthetic appreciation that will characterize the later works, especially the essay on Demosthenes and the treatise *On Literary Composition*. This gives the essay on Lysias what Usher calls "A Janus-like quality, looking inwards to the earlier systems of the ancient rhetoricians, of Theophrastus and Hermagoras, and outwards to the later intuitive criticism of Dionysius in the *De Compositione Verborum*, and of the author of the treatise *On the Sublime*."¹² The essay, like Cicero's *On Invention*, reads very much like the work of a man who had recently been a student, who still clings fairly timidly to the neat systems that he learned from his teachers. Since there is so much Peripatetic influence on the essay, as I will demonstrate below, this would tend to support the idea that Dionysius had studied with the Peripatetics.¹³

In his discussion of Lysias' style (2-14) Dionysius seems to be following Theophrastus' doctrine of the four virtues of style,¹⁴ in an admittedly expanded version.¹⁵ He argues that Lysias uses pure, Attic vocabulary (2) and common everyday words (3). These two characteristics would seem to be part of what Theophrastus called ἑλληνισμός. The style of Lysias is also characterized by lucidity and brevity (4). It is in fact so brief at times that it could be called terse or taut (6). Dionysius says (6) that he considers Lysias to have been the inventor of this extremely concise style just mentioned, although, he points out, Theophrastus attributed it to Thrasyarchus.¹⁶ This reference to Theophrastus is our first overt indication that he is probably the source of the framework that Dionysius was following in this part of his essay. Dionysius then argues that Lysias' style is also characterized by vividness (ἐνάργεια; 7), produced mainly by his very adept choice of circumstantial details. I would argue that these references to lucidity, brevity, and vividness could be subsumed under Theophrastus' heading of clarity, or σαφήνεια, especially as that theory was modified by Diogenes of Babylon, who added brevity to the traditional four virtues of style.¹⁷ Next Dionysius discusses

¹² S. Usher, tr., *Dionysius of Halicarnassus: The Literary Essays*, Vol. I (Cambridge 1974) 18-19.

¹³ Kennedy (above, note 7) 346.

¹⁴ For Theophrastus and the four virtues of style, see Cicero, *Orator* 79 = text 684 FHS&G (*Theophrastus of Eresus, Sources for his Life, Writings, Thought and Influence*, ed. W. Fortenbaugh, P. Huby, R. Sharples and D. Gutas, Leiden 1991).

¹⁵ Bonner (above, note 9) 43.

¹⁶ Text 695 FHS&G.

¹⁷ Bonner (above, note 9) 17.

Lysias' use of ἡθοποιΐα (8) and then concludes (9) that no orator had a greater sense of propriety in adapting oratory to the speaker, the audience, and the topic under discussion. These traits are obviously related to what Theophrastus had called τὸ πρέπον. After ἐλλητισμός, σαφήνεια, and τὸ πρέπον one would expect a discussion of κατασκευή, or ornamentation. Instead, we find the discussion of charm (10-14) that I mentioned earlier. It is clear why Dionysius abandoned Theophrastus' fourth virtue of style and substituted χάρις for it. He had already said earlier (3, 8) that Lysias did not use elements of style that we normally associate with ornamentation. It is also clear, however, that he has Theophrastus in mind in this section of the work, for in section 14, after summarizing his own comments on the style of Lysias, he criticizes Theophrastus for having censured Lysias' extensive use of antithesis, symmetry, assonance, and other figures of speech usually associated with poetry, in other words, with ornamentation. In fact, he quotes the passage from Theophrastus at length and concludes that in this instance the critic deserves more blame than the orator whom he criticizes.¹⁸ It is interesting to note, however, that there is more ornamentation in the speeches of Lysias, even in a speech such as the one about Eratosthenes the adulterer, than Dionysius would like to admit, and Theophrastus had a point, although, if Dionysius is quoting him correctly, he made it too strongly.

One sees, therefore, in these opening sections of the essay on Lysias some Peripatetic influences. In addition to the basic framework of Dionysius' discussion of Lysias' style, which was derived from Theophrastus, there are also ideas that were important even in Aristotle's discussion of style, especially the emphasis on clarity (cf. *Rhet.* 3.2.1) and conciseness (cf. 3.6.1). One sees also, however, the beginning of a tendency, which, I would argue, will become more pronounced in the later works, to modify this tradition.

The rest of the essay on Lysias, however, still shows influence of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. In section 16, for example, Dionysius refers, like Aristotle in Book 1 of the *Rhetoric* (3.3), to three kinds of oratory, using the same terms that Aristotle had used, δικονικόν, συμβουλευτικόν, and ἐπιδεικτικόν. And in section 17, where he discusses Lysias' proemia, he says that Lysias, as Aristotle recommends (3.14.6-8), arouses sympathy, provokes his audience's attention, and makes them receptive to his arguments. Dionysius uses the same terms that Aristotle had used, except that Dionysius twice uses a noun where Aristotle had used an adjective (εὐνοία/εὖνουν; προσοχήν/προσεκτικόν; εὐμάθεια), and he also lists these functions of the proemium in the same order that Aristotle had used. When he discusses the proem to the speech *Against Diogenes*, however, he gives rules for the introduction that are not found in Aristotle: that the proemium should foreshadow the arguments to be used in the body of the speech and that it should be smoothly expressed

¹⁸ Text 692 FHS&G.

(24). Here again we see a willingness to modify or supplement the tradition in which he had probably been educated.

The most Aristotelian section of Dionysius' essay on Lysias, however, as one might imagine, is the discussion of argumentation in section 19. Here he picks up several ideas that we now associate with the Aristotelian tradition: the three types of artful proofs, the logical, the ethical, and the pathetic (cf. *Rhet.* 1.2.3-6); the importance of the argument from probability (cf. 1.2.15); the function of example in inductive proofs (cf. 1.2.8-9); the use of the commonplace of similarity and difference (cf. 2.23.4-5); and the distinction between compelling (τεκμήρια) and circumstantial (σημεῖα) evidence (1.2.16-18).

In Dionysius' first essay, therefore, we see direct Peripatetic influence, and much of it is of a technical nature. The next two essays, the one on Isocrates and the one on Isaeus, follow the same general plan as the essay on Lysias, and the rhetorical categories that determine this plan are derived to a great extent, as I have demonstrated already, from the Peripatetic tradition. There are also other Peripatetic influences. For example, in section 3 of the essay on Isocrates, after he has discussed the "virtues" of the style of Isocrates in section 2, as in the essay on Lysias, Dionysius says that according to Theophrastus there are three elements that produce an impressive style: choice of words (ἡ ἐκλογή τῶν ὀνομάτων), composition (ἡ ὁρμονία), and the use of figures (τὰ σχήματα).¹⁹ He then discusses Isocrates' style in reference to each of these in the rest of section 3.

In section 18 Dionysius says that he is aware of a statement attributed to Aristotle that itinerant booksellers carry around many forensic speeches by Isocrates, but he says that he does not believe this statement since Aristotle was obviously trying to denigrate Isocrates. He says that he finds the reply to these accusations by Cephisodorus of Athens much more believable. Cephisodorus' reply to Aristotle seems to have been a substantial work (τὴν ἀπολογίαν τὴν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ τὴν πᾶνυ θαυμαστήν ἐν ταῖς πρὸς Ἀριστοτέλην ἀντιγραφαῖς), and this would tend to indicate that the criticisms themselves were substantial. This anti-Isocratean tradition in the school of Aristotle may also be reflected in the comments of Hieronymus, cited by Dionysius in section 13 of this essay, to the effect that Isocrates' speeches are quite readable but would have been impossible to deliver. Hieronymus, who lived in the third century B.C., had been trained as a Peripatetic but had then set up a school of his own in Athens.²⁰

These criticisms of Aristotle by Dionysius are another indication, like his comments in the *First Letter to Ammaeus*, of a breaking away from the rhetorical tradition in which he had probably been educated, and this may have been accelerated after his moving to Rome, where political oratory had a more recent history.

¹⁹ Text 691 FHS&G.

²⁰ Cf. the discussion in K. Dover, *Lysias and the Corpus Lysiacum* (Berkeley 1968)

Moreover, in the *First Letter to Ammaeus* Dionysius argues that Isocrates and Isaeus were influences on Demosthenes just as important as Aristotle. In fact, in the essay *On Isaeus* he says that Isaeus was the source from which the eloquence of Demosthenes flowed. This would indicate that the *First Letter to Ammaeus* followed the essays on Lysias, Isocrates, and Isaeus.²¹ Bonner, in fact, even thinks that the reference to Demosthenes in the essay *On Isaeus* may have provoked the comments of the unnamed Peripatetic philosopher whom Dionysius attempts to refute in the other work.²² What is important for our purposes here, however, is that there does seem to be some progression in these essays in Dionysius' hesitancy about the Peripatetic tradition: a modification of Theophrastus' theory in the essay on Lysias; open criticism of Aristotle in the essay on Isocrates; and a categorical denial of the influence of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* in the *First Letter to Ammaeus* and, implicitly, in the essay on Isaeus.

The essays on Isocrates and Isaeus, however, as I indicated earlier, are similar to the essay on Lysias in their general structure. They are also different. In the essay on Lysias Dionysius' almost mechanical adherence to the categories of rhetoric, many of them Peripatetic, really seems to be almost a hindrance, and he often seems to be more concerned with rhetoric than with oratory. In the essay on Isocrates, however, and even more so in the one on Isaeus, he begins to rely more and more on his aesthetic intuition and to engage more in analysis of passages than in discussions of rhetorical theory. As Bonner says, "In short, even though these essays lie under the shadow of the rhetorical school with its insistence on imitation, its technical terminology and its subdivisions, there is a marked move away from the mechanical use of rhetorical resources towards a freer and more independent type of exposition."²³ This will be more pronounced in the next two works.

There are comparatively few direct references to the Peripatetic tradition in the essay on Demosthenes or in the work *On Literary Composition*, which was produced at about the same time. Although taken together these two works are more than three times as long as the essay on Lysias, there are fewer instances of Peripatetic influence. And when there are references to this tradition, Dionysius often seems more willing than before to modify Peripatetic theories. Of course, the essay on Demosthenes is organized around the concept of three styles, the grand, the middle, and the plain, and some have argued that this theory goes back to Theophrastus. Indeed, Dionysius himself says in section 3 of the essay on Demosthenes that Theophrastus felt that it was Thrasymachus of Chalcedon who had created a mixed style out of a blend of elements from the very simple style of Lysias and the artificial styles of Thucydides and Gorgias.²⁴ This does not necessarily mean, however, that

²¹ Bonner (above, note 9) 38.

²² Bonner (above, note 9) 34.

²³ Bonner (above, note 9) 58.

²⁴ Text 685 FHS&G.

Theophrastus conceptualized three distinct types of style; and most scholarly opinion thinks that he did not.²⁵ Therefore, I will limit my comments to those passages where Peripatetic influence is less debatable.

In the *Rhetoric* Aristotle had dealt with invention (Books 1 and 2), style (Book 3.1-12), and arrangement (3.13-19), and in his earlier essays Dionysius had treated these three topics as well. The essay on Demosthenes, however, is devoted almost exclusively to a consideration of style. Admittedly, he says at the end of the essay (58) that he will devote a separate treatise to Demosthenes' treatment of subject-matter. But we do not have this work, and it is not certain that he ever wrote it. And even in the area of style he diverges from the Peripatetic tradition. Earlier (*On Isoc.* 3) he had said that Theophrastus had stipulated that stylistic theory should discuss word-choice, composition, and the use of figures, probably meaning Gorgianic figures.²⁶ In the essay *On Literary Composition*, however, he says (1) that style is a question of word-choice and composition, and these are, very generally speaking, the two parts into which the essay on Demosthenes falls, although there is some discussion of figures, especially in his comments on Isocrates in the first part. He also makes use of the concept of the virtues of style, but these are so vastly expanded as to make Theophrastus' four virtues seem irrelevant.²⁷ Moreover, although he cites Aristotle in the treatise *On Literary Composition* (25) to prove that rhythm is an important element in the style of political speeches, his actual discussion of rhythm differs from that of Aristotle. The latter had opposed the use of recognizable rhythms, except the paean (*Rhet.* 3.8.4). Dionysius, however, is much more inclined to admit regular rhythms into prose, even those associated with poetry (cf. *On Lit. Comp.* 17-18).

There are also, however, references indicating complete agreement with the Peripatetic tradition. Both in the essay on Demosthenes (48) and in the treatise *On Literary Composition* (2) Dionysius quotes Aristotle as having divided the parts of speech into nouns, verbs, and conjunctions. He lists other alternative ways of dividing words, but he admits that Aristotle may have been right. In *On Literary Composition* (16) he also cites, with great approbation, a passage from Theophrastus' work *On Style* to the effect that some words are naturally beautiful and impressive and others are not.²⁸

Most of the Peripatetic references that I have discussed so far are from Aristotle and Theophrastus. In the essay on Demosthenes, however, there are also several references to Demetrius of Phalerum. When Dionysius is discussing Demosthenes'

²⁵ See, e.g., Doreen Innes, "Theophrastus and the Theory of Style," *Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities* 2 (New Brunswick, NJ 1985) 260-3 and George Kennedy, ed., *The Cambridge History of Literary Criticism* (Cambridge 1989) 195.

²⁶ Text 691 FHS&G.

²⁷ Cf. Bonner (above, note 9) 61.

²⁸ Text 688 FHS&G.

famous attempts to improve his delivery, he cites a biography by Demetrius. Dionysius does not say much about this biography, but Plutarch cites it several times in his *Life of Demosthenes*. It must have contained material critical of Demosthenes since Plutarch says that Demetrius accused him of cowardice and bribe-taking (14) and felt (11) that his delivery was low, ignoble, and effeminate. Dionysius also cites Demetrius (5) in support of his argument that Plato abuses the Gorgianic figures.

In the treatise *On Literary Composition* Dionysius also makes reference to what seems to me, at least, to be the most important and lasting lesson that he learned from the Peripatetic tradition, and that is the importance of the mean (*μεσότης*) in every field of endeavor. He says (24) in reference to the mixed kind of composition that he is about to discuss:

It has no form peculiar to itself, but is a sort of judicious mixture of the other two styles and a selection from the most effective qualities of each. This kind seems to me to carry off first prize, since it represents a sort of mean, and virtue in life, conduct and the arts is a mean, in the view of Aristotle and the other philosophers of his school.²⁹

A similar idea appears in the essay on Demosthenes (15) in his discussion of the middle style, which he feels, erroneously I think, that Demosthenes prefers:³⁰

Thus a speech that is intended for the well-educated few will not appeal to the vulgar and ignorant masses, while a speech which is intended to please the majority of ordinary men will be despised by men of refinement. But the speech which aims to persuade both these extreme classes of audience is less likely to fail in its objective. Such a speech would be a blend of the two types of style. That is why I have come to regard this style of composition as the most effective medium, and the oratory of which I most approve is that which avoids the excesses of the plain and the grand style.

Thus, in the long run it was not the technical aspects of the Peripatetic tradition, which we see in the essay on Lysias, that were to have an important influence on Dionysius: It was rather the whole spirit of Aristotelianism, seen most clearly, perhaps, not in the *Rhetoric*, but in works such as the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

Finally, in the works of the last period there are two references to the Peripatetic tradition which I cite for the sake of completeness. In the essay on Thucydides

²⁹ I have used, both here and in the next passage, the translation by S. Usher in the Loeb Classical Library, Vols. I and II (Cambridge 1974, 1985).

³⁰ Cf. C. Wooten, "Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Hermogenes on the Style of Demosthenes," *American Journal of Philology* 110 (1989) 578.

Dionysius repeats the statement made in the treatise *On Literary Composition* (1) that style is divided into only two parts, word-choice and composition, again deleting the third element, figures, recognized by Theophrastus. In the essay on Dinarchus (6) he makes a distinction between an enthymeme and the fuller form of an enthymeme, which he calls an epicheireme. He had made this same distinction in the essay on Isaeus (16), and this is, as far as I know, the first extant example of a distinction being drawn by an extant Greek writer between an enthymeme and an epicheireme.³¹ Aristotle had used the term epicheireme, but not in the sense of a full rhetorical syllogism (*Topics* 8.11.12). Theophrastus also used the term and according to Diogenes Laertius (5.43, 49) wrote books on the topic.³² Thus, although the distinction appears for the first time in Greek in Dionysius, it seems to be a Peripatetic idea.³³

In conclusion, I would like to make two points. First, Dionysius certainly was familiar with a Peripatetic tradition in rhetoric, although this tradition seems to be limited almost exclusively to Aristotle and Theophrastus. Dionysius has a direct and thorough knowledge of these writers, but he does not seem to know a distinct Peripatetic tradition after them. Secondly, this Peripatetic tradition is quite important in Dionysius' earlier works but is less so in the later ones. This, I think, is for two reasons. First, as Dionysius became more self-confident and mature he seems to have relied less on rhetorical theory and more on his own intuitive reading of oratorical texts. Secondly, as his admiration for Demosthenes grew, I think that he must have come to realize, in spite of his comments at the end of the *First Letter to Ammaeus* (12), that the Peripatetic tradition that he knew, especially as that is seen in the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle, is really not a very good description of Demosthenic oratory.³⁴ Plutarch's comments about the treatise of Demetrius of Phalerum on Demosthenes may also suggest that there was even a tradition in the school of Aristotle that was hostile to Demosthenes, as there seems to have been to Isocrates, and political considerations would not make this surprising. This hostility, if it existed, would have obviously alienated Dionysius. Therefore, as was often the case in Greek politics, Demosthenes may also have been a divisive influence in Greek literary history.

³¹ The distinction seems inherent in discussions of argumentation in Cicero's *On Invention* and in the *Rhetoric to Herennius*; see Caplan's edition of the latter work in the Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass. 1954) 106-7.

³² Text 1 and 68 no. 23-4 FHS&G.

³³ Usher (above, note 29) I.212-13.

³⁴ Usher (above, note 29) II.304-5.

Where Have the Topics Gone?

Jan M. van Ophuijsen

for Peter Stork

ἀνδρὶ φίλῳ συνετῷ τε καὶ εὖνῳ

I. Rhetoric in the Peripatos—II. Topics in Rhetoric and in Dialectic—III. Rhetoric the Counterpart to Dialectic (1): the Aristotelian Foundation—IV. Aristotelian Reflections in a Greek Rhetorician—V. The Peripatos after Aristotle. Rhetoric the Counterpart to Dialectic (2): Peripatetic *theseis*—VI. Theory of Topics in the Peripatos after Aristotle: i. Theophrastus—ii. Eudemus and Strato—VII. For a View of the Whole—Appendices: I. Some Implications for Dialectic—II. Rhetoric the Counterpart to Dialectic (3): a Non-Peripatetic Parallel—Bibliography

I. RHETORIC IN THE PERIPATOS

To confront the theme of 'Peripatetic rhetoric after Aristotle' with the field of topics*¹ may look like an unpromising exercise. According to one influential view, for which Wehrli may be taken as representative, the Peripatos always remained in the grip of Plato's hostility towards rhetoric: with the exception of the subject of diction (λέξις) the theory of rhetoric was neglected by all members of the school except for Theophrastus and Demetrius. In dialectic, on the other hand, individual topics were reduced to hypothetical syllogisms by Theophrastus;² this led to a reduction in the size of his work entitled *Topics* as compared to that of Aristotle.³

* For full references see the Bibliography at the end of this chapter. I am indebted to L.M. De Rijk, W.W. Fortenbaugh, P.M. Huby, J. Lameer, J.H. Lesher, A.A. Long and R.W. Sharples for reading and helpfully commenting on successive versions of this paper.

¹ The noun represents both Greek τοπικά 'things concerning τόποι' used by Aristotle in his *A.Pr.* and *Rhet.* to refer to his book on the subject, and τοπική as used by Cic. *Top.* 6 to distinguish the subject from dialectic; cf. VII n. 257 below. The singular topic represents the Greek τόπος, the plural of which appears here as topics (τόποι).

² See VI.i below.

³ Wehrli 1983 after Bochenski after Solmsen 1929, quoted pp. 158-9 nn. 210 & 212 below.

It looks as though the subject of dialectical topics was incorporated into, or superseded by, analytics, in the hands first of Aristotle himself and then of Theophrastus. After Theophrastus all that we have of topics is one single fragment of Strato, and Chrysippus confirms⁴ that Strato was the last member of the Peripatos to study dialectic. The lists of titles confirm the suggestion that the field of topics at least within the school of Aristotle went to waste.

There are grounds, however, for challenging this picture and reconsidering the Peripatetic stand in the propaganda war between philosophers and rhetoricians.⁵ That this controversy did not remain stuck in talking at cross-purposes, and that philosophy did not keep all the good arguments to itself, is chiefly owing to the willingness of Aristotle, after Plato's barely qualified rejection, to take rhetoric seriously and assign to it a place in what was to become the encyclopaedia. Yet according to Wehrli Plato's condemnation of rhetoric lingered on in the Peripatos;⁶ moreover the subject was neglected in favour of topics of greater 'exoteric' interest.⁷ His only argument which is not *ex silentio* is the title of Heraclides' *On Public Speaking, Or Protagoras*,⁸ which is suggestive rather than conclusive. Besides Demetrius⁹ he mentions Hieronymus, but the fragments he has collected¹⁰ all concern diction (ῥῆξις), as is established in his own commentary.¹¹ In his commentary on Critolaus, however, Wehrli declares¹² this philosopher's rejection of rhetoric to be opposed to the stance of his predecessors, among whom he includes Eudemus as well as Demetrius of Phaleron and Hieronymus. For Eudemus the association with rhetoric

⁴ Plut. *de Stoic. repugn.* 24 1045 F = Strato fr. 19 in Wehrli (1969²) part 5 p. 13/48.

⁵ Or struggle between a hypostasized *Rhetoric* and Philosophy as representing two cultures, in the graphic terms of e.g. Von Arnim 4-114 'Sophistik, Rhetorik, Philosophie in ihrem Kampf um die Jugendbildung', Jaeger 105 'Der Streit der Philosophie und Rhetorik ... als Leitmotiv durch die Geschichte der antiken Kultur', or Kennedy (1963) 321-30 'The quarrel between rhetoric and philosophy'. As for the two cultures, the well-known phrase of C.P. Snow was anticipated by Marrou (I) 313 in a contrast between the ancient 'rivalité entre philosophes et rhéteurs' and what at the time of writing in 1944 looked like a 'division paisible' between 'lettres' and 'sciences' in the modern age: '... il s'agissait de deux cultures rivales, se disputant le droit à l'existence avec acharnement'.

⁶ 'Rückblick' (1969²) part 10 p. 125, 'Nachhaltiger als Platons Verurteilung der Dichtung scheint im Peripatos sein Kampf gegen die Rhetorik gewirkt zu haben'.

⁷ Wehrli (1969²) 10: 125 considers it 'nicht ausgeschlossen, dass einige weitere Belege infolge unserer kärglichen Überlieferung fehlen'; nevertheless, (ib. 122) 'dass im übrigen Themen dieser Art spärlicher belegt sind als solche von allgemeiner Zugänglichkeit ... liegt nicht an den Zufällen der Überlieferung, sondern am ... allgemeinen Überwiegen der exoterischen Interessen'.

⁸ Περὶ τοῦ ῥητορεύειν ἢ Πρωταγόρας: fr. 33 in Wehrli's (1969²) 7: 14 & 16/69.

⁹ For Demetrius see V at nn. 195-7 below.

¹⁰ Fr. 50-2; his (1969²) 10: 21-2.

¹¹ Ib. 43.

¹² On 25-39, at (1969²) 10: 69 'Mit der Ablehnung der Rhetorik stellte K. sich in Gegensatz zu den älteren Peripatetikern'.

has to rely on the title *On Diction* or *On Expression* (Περὶ λέξεως), but this work, as far as we can tell from the handful of fragments that we have,¹³ dealt with the expression of propositions as implied in such phrases as 'transgressing the established expression'¹⁴ and 'by this expression he posits, he signifies ...',¹⁵ and in the classification of fallacies and their refutations into those 'by the expression' and those 'outside the expression'¹⁶—in other words, with the subject matter of *De interpretatione*.¹⁷ Reservations with regard to rhetoric may be suspected for Chamaeleon,¹⁸ and for Ariston of Ceos, if it is he who wrote *Against The Orators*.¹⁹

A turn towards rhetoric has been assumed²⁰ for the Lyceum after Strato under Lycon, who was renowned as a fine speaker.²¹ If (1) this may be combined with Chrysippus' report, quoted above,²² that Strato was the last of the Peripatetics to occupy himself with the theory of dialectic, and if (2) we take it that the practical training in both dialectic and rhetoric referred to by Alexander and Diogenes²³ continued to be a feature of the school, this would yield, instead of an unexplained change of direction, a shift of emphasis as part of an organic development in which each successive head of the school might still think of himself as faithfully preserving and transmitting the Aristotelian heritage. The renewed rejection of rhetoric by Critolaus in concert with other heads of philosophical schools can hardly count as an exception: far from being directed at Aristotle's more rarefied conception of the subject, this is likely to have been an assertion of its claims in the face of an unphilosophical rhetoric encouraged by the new demand for unadorned and intellectually unambitious but practically effective legal speeches created by the extension of Roman jurisdiction.²⁴

There is no clear evidence, then, that the school ever retracted Aristotle's qualified acceptance and intellectualized conception of rhetoric, which makes it both formally

¹³ 25-9, in (1968²) 8: 20-1/84-7.

¹⁴ Arist. *Top.* 2.1 109a28-9 παραβαίνειν τὴν κειμένην λέξιν.

¹⁵ Ib. 5.5 134a6 & 15-16 respectively τίθησι τῇ λέξει, τῇ λέξει σημαίνει.

¹⁶ S.E. 2 165b24-5 παρὰ τὴν λέξιν as opposed to 166b20 ἔξω τῆς λέξεως.

¹⁷ The ambiguity of the term λέξις in the book-titles of Theophrastus and Eudemus neatly balances that of the term ἐρμηνεία in the traditional book-titles of Aristotle and Pseudo-Demetrius.

¹⁸ 35 (1969²) 9: 59/84.

¹⁹ Πρὸς τοὺς ῥήτορας, 9 (1968²) 6: 32/50-1.

²⁰ By Von Arnim 83.

²¹ φραστικός ἀνὴρ and ἐν τῷ λέγειν γλυκύτατος fr. 18 (1968²) 6: 13/24-5; recalling τὸ τῆς φράσεως θεσπέσιον of Theophrastus (1.30-1 FHS&G = D.L. 5.38).

²² At n. 4.

²³ See V below at pp. 148-52.

²⁴ For Critolaus' attempt to make the heritage of encyclopaedic learning accumulated in the Peripatos operative in this controversy see his fr. 35-9, Wehrli (1969²) 10: 57-8/73, esp. fr. 37 a & b. For Critolaus' followers the younger Ariston and Diodorus of Tyrus see Wehrli (1969²) 10: 79-84, and (fr. 6) (1969²) 10: 88/91 respectively.

and materially parasitic on other arts in *inventio* but not, before the rise of grammar, in diction (λέξις).

II. TOPICS IN RHETORIC AND IN DIALECTIC

In dealing with the subject of topics we should do justice at once to the widely diverse ramifications and to the still operative unity of the concept of a topic itself.²⁵ We may begin by indicating, as a working hypothesis, how this might be attempted.

The task of defining the topic was notoriously neglected by Aristotle.²⁶ The concept was not a monolithic whole even in Aristotle, and its mixed origins are still seen in such rhetoricians as Cicero and Themistius. The terms invoked by Aristotle in explaining topics bring with them rather diverse associations: e.g. a 'point' or 'element' or 'letter' (στοιχείον),²⁷ which has connotations of an ultimate constituent, of a foundation and of a guarantee; or a 'beginning' (ἀρχή) of some sort, in a non-technical use for what is something less than a principle of science.²⁹ The principal epithet of topic (τόπος) is 'common' (κοινός), which in this connection may refer to at least three different relations: topics may be common either (1) to many subjects,³⁰ (2) to proof and refutation,³¹ or accusation and defence, or praise

²⁵ The interpreter who manages to be at once precise and liberal is Sprute (1982) 153: '... liesse sich ein Topos als ein Prinzip verstehen, auf Grund dessen eine enthymematisch begründete These den Zuhörern als erwiesen erscheint. Ein derartiges Prinzip könnte ... in einer allgemein anerkannten, d.h. als ἔνδοξον zu klassifizierenden Behauptung bestehen, die als Prämisse in eine Vielzahl syllogistischer Argumentationen eingehen kann. Ein so verstandener Topos wäre sowohl Ausgangspunkt bei der Bildung von Enthymemen als auch Konstituens der Enthymeme selbst, weil er als Obersatz in die syllogistische Argumentation eingeht. (...) diese Deutung ... nur einem Teil der aristotelischen Topoi entspricht ... Daneben ... noch ... und unter diesen sogar solche, auf welche die aristotelische Erläuterung des Toposbegriffs überhaupt nicht zutrifft'. It is not neat; but it is Aristotle.

²⁶ Cf. De Pater (1965) 93 on *Rhet.* 2.26 1403a16 as the 'seule définition ... des lieux' supplied by Aristotle, which, however, 'offense le précepte donné par lui-même' sc. at *Top.* 6.5 142b22-9.

²⁷ With Cic. *De or.* 2.130 *locos qui ut litterae ad verbum scribendum sic illi ad causam explicandam statim occurrant* cf. *Top.* 25 *his igitur locis qui sunt expositi ad omne argumentum reperiendum tamquam elementis quibusdam significatio et demonstratio [ad reperiendum] datur.*

²⁸ *Rhet.* 2.22 1396b20-1 εἰς μὲν οὖν τρόπος τῆς ἐκλογῆς πρῶτος οὗτος ὁ τοπικός, τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖα τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων λέγωμεν· στοιχείον δὲ λέγω καὶ τόπον ἐνθυμήματος τὸ αὐτό, cf. *Rhet.* 2.26 1403a16-17 τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ λέγω στοιχείον καὶ τόπον· ἔστιν γὰρ στοιχείον καὶ τόπος εἰς ὃ πολλὰ ἐνθυμήματα ἐμπίπτει. Cf. De Pater 110-15.

²⁹ Cf. *Top.* 8.14 163b33 ἀρχῆς ... καὶ ὑποθέσεως; and Solmsen (1929) 67 & Graeser 105 n. 2 cited at n. 227 below.

³⁰ *Rhet.* 1.2 1358a12-17, nn. 96-9 below, & 31-2 λέγω δ' εἶδη μὲν τὰς καθ' ἕκαστον γένος ἰδίας προτάσεις, τόπους δὲ τοὺς κοινούς ὁμοίως πάντων.

³¹ The distinction is operative at *Rhet.* 2.22 1396b22-7 ἐνθυμημάτων εἶδη ... δεικτικά ... ὅτι ἔστιν ... ἐλεγκτικά ... διαφέρει ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς ἔλεγχος καὶ συλλογισμός.

and blame;³² or (3) to all three genres of oratory.³³ And the opposition of topic (τόπος) to the highly ambivalent 'form' (εἶδος)³⁴ is hardly suited to clarify matters.

The history of the concept is one, if not of productive misunderstandings, then at least of suggestive ambiguities. There is a danger of forgetting that the word is only partly a technical term, and partly a word of ordinary language, and moreover one standing for such an elementary notion that it is at all times liable to be exploited for new metaphoric uses. Even if there is a tendency towards progressively narrower definition and more exact specification of the concept at least in the context of dialectic,³⁵ other uses are not thereby superseded. Older and less specialized uses may continue to influence the interpretation of the doctrine as long as the Aristotelian texts are read, and its everyday non-technical associations cling to the term as long as the language is spoken. To understand its history we ought at every stage to distinguish between what was intended by the author who uses it, and how it may have been interpreted in the light of other uses. Again we should be sensitive to connections between developments in different contexts: thus it is hardly a coincidence that a solidification, so to speak, of the topic into a timeless truth in dialectic parallels its solidification into an eternal platitude in rhetoric.³⁶

Given this only semi-technical character, the word is perhaps most adequately described in the terms of structural semantics as a set of distinctions of which now these, now others are actualized according to the different contexts in which it is applied, and between which there is seen a family resemblance in the sense that each use is clearly related to some, but not necessarily to all other uses.³⁷ Such

... δεικτικὸν ... τὸ ἐξ ὁμολογουμένων συνάγειν ... ἐλεγκτικὸν τὰ ἀνομολογούμενα συνάγειν, but not as differentiating among τόποι.

³² Cic. *Brut.* 46 ait Aristoteles ... scriptasque fuisse et paratas a Protagora rerum illustrium disputationes quae nunc communes appellantur loci. quod idem fecisse Gorgiam, cum singularum rerum laudes vituperationesque conscripsisset, quoted e.g. by Sprute (1982) 148 n. 12.

³³ For κοινά, though not κοινοὶ τόποι, in this sense cf. *Rhet.* 2.18 1391b27-1392a1.

³⁴ *Rhet.* 1.2 1358a31-2.

³⁵ See VI.i at pp. 159-61 & App. I at p. 166 below.

³⁶ It is a telling detail that Themistius at *Paraphr. A.Po.* 18.24-7, in the context of recommending dialectical topics to the geometer, adduces περὶ καλοῦ as well as περὶ ἐναντίου. Cf. App. I p. 166 at n. 265 below.

³⁷ This is another way of saying that competence in a language does not necessarily involve more conceptual analysis in its speakers than is required for successful communication: a word is taken to refer to one single concept until users run into what hinders them from doing so. It is significant that several references to distinctions within the concept come from Roman authors like Quintilian and Boethius, whose awareness of them, like ours, was heightened by their reading in, and sometimes translating from, a language not their own.

distinctions³⁸ might be grouped into the primary uses for what is a place or space of some sort, and the secondary uses envisaging what is *contained* in some place or a space. Examples of the first group, many of them overlapping, are references to: a point in the course of a speech; a heading in the work of the orator, and thus in the curriculum of the teacher of rhetoric; a metaphorical space for developments by the orator as opposed to cut and dried ingredients;³⁹ the 'position or standpoint from which you assail your opponent or defend your thesis';⁴⁰ an area or field of subject matter;⁴¹ a place which contains, and where you find, arguments,⁴² or propositions.⁴³ Secondary uses, for what is at a place or in a space, again overlapping, include: a pair of arguments for and against the same general point; each of such a pair; a 'strategy of argumentation with which one can construct a number of particular arguments';⁴⁴ a 'basic principle that can serve to support

³⁸ What follows is not so much a catalogue of opinions, such as that given by De Pater 92-3, as a sample of aspects of the concept every one of which is at some stage or in some contexts operative.

³⁹ Cf. Sprute (1982) 149 on Isocr. 10 (*Hel.*) 4 'die Technik oder der Kunstgriff *περὶ ὧν ἂν τις πρόβηται ψευδῇ μηχανήσασθαι λόγον* ... Mittel ... um bestimmte Ausführungen zu machen ... zu argumentieren'.

⁴⁰ According to Düring 203 n. 1 this is what 'τόπος of course means'. Cf. Sprute (1982) 149-50 on Isocr. 12 (*Panath.*) 111 'Gesichtspunkte ... welche den Redner instandsetzen können lobende ...' and on Dem. 25 (Aristogeiton I) 76 '... zweckentsprechende Äusserungen zu machen.'

⁴¹ Cf. Sprute (1982) 149: Isocr. 5 (*Phil.*) 109, 10 (*Hel.*) 38 'könnte ... auch eine metaphorische nicht-technische Bedeutung in Betracht kommen ... 'Feld' oder 'Gebiet', das der Redner mit seinen Ausführungen berührt oder erschöpft'. Stoics divided and subdivided philosophy into numerous τόπους (e.g. D.L. 7.39, 43-4, 160).

⁴² "places for finding" something, namely, though Aristotle does not say so, for finding arguments' Kapp 5. Cf. *Rhet.* 2.26 1403a16-17 ἔστιν ... τόπος εἰς ὃ πολλὰ ἐνθυμήματα ἐμπίπτει, Cic. *Top.* 8 *locum esse argumenti sedem, argumentum autem rationem quae rei dubiae faciat fidem*, Quint. 5.10.20 quoted p. 138 n. 48 below. Sprute (1982) 148 on the origin of the τόπος concept may be right that '... ein Ciceros Definition [des Topos als 'argumenti sedes'] entsprechender griechischer Ausdruck bei Aristoteles' Zeitgenossen oder Vorgängern ... nicht belegt werden kann', but may not the passage in the *Rhetoric* count as testimony from Aristotle himself? 2.24 1401a(1-7) τόποι ... εἰς μὲν ὁ παρὰ τὴν λέξιν ... ἡ γὰρ τοιαύτη λέξις χώρα ἐστὶν ἐνθυμήματος is different but relevant as another spatial metaphor.

⁴³ 'die Topik ... ist primär die Kunst, die "Örter" zu finden, wo man sich seine προτάσεις holen kann' Von Fritz 219 n. 451. Cf. *Top.* 8.14 163b32 πρότασιν ... κοινήν, on which [Alex.] in *Top.* 586.23 πρότασιν κοινήν τὸν τόπον λέγων.

⁴⁴ This and the next one Stump (1978) 16 and (1988) 4. Her examples for both are *Top.* 4.4 124b15-16 'If the species is a relative [one must] examine whether the genus is also a relative, for if the species is a relative, the genus is also' at (1978) 167 (= 1988: 4), and *Top.* 4.1 121a12-19 '(species partake of their genera but genera do not partake of their species) ... one must see whether what is given as the genus partakes of or can partake of the species' at (1978) 206. Cf., for the *Rhetoric*, Sprute (1982) 147 'So *ermöglicht*

a variety of arguments' or 'principle confirming the line of argument produced by the strategy';⁴⁵ a prescription to select one of such a pair; a statement likely to be accepted; a statement used as a major premiss.⁴⁶

This suggests that one need not and should not look for one single origin of the concept any more specific than the notion of space which underlies the metaphor—or perhaps we should say metaphors. Such a quest must either leave many uses unexplained, as the hypothesis that the concept was lifted wholesale from mnemotechnics does,⁴⁷ or land in a noncommittal indistinctness. This is not to transgress the commandment that *significata* shall no more than *entia* be multiplied beyond what is necessary. The situation is one of multiple reference corresponding to semantic unity at a non-technical, even basic level. If we take what looks like a relatively fundamental split within the technical usage of the term 'topic' (τόπος), that it may refer just as naturally to statements as to classes of statements, we can see why this ambivalence does not detract from its usefulness, by considering a statement containing abstract or common nouns as a notation of a class or type of statements, with these nouns serving as informal variables, to be replaced by proper names or unique descriptions when we make explicit token-statements. Such a general statement is formally indistinguishable from a single proposition or premise (πρότασις), and the criterion for calling either of them a topic (τόπος) may just be whether they provide a convenient shorthand, saving students the trouble of memorizing particular cases. The level of abstraction at which a teacher of rhetoric—or indeed of dialectic—places the topics (τόποι), may vary for different parts of the subject, and is in the end a matter of didactic efficacy; in general this level will be lower in rhetoric, where the choice of subjects is narrower and more fixed; but the difference with dialectic is a difference of degree.

The subject of topics as a whole is divided between the two disciplines of rhetoric and dialectic which in modern times have come to be discussed separately.

In rhetoric the treatment of topics from Cicero down to the Greek handbooks of the second and third centuries seems to have been eclectic: a confusing, and perhaps confused, application both of Aristotelian and of pre-Aristotelian, or at least non-Aristotelian conceptions. These latter, sometimes dismissed as vulgar and

... die Mehrzahl der aristotelischen Topoi nicht bloss Enthymeme, sondern *garantiert* zugleich deren Überzeugungskraft.'

⁴⁵ I.e. a general statement corresponding to such a strategy.

⁴⁶ According to Thionville (30-2 &) 56 'les lieux communs sont incontestablement pour Aristote des propositions; mais il ... les donne souvent comme des conseils et des préceptes.' Cf. De Pater (1965) 7.

⁴⁷ Solmsen (1929) 170, accepted ('plausibly') by Sorabji 30. The analogy at *Top.* 8.14 163b28-32 seems to imply that any connection there may have been was no longer self-evident; cf. [Alex.] in *Top.* 586.10-587.7.

inferior by Cicero and Quintilian⁴⁸ as well as by Aristotle, are traceable to Isocrates and Anaximenes, but they are actually not without reflections in Aristotle: the term 'topic' (τόπος) refers to a number of different things even in the *Rhetoric*, as was shown very clearly by Sprute.⁴⁹

In dialectic the topic goes through a more linear development, connected with an extension of syllogistic. This development as traced by De Pater, Stump, and Ebbesen may perhaps be summarily represented as a progressive narrowing down of the notion of a topic (τόπος) by eliminating its ambiguities: the prescriptive aspect it has in Aristotle is detached by Theophrastus and set up independently under the name of precept (παράγγελμα), so that what was in part a strategy becomes a principle;⁵⁰ this is lifted from the sphere of what is 'accepted' (ἔνδοξα) into that of 'axioms' in a fairly strong sense⁵¹ by Themistius, and so via Boethius is 'absorbed'⁵² into the *consequentiae* of scholastic logic. In addition to the Peripatos the Stoic Posidonius presumably,⁵³ and Galen probably,⁵⁴ contributed to this development in dialectical topics.

The most obvious overlap between the two traditions is in Cicero's *Topics*. In antiquity this text was both studied as one among Cicero's authoritative rhetorical treatises, and at the same time so to speak adopted into the Aristotelian *Organon*, perhaps largely on the strength of Cicero's claim to be relating 'certain topics of Aristotle'.⁵⁵ It thus counts for Boethius as a seminal text on dialectical topics, as opposed to the rhetorical topics he finds in Cicero's *De inventione*.⁵⁶ Cicero's claim remains a subject of dispute.⁵⁷ What is agreed, and concerns us here, is that his *Topics* contains much that is Peripatetic, but is not a translation, paraphrase or summary either of the *Topics* or of the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle.

The divergence between the two disciplines of rhetoric and dialectic has seemed to justify separate accounts of the subject of topics in each discipline.⁵⁸ This

⁴⁸ Quint. 5.10.20 *locos appello non ut vulgo nunc intelleguntur in luxuriam et adulterium et similia sed sedes argumentorum in quibus latent, ex quibus sunt petenda.*

⁴⁹ Sprute (1975), resumed in (1982). The principal distinction among τόποι is between the kind εἰς ὃ πολλὰ ἐνθυμήματα ἐμπίπτει (*Rhet.* 2.26 1403a17) and what in German can be called 'enthymemfremde Topoi': (1982) 168-71.

⁵⁰ The terms are those of Stump e.g. (1978) 167.

⁵¹ Cf. Kidd 278, Ebbesen (1982) 111-18.

⁵² The term 'absorption' is borrowed from O. Bird by Stump (1978) 25 & (1982) 273 (title) & 275.

⁵³ Cf. Ebbesen (1981) 116, where he refers to Kidd for Galen's dependence on Posidonius, & (1982) 113 & 117 n. 35, where he adds qualifications.

⁵⁴ Cf. Ebbesen (1981) & (1982), both at p. 117.

⁵⁵ *Aristotelis topica quaedam*; cf. V at n. 141 below.

⁵⁶ *Top. diff.* 1 1173 C.

⁵⁷ For a cautious and balanced account see Huby (1989).

⁵⁸ The position of Stump (1978) may be taken as typical. She grants that 'a thorough account of an Aristotelian Topic would require discussing the *Rhetoric* as well as the *Topics*'

approach might appear to have been authorized in advance by the fact that Aristotle distinguishes between the two disciplines and accords them separate treatments, each with its own set of topics.⁵⁹ A complication is that even in Aristotle the connection between the two divisions is not transparently clear.⁶⁰ But whatever this connection may have been, it is tacitly assumed to have been dissolved after Aristotle. After all, given the alleged neglect of rhetoric in the Peripatos there was apparently not all that much left to connect; and perhaps, given the ambiguity of the term 'topos' (τόπος) in the *Rhetoric*, the link between that work and the *Topics* had, in spite of the cross-references between them,⁶¹ always been artificial and strained.

It seems we have come a long way since the days when Brandis could trace many topics of the *Rhetoric* to the *Topics*, or Solmsen could apply Jaeger's genetic approach to logic-cum-rhetoric from the Academy to the post-Aristotelian Peripatos under Theophrastus—to say nothing of the time when the *Rhetoric* was taken to belong to, or with, the *Organon*.⁶² Still, the results achieved in the analysis of the concept of a topic (τόπος) have not solved all related problems. In the historiography of dialectic the possibility of a borrowing from rhetoric is now and

(159), yet claims that Boethius' rhetorical topics 'require a completely separate treatment' (179-80) even though 'Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is the ultimate source, at least indirectly, of Boethius' discussion of rhetoric' (141). When she decides how much of Aristotle's theory of *Topics* is sufficient for her purposes (159), and where it is necessary to 'touch on' the *Rhetoric* (160), we cannot but take her on trust. Cf. also 142 & 208. Among systematic expounders of rhetoric, on the other hand, Volkmann (206 n. 2) at least calls attention to the problem 'Wie weit sich die in der rhetorischen Topik vorkommenden Topen mit den vielfach gleichlautenden Ausdrücken der Peripatetischen und Stoischen Logik decken, welchen Einfluss überhaupt die Entwicklung der Logik bei den Griechen auf die Entwicklung der Rhetorik gehabt hat'—though he might have referred to the foundations laid in Brandis (1849). The most puzzling and least satisfactory treatment is that of Martin 110-11, who on the one hand takes it for granted that the author of the list in the Anonymus Seguerianus cited below 'wollte offenbar Sichtung und Ordnung in die willkürliche Aufzählung des Aristoteles bringen' and that the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* and Cicero *De inventione* again 'offenbar' aim at giving 'eine durchsichtigere logische Gliederung', and on the other hand dismisses Cicero's acknowledgement to Aristotle in the *Topics* in the sentence 'der Grund ist nicht zu erkennen'. The discussion of Kennedy (1963) 19-20, 96, 293 is more helpful.

⁵⁹ 'Aristotle considers these *Topics* [of *Top.* books 2-7] part of dialectic and distinguishes them from two different but analogous sorts of *Topics*, rhetorical *Topics* ... and mnemonic *Topics* ...' Stump (1982) 273, repeated (1988) 4-5, including the reference to (1978) 170-2 for rhetorical topics. Cf. (1978) 207: 'In rhetoric, there are *Topics* similar in content and function to dialectical *Topics*', Solmsen (1941) 41 'of the same kind'.

⁶⁰ See next section.

⁶¹ Mostly from *Rhet.* to *Top.*, but for a reference to rhetoric if not to the *Rhetoric* see *Top.* 8.14 164a5-6.

⁶² Cf. Moraux (1973) 90, referring to the classification of the works of Aristotle by the Neoplatonic commentators: 'In der διαίρεσις werden Rhetorik und Poetik als Bestandteile des Organon angeführt', it being understood that 'die διαίρεσις will eine rein logische Systematisierung sein'.

then considered.⁶³ But this even if it were the case would not be verifiable, or likely ever to become verifiable, and I submit that it is not plausible a priori: it is easier to see what Cicero had to gain by borrowing from philosophy and especially from dialectic, than to conceive what dialectic in the process of being formalized could learn from a rhetoric freed from the straitjacket of Aristotelian logic.⁶⁴ As for rhetoric, 'anyone who attempts something in the nature of a historical analysis' of later handbooks on *inventio* is still reduced to the same 'verge of despair' that Solmsen was more than fifty years ago.⁶⁵ In the circumstances it may be helpful to consider whether we can get the cross-fertilization, or lack of it, between dialectic and rhetoric after Aristotle any clearer, especially in their common ground of topics.⁶⁶ First we should review the statements of Aristotle on the connection between the two divisions, from which his successors within the school are likely to have taken their clue and against which their views have to be measured. Next we shall consider some possible traces of Aristotle's influence in one of the later handbooks (τέχναι) of rhetoric.

III. RHETORIC THE COUNTERPART TO DIALECTIC (1): THE ARISTOTELIAN FOUNDATION

Relations between the two disciplines are considered in the *Rhetoric*, where Aristotle defines them in different ways.⁶⁷ At the very beginning of the work it

⁶³ Thus Ebbesen (1981) 110 'The explanation [of the conception of the τόπος as an ἀφορμή] ... may well be Theophrastean, though it is, of course, possible that the Aphrodisian got it from rhetoric ... If Cicero and Themistius do not draw on a rhetorical tradition, we must search for a philosophical source' & (1982) 115 'One possibility is that Cicero had his list and his conception of topics from his rhetorical training ... Another possibility is that Andronicus ... had written ... a systematic list of the *topoi* inspired, perhaps, by early Peripatetic treatises and/or rhetorical tradition.'

⁶⁴ Marius Victorinus *De diffinitione* at PL 64 895 B sums it up: *omnia recte orator exprimit quae sunt in dicendo philosophorum. nam et vero utitur argumento, quod est philosophorum proprium, utitur etiam necessario. at contra philosophus in disputationibus propriis rhetorum cuncta condemnat: neque enim adjungit aliquando signum, neque quod credibile dicitur, et omne probabile penitus a virtute sui sermonis excludit; cf., specifically about topics, Boeth. *Top. diff.* 4 1216 A *itaque fit ut semper exeat rhetor dialecticis locis, dialecticus suis possit esse contentus. ... dialecticus vero qui prior est posteriore non eget.* The fact that rhetoricians might disagree with this does not make an influence of rhetoric on dialectic any more likely.*

⁶⁵ Solmsen (1941) 177.

⁶⁶ The use of the terms 'dialectical topics' and 'rhetorical topics' should not prejudice the question; here these will simply refer to topics found in contexts specifically of dialectic and of rhetoric, e.g. Aristotle's *Topics* and *Rhetoric*, respectively.

⁶⁷ Sprute (1982) supposes that Aristotle (43) 'eine genaue Bestimmung des Verhältnisses ... gar nicht beabsichtigt hat' but (45) 'dieses Verhältnis nur annäherungsweise zu beschreiben sucht', on the assumption that the use of expressions which do not add

is stated that rhetoric is the *counterpart* of dialectic.⁶⁸ One implication is that the two subjects are placed at the same hierarchical level in a *divisio scientiarum*; but this is contradicted in the next chapter, where rhetoric is said to be a *part* of dialectic.⁶⁹ Is there any chance of reconciling these two descriptions by identifying different perspectives from which each of them applies? The ground which is given for the first, as a counterpart, is that 'both disciplines deal with certain matters which are somehow the common property of all to be acquainted with, and which do not belong to any one definite science'.⁷⁰ The ground for the second, as part of dialectic, seems to be found⁷¹ not in any similarity in kind between the external objects to which each of them relates, but in their very substance: the 'technical procedure'⁷² of rhetoric is concerned with means of persuasion or proofs,⁷³ proof is a form of demonstration,⁷⁴ the rhetorical form of demonstration is the enthymeme,⁷⁵ which is thus the principal means of persuasion⁷⁶ and which is a form of syllogism;⁷⁷ and 'all syllogisms without exception are the object of inquiry of dialectic, whether (sc. of dialectic) as a whole or in part'.⁷⁸ The relation between the two disciplines is here capable of being expressed in terms of part and whole, precisely because the relation between their constituent factors is expressed in terms of species and genus.

The latter perspective is immediately confirmed when we read⁷⁹ that the expert in syllogisms will also be best at enthymemes, provided that he should additionally 'assume', i.e. take into account,⁸⁰ what enthymemes are about,⁸¹ and what their differences⁸² from 'logical'⁸³ syllogisms are. The notion of a part is perhaps implicit

up to (43) 'erschöpfende Auskunft' or a (45) 'befriedigenden Eindruck', accords with Aristotle's conception of the method of rhetoric, which does not aim at accuracy and completeness but at practical usefulness. I hope to show that Aristotle's statements, though not maximally explicit, are quite exact.

⁶⁸ *Rhet.* 1.1 1354a1 ἡ ρητορική ἐστὶν ἀντίστροφος τῇ διαλεκτικῇ.

⁶⁹ *Rhet.* 1.2 1356a30-1 ἔστι γὰρ μῶριόν τι τῆς διαλεκτικῆς.

⁷⁰ *Rhet.* 1.1 1354a1-3 ἀμφοτέραι γὰρ περὶ τοιούτων τινῶν εἰσὶν αἱ κοινὰὶ τρόποι τινὰ ἀπάντων ἐστὶ γνωρίζειν καὶ οὐδεμιᾶς ἐπιστήμης ἀφορισμένης.

⁷¹ At *Rhet.* 1.1 1355a6-9.

⁷² *Rhet.* 1.1 1355a4 ἔντεχνος μέθοδος.

⁷³ Ib. πίστεις.

⁷⁴ *Rhet.* 1.1 1355a5 ἀπόδειξις.

⁷⁵ *Rhet.* 1.1 1355a6-7 ἐνθύμημα.

⁷⁶ *Rhet.* 1.1 1355a7-8 κυριώτατον τῶν πίστεων.

⁷⁷ *Rhet.* 1.1 1355a8 συλλογισμός τις.

⁷⁸ *Rhet.* 1.1 1355a8-9 περὶ δὲ συλλογισμοῦ ὁμοίως ἅπαντος τῆς διαλεκτικῆς ἐστὶν ἰδεῖν, ἢ αὐτῆς ὅλης ἢ μέρους τινός.

⁷⁹ *Rhet.* 1.1 1355a10-14.

⁸⁰ προσλαβών: less probably in view of the active voice, that he 'has also made his own'.

⁸¹ *Rhet.* 1.1 1355a12-13 περὶ ποιᾶ τέ ἐστι τὸ ἐνθύμημα—as distinct from syllogisms, which may be about anything.

⁸² *Rhet.* 1.1 1355a13 διαφοράς.

⁸³ Ib. λογικούς: either 'logical' in roughly our modern sense, cf. *Top.* 1.14 105b21,

in the proviso concerned with what enthymemes, as distinct from syllogisms which may be about anything, are about, suggesting that there is a material as well as a formal aspect to the demarcation at least of rhetorical enthymemes, and so recalling the earlier qualification as a counterpart, and in the next chapter it is expressly applied to rhetoric where this is qualified not only as 'a part of dialectic',⁸⁴ but also as 'similar to it' in that, again, 'neither is a science of what is the case concerning any one definite subject, but both are abilities to supply arguments'.⁸⁵ In the preceding sentence rhetoric had been called 'as it were an offshoot'⁸⁶ of dialectic and the political part of ethics; a few pages onwards⁸⁷ this is expressed without recourse to metaphor where we read that rhetoric 'is composed'⁸⁸ of analytics and of the ethical part of politics,⁸⁹ with the addition that it 'is similar on the one hand to dialectic and on the other hand to sophistic arguments'.⁹⁰ A similarity to dialectic alone, which may be connected with the one here envisaged, is in that both rhetoric and dialectic 'are of contraries', 'deduce contraries', and involve the capacity, if not the act, of arguing for contrary persuasions and convictions.⁹¹

It thus appears to be possible, by applying the distinction between formal and

23 or ἐν λόγῳ, 'verbal', explicit, as opposed to incomplete, partly notional ἐνθυμήματα, i.e. ἐνθυμούμενα, things 'taken to one's θυμός' requiring a mental supplement.

⁸⁴ N. 69 above.

⁸⁵ *Rhet.* 1.2 1356a30-3 (28 ἡ ῥητορική) ἔστι γὰρ μῶριόν τι τῆς διαλεκτικῆς καὶ ὁμοία (ΑΓ: ὁμοίωμα Ω), καθάπερ καὶ ἀρχόμενοι εἶπομεν· περὶ οὐδενὸς γὰρ ὁρισμένου οὐδετέρᾳ αὐτῶν ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη πῶς ἔχει ἀλλὰ δυνάμεις τινὲς τοῦ πορίσαι λόγους. The addition 'as we have also said at the beginning' strictly speaking does not apply to the assertion of the similarity which precedes, but only to the specification which follows it. The negative half of the latter statement had in fact been repeated once before at 1.1 1355b8-9 οὐκ ἔστιν οὔτε ἐνὸς τινος γένους ἀφορισμένου ἡ ῥητορική, ἀλλὰ καθάπερ ἡ διαλεκτική κτλ.

⁸⁶ *Rhet.* 1.2 1356a25 οἷον παραφυσές τι.

⁸⁷ *Rhet.* 1.4 1359b9-12.

⁸⁸ *Rhet.* 1.4 1359b9 σύγκειται.

⁸⁹ Again this is supposed to be 'what we have in fact also said before': 1359b8-9 ὅπερ ... καὶ πρότερον εἰρηκότες τυγχάνομεν.

⁹⁰ *Rhet.* 1.4 1359b11-12. The alleged similarities have been explained by Dufour as referring to its use for confirmation and for refutation respectively, but the similarities to dialectic and to eristic respectively, to be cited presently, suggest that perhaps the affinity with the one or the other discipline is determined by whether the premises involved are ἐνδοξα or only φαινόμενα ἐνδοξα, cf. in the context to be quoted in the next note at 1402a14 ἔσται τὸ μὴ εἰκὸς εἰκὸς, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀπλῶς, 22-3 φαίνεται μὲν σὺν ἀμφοτέρᾳ εἰκότα, ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν εἰκὸς, τὸ δὲ σὺν ἀπλῶς, & 26-7. Thus Spengel and Grimaldi.

⁹¹ *Rhet.* 1.1 1355a35-6 ὁμοίως εἰσιν ἀμφοτέραι τῶν ἐναντίων, 34 τὰναντία συλλογίζεται, & 29-30 τὰναντία δεῖ δύνασθαι πείθειν, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς συλλογισμοῖς respectively.—A similarity to eristic alone is found in the fact that both rhetoric and eristic provide scope for 'Protagoras' profession' of turning the weaker argument into the stronger: *Rhet.* 2.24 1402a24-8 τὸν ἥττω δὲ λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν ... τὸ Πρωταγόρου ἐπάγγελμα· ψεῦδός τε γὰρ ἔστιν καὶ οὐκ ἀληθὲς ἀλλὰ φαινόμενον εἰκὸς, καὶ ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ τέχνῃ ἀλλ' ἐν ῥητορικῇ καὶ ἐριστικῇ.

material, to reconcile the various statements contained in the *Rhetoric* about the relation of the 'art' of that name to dialectic. If we now descend to the constituent factors of each, the dialectical and rhetorical syllogisms, we find that for both disciplines a distinction is made between arguments according to the procedure⁹² of the discipline itself, and arguments according to other 'arts' and 'capacities'⁹³—with the remarkable addition 'some of which exist but others have not yet been grasped'.⁹⁴ Aristotle anticipates our incomprehension⁹⁵ and explains: 'dialectical and rhetorical syllogisms are those of, or in regard to which we speak of topics (τόποι) ...',⁹⁶ i.e. 'those which⁹⁷ are (in) common, about matters of law, physical science, and of citizenship and many (sc. more) things differing in species,⁹⁸ such as the topic of more and less':⁹⁹ the argument *a fortiori*, which is equally applicable to all these areas, and is so in rhetorical as well as in dialectical discussions of them.

To these 'common' (sc. *places*, presumably) Aristotle opposes certain 'special' things (ἰδία), which are confined to single subjects such as physics and ethics.¹⁰⁰ The substantive use of this adjective 'special' (ἰδία)¹⁰¹ does not specify between individual arguments and classes of arguments. Whereas the common things do not make one knowledgeable in any particular subject,¹⁰² well-chosen 'specials' can land a person in a new branch of science,¹⁰³ if he hits upon premises qualified to serve as its principles.¹⁰⁴ Just how this is done Aristotle does not here explain, and elsewhere it is worked out only for dialectic. It appears as though he envisaged two applications for rhetoric as part or as analogue of dialectic: the common one,

⁹² *Rhet.* 1.2 1358a4 & [6] μέθοδον.

⁹³ *Rhet.* 1.2 1358a6-7 τέχναι and δυνάμεις.

⁹⁴ Or 'mastered': *Rhet.* 1.2 1358a7 τὰς μὲν οὖσας τὰς δ' οὐκ ᾧ κατελημμέναις.

⁹⁵ *Rhet.* 1.2 1358a9-10 μᾶλλον σαφὲς ἔσται διὰ πλείονων ῥηθέν.

⁹⁶ Or '... enumerate the τόποι': *Rhet.* 1.2 1358a10-12 λέγω γὰρ διαλεκτικούς τε καὶ ῥητορικούς συλλογισμούς εἶναι περὶ ὧν τοὺς τόπους λέγομεν.

⁹⁷ Most probably 'those τόποι which', although 'those συλλογισμοί which' cannot be excluded on grounds of grammar.

⁹⁸ *Rhet.* 1.2 1358a12-14 οὗτοι δ' εἰσὶν οἱ κοινοὶ περὶ δικαίων καὶ φυσικῶν καὶ περὶ πολιτικῶν καὶ περὶ πολλῶν διαφερόντων εἶδει ...

⁹⁹ *Rhet.* 1.2 1358a14 ... οἷον ὁ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον τόπος.

¹⁰⁰ *Rhet.* 1.2 1358a17-18 ἰδία δὲ ἅα ἐκ τῶν περὶ ἕκαστον εἶδος καὶ γένος προτάσεών ἐστιν, οἷον περὶ φυσικῶν εἰσι προτάσεις κτλ.

¹⁰¹ The adjective ἰδία should be taken substantively: the only neuter antecedent available, ἐνθυμήματα, does not fit, since (other) συλλογισμοί are included at 1358a15 & 19.

¹⁰² *Rhet.* 1.2 1358a21-2 κάκεῖνα μὲν οὐ ποιήσει περὶ οὐδὲν γένος ἔμφορα· περὶ οὐδὲν γὰρ ὑποκείμενόν ἐστιν· ...

¹⁰³ *Rhet.* 1.2 1358a23-5 ... ταῦτα δὲ ὅσῃ τις ἀν βελτίῳ ἐκλέγεται [τὰς προτάσεις] λήσει ποιήσας ἄλλην ἐπιστήμην τῆς διαλεκτικῆς καὶ ῥητορικῆς· ...

¹⁰⁴ *Rhet.* 1.2 1358a25-6 ... ἀν γὰρ ἐντύχη ἀρχαῖς οὐκέτι διαλεκτικὴ οὐδὲ ῥητορικὴ ἀλλ' ἐκείνη ἔσται ἣς ἔχει τὰς ἀρχάς.

in which well-trying forms of argument and probable statements, i.e. formal and material generalities, are used to deal with individual cases, and another one in which such patterns and premises are used to arrive at new general and probable statements in fields as yet uncultivated. It may be doubted whether he foresaw as prominent a part for rhetoric as for dialectic in this connection; perhaps this is why he had recourse to the analogy with a discipline which is better suited to illustrate the differences between general and particular, and between formal and material arguments. But it is not implausible that he did indeed conceive of a limited role for rhetoric in the generation of branches of ethics and politics especially. However that may be, what concerns us here is that everything he says has reference to both disciplines.¹⁰⁵ These crucial passages in Aristotle, then, provide no authority for treating rhetorical and dialectical topics as two separate fields.

IV. ARISTOTELIAN REFLECTIONS IN A GREEK RHETORICIAN

It is generally agreed that some of the Greek handbooks (τέχνη) of rhetoric of the second and third centuries A.D. contain Aristotelian matter. Under the heading of the means of proof or persuasion (πίστεις), a comparatively full and clear account is preserved by the author known as the Anonymus Seguerianus.¹⁰⁶ It includes a catalogue of ten topics¹⁰⁷ with subdivisions which is explicitly traced to Aristotle by the Anonymus.¹⁰⁸ The connection with Aristotle, approved by Volkmann,¹⁰⁹ Martin,¹¹⁰ and Kennedy,¹¹¹ is indeed quite unimpeachable, since all but one¹¹² of the ten items in the list, or at least words formed from the same stem, can be traced to Aristotle.

Volkmann, echoed by Martin, specifies that the list is a simplification of, and an improvement on, that in the *Rhetoric*. Now it is true that several of these terms, e.g. definition (ὁρος), division (διαίρεσις), and judgment (κρίσις), are found in the *Rhetoric*; in one case, though the term itself does not occur in the *Rhetoric*,

¹⁰⁵ The analogy is continued in the remaining sentences of the introduction, 1358a 26-35.

¹⁰⁶ Anon. Seg. 377.17-387.20 περὶ πίστεων (*RhGr* 1 ed. Sp.-H.).

¹⁰⁷ Ib. 382.3-385.8. The list of these ten τόποι, at 382.11-13, is ὁρος διαίρεσις παράθεσις συστοιχία περιοχὴ ὁμοίων παρεκόμενον μάχη δύναμις κρίσις.

¹⁰⁸ Or by his source Nicocles. There are problems of text as well as of interpretation here, but it seems that Aristotle is said to have 'found' (εὑάδεν P: εὔπεν Spengel: εὔρηκε Volkmann) most of these topics.

¹⁰⁹ P. 207.

¹¹⁰ P. 110.

¹¹¹ Kennedy (1983) 90.

¹¹² The exception is μάχη, which is no more than a new genus for the species ἐναντία and ἀντιτεταμένα familiar from the *Topics*, with their associates στερητικά and ἀποφατικά found in the *Analytics*. The term is at the level of abstraction of the logical works rather than of the *Rhetoric*.

a related word does: thus with *systoichia* 'series, set' compare *systoichos* for an item in such a series or set.¹¹³ However, those found in the *Rhetoric* with the one significant exception of judgment (κρίσις), i.e. authority, also occur in the *Topics*, whereas for more than one there are parallels in the *Topics* only: thus for 'juxtaposition' sc. for comparison (παράθεσις), 'comprehension' (περιοχή), and 'attendant' (παρεπόμενον) we find forms of the related verbs 'juxtapose' (παραιτιθέναι),¹¹⁴ 'contain, comprehend' (περιέχειν),¹¹⁵ and 'attend' (παρέπεσθαι)¹¹⁶ in the *Topics*, and the topic of the 'similar' (ὅμοιον) in the Anonymus recalls the 'consideration of what is similar' in Aristotle.¹¹⁷ And for the *systoichia* just mentioned the *Topics* contains not just the related adjective,¹¹⁸ but the noun itself.¹¹⁹

The bare list of these ten main headings, then, seems to show a closer affinity with the *Topics* than with the *Rhetoric*, and subdivisions such as genus and difference confirm this impression.¹²⁰ We must allow for the fact that the *Rhetoric* includes topics (τόποι) also found in the *Topics* but expressed with a different degree of technicality in each work; but even if some more items in the list of the Anonymus could be connected to the *Rhetoric*, the wording of the Anonymus would still suggest that rhetoricians had not contented themselves with the *Rhetoric*, but gone back to the dialectical source. So was Aristotle's *Topics* their point of departure, and were some of the abstract nouns supplied by the rhetoricians?¹²¹ This is not the only possibility, and I submit that it is not the most likely one. It turns out that the nouns¹²² lacking in Aristotle are all found in Alexander's commentary on the *Topics*, which makes it more probable that the list reflects a post-Aristotelian development in dialectic.¹²³ And a number of items, as well as the order¹²⁴ in

¹¹³ *Rhet.* 1.7 1364b34—it happens that the two words are themselves examples of σύστοιχα.

¹¹⁴ παραιτιθεμένων *S.E.* 15 174b5.

¹¹⁵ *Top.* 4.2 121b25-32, 6.2 140a1 & 2, 6.3 141a17, 6.6 144a12-13 & b13-23 & 28.

¹¹⁶ *Top.* 3.2 117a7 (παρεπομένον) & 10, *S.E.* 28 181a22 παρεπομένου.

¹¹⁷ τοῦ ὁμοίου σκέψις or θεωρία, *Top.* 1.13 105a25 & 18 108b7 & 24 respectively.

Cf. τὴν δὲ ὁμοιότητα σκεπτέον 1.17 108a7, διὰ τῆς ὁμοιότητος συνθάνεσθαι 8.1 156b10.

¹¹⁸ σύστοιχος *Top.* 2.9 114a27, 4.3 124a10, 7.3 153b25, 8.1 156a28-9.

¹¹⁹ *Top.* 2.9 114a37-9.

¹²⁰ Among τὰ ἐν (αὐτῷ) τῷ ὄρῳ, the second of the three species of ὄρος, at 382.17-18. They recur in Themistius *apud* Boethius *Top. diff.* 2 1194 C among those *ab his quae [substantiam] consequuntur*, the second subdivision of the intrinsic ones; cf. under (II) below.

¹²¹ This is not Aristotle's style of doing rhetoric, but modern parallels could be found for technical jargon developed while a subject is in the process of emancipation from philosophy and seeking independent recognition.

¹²² Or, more precisely, substantive referring expressions: παρεπόμενον as well as παράθεσις, περιοχή and μάχη.

¹²³ Indications for a turn towards abstraction in rhetoric (that of Theophrastus) are given App. I p. 166 n. 269 below.

¹²⁴ This order is more easily understood as an expansion of the four ἐνστάσεις in

which they appear, invites comparison with a list of topics that Boethius in *De topicis differentiis* Book II quotes from Themistius, and to some extent with the lists of purportedly Aristotelian topics found in Cicero's *De oratore*, *Partitiones oratoriae*, and especially in his *Topics* which, as we have seen,¹²⁵ was taken to belong to dialectic rather than to rhetoric by Boethius at least. Four points of comparison merit special mention.

(I) Themistius according to Boethius has a main division¹²⁶ into arguments taken from the terms of the question, arguments drawn from outside, and an intermediate class. The ones from outside, *extrinsecus*, are *majus* and *minus*, *similitudo*, *oppositio*, *rei iudicium*,¹²⁷ corresponding to numbers (3) 'juxtaposition' *παράθεσις*, (6) 'similar' *ὁμοιον*, (8) 'opposition' *μάχη*, and (10) 'judgment' *κρίσις* in the Anonymus.

(II) The first subdivision of Themistius' intrinsic class covers arguments from the *substance*,¹²⁸ sc. of the things denoted by the terms in the question. This corresponds roughly with the *definition* with which the Anonymus began. Both authors here subdivide in three: the third item is, or includes, 'etymology' (*ἐτυμολογία*)¹²⁹ and *nominis interpretatio* in the Anonymus and in Themistius respectively, or *notatio* as Cicero translates it: i.e. arguing from the word denoting the thing in question.

(III) The topic 'from similarities' (*ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων*) is divided by the Anonymus into what is similar in quality (*κατὰ τὴν ποιότητα*) and what is similar by analogy (*κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν*). This corresponds to the division of *similitudo* into 'similarity of a thing'¹³⁰ and proportionality, or *rei similitudo* and *proportionis ratio* respectively, as appears when Boethius opposes similar things, *res similes*, to what is 'divorced in every quality and proportion' or 'relation', *omni qualitate omnique ratione disjunctum*.¹³¹ The Anonymus in speaking of 'similarity in quality' (*ποιότης*) is using a more dialectical vocabulary than the dialecticians Themistius and Boethius themselves.

(IV) The Anonymus' 'similar in quality' and his division in three of 'juxtaposition' for comparison (*παράθεσις*) into that 'according to more, less, and

Rhet. 2.25 1402a36-7 (following a reference to τὰ τοπικά): ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ, ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου, ἐκ τοῦ ὁμοίου, and ἐκ τῶν κεκρυμένων, than as the reduction, supposed by Volkman and Martin, of the list of δευτικά in 2.23.

¹²⁵ Above, II at n. 56.

¹²⁶ Boeth. *Top. diff.* 2 1194 B.

¹²⁷ Boeth. *Top. diff.* 2 1194 D.

¹²⁸ Boeth. *Top. diff.* 2 1194 B.

¹²⁹ The τόπος is in Arist. *Top.* 2.6 112a32-8, though the term, known to Alex. in *Top.* 175.29-176.4, may be Stoic, cf. Prantl 516.

¹³⁰ Or 'similarity to a thing'.

¹³¹ Boeth. *Top. diff.* 1195 A—unless this should be interpreted as 'in its entire essence and definition' (L.M. de Rijk, personal communication).

equal' recalls a division of the encomium ascribed to Theophrastus¹³² into qualitative and quantitative. The quantitative part is there said to reside 'in comparisons' (συγκρίσεις), 'for when we have established the quality, then we demonstrate the quantity by juxtaposition with something else.' Quality is said to belong to the investigation (ἐξετάσεως) of essence (οὐσίαν),¹³³ quantity to that of accident (συμβεβηκότος), an Aristotelian distinction reflected in Themistius' *substance* as opposed to *accidents*, and which we know from Alexander to be particularly relevant to Theophrastus.¹³⁴

As to Cicero, in addition to what all three authors have in common, such as beginning with definition and ending with judgment (κρίσις),¹³⁵ he resembles the Anonymus in dividing division itself: his *partitio* and *divisio* presumably render μερισμός or division into parts, and (εἰδική) διαίρεσις or division into species,¹³⁶ a Stoic distinction.¹³⁷

Now whatever the correlation between Themistius and Cicero—whether (a) Themistius, at any rate, may have read Theophrastus,¹³⁸ or (b) we should assume intermediate stages in the tradition—it seems clear that Cicero's account presupposes Theophrastus, and it is reasonable to make the same claim for the Anonymus on the strength of his list, as well as on that of his definition of the topic as a 'point of departure for an argument' (ἀφορμή ἐπιχειρήματος).¹³⁹

These parallels suggest that dialectic can help us to understand rhetoric, and more specifically that we have to take post-Aristotelian dialectic—the dialectic of such people as Theophrastus, Alexander, Themistius and Boethius—into account when tracing the development of rhetoric. There must have been new currents between the two disciplines as well as within each discipline, and rhetoric is likely to have been on the receiving end.

¹³² 678 FHS&G (John of Sardis on Aphthonius).

¹³³ Unlike ὅμοιον, which is relational.

¹³⁴ Cf. VI.i pp. 161-3 & App. I p. 167 below.

¹³⁵ In Aristotle's *Rhetoric* this is the last of the list of τόποι for ἔλεγχος, but in his list of topics for confirmation it comes earlier. For the Latin equivalent *auctoritas* see Cic. *Top.* 24, 73-8, Quint. 5.11.36-44.

¹³⁶ *De or.* 2.165 *partitio*, *Part. or.* 139 *partiri et ... ambigui partitiones dividere*, *Top.* 36 *divisio*, 71 *partitio*, 28 & 30 & 33 *partitio* distinguished from *divisio* in terms of *membra* as opposed to εἶδη, 34 the two mentioned as though the verbs themselves were roughly synonymous, with a motivation which looks like a misunderstanding of the definitions we have in the Anonymus (382.20-383.3 Sp.-H.), and 83.—The Anonymus is taking some elementary dialectic for granted when he skips the definition of εἰδική διαίρεσις. See now Mansfeld (1992) 329.

¹³⁷ For Stoic matter in Cicero and Boethius see Cic. *Top.* 53-7 with Boethius' commentary 347-66 Or.-B. = 1124-44 Migne, cf. V n. 202 below.

¹³⁸ 'not impossible' Ebbesen (1981) 111, cf. (1982) 115 n. 33 'directly or indirectly'; 'seems unconvincing' Huby (1989) 69. The question was adumbrated by Thionville 103, 105-6, cf. 99, 101.

¹³⁹ Whose Theophrastean origin was noted by Ebbesen, cf. II, n. 63 above.

**V. THE PERIPATOS AFTER ARISTOTLE.
RHETORIC THE COUNTERPART TO DIALECTIC (2):
PERIPATETIC THESEIS**

Should we think of this communication as incidental borrowing, or do we have any indication that Peripatetics after Aristotle still *meant* their topics to serve the purposes of rhetoric as well as of dialectic? The greatest obstacle to answering this question is that our sources tend to invoke either Aristotle, or Aristotle-cum-Theophrastus, or the Peripatos in general, but often fail to discriminate between individual Peripatetics. Now this fact considered in itself should perhaps create a presumption that the link established by Aristotle was not severed. Can we go one small step further? Let our working hypothesis be that when authors appeal to Aristotle for things which we do not find in Aristotle but acknowledge to be compatible with Aristotelian thinking, they unwittingly produce evidence for the Peripatos after Aristotle. Two witnesses to whom this might apply are Cicero and Diogenes Laertius.

The core of Cicero's ample but diffuse testimony on Aristotelian topics is in three passages. (1) The preface to Cicero's *Topics*¹⁴⁰ introduces its subject (τοπική) as that part of the *ratio disserendi* which deals with *invenire*, balanced by dialectic (διαλεκτική) as the part dealing with *iudicare*. Reference is made to *Aristotelis topica quaedam*, i.e. if not 'Aristotle's *Topics*', then at least 'Aristotelian topics'.¹⁴¹ Neither the phrase nor the context necessarily implies that Cicero was aware of any distinction between the topics of Aristotle's *Topics* and those of his *Rhetoric*. (2) The second passage suggests that he was not: according to *De or.* 2.152¹⁴² Aristotle 'laid down certain places where the entire method of arguing¹⁴³ will be found not only for the debates of the philosophers but also for this [kind of] speech that we use in lawsuits'. (3) At *Orator* 46 he is more specific: the subject is 'finding and judging what to say',¹⁴⁴ which, though it 'belongs to wisdom rather than to eloquence',¹⁴⁵ requires of the orator that he too should know the 'places of the

¹⁴⁰ Cic. *Top.* 6-7.

¹⁴¹ *Ib.* 1. On this phrase and pretence see Stump (1978) 20-2, Fortenbaugh (1989) 44 with n. 12 at p. 57-8, Huby (1989) 61-2. The preface (*Top.* 1-3) as a whole seems to exploit the inaccessibility of Aristotle's works to camouflage Cicero's own imperfect acquaintance with their content.

¹⁴² *posuit quosdam locos ex quibus omnis argumenti via [or ratio] non modo ad philosophorum disputationem sed etiam ad hanc orationem qua in causis utimur inveniretur.* Cf. Fortenbaugh (1989) 44 'This is normally understood as a reference to Aristotle's *Topics*. The understanding is certainly correct ...'. I submit the reference is rather less specific.

¹⁴³ In addition to the textual choice between *via* and *ratio* there is the syntactical choice between taking *omnis* as nominative or as genitive.

¹⁴⁴ *Or.* 44 *invenire et iudicare quid dicas.*

¹⁴⁵ *Ib.* *propria magis prudentiae quam eloquentiae.*

arguments and reasons'.¹⁴⁶ The orator uses these to elevate the issue from the particular to the general, i.e. he ascends from the *quaestio finita*, or in Greek *hypothesis* (ὑπόθεσις), to a *quaestio infinita* or *thesis* (θέσις), 'in which [Aristotle] exercised young men not with a view to the philosophers' habit of subtle disputation but to the orators' capacity for speaking pro and con¹⁴⁷ with greater fullness and more ornament'.¹⁴⁸ Here the line dividing the two fields is definitely crossed, if it is not effaced: Aristotle is credited with the notion that topics serve for argument for and against a general thesis as a way of training orators. If we combine the testimony of his *Topics* and *Orator* we arrive at a conception of topics as an *ars inveniendi* common to oratory and dialectic, which Cicero ascribes to Aristotle.

Cicero of course has an axe to grind: to legitimate his own idea and ideal of rhetoric his strategy is to convince the enemies of rhetoric that his conception is authentically philosophical, and the enemies of philosophy that he is not really borrowing from the philosophers but only reclaiming what they took from rhetoric.¹⁴⁹ While this does not discount his evidence altogether,¹⁵⁰ some confirmation would be welcome.¹⁵¹ Perhaps Diogenes Laertius is a more credible witness when he states that Aristotle 'trained pupils 'for thesis' (πρὸς θέσιν) while at the same time having them go through a rhetorical training'.¹⁵² This again testifies to a link between dialectic and rhetoric in Peripatetic teaching. The apparent implication of a rhetorical training by Aristotle has been accepted by some scholars,¹⁵³

¹⁴⁶ *Ib. argumentorum et rationum locos.*

¹⁴⁷ Cf. *De or.* 3.80 ... *qui Aristotelio more de omnibus rebus in utramque partem possit dicere et in omni causa duas contrarias orationes, praeceptis illius cognitis, explicare* (quoted e.g. by Von Arnim 82).

¹⁴⁸ *Or.* 46 in hac Aristoteles adolescentis non ad philosophorum morem tenuiter disserendi, sed ad copiam rhetoricum in utramque partem, ut ornatus et uberius dici posset exercuit (idemque locos ... quasi argumentorum notas tradidit unde omnis in utramque partem traheretur oratio).

¹⁴⁹ Cicero is our best witness to a 'Versuch der Rhetoren, die in den Philosophenschulen herkömmlichen praktischen Disputationsübungen über allgemeine Fragen aus dem Zusammenhang des philosophischen Unterrichts herauszureissen und für die Rhetorik in Anspruch zu nehmen' (Von Arnim 92).

¹⁵⁰ In addition to his explicit statements it is significant that Cicero obviously considers Aristotelian topics not just smart but useful in oratorical practice, as seems plain from their inclusion in the *Part. or.*, from the dedication of his *Topics* to the lawyer Trebatius, and arguably from his giving these topics, not the less abstract and more specialized ones, to down-to-earth Antonius to explain in *De oratore*, rather than to Crassus as the exponent of a more exalted view of the art.

¹⁵¹ To Quintilian 12.2.25 *thesis dicere exercitationis gratia fere est ab iis [sc. Peripateticis] institutum*, quoted by Thom 178, Moraux (1968) 301 with n. 4, the same reservations apply just to the extent that he depends on Cicero.

¹⁵² D.L. 5.3 πρὸς θέσιν συνεγύμναζε τοὺς μαθητάς, ἅμα καὶ ῥητορικῶς ἐπαισκῶν (quoted by Von Arnim 82). The singular, without an article, suggests the name of a classroom subject, like Arithmetic or Composition.

¹⁵³ 'Von einwandfreie Zeugen überliefert' Von Arnim 82.

questioned by others;¹⁵⁴ I submit that Diogenes' report does not necessarily presuppose a training in rhetoric as distinct from dialectic,¹⁵⁵ but only that Aristotle considered training for theses (πρὸς θέσιν) useful as a preparation for oratory among other applications—a supposition which finds support in his own utterances in the *Rhetoric*.¹⁵⁶

Our third witness is Alexander, who explains in greater detail this custom of arguing on both sides of a question in his commentary¹⁵⁷ on the passage, early in the *Topics*, about the uses of that work and study.¹⁵⁸ Here Aristotle claims training as one, actually the first, use of his study.¹⁵⁹ Alexander offers the pursuit of arguing for and against a thesis as one possible reference for this training,¹⁶⁰ and explains that this kind of argument, or speech,¹⁶¹ was customary among the old philosophers.¹⁶² Indeed they are said to have set up most of their classes¹⁶³ in this way, not on the basis of¹⁶⁴ books, but arguing¹⁶⁵ and training their capacity for finding arguments¹⁶⁶ on a given thesis¹⁶⁷ which they tried to establish and

¹⁵⁴ Throm 178.

¹⁵⁵ 'dass er seine Schüler in ὑποθέσεις exerzierte' Throm 179.

¹⁵⁶ Cf. *Rhet.* 1.1 1355a10-14 ὁ μάλιστα ... δυνάμενος θεωρεῖν ἐκ τίνων καὶ πῶς γίνεται συλλογισμός, οὗτος καὶ ἐνθυμηματικός κτλ (Cf. III at n. 79 above).

¹⁵⁷ In *Top.* 27.11-24 on 101a26-8; the earlier part = 135 FHS&G.

¹⁵⁸ 101a26 πραγματεία.

¹⁵⁹ 101a27 πρὸς γυμνασίαν.

¹⁶⁰ In *Top.* 27.11-12 τὴν εἰς ἑκάτερον μέρος ἐπιχείρησιν. Cf. D.L. 4.28 on Arcesilaus πρῶτος δὲ καὶ ἐς ἑκάτερον ἐπεχείρησε—the first sc. in the Academy (quoted e.g. by Von Arnim 85).

¹⁶¹ 12 τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶδος τῶν λόγων.

¹⁶² 12 σύνθηες ... τοῖς ἀρχαίοις.

¹⁶³ 13 τὰς συνουσίας τὰς πλεῖστας. Alexander is presumably not thinking of their classes in dialectic alone, since (1) it hardly needs to be argued that the study of dialectic is useful for a training in dialectic, and (2), if πραγματεία is taken to refer to the book, it becomes either trivial or inconsecutive to explain its usefulness by the unavailability of books.

¹⁶⁴ 13 ἐπί; 'dans des ouvrages écrits' Moraux (1968) 301, but Alexander is contrasting two types of συνουσία; the contemporary (27.14 ὥσπερ νῦν) style, supposed to be familiar to his readers, may well be that of professorial courses of lectures explaining a text such as underlie his own commentaries.—In the parenthesis 'for there were no such books yet at the time' the MS. reading τοιαῦτα (14) either implies that the reference is to the time before Aristotle wrote his *Topics*, a limitation which ἀρχαίοις (12) has not prepared us for, or it refers not to such books as the *Topics*, nor to such books as συνουσίαι are based on in Alexander's time, but to the genre of books containing probable arguments pro and con which has not yet been mentioned. One might contemplate writing 'not so many', sc. as now, TOTETOCAYTA having been misread as TOTETOIAYTA, perhaps under the influence of τοιοῦτον (12) or even τοιαῦτα (17).

¹⁶⁵ 15-16 ἐπεχέειρουν.

¹⁶⁶ 15 γυμνάζοντες αὐτῶν τὸ πρὸς τὰς ἐπιχειρήσεις εὐρετικόν.

¹⁶⁷ 14-16 θέσεώς τινος τεθείσης, εἰς ταύτην ... ἐπεχέειρουν.

refute¹⁶⁸ by means of readily accepted premisses.¹⁶⁹ Alexander adds that there are books 'of this kind',¹⁷⁰ containing arguments in defence of opposites through accepted statements,¹⁷¹ both by Aristotle and by Theophrastus. These have been identified¹⁷² with the *theseis* (θέσεις) listed by Diogenes Laertius.¹⁷³ Whether we accept this identification or not, it is important to note that Aristotle himself provides a point of departure for the alleged custom, not only in the context Alexander is commenting on, in the words 'if we are able to discuss problems from opposite viewpoints we shall more easily in each case perceive what is true and what is false',¹⁷⁴ but also and more specifically in the more concrete and practical Book VIII in the words 'with regard to every thesis both the argument that it is the case and (the argument) that it is not the case has to be reviewed, and when one has found it one must at once proceed to look for its refutation',¹⁷⁵ and '... to select and juxtapose¹⁷⁶ arguments bearing on the same thesis'.¹⁷⁷

Having provided this explanation of the *Topics* as a manual 'for training', Alexander goes on to draw an analogy with rhetoric:¹⁷⁸ 'for just as in rhetorical

¹⁶⁸ 16 κατασκευάζοντές τε καὶ ἀνασκευάζοντες ... τὸ κείμενον.

¹⁶⁹ 16 δι' ἐνδόξων.—The same tradition appears to underlie Strabo (13.1.54, 3.852 Meineke = fr. 37 FHS&G) συνέβη δὲ τοῖς ἐκ τῶν περὶ αὐτῶν τοῖς μὲν πάλαι τοῖς μετὰ Θεόφραστον οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὅλως τὰ βιβλία πλὴν ὀλίγων καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν μηδὲν ἔχειν φιλοσοφεῖν πραγματικῶς ἀλλὰ θέσεις ληκυθίζειν, though we should not take for granted either the supposed connection of the scarcity of books with the fortunes of Aristotle's library (already questioned by Von Arnim 83), or the generalization to a μηδὲν ἔχειν φιλοσοφεῖν πραγματικῶς.

¹⁷⁰ 17 τοιαῦτα.

¹⁷¹ 18 τὴν εἰς τὰ ἀντικείμενα δι' ἐνδόξων ἐπιχείρησιν.

¹⁷² At least implicitly by Throm 171-3, who quotes from the section περὶ τῆς τῶν νέων ἀγωγῆς in Theon (*RhGr* 2) 69.1 Sp. παραδείγματα δὲ τῆς τῶν θέσεων γυμνασίας λαβεῖν ἐστὶ παρὰ τε Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ Θεοφράστου. πολλὰ γάρ ἐστιν αὐτῶν βιβλία θέσεων ἐπιγραφόμενα. For Theophrastus expressly by FHS&G 68 under 34 pp. 122-3.

¹⁷³ For Theophrastus (D.L. 5.44 & 49 & 46 = 68 mrs. 34-6 FHS&G) the only specified title is that of a single περὶ ψυχῆς θέσις (46). Those of Aristotle (D.L. 5.24) include θέσεις ἐπιχειρηματικαὶ and again περὶ ψυχῆς.

¹⁷⁴ At 1.2 101a35, δυνάμενοι πρὸς ἀμφοτέρω διαπορῆσαι ῥῆσιν ἐν ἐκάστοις κατονώμεθα τάληθές τε καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος.

¹⁷⁵ At 8.14 163a36-b1, πρὸς ἅπασαν τε θέσιν καὶ ὅτι οὕτως καὶ ὅτι οὐχ οὕτως τὸ ἐπιχείρημα σκεπτέον καὶ εὐρόντα τὴν λύσιν εὐθὺς ζητητέον.

¹⁷⁶ The παράλληλα παραβάλλειν carries connotations of comparing and of matching against each other.

¹⁷⁷ At 8.14 163b4-5, παράλληλά τε παραβάλλειν ἐκλέγοντα πρὸς τὴν αὐτὴν θέσιν ἐπιχειρήματα, quoted by Moraux (1968) 303. Various objects of the exercise are distinguished at *Top.* 8.5 159a25 ff., quoted by Throm 177. We need not assume, then, that Alexander gives us nothing more than an elaboration of Aristotle's own statement that rhetoric and dialectic, alone among τέχναι, serve to deduce opposite conclusions (τάναντία συλλογίζεται *Rhet.* 1.1 1355a34-5), cf. n. 91 above.

¹⁷⁸ 27.21-4.

exercises those who are capable of dividing the problems¹⁷⁹ and surveying the order of the chief headings¹⁸⁰ have greater ease in arguing,¹⁸¹ so in dialectical (exercises) too those who know the procedure are more easily provided with arguments bearing on the issues.¹⁸² What is remarkable about this passage is that it provides a description of rhetoric entirely couched in terms of dialectic.¹⁸³ In fact it would

¹⁷⁹ διαιρεῖν ... τὰ προβλήματα.

¹⁸⁰ τὴν τάξιν τῶν κεφαλαίων συνορῶντες. For συνορᾶν as the object of an exercise, now in dialectic, cf. *Top.* 1.17 108a12-14 μάλιστα δ' ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς διεστῶσι γυμνάζεσθαι δεῖ· ῥῶον γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν λουπῶν δυνησόμεθα τὰ ὅμοια συνορᾶν. Cf. Philodemus *Rhet.* 2.30.14-31.2 § 20 ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ καὶ μνήμης τοῦ ὁμοίου καὶ ἀνομοίου καὶ τὰκόλουθα συνεωρακῶς κτλ. Theophr. *Metaph.* 8.20 8b24-5 assigns τὸ ἐν πλείοσιν τὸ αὐτὸ συνιδεῖν το ἐπιστήμῃ.

¹⁸¹ ῥῶον ἐπιχειροῦσιν. The extension of the originally dialectical term ἐπιχειρεῖν to rhetoric is familiar: for the rhetorical uses cf. Solmsen (1941) 169-70, Kennedy (1963) 273 & 316-17 & (1983) 88-92, both authors referring to Kroll (1936). D.L. lists books of ἐπιχειρήματα by Theophrastus (5.43 & 49 = FHS&G 68 nrs. 22 & 23). Of these books Kroll (1936) 10 takes it for granted that 'wir dürfen sie für dialektisch halten', yet he (ib.) 'würde es nicht für unmöglich halten, dass Theophrastus den Begriff zuerst in die Rhetorik eingeführt hat'; Bochenski (30), anticipated by Brandis (1860) 280 n. 143, remarks that 'on peut douter que cette oeuvre ait contenu des enseignements de logique ou de rhétorique'; it is not likely, however, to have dealt with rhetoric as distinct from logic, in view of the definitions of topic and epicheireme transmitted by Alexander preceding his second quotation of Theophrastus' definition of the topic (II n. 63 & IV at n. 139 above & VI.i at n. 225 below), ἔστι δὲ ὁ τόπος ἀρχὴ καὶ ἀφορμὴ ἐπιχειρήματος· ἐπιχείρημα δὲ καλοῦσι τὸν διαλεκτικὸν συλλογισμόν (FHS&G 122 B = Alex. in *Top.* 126.11-12). Though the definition of the epicheireme is taken from Aristotle (*Top.* 8.11 162a16 ἐπιχείρημα δὲ συλλογισμὸς διαλεκτικὸς, contrasting with that of the enthymeme at *Rhet.* 1.2 1356b4-5 ἐνθύμημα μὲν ῥητορικὸν συλλογισμόν), the plural implies that it was not peculiar to him, and the fact that Alexander immediately goes on to quote Theophrastus' definition of the topic makes it safe to assume that Theophrastus adopted that of the epicheireme as it stood.—A work περὶ ἐνθυμημάτων is likewise ascribed to Theophrastus by D.L. 5.48 = FHS&G 666 nr. 6.

¹⁸² ῥῶον ἐπιχειρημάτων εὐποροῦσι πρὸς τὰ προκείμενα. Cf. *Top.* 2.4 111b12 μὴ εὐποροῦντι δὲ ἐπιχειρήματος πρὸς τὴν θέσιν & 32-3 πρὸς δ' εὐπορήσομεν ἐπιχειρημάτων, and Alex. in *Top.* 5.26 in the context quoted at n. 226 below.

¹⁸³ This obviously applies to διαιρεῖν and προβλήματα as much as to συνορᾶν and ἐπιχειρεῖν, but even the τάξιν in τὴν τάξιν τῶν κεφαλαίων συνορῶντες is closer to the τάξις, discussed in *Top.* 8.1-4, of the premises (προτάσεις 8.1 155b19) necessary (ἀναγκαῖας ib.) to the argument (ἔθεν ἐπιχειρητέον 155b5): δεῖ ... τάξαι καθ' ἕκαστα πρὸς ἑαυτὸν 155b6; περὶ τάξεως ... λεκτέον 155b18; πῶς ... τάττειν δεῖ, σχεδὸν ἱκανὰ τὰ εἰρημένα 8.4 159a15-16, than it is to the τάξις of a speech as it is finally pronounced, which is the subject of *Rhet.* 3.13-19; and the κεφάλαια to be ordered, recalling the εἰπεῖν ... δι' ὧν δέδευκται, κεφαλαιωδῶς of *Rhet.* 3.19 1419b31-2 and even more the συλλογισμῶν πολλῶν κεφάλαια of *Rhet.* 2.24 1401a9 (where a parallel is drawn with dialectic), may well comprehend more than just those mentioned by Sch. Thuc. 3.9.1, exemplified by τὸ δίκαιον, τὸ δυνατόν and τὸ σύμφερον, which Rademacher p. 226 ad 62 (referred to by Grimaldi 120 notes 35 & 36) calls τελικὰ κεφάλαια and *sedes argumentorum*. Cf. [Alex.] in *Top.* 519.23-30, 520.14-20.

not be possible to distinguish between the two disciplines on the basis of this characterization. We may well ask what is the difference between them according to Alexander.

Alexander lists the resemblances and differences between rhetoric and dialectic near the beginning of his commentary on the *Topics*.¹⁸⁴ Much of it is orthodox Aristotelian doctrine taken from the beginning of the *Rhetoric*;¹⁸⁵ thus there is still a relation of counterparts as well as a relation between part and whole. But there are interesting shifts of emphasis: it could be said that Alexander finds the relation of part to whole in the matter, and the relation between counterparts in the form of each discipline, whereas in Aristotle it was the other way round. First, dialectic is said to be about every subject matter, whereas rhetoric is 'most of all', or 'more',¹⁸⁶ about matters of citizenship; secondly, dialectic proceeds by question and answer, rhetoric for the most part by continuous speech¹⁸⁷—a criterion never stated in so many words by Aristotle,¹⁸⁸ but all the more often after him.¹⁸⁹ Whether it shows Stoic influence¹⁹⁰ or derives from older conceptions of dialectic, its popularity makes

¹⁸⁴ In *Top.* 3.25-5.16, 6.18-21.

¹⁸⁵ See III above.

¹⁸⁶ μάλιστα 4.13-14, μάλλον 5.11-12 respectively.

¹⁸⁷ διεξοδικούς, -ικῶ 5.8 & 12.

¹⁸⁸ Another instance of a distinction not found in Aristotle's text but projected onto him from an early stage, is the definition of the enthymeme as an incomplete, or not fully explicit syllogism, with one premiss unspoken (e.g. Alex. in *Top.* 9.8, Boeth. *Top. diff.* 4 1206 C). More generally there are several criteria in play, formal as well as material, for both disciplines even in Aristotle; it would be possible to constitute a number of slightly different but mostly overlapping disciplines by means of each of such criteria — it could be said that the mixed constitution of both rhetoric and dialectic carries within itself the seeds of evolution: in other ages with different social, political, and educational structures different criteria came to be operative. But it was more economical and in conformity with the intended practice to teach two as it were composite disciplines, reducing eristic to the status of a poor relative of dialectic, and it was in the interest of the annexation and upgrading of rhetoric, and of the emancipation of dialectic from Platonic metaphysics, to make the most of the analogy between the two. To the explicit connections noted above add the parts of τάξις and of something corresponding to λέξις postulated for dialectic at the beginning of *Top.* 8 (1-3 155b3-59a14: e.g. τάξις (cf. n. 183 above), 8.1 155b22-4 ὁκνον τοῦ λόγου, σαφέστερον τὸν λόγον), cf. [Alex.] in *Top.* 519.27-30; and the analogy between πρόθεσις :: πίστις = πρόβλημα :: ἀπόδειξις posited at *Rhet.* 3.13 1414a35-7. Aristotle's incorporation of the τέχναι of his predecessors in the form of τόποι in *Rhet.* 2.23 might be considered as an earlier example of such a redrawing of borders, this a purely expansionist one in rhetoric only, whereas between dialectic and rhetoric the battle-front moves to and fro.

¹⁸⁹ E.g. Quint. 2.20.7 *oratio perpetua and concisa*, Boeth. *Top. diff.* 4 1206 C & 1208 B *perpetua and continue, continua oratione*, Syrianus in *Hermog. Comm.* II 59, 21 f. Rabe λέγειν ἀποτάδην and διαλέγεσθαι (quoted by Throm 58 & 178 respectively).

¹⁹⁰ As Throm 58 f. infers from D.L. 7.42 τοῦ ὁρθῶς διαλέγεσθαι περὶ τῶν ἐν ἐρωτήσει καὶ ἀποκρίσει λόγων opposed to τὸ εὖ λέγειν περὶ τῶν ἐν διεξόδῳ λόγων among other

sense inasmuch as this difference is the only one of the three which is not a difference of degree.¹⁹¹ Thirdly, dialectic 'makes more general statements', rhetoric 'speaks more about individual things'.¹⁹² These are specified as 'circumstances, events, moments, persons, places and the like',¹⁹³ as being the issue of all three main genres of oratory.¹⁹⁴

It may be objected that Diogenes Laertius and Alexander do not mention topics, as Cicero does. But if it is granted that both authors confirm Cicero's picture of the Peripatetic treatment of *theseis* (θέσεις) in general, then his statements about the role of topics in these deserve at least to be taken seriously. In fact we can be more specific. Consider the possible bearings of the criteria just mentioned on topics. That of (1) subject matter is a matter of degree, and should lead us to expect an overlap between the sets of topics relevant to each discipline. That regarding the (3) level of abstraction or generality is also a matter of degree, and opens the door for the orator to appropriate as many dialectical topics as seems expedient. And the universally popular one of a (2) difference between dialogue and continuous speech does not imply any differentiation between kinds of topics.

I am suggesting that the interlocking of rhetoric and dialectic envisaged by Aristotle continues to be valid for the Peripatos after him, and that the features they share become if anything more prominent. It is easy to adjudicate in the wrangle over the *thesis* (θέσις): this is self-evidently at home in dialectic, but it is also at home in rhetoric in so far as it suits the orator to discuss an individual case in general terms. The extent to which it in fact does could vary between, on the one hand, a restriction to the circumstances (περιστάσεις) of the case, and to the special topics which regard these; and on the other hand the annexation of most of, if not all, the general topics of dialectic. Just where along this range the orator should place himself is not properly for the professor of dialectic to judge, but both extremes pose a threat to him: either he is passed by as irrelevant, or

testimonies. I would merely question that it is distinctively Stoic. The paragraph as a whole, with which cf. Alex. in *Top.* 1.10-14, brings out the veridical perspective: πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν εὐρεῖν, τὰς τῶν φαντασιῶν διαφορὰς ἀπευθύνουσι, πρὸς ἐπίγνωσιν τῆς ἀλήθειας, ἐπιστήμην ἀληθῶν καὶ ψευδῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων, and shows that the contrast between ἐν διεξόδῳ and ἐν ἐρωτήσει καὶ ἀποκρίσει is secondary; otherwise the ὅθεν which provides the transition to the definition as an ἐπιστήμην ἀληθῶν κτλ would become a *non sequitur*. It is this conception of dialectic, which is that of Chrysippus (cf. LS 31, p. 190), but is also implied for Zeno in Plut. *Repugn. Stoic.* 8 1034 E = LS 31L, which underlies that of Cic. *Top.* 6 as *pars, viae, scientia iudicandi*, cf. *De or.* 2.157-9 quoted n. 202 below.

¹⁹¹ Against Throm 58-9, cf. 178.

¹⁹² καθολικωτέρας καὶ κοινοτέρας τὰς ἀποφάνσεις ποιεῖσθαι 5.9-10 and περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα μᾶλλον λέγειν 5.13, respectively.

¹⁹³ πρὸς γὰρ τὰς περιστάσεις καὶ τὰς τύχας τε καὶ τοὺς καιροὺς καὶ τὰ πρόσωπα καὶ τοὺς τόπους καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τοὺς λόγους σχηματίζει 5.13-15.

¹⁹⁴ περὶ τοιούτων γὰρ αἱ τε δίκαι καὶ αἱ συμβουλαὶ καὶ τὰ ἐγκώμια 5.16.

his special competence is contested. In the teaching of rhetoric the mean to strike is the subject of a prolonged debate. But the question is probably not decided by the arguments of the rhetoricians either. In the last resort it is likely to be determined by the demands which a society makes on the orator.

Here it is worth recalling that the political situation in Athens during the years after Aristotle's death no longer allowed the same scope for specifically rhetorical topics as it had before. What we hear about the most acclaimed proponent besides Theophrastus of rhetoric in the Peripatos, Demetrius of Phaleron, points to an unsurprising shift in emphasis: from forensic and deliberative oratory, characteristically directed at winning over large assemblies and juries of laymen by scoring points and vilifying opponents, to other *genres*, serving for encounters (*ἐντεύξεις*) in general,¹⁹⁵ in which there would seem to be few, if any restrictions on subject matter; and also to other *virtues*.¹⁹⁶ This squares with our data on the rhetorical theory of Theophrastus: intrinsic development in the field of rhetoric centered on the subject of diction (*λέξις*)¹⁹⁷ and was connected with those of grammar¹⁹⁸ and philology;¹⁹⁹ both were fostered by the spread of the language, and the literary culture, to new parts of the world. Rhetoric, somewhat uprooted from what is now often called its *Sitz im Leben*, no longer had as distinct a subject matter as it had in Aristotle's time. Orators would more often, in the terms which were to be made familiar by Hermagoras, dwell on *theseis* (*θέσεις*) rather than

¹⁹⁵ In fr. 157 W. Dem. Phal. is mentioned by Philodemus as 'adding to the *demegoric* and the *dicanic* with the *sophistic* genre of speeches the (*λόγον*) τὸν ἐντευκτικὸν ἅπασιν,' which Philodemus divides into τὸν τοῖς πλῆθεσιν ἐντε[υκτικὸν] καὶ τὸν κατὰ πρεσβείαν τοῖς δυνάσταις). The noun corresponding to ἐντευκτικός denotes one of the uses of dialectic and of rhetoric: *Top* 1.2 101a26-7 *χρήσιμος ἢ πραγματεία ... πρὸς τὰς ἐντεύξεις* is recalled at *Rhet* 1.1 1355a21-9 in a statement of the use of rhetoric: *χρήσιμος δὲ ἡ ῥητορικὴ ...* (24) *ἐτι δὲ πρὸς ἐνίους ...* (27) *ἀνάγκη διὰ τῶν κοινῶν ποιῆσθαι τὰς πίστεις καὶ τοὺς λόγους, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοπικοῖς ἐλέγομεν περὶ τῆς πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐντεύξεως*. This context, as well as the report about Demetrius, tells against identifying this use for encounters with forensic oratory.

¹⁹⁶ Cicero *Brut.* 9.37 (= 175 W.) qualifies Demetrius as *eruditissimus* compared to the orators of the fourth century, Demosthenes, Hyperides, Aeschines, Lycurgus, Dinarchus, and Demades. At *De or.* 2.23, 94 ff. (= 174 W.), where Demetrius is contrasted with the same list of orators minus Demades, these are summed up as *qui se ad causas contulerunt*.

¹⁹⁷ Two connections established in our sources which seem relevant in this context are (1) that between *ornatus* ('Schmuckmittel') and the ἐπιδεικτικόν, for which see Wehrli on Dem. Phal. 175; and (2) an explicit correlation between *λέξις* and delivery (Dem. Phal. 169 W., Hieronymus fr. 52 [a & b] W.), to be considered together with a change in the required style of delivery (*ὀνόκρησις*) which in its turn could be related to a shift from *inflammare* to *delectare* (Dem. Phal. 161-8 on Demosthenes).

¹⁹⁸ Cf. Theophr. fr. 683 FHS&G.

¹⁹⁹ Cf. Praxiphanes 8-10 W., on whom Pfeiffer, pp. 95 & 158. For Heraclides Ponticus as 'In der Literaturwissenschaft neben Aristoteles Wegbereiter der Alexandriner' (Wehrli 1983), cf. *RE Suppl.* 11 (1968) 675-86 at 683-4.

descend to *hypotheses* (ὑποθέσεις).

It seems a reasonable supposition that, in the Peripatos at least, the development of dialectic in some ways mirrored that of rhetoric. As the inductive investigation of the real world by members of the school accumulated more positive knowledge of facts, dialectic was not only cleared of the sceptical potential implied in its close kinship with eristic, it was also progressively divorced from the particular epistemological connection in which it had been placed by Aristotle: though it still set out from things that are 'admitted' (ἐνδοξα), it was perhaps no longer to the same extent expected to arrive at new 'principles' (ἀρχαί) or points of departure for demonstrative science.

These may perhaps count as tendencies towards convergence in both disciplines. Both of them continued to be practised in school, and rhetoric still found applications in the world outside. As the principal distinction between them there remained that between alternating and continuous utterance. The subordinate difference in the diction appropriate to each was elaborated in the form of a doctrine of style, now conceived as an extra conferred on the continuous speech, rather than as a feature of all utterance.²⁰⁰ This became the province of the teacher of rhetoric, whereas the *ars iudicandi* remained the competence of the dialectician. But there was nothing to prevent them from sharing the same *ars inveniendi*.²⁰¹ This, as we have seen, is how the field of topics was understood by Cicero.²⁰² Such a

²⁰⁰ The Stoic analogy of the closed fist and the open hand is not entirely foreign to Peripatetic conceptions. Cf. Arist. *Rhet.* 2.24 1401a2-13 on τὸ συνεστραμμένον καὶ ἀντικειμένως λέγειν as that λέξις which χώρα ἐστὶν ἐνθυμήματος, serving for τὸ τῇ λέξει συλλογιστικῶς λέγειν.

²⁰¹ This does not preclude that they may make a different use of the same topics. Cf. the end of Boeth. *Top. diff.* 4 at 1216 B ... *in dialecticis locis ... a genere argumenta sumuntur, id est ipsa generis natura; sed in rhetoricis ab eo generis quod illic genus est de quo agitur, nec a natura generis sed a re generis, scilicet ipsa quae genus est; and ib. C dialectica ... ex ipsis qualitatibus, rhetorica ex qualitate suscipientibus rebus argumenta vestigat. ut dialecticus ex genere, id est ex ipsa generis natura, rhetor ex ea re quae genus est; dialecticus ex similitudine, rhetor ex simili ... ille ex contrarietate, hic contrario.* Boethius is in no doubt that Cicero's *Topics* serve the latter use: ib. CD *M. Tullius Topica quae ad C. Trebatium peritum juris edidit non eo modo quo de ipsis disputari possit disseruit, sed quemadmodum rhetoricae facultatis argumenta ducuntur.*

²⁰² Some references to dialectic later in Cicero's *Topics* cut through the demarcation from topics with which he began (*Top.* 6 quoted p. 148 above). In 53 ff., anticipated in 19-21, Cicero discusses a *locus dialecticorum proprius*, that of consequents, antecedents and 'contradictories'. He explains three modes of inference (54 *modus conclusionis, concludendi*), the third of which he relates (55) to ἐνθυμήματα of a type which we do not find in Aristotle but do find in Anaximenes at 10, 1430a23-39. Did Cicero, or his source, at some time conflate Theophrastus' *Topics* with the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* purportedly by Aristotle? Did he flatter himself that the result might capture the essence of Aristotle's more formidable *Topics* and *Rhetoric* respectively?—He then declares (56) that this latter *genus disserendi* (i.e. the third mode?) is in common between lawyers and philosophers,

conception accounts for the analogies between the description of rhetoric and of dialectic,²⁰³ and in particular for the extension of the term *epicheireme* (ἐπιχειρήμα) to rhetoric. I submit that it also squares with our data, to be reviewed next, on the intrinsic development of dialectical topics in the hands of Aristotle and Theophrastus, in particular on the reduction of topics to varieties of the syllogism, since it was precisely as an *ars inveniendi* that topics refused to be formalized into analytics.²⁰⁴

VI. THEORY OF TOPICS IN THE PERIPATOS AFTER ARISTOTLE

While there is no direct evidence for Peripatetic discussion of expressly rhetorical topics before Cicero, there is some for topics in the context of dialectic. Nearly all of this concerns Theophrastus.

i. Theophrastus

Something of a consensus on the state of the art of topics in Theophrastus has been established in successive publications by Solmsen, Bochenski, and Wehrli. The most recent statement is by Wehrli, who claims²⁰⁵ that the doctrine of hypothetical

but more usual among the latter, adds four more modes (including one considered as invalid by Kneale 179-81 but vindicated by Huby *LCM* 13.4 [1988] 60-1), and (57) dismisses these, or the lot, in the words *ex eis modis conclusiones innumerabiles nascuntur, in quo est tota fere διαλεκτική, sed ne hae quidem quas exposui ad hanc institutionem sunt necessariae*. The underlying conception of his subject, just like that cited earlier, cannot be found in Aristotle himself. Unlike the other one, it cannot as it is be traced to his school either, since it presupposes Stoic rather than Peripatetic *διαλεκτική*. It appears that Cicero had some acquaintance with Stoic dialectic, but no very clear idea of the contents of either the *Rhetoric* or the *Topics* of Aristotle, and by implication not of what Aristotle meant by *τοπικά* (Cicero's very word *τοπική* is post-Aristotelian: see VII n. 257 below) and *διαλεκτική*. His un-Aristotelian conception of the latter comes out most clearly in *De or.* 2.157-9, where Antonius first objects to the *διαλεκτική* promoted in Rome by Diogenes that in it *nullum est praeceptum quo modo verum inveniatur sed tantum est quo modo iudicetur*, later that he *quem ad modum inveniam quid dicam non docet*. The rub is in the cavalier treatment allotted to *verum*, which is first appropriated, then just as easily dropped. Aristotle's *Topics* were devised both for finding and for judging, but Aristotle did not publicize either dialectic or rhetoric as sufficient for finding *the truth*. In the circumstances it is no cause for surprise that Cicero had not fully digested the heterogeneous ingredients of his blend; but this by itself does not rule him out as a witness that a notion of topics as an *ars inveniendi* common to oratory and dialectic developed in the Peripatos after Aristotle.

²⁰³ For a parallel outside the Lyceum see Appendix II.

²⁰⁴ A point missed by Volkmann (1885) 211 when he complained that Cicero in his *Topics* 'auch allerlei hinzugefügt, was nicht sowohl in die Topik als die Invention im allgemeinen gehört'.

²⁰⁵ 'Die grösste Tragweite hat Th.s Begründung einer Lehre von den hypothetischen

inferences provided topics with a fixed position in the system of syllogistic, and that this accounts for the reduced volume of Theophrastus' work entitled *Topics* as compared with Aristotle's. It is implied, not that topics have become a part of syllogistic, but that a large part of what used to be the matter of topics is now dealt with in terms of a branch of syllogistic.

This view may be traced to Bochenski, who noticed²⁰⁶ that what little there is left of Theophrastus' *Topics* is all of an introductory nature, and thought it likely that the two books of this work were confined to preliminaries, while the discussion of the topics themselves was given in the books of *Topics Reduced*.²⁰⁷ The title implies that this discussion took the form of a reduction,²⁰⁸ presumably to syllogisms of the hypothetical variety,²⁰⁹ in particular that called 'according to quality' (κατὰ ποιότητα): i.e. syllogisms 'from the more, less, and equally (so)' (ἀπὸ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον καὶ ὁμοίως)²¹⁰ as illustrated by the Florentine fragment.²¹¹ Bochenski in turn took his clue from Solmsen, who started from the partly systematic and partly historical question, what value the topics (τόποι) could retain, for Aristotle himself and for the Peripatos after him, once his later syllogistic had been developed.²¹²

Schlüssen, durch welche die Topik eine feste Stellung im System der Syllogistik erhielt. Vor allem durch diese Einbeziehung wird bedingt sein, dass die beiden analytischen Pragmatiken des Th. die aristotelischen an Umfang überboten und seine <Topika> entsprechend klein waren.' (1983) 479 a. In private correspondence Mrs. P.M. Huby has stated that context in Averroes from which 132 FHS&G is taken suggests another and longer *Topics* by Theophrastus.

²⁰⁶ Pp. 36-7.

²⁰⁷ 'Ἀνηγμένων τόπων D.L. 5.42 = 1.72 FHS&G. For the correct title see Bochenski 29-30.

²⁰⁸ Whether this was faithful to Aristotle's own intentions or not does not concern us here, and there is no sign that it was the first concern of Theophrastus' successors.

²⁰⁹ Bochenski p. 118.

²¹⁰ P. 119 under 26, referring to Alex. in *A.Pr.* 390.7-8 W. and to Solmsen 65, who states that 'die συλλογισμοὶ κατὰ ποιότητα oder ... hypothetischen Schlüsse ἀπὸ τοῦ μᾶλλον, τοῦ ὁμοίου, τοῦ ἥττον decken sich in der Tat mit dem dialektisch-rhetorischen τόπος τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον' (i.e. a fortiori), and refers to Alex. in *A.Pr.* 265.28 ff.; 324 ff. W. The example given by Alexander at 324.26-9 is, slightly simplified, 'if what seems more self-sufficient with regard to happiness is yet not self-sufficient, then what is less self-sufficient is not self-sufficient either; health, though it seems more so than wealth, yet is not self-sufficient with regard to happiness; therefore wealth is not so either', with which compare *Rhet.* 2.23 1397b12 ff. εἰ δὲ μᾶλλον ἂν ὑπάρχοι μὴ ὑπάρχει, ... οὐδ' ὅτι ἥττον, *Top.* 2.10 115a6 ff. εἰ δὲ μᾶλλον εἰκὸς ὑπάρχειν μὴ ὑπάρχει, οὐδ' ὅτι ἥττον. See Barnes (1985) 132-3.

²¹¹ Pp. 119-20 under 27. The fragment is PSI 1095 = Appendix 2 (vol. 1) FHS&G; cf. Solmsen (1929) 65 n. 2, who refers to *Top.* 5.8 138a13 ff. For the relation to Theophrastus see Barnes (1985) 134-5.

²¹² Solmsen (1929) 58 '... welchen Wert konnten die τόποι noch auf dem Boden der späteren Syllogistik für Aristoteles selbst und für den späteren Peripatos besitzen?', cf. 64

Bochenski found a 'more logical tendency', sc. than that of the Aristotelian *Topics*, 'towards an assimilation of the topics (τόποι) to formal logic'²¹³ in Theophrastus' definition of the topic (τόπος)²¹⁴ and in his distinction between a topic and a 'precept' (παράγγελμα).²¹⁵

The definition makes the topic a starting-point (ἀρχή), or element (στοιχείον), as Aristotle too had called it,²¹⁶ 'from which we take the starting-points concerning each subject by turning our mind to it'. It is said to be delimited²¹⁷ in circumscription, but unlimited as to the individuals coming under it. It is qualified as delimited in that 'either it comprises the common and general (notions) which are the chief (ingredients) of syllogisms, or these are capable of being shown or taken from them'. The latter alternative conceivably means that we assume a relevant general notion or statement as a proposition and premise or as part of one, or prove one as a conclusion relevant to the issue. An illustration of the intended kind of limitation²¹⁸ is provided by Alexander in his example of a topic,²¹⁹ which he also calls an argument or speech and a proposition or premise,²²⁰ 'if a contrary (A) belongs to a contrary (1), then its contrary (A') belongs to the contrary of the other (1)': this, Alexander explains, is delimited to contraries generally, not to this or that species or specimen of contraries, though we may argue about these on the strength of it.

Solmsen has remarked on two features of this definition which he found 'un-Aristotelian': (1) Theophrastus' use of the term here translated by 'starting-point' or 'point of departure'²²¹ (ἀρχή) but more usually by 'principle', and (2) the notion of a topic (τόπος) developed in the form of a general opinion (δόξα) from which premises are derived which are similar to it in intension but more restricted in

'unsere Frage nach dem Schicksal der τόποι und der topischen Schlüsse', 64-5 'die συλλογισμοὶ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως, in denen sie weiter zu leben scheinen'. We shall here take for granted his assertions that (65) 'nicht nur diese Spielart der συλλογισμοὶ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως für die Umdeutung der topischen Syllogismen wertvoll war' and that (66) 'es lässt sich kein einziger τόπος der Topik nennen, bei dem eine derartige Umsetzung in ... einen Prämissensyllogismus mit konditionalem Obersatz nicht denkbar wäre'. His inference that (66) 'da die antiken Nachrichten uns keinen Schritt weiter begleiten können, ist es müßig nachzusinnen, welche Formen des hypothetischen Syllogismus welche τόποι aufnehmen konnten' is effectively refuted by Barnes' demonstration (1985) that this type of exercise is not necessarily otiose.

²¹³ P. 123.

²¹⁴ Alex. in *Top.* 5.21-6 = FHS&G 122 A,1-6, cf. in *Top.* 126.14-16 = FHS&G 122 B.3-5.

²¹⁵ Alex. in *Top.* 135.2-18 = FHS&G 123.

²¹⁶ *Rhet.* 2.22 1396b20-1 & 26 1403a16-17, quoted n. 28 above.

²¹⁷ ὁρισμένως.

²¹⁸ For one entirely different and one slightly different account see Solmsen 68 in his main text and in his note 6 respectively.

²¹⁹ In *Top.* 126.16-17 = FHS&G 122 B.5-6.

²²⁰ λόγος and πρότασις respectively.

²²¹ Above, this page.

extension.²²² As for (2), this is admittedly not Aristotelian in the trivial sense that it cannot be attested in Aristotle, and more importantly in that Aristotle does not present the topics (τόποι) as premises;²²³ but it becomes compatible with Aristotle's account, which is just not as explicit as Theophrastus set out to be, as soon as the enthymemes which Aristotle refers to in his definition of 'topic and element' as that 'into which many enthymemes fall', are viewed as complex opinions (δόξαι) rather than e.g. as sets of simple propositions.²²⁴ As to (1), the concept of a starting-point (ἀρχή) here operative is explained by Alexander, if he is not actually quoting or paraphrasing Theophrastus, as that of a point of departure²²⁵ from which we may be provided with²²⁶ a plausible premise. This is most easily understood as being a rather looser use of the term than the Aristotelian use for a principle of science.²²⁷ This interpretation is confirmed when we come to the distinction between topic (τόπος) and precept (παράγγελμα). Here, just as the topic was called by Alexander a starting-point for an epicheireme or dialectical syllogism,²²⁸ the 'precept' (παράγγελμα)²²⁹ in turn is called a starting-point for a topic. If this is

²²² P. 67: 'Aristotelisch ist weder die Fassung der τόποι als einer Art ἀρχή ... noch der Gedanke, dass aus dem in Form einer allgemeinen δόξα entwickelten τόπος an Umfang beschränkte, aber inhaltlich gleichartige Prämissen entnommen werden ...'.

²²³ '... als Prämissen werden wir die τόποι nicht fassen ...' Solmsen 166. For Themistius see App. I pp. 166-7 below.

²²⁴ 'Der Gedanke: εἰ μὴδ' οἱ θεοὶ πάντα ἴσασιν, σχολῇ οἱ γ' ἄνθρωποι ist geformt durch den τόπος τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον, dessen logischer Sinn in dem allgemeinen Satz: εἰ ᾤ μᾶλλον εἶναι ὑπάρχει, μὴ ὑπάρχει, δηλον ὅτι οὐδ' ᾤ ἥττον zur Formulierung gelangt (B 23, 1397b13)' Solmsen 164 (*italics added*).

²²⁵ ἀπὸ τούτων ... ὁρμώμενον, ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ὁρμώμενους Alex. in *Top.* 5.26 = FHS&G 122 A & in *Top.* 126.20, FHS&G 122 B respectively, cf., in a context to be quoted presently, 126.11 ἀφορμή.

²²⁶ In the clause ἀπὸ τούτων ... ἔστιν ὁρμώμενον εὐπορεῖν προτάσεως ἐνδόξου πρὸς τὸ προκείμενον, which serves to relate Theophrastus' definition to Aristotle's text as paraphrased by Alexander in the words (5.20-1) (ἀφ' ὧν ὁρμώμενοι) δυνησόμεθα περὶ παντός τοῦ προτεθέντος δι' ἐνδόξαν συλλογίζεσθαι, the verb εὐπορεῖν recalls Arist. *Rhet.* 1.2 1356a33 (rhetoric and dialectic are neither of them sciences concerning a definite subject but) δυνάμεις τινὲς τοῦ πορίσαι λόγους, cf. III n. 85 & V n. 182 above.

²²⁷ Cf. *Rhet.* 1.2 1358a25-6 εἰς ἐντύχη ἀρχαῖς οὐκέτι διαλεκτικῇ οὐδὲ ῥητορικῇ ἀλλ' ἐκείνη ἔσται ἥς ἔχει τὰς ἀρχάς, quoted by Solmsen 67 n. 2, and III n. 104 above. However, Solmsen himself (p. 71) quotes a fairly similar use of the word in Aristotle, which remains well within the sphere of non-apodeictic discourse, at *S.E.* 6 168a17 ἥ δὴ οὕτως διαίρετόν τοὺς φαινόμενους συλλογισμοὺς καὶ ἐλέγχους ἢ πάντας ἀνακτεόν εἰς τὴν τοῦ ἐλέγχου ἄνοιαν ἀρχὴν ταύτην ποιησαμένους· ἔστι γὰρ ἅπαντας ἀναλῦσαι τοὺς λεχθέντας τρόπους εἰς τὸν τοῦ ἐλέγχου διορισμόν. Cf. also Graeser 105 n. 2—An untechnical use of ἀρχή would be compatible with Bochenski's suggestion (p. 29 under 8) that Theophrastus may have dealt with ἀρχαί as axioms in the sense of the *Posterior Analytics* under the title of πρώτων προτάσεων.

²²⁸ In *Top.* 126.11-12 = FHS&G 122B.1-2, recalled at 135.6 = FHS&G 123.4.

²²⁹ 'Zuruf' Prantl 394, Brandis (1860) 278.

combined with the definition of the topic just quoted, we get a starting-point, the precept, for a starting-point, the topic, for starting-points, the premises about definite matters. The precept is described in some sort of analogy with the topic: just as the topic was said to comprise things common and general, so the precept is said to be more *common* and *general* (and, it is added, simple), and as such things common and general were said to be 'shown and taken from' (the topics), so the topic is said to be 'found from' the precept. This analogy, if it may be called one, turns out to be somewhat strained, for Alexander's examples show the precept to be no more than an instruction to select a particular class of Topics.²³⁰ Thus the topic quoted before,²³¹ 'if a contrary (A) belongs to a contrary (1), then its contrary (A') belongs to the contrary of the other (1')', comes within the scope of the precept 'one must argue from contraries'.²³²

Alexander also quotes Theophrastus as using the expression 'parangelmatic topic', apparently as a terminological compromise applying to things which, though listed as topics by Aristotle, were precepts according to Theophrastus' finer distinctions.²³³ In all it seems as though Theophrastus was aware of the heterogeneous character of the Aristotelian concept of a topic, and was trying to restate the original doctrine in such a way as to make explicit under separate headings what it contains in the way of rules for the activity of discussion and inquiry, and what of general statements.²³⁴

A revision of the topics curriculum by Theophrastus is reported by Alexander,²³⁵ supplemented by Proclus²³⁶ and Averroes.²³⁷ The gist is that the distinction of the *praedicabilia* which is basic to the ordering of the *Topics* of Aristotle was in Theophrastus' *Topics* reduced to a distinction between what falls under the definition, i.e. genus, difference, and sameness, and what does not, i.e. accident, which is now made to include property. Alexander's comment on this bipartition into definition

²³⁰ To his examples of each class Alexander adds a summing up (135.10-11) in the words ὁ γὰρ τόπος πρότασις ἥδη τις ἀπὸ τοῦ παραγγέλματος γεγονυῖα. The ἥδη implies that the παράγγελμα was not, or not 'yet' as we might say, a πρότασις. To call this sentence a definition of τόποι as 'prémisses déduites d'un précepte' (De Pater 92 w. note 137; italics added) is forced.

²³¹ At n. 220: Alex. 126.16-17 ~ 135.8-9.

²³² 135.7.

²³³ Alex. 135.11-13 W. ταύτην δὲ [λέγω] τὴν διαφορὰν παραγγέλματος τε καὶ τόπου εἰδὼς ὁ Θεόφραστος τὰ τοιαῦτα ὁποῖός ἐστιν ὁ πρῶτος εἰρημένος τόπος παραγγέλματα λέγει καὶ τόπους παραγγελματικούς. This tells against the claim of Stump (1978) 211 that what she calls 'the strategies' (were) 'by Theophrastus ... denied the status of Topics'.

²³⁴ A similar isolation of the prescriptive factor for rhetoric *tout court* is suggested by a title παραγγέλματα ῥητορικῆς transmitted by Diogenes Laertius 5.47 = FHS&G 666 under 3.

²³⁵ In *Top.* 55.24-7 = FHS&G 124 A.

²³⁶ FHS&G 124 B.

²³⁷ *Middle Comm. Top.* = FHS&G 132, cf. Zimmermann chap. 16 in this volume.

and accident is that 'in his zeal to transmit one general method he has made the subject less clear'.²³⁸ It should be noted that both the rearrangement and the objection had been anticipated by Aristotle.²³⁹ Averroes in one section of his treatment adopts the 'order and ... division' of Themistius and Theophrastus²⁴⁰ with the comment 'although this procedure is at variance with the order in Aristotle's book, it nevertheless appears to be more in accordance with the discipline (of dialectic) and more helpful for memorization and study'.²⁴¹ Averroes shows himself aware of some of Theophrastus' motives: 'Theophrastus ... reproaching Aristotle for having repeated here the topics of genus'.²⁴² Though Averroes' evaluation is different, the commentators agree in implying that Theophrastus subordinated the convenience of students, teachers and practitioners of the art to considerations of economy and elegance of the system.²⁴³

ii. Eudemus and Strato

Eudemus as far as we know did not deal with topics directly,²⁴⁴ but in one

²³⁸ In *Top.* 55.24-7 (FHS&G 124 A) καθόλου μίαν μέθοδον παραδιδόναι σπουδάσας ... άσφαφεστέραν έποίησε την πραγματείαν. Cf. a similar criticism of Theophrastus, on the subject of contraries being in different genera, in *Simpl. in Cat.* 415.15-19 (FHS&G 127 A): άπορώτερον έτι ποιούντα τόν λόγον.

²³⁹ *Top.* 1.6 102b26-38, esp. 34 ff. ... άπαντ' άν είη τρόπον τινά όρικα τά καθρηθιμμένα. άλλ' ού δια τούτο μίαν επί πάντων καθόλου μέθοδον ζητητέον· ούτε γάρ ράδιον εύρειν τούτ' έστιν, εί θ' εύρεθείη παντελώς άσαφής και δύσχρηστος άν είη πρός την προκειμένην πραγματείαν. The μίαν καθόλου μέθοδον is quoted by Alexander at 55.23 and is in the next line echoed in his comment on Theophrastus.

²⁴⁰ *Middle Comm. Top.* 602.14-603.6 (= FHS&G 132) on 'the topics which are taken from the fact that a definition is not a definition': 'we will enumerate these topics according to this order and in this division, for this is what Themistius did and before him Theophrastus'. Cf. App. I p. 166 below.

²⁴¹ More precisely 620.7-8 'the topics of the definitions ... arranged according to the order given to them by Theophrastus and Themistius, since it fits better the *order* of the (dialectical) discipline and is easier to memorize'.

²⁴² At 604.1-2, in the context of a distinction between two objections both involving genus.

²⁴³ This would constitute an exception to the 'durch den schulmässigen Charakter erhöhten Zugänglichkeit' attributed to the logical writings of Theophrastus by Wehrli (1983) 503. Cf. App. I pp. 166 n. 269 below.

²⁴⁴ According to Volkman 206 'Eudemus, der Schüler des Aristoteles' was among those who simplified and brought order into the list of topics given by Aristotle in *Rhet.* book 2 'durch Zusammenfassen des gleichartigen und Aufstellung besonderer Unterarten', and probably by pruning it of superfluous matter. The reference he gives is to Anon. *Seg. RhGr* 1 382.5-10 Sp.-H., who in the context quoted p. 144 ff. above on the authority of Neocles cites a distinction between the τόποι common to all στάσεις and those proper to each single one, then seems to cite Aristotle as the inventor of most of both sets, and adds that he agreed with Eudemus the member of the Academy about the special ones: ιδίους,

fragment of his *On Expression* (περὶ λέξεως)²⁴⁵ he draws a distinction between questions about accident, questions about essence and dialectical problems which, while reflecting orthodox Aristotelian doctrine,²⁴⁶ also calls to mind Theophrastus' rearrangement of the topics.

The only member of the school after him to have bothered with topics as such seems to be Strato, of whom Alexander records²⁴⁷ that he added a new topic to an Aristotelian topic concerning relations.²⁴⁸ Alexander rejects this addition.²⁴⁹ Brandis²⁵⁰ deduced from evidence preserved by Alexander in a different connection²⁵¹ that Theophrastus sided with Aristotle. The significance of the debate for our present purpose is that Strato was not prevented by Theophrastus' recasting of topical arguments into analytic form from studying individual topics as he found them in the text of Aristotle. Theophrastus' reductionist project did not do away with Topics as a separate subject.

Strato is reported by Chrysippus²⁵² as being the last Peripatetic to have paid attention to dialectic. Topics as treated by Theophrastus and Strato are no exception to Barnes' summing up of the Peripatetic achievement in logic, and especially of what they did not achieve:²⁵³ 'The Peripatetics ... did not conceive the notion of a logical system which would include arguments of different types, nor did they attempt a unitary and comprehensive regimentation of valid arguments. Their logic was ... piecemeal.'

which Volkmann or Spengel changes into κοινούς because what follows is a list of common ones. None of this is acknowledged as belonging to the Academy by Dillon or Glucker, or to Eudemos of Rhodes by Wehrli. Contrast Volkmann (1885) 206 'Eudemos, der Schüler des Aristoteles', followed by Martin 110-11 & 116.

²⁴⁵ Fr. 25 Wehrli, preserved by Alex. in *Top.* 69.13 ff. Wallies. For the title cf. I p. 133 above.

²⁴⁶ As Wehrli notes *ad loc.*: 'Die klassifizierende Unterscheidung von Fragen ... nach logischem Sinngehalt ... wirkt wie eine Ausführung der aristotelischen Themastellung τί ἐρώτησις (Poetik 1456b12, ...). Im einzelnen ist aristotelisch die Sonderung nach συμβεβηκός und οὐσία, cf. *Metaphysik* 1007a31 ...'; for the dialectical question Wehrli compares *De int.* 11 20b22 and *A.Pr.* 1.1 24a22.

²⁴⁷ Fr. 30 W.

²⁴⁸ Coming from a work Περὶ τοῦ προτέρου καὶ ὑστέρου on the πολλαχῶς λεγόμενον of Arist. *Metaph.* 4.11, this looks like piecemeal engineering rather than a fresh start, and is compatible with Wehrli's assessment (1969) 100 that 'Die Titel seines Schriftenverzeichnisses, welche lauter Einzelthemen isolieren, deuten einen Verzicht auf gerade jene Einheit an, um die Eudemos sich besonders bemüht hatte'.

²⁴⁹ 30.18 οὗτος μὲν καινοτομήσαι βουλευθεὶς ὄλγον ἀναιρεῖ μείζον τι.

²⁵⁰ (1860) 279.

²⁵¹ Alex. in *Metaph.* 408.18-22 = Theophr. 131 FHS&G.

²⁵² 19 W. = Plut. *Stoic. repugn.* 24 1045 F = SVF 126, quoted I p. 132 at n. 4 above.

Our source material does not contradict him; that Alexander quotes Theophrastus' definition of the τόπος and distinction of the παράγγελμα from it, and Strato's one τόπος, proves that some of their work in the field (1) was available to, and (2) is not ignored by him.

²⁵³ Barnes (1985) 138-9.

VII. FOR A VIEW OF THE WHOLE

A hypothetical reconstruction of the post-Aristotelian perspective on topics has to take into account what data we have both on theory and on practice. Such development as we find in the theory of the subject was of an academic and esoteric nature.²⁵⁴ This development might have tended to widen the gap between topics as a feature of dialectic for practice within the school and topics as found in actual speeches, or between the uses Aristotle had intended his *Topics* and his *Rhetoric* to serve. But, first, we have found no indication that it made much difference, and one or two that it did *not* make much difference, either to the actual list of topics²⁵⁵ or to the use made of them in teaching.²⁵⁶

In what precedes I have not tried to suggest that any member of the Peripatos ever literally defined topics as the *ars inveniendi*.²⁵⁷ But that the conception of topics as an *ars inveniendi* common to rhetoric and dialectic is implied in the way these subjects were treated in the Peripatos after Aristotle, seems to be the conjecture which is compatible with the largest amount of evidence, and I propose that the burden of proof is with those who would deny it.²⁵⁸

If any of this holds water, then it would appear that historical accounts as analytical and separative²⁵⁹ as those now current involve a risk of losing sight of significant and illuminating connections. To come back to Solmsen's verge of despair: the best hope of remaining this side of the verge is, I believe, in a combination of two examples given by Solmsen himself at different times: the undogmatic method, demonstrated in his article of just fifty years ago, of tracing

²⁵⁴ The practical impact, if it had any, must be looked for in the application of dialectic as an approach to science, and the place to look for it is in the writings of Theophrastus.

²⁵⁵ Compare Strato with Theophrastus (preceding section).

²⁵⁶ Compare Alexander on the Peripatetics in general with Diogenes on Aristotle and with Aristotle's own instructions in the *Topics*, under V pp. 148-52 above.

²⁵⁷ Cicero's feminine noun *τοπική* could be a back formation from Latin *Topica*, or be short for *ἡ τοπική προσηγορία* if this phrase (title of books 2-4 of Alex. in *Top.* in MSS. A and D) could be ascribed e.g. to Andronicus.

²⁵⁸ Against Barnes (1981) 82: 'Boethius' bipartition of logic, which he adopts from Cicero, is not particularly apt: *Topics* deals with arguments that are informally valid (arguments, that is, which are not valid solely in virtue of their logical form); ... it is [not] a "logic of discovery". His verdict may be justified from Aristotle's viewpoint, or from a systematic (or should we say a modern?) one, but it is not much help towards understanding Cicero, Boethius, or the long tradition in which they stand.

²⁵⁹ What applies to the ancient traditions of topics applies a fortiori to their continuations: Stump (e.g. 1982) provides expert guidance to later developments in logic, but one would not guess from her writings that the middle ages knew any other *loci* than those which evolved into *consequentiae*. Conversely Grimaldi in his pages (116-18) on the influence of the topics finds room for Vico, Curtius, Elizabethan poetry and Chicago rhetoric but, notwithstanding the title of his monograph, completely neglects the history of logic.

Peripatetic traits and strains in a corpus of heterogeneous material, which add up to an Aristotelian tradition; but applied to the learned tradition (παράδοσις) in the two connected spheres of activity of dialectic and of rhetoric covered in his earlier book. And in addition we have to be attentive to changes in the understanding of these fields, and to the redrawing of borders between them in a changing educational context.

APPENDICES

I. SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR DIALECTIC

Not only does the history of rhetoric have something to learn from that of dialectic, that of dialectic might also derive some light from that of rhetoric, even though generally speaking dialectic is the lender and rhetoric the borrower. If it is correct to distinguish between 'thetic'²⁶⁰ topics common to the two disciplines and 'hypothetic' ones peculiar to rhetoric, this implies that Boethius, while in one sense he is following Cicero, is at the same time turning the tables on him: as Cicero was appropriating the thesis and its *τόποι* for rhetoric, so Boethius is repossessing them for dialectic.²⁶¹ His concern in *On Topical Differences* is not so much with dialectic as distinct from demonstration, let alone with rhetoric as such: it is to reduce all kinds of argument to a hierarchic order which he thought of as basically Peripatetic,²⁶² though he was conscious of differing from Aristotle in his conception of a topic:²⁶³ first those from thetic topics and only then the specifically rhetorical ones, and within the first class with those from definitions coming before those from accidents. The resulting order is from more certain and compelling to less: from demonstrative to probable and dialectical.²⁶⁴ Was this hierarchy imposed by Boethius, or can we trace it to his direct or indirect sources? Here let us for a moment indulge in speculation.

A preoccupation with the certainty or non-certainty of *τόποι* can be proved for

²⁶⁰ In the sense of 'belonging to *θέσεις*'; leaving aside the question whether this equals *θετικός*, cf. *Thom* 156-9.

²⁶¹ Cf. the end of *Top. diff.* from 1215 CD onwards, quoted II n. 64 & V n. 201 above.

²⁶² '... Boethius, whose logic was fundamentally Peripatetic' Barnes (1985) 135, cf. (1981) *passim*. What else could he base himself on? 'Boethius knew Stoic logic' Barnes (1981) 83; contrast 'Boethius knew next to nothing about Stoic logic' Ebbesen (1987) 300. Both authorities agree that what he knew he found obscure and left aside. The one place where he could not afford to do so is his commentary on Cicero's *Topics* 53-7, books 4-5, 1124-44 M. = 347-66 Or.-B.

²⁶³ This does not prejudice whether Boethius understood Aristotle correctly, as Stump denies that he did, implicitly at (1978) 180 and expressly at (1988) 190 n. 53.

²⁶⁴ 2 1195 AB.

Themistius, who in his paraphrase of the *Posterior Analytics* declares²⁶⁵ that 'for demonstrations one must also observe the highly useful topics which we have received in the dialectical writings', and whose definition of the τόπος, quoted by Averroes²⁶⁶ after that of Theophrastus, runs 'a universal *proposition*, more true than the other propositions of a syllogism, which is sometimes itself placed in a syllogism and sometimes its purport (*significatum* Martinus, *sententia* Abram) and force (*vis*)', and bespeaks the same concern. It is possible to disagree about the significance of this definition: Stump and Ebbesen²⁶⁷ both take the *vero* by which Averroes' translators join Themistius' definition to Theophrastus' to express a contrast, but Ebbesen accumulates arguments *ex silentio* to prove that Themistius' 'remarkable doctrine' of an 'elevation of topical propositions to the rank of scientific axioms' postdates at least Theophrastus, and he seems to imply Alexander and Galen as well,²⁶⁸ whereas Stump subscribes to Averroes' view that 'the difference between Themistius and Theophrastus ... consists mostly in Themistius' insistence that a principle is sometimes used within a syllogism'. Her summing up is that the two 'pick out the same sort of thing as a principle [i.e. topic]; the difference between their two definitions seems to be only in emphasis, Theophrastus speaking of a principle as a source and element, Themistius referring to it as a general proposition'. The account of Stump seems more conformable with the evidence for Themistius as a whole. It might be objected that Themistius demands a proposition *more true* than the others; but would this requirement not be satisfied by the major premise being more general and comprehensive than the others? Themistius is thus seen to be continuing a tendency in Theophrastus to conceive of τόποι as propositions, and disregarding his more orthodox Aristotelian utterances: Theophrastus had isolated the aspect of a precept. or with Stump 'strategy', but did not discriminate between the place to find major premises *pro* and *con*, and the major premises themselves.²⁶⁹

The other point of contact between Themistius and Theophrastus in the field of topics is in the order of the τόποι. Themistius according to Averroes adopted

²⁶⁵ At 18.26-7. I owe the reference to Ebbesen (1981) 117-18. Cf. n. 36 above.

²⁶⁶ *Primi voluminis* p. 28 D as quoted by Stump (1978) 212-13 w. nn. 26 & 29, italics added.

²⁶⁷ Implicitly at (1982) 114 n. 30.

²⁶⁸ This is stated explicitly by Ebbesen (1981) 117.

²⁶⁹ Compare the use of ἀρχή which likewise proved open to different interpretations: VI.i n. 227 above.—The ambiguities are those of Aristotle, but Theophrastus' discussion, which may not even have been intended to supersede but only to supplement the existing *Topics*, may well have been more liable to misunderstanding owing to its brevity and to the more abstract character of its classification and perhaps of its definitions: cf. in rhetoric his division of the ἐγκώμιον (678 FHS&G referred to in IV n. 132 above), and his definitions of the γνώμη (ἐστὶ καθόλου ἀπόφασις ἐν τοῖς πρακτικοῖς 676 FHS&G) and of the ἐπίθετον ... κατὰ τὸ μὴ συμβεβηκό[ς] δὲ δὴ στέρησίν τινες καλοῦσιν (App. fr. 9 vs. 46-53 FHS&G): the *epitheton ornans*?

the order established by Theophrastus. Parallels between Themistius and Cicero in Boethius *On Topical Differences* confirm an early date for this classification which has definition before accidents. Boethius' borrowings from Themistius seem to include the allocation of the ἰδία with the συμπερηκότα²⁷⁰ which Proclus ascribes to Theophrastus.²⁷¹

The Theophrastean order is not approved by Alexander.²⁷² But did he appreciate what Theophrastus was about? To question this may look like forsaking the interpreter's duty to put the most favourable construction on the words of his author. However, in this instance to uphold Alexander is to disavow Theophrastus, so it is not obvious to whom our allegiance is due. Two observations may tell against Alexander: he has Theophrastus run headlong into the very trap which Aristotle had expressly warned his readers against, without providing him with a motive; and he implicitly admits that he found Aristotle easier to understand than he did Theophrastus. In the circumstances I submit the lesser offence is to assume that the commentator had assimilated his author's viewpoint so completely that a certain bias against heterodoxy and a slight distortion may have resulted.²⁷³

The purpose of Theophrastus' rearrangement remains uncertain. Perhaps, however, it was not primarily to subsume all topics under the Aristotelian headings of definition and accident, but to separate those which were *in terminis* from the extrinsic ones, and so achieve an order of decreasing certainty. Theophrastus may have thought it worth the loss in clarity. Moreover it proved possible to disagree whether there was in fact any such loss: at least Themistius and Averroes congratulated Theophrastus with an improvement even on this score. And finally, here again he may have thought of himself as following up hints dropped by Aristotle; for just as Boethius specifies which topics are appropriate to demonstrative syllogisms and which to dialectical, which to categorical syllogisms and which to hypothetical, had not Aristotle himself, when discussing some of the same topics,

²⁷⁰ *Quod vero proprie inseparabile vel adhaerens accidens nuncupatur, id in communiter accidentibus numerabitur* Boethius *Top. diff.* 2 1194 C.

²⁷¹ *In Pl. Parm.* 1 proem 635.10-12 Cousin = FHS&G 124 B.

²⁷² *In Top.* 55.26-7 = FHS&G 124 A, cf. VI.1 n. 235 above.

²⁷³ For some relevant observations on Alexander's context of second century educational institutions and its influence on the 'contents of teaching' see Ebbesen (1981) 54-6.—I do not quite understand how Ebbesen within the space of one footnote (1982) 115 n. 33 can direct his readers to compare Cicero's 'division of the technical *loci* into (1) such as are derived from the thing itself, and (2) such as are derived from its concomitants' with 'Theophrastus' classification of topical problems in definitional and accidental', which we know from Alexander, and yet refer to 'the silence of Alexander of Aphrodisias about such a salient feature of Theophrastus' topics'. Surely the most natural explanation is that Alexander, having stated his agreement with Aristotle against Theophrastus over the general principle, did not consider it his duty in a commentary on the former to supply details about the latter?

specified of one of them at least that it was appropriate to hypothetical syllogisms?²⁷⁴

II. RHETORIC THE COUNTERPART TO DIALECTIC (3): A NON-PERIPATETIC PARALLEL

The conception of dialectic and rhetoric as compatible and somehow analogous is not confined to Peripatetic philosophers. Besides the inclusion of rhetoric with logic by the Stoics,²⁷⁵ and the rhetorical teaching of Philo of Larisa and perhaps other members of the Academy,²⁷⁶ a notable parallel is found in Epicurus' teacher Nausiphanes.

Philodemus *Vol.Rhet.* 2.42.14-43.6 § 30²⁷⁷ ascribes to Nausiphanes the view that ὁ ... μακρῷ λόγῳ καὶ συνειρομένῳ καλῶς χρώμενος ἄριστα χρήσεται καὶ τῷ διὰ ἐρωτήσεως καλουμένῳ καὶ ὁ τούτῳ κάκεινῳ. The ground given for this is that, in the case of the continuous speech, 'understanding up to which point you have to make your audience acquainted with what falls under one notion²⁷⁸ is the same thing as being able to see up to which point one will, in propounding dialectical questions, neither fall short of nor exceed that which leads the respondent on to an admission²⁷⁹ of the unknown fact', i.e. of the proposition which is the subject of the inquiry.²⁸⁰ From the same context in Philodemus (42.6-12), the phrase (τὸν ὀρθῶς φυσιολογούντα, ὅτι ...) κατὰ πηλίκαια τινὰ διαίρων τὰ τοῦ λόγου καθ' ἕκαστα μέχρι τοῦ ποιεῖν κεφαλαιώματά τινα κατὰ τοὺς τούτων ἐναργῆ ἐπιστήμην ἀπειργασμένους invites comparison with Alexander's κεφάλαια quoted above.²⁸¹ The attribution of this faculty to the natural philosopher is in the tradition of claiming that the philosopher, uniting in himself all the accomplishments that really matter, is the true orator and best qualified to run the state, a tradition which runs at least from Plato via the Stoic and perhaps Antisthenic²⁸² maxim ὅτι μόνος ὁ σοφὸς

²⁷⁴ *Top.* 1.18 108b7.

²⁷⁵ *LS* 31, esp. pp. 188-9.

²⁷⁶ Cf. Von Arnim 81, repeated 87 '... sowohl die peripatetische als, seit Arkesilaos, die akademische Schule nicht nur *sapere*, sondern auch *dicere* lehren'.

²⁷⁷ Quoted by Von Arnim 61.

²⁷⁸ τὸ πῦκτον ὑπὸ μίαν διάνοιαν *ib.* 43.9-11. Rhetoric, just as in the passage from Alexander quoted V at nn. 178-83 above, is deliberately referred to in terms which one would sooner expect to refer to dialectic; here, conversely, the description of dialectic which follows recalls the phrase δύναμις ... τοῦ θεωρῆσαι in Aristotle's definition of rhetoric at *Rhet.* 1.2 1355b25 τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον πιθανόν.

²⁷⁹ ὁμολογίαν Von Arnim 61: ἐπὶ τὴν ἰδέαν Sudhaus.

²⁸⁰ ... δύνασθαι θεωρεῖν μέχρι ὅσου προτεινῶν οὐτ' ἂν ἐλλείπει τις οὐδ' ὑπερβαίνει τοῦ προάξοντος τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον ἐπὶ ὁμολογίαν ἀγνωσμένου πράγματος *ib.* 43.11-18. The term προάγειν is found both at *Top.* 8.10 161a4 & 8 and at *Rhet.* 1.1 1354a25, 1.2 1356a14, 3.14 1415a37, but always with reference to πάθη.

²⁸¹ V n. 183.

²⁸² Von Arnim 78.

ρήτωρ²⁸³ to Critolaus. What concerns us is that Nausiphane substantiated his claim by positing the same relation between the methods of proof appropriate to natural philosophy and to political speech which Aristotle assumed between those of dialectic and of rhetoric.²⁸⁴

Nausiphane's claim for the natural philosopher,²⁸⁵ that he οὐδαμῶς²⁸⁶ διδακτικῆς λέξεως ἀπορεῖν ἀλλ' ὡς ἐνδέχεται βέλτιστα χρῆσθαι καὶ ὡς ἂν μάλιστα περὶ πραγμάτων ἀδήλων²⁸⁷ οἱ βουλευόμενοι πύθοντο καὶ μάθοιεν, i.e.²⁸⁸ that he was a master of the style appropriate to political deliberations, may be compared with Demetrius of Phaleron²⁸⁹ claiming for one and the same universal speaker both the genre of speeches for ἐντεύξεις and that about truth²⁹⁰ and of inquiries needing proof²⁹¹—with Cicero's posthumous approval.²⁹²

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²⁸³ E.g. Alex. in *Top.* 134.13-14 = SVF 3.595.

²⁸⁴ From Philod. *Vol.Rhet.* 2.36.3 § 24 onwards, cf. Von Arnim 59-60. I am not here concerned with questions of influence or polemics or with relations of Nausiphane to the Peripatos or any other schools generally.

²⁸⁵ Quoted and contested by Philodemus *Vol.Rhet.* 2.22.9-16.

²⁸⁶ Von Arnim 56: μηδ' ἐτ[έ]ρουσ[ιν] ὅσ[ω]ς Sudhaus.

²⁸⁷ For διδακτικῆς and πραγμάτων ἀδήλων cf. Philod. 2.37.5-10 πρότερον ὑποκεῖσθαι δεῖ τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων εἰδησιν εἰ μέλλει τις ἐνθυμήσεσθαι τι τῶν πολιτικῶν ὁρθῶς ἢ διδάξειν and 2.39.3-5 ἐκ τῶν φαιερῶν ἂν καὶ ὑπαρχόντων περὶ τῶν μελλόντων (quoted by Von Arnim 60); for ἐνθυμήσεσθαι as 'producing ἐνθυμήματα' cf. III n. 83 above.

²⁸⁸ As Von Arnim 56 interprets it.

²⁸⁹ 157 W.

²⁹⁰ περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας ib.

²⁹¹ τὰς σκέψεις ... τὰς πίστεως δεομένους ib.

²⁹² *De off.* 1.1.3. Cf. *De leg.* 3.6.14; recalling the latter, but with a different emphasis *Brut.* 9.37 (= Dem.Phil. fr. 73 & 72 & 175 W. respectively).

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²⁹³ A reference of the form '225-9 (1968?) 8: 20-1/84-7' is to be read as 'fragments 25 to 29 in part 8, re-edited in 1968, at pages 20 to 21 for the text with 84 to 87 for the commentary'.

Peripatetic Rhetoric as It Appears (and Disappears) in Quintilian

George A. Kennedy

Quintilian taught rhetoric in Rome under the sponsorship of the Flavian emperors from c. 71-91 A.D. After retirement, he wrote a great treatise *On the Education of the Orator* (*Institutio oratoria*) in twelve books which contains his views on all stages of education from childhood to maturity and includes a systematic account of rhetorical theory, which is the most extensive and inclusive such work in Latin. He repeatedly looks back at the theories, definitions, and terminology of earlier Greek and Latin writers on rhetoric, and portions of his work provide a kind of historical survey of the development of the discipline. He is heavily indebted to Cicero, whom he admires above all others, but he claims to have done extensive research for two years in the works of "innumerable" writers (*Ep. ad Tryph.*¹).

The word "Peripatetic" appears only five times in Quintilian's *Institutio oratoria*,² though what is said about the Peripatetics in these five contexts is somewhat complemented by remarks elsewhere. Since all the references to the Peripatetics refer to theories of rhetoric, it might seem reasonable to conclude that Quintilian regarded them as holding a distinctive view of the subject or of some of its parts, but what that distinctive view might have been is complicated by inconsistency in what is attributed to Peripatetics as a group, what is said of particular Peripatetic philosophers, and other factors to be discussed.

By "Peripatetic" it seems clear that Quintilian does not mean Aristotle or Theophrastus.³ In the survey of the history of rhetoric in *Institutio oratoria* 3.1.8-21 Quintilian marks out a series of stages in technical writing on rhetoric from

¹ Thus the possibility that these writers include members of the Peripatos.

² 2.15.19,20; 2.17.2; 3.1.15; 12.2.25.

³ In contrast to Cicero, *De oratore* 1.43. In his comments on my original paper, Wolfram Ax pointed out that Cicero names Aristotle, Theophrastus, and later Peripatetic writers on rhetoric even less often than does Quintilian.

Corax and Tisias to his own time. After Aristotle and Isocrates in Quintilian's list comes their contemporary Theodectes, then Aristotle's student Theophrastus (3.1.14-15). Thereafter, Quintilian says, philosophers wrote more zealously on rhetoric than did rhetoricians, especially the "leaders of the Stoics and Peripatetics." The list then continues with Hermagoras, Athenaeus, and writers of the first century, including Apollonius Molon, Caecilius, and Dionysius of Halicarnassus, none of whom are usually thought of as philosophers. This might be taken to suggest that contributions to rhetoric were made by unnamed philosophers of the third and early second century, but with the appearance of Hermagoras' new system, rhetoric became the province of professional rhetoricians.

Friedrich Solmsen began his famous article "The Aristotelian Tradition in Ancient Rhetoric,"⁴ with this passage in Quintilian and says that it describes how rhetoric "split into two different types," the Isocratean and Aristotelian, the latter continued "by other schools of philosophy like the Stoic." But Quintilian does not specifically note such a polarization. What he says is that Isocrates is regarded as a student of Gorgias and that from that point "the roads begin to part" (3.1.14: *hinc velut diversae secari coeperunt viae*). The concept of two sharply contrasting traditions, the Isocratean and the Aristotelian, is to be found in Cicero's *De inventione* 2.8. Quintilian knew that work, but his survey of the history of rhetoric is not derived from it: he includes much that is not in *De inventione* and he does not make the point that Cicero stresses, the bifurcation and later reunification of two traditions.⁵ In fact, read without the assumption that he was following Cicero, Quintilian's remarks seem to suggest the existence of three rather than two traditions. One is that of Isocrates and his students, another that of Aristotle and Theophrastus, a third that represented by Theodectes, who seems to be placed on an equal footing with the other two. In 1.4.18 Quintilian has noted an agreement between Aristotle and Theodectes on the parts of speech, and in 2.15.10 he refers to a rhetorical treatise bearing Theodectes' name, which he says may be his own work or, as many believe, a work by Aristotle. This is presumably the *Theodectea* referred to by Aristotle in *Rhetoric* 3.9.10. The definition of rhetoric given there, Quintilian says, agrees with the definition given by Gorgias in Plato's dialogue of that name. Since Quintilian specifically says that Theodectes was an approximate contemporary of Isocrates and Aristotle (3.1.14), he does not regard him as a student of either of them but as an independent figure. Neither here nor elsewhere in the *Institutio* does Quintilian seem aware of two separate traditions, even though Cicero, his favorite author, might have encouraged such a view, nor does he seem aware of separate Isocratean and Aristotelian traditions extending through the Hellenistic

⁴ AJP 62 (1941) 35. See also Joachim Adamietz, *M.F. Quintiliani Institutionis oratoriae, Liber III* (Munich 1966) 74-5.

⁵ On the source of Quintilian's discussion, see K. Schöpsdau, *Antike Vorstellungen von der Geschichte der griechischen Rhetorik* (Saarbrücken 1969) 146ff.

period,⁶ nor does he show any awareness of a kind of Aristotelian renaissance in the first century B.C. after Andronicus' publication of the Aristotelian treatises. A case, of course, can be made for that from Cicero's writings, the Demetrian treatise *On Style*, and Dionysius of Halicarnassus. What Quintilian apparently saw instead was a complex network of views that began to become confused in the mid-fourth century and led in many—in his view, too many—different directions. Rather than trying to sort out the different strands, he wants to set instruction on the right course for the future. This interpretation receives support from other passages to which I shall turn.

In a note on 3.1.4 Cousin⁷ cited Demetrius of Phaleron, Hieronymus of Rhodes, and Praxiphanes as Peripatetics interested in rhetoric, deriving his information from Kroll's survey in the *Real-Enzyklopädie*, Supplementband VII (col. 1081-2), but Cousin warns that their views are little known.⁸ Diogenes Laertius (5.80) lists "On Rhetoric in two books" as a work of Demetrius. Quintilian's references to Demetrius are only to his oratory; he says that declamation on fictitious legal themes came into general use in Demetrius' time (2.4.41), speaks of his eloquence as *versicolor* (10.1.33), and calls him "almost the last of the Attics," "one who is said to have been the first to set eloquence on the downward path" (10.1.80). Quintilian never mentions Hieronymus or Praxiphanes. Conversely, he often refers to sources only as "the Greeks," thus lumping possible Peripatetic contributions into a large amorphous mass.

The only two Hellenistic Peripatetics named by Quintilian are Critolaus and Critolaus' student Ariston, whom Wehrli identified as a younger philosopher of that name, not the better known Ariston of Ceos.⁹ In 2.15.19-20, discussing definitions of rhetoric, Quintilian quotes, in Latin, Ariston's definition of rhetoric as "*scientia videndi et agendi in quaestionibus civilibus per orationem popularis persuasionis*," and remarks that "because he is a Peripatetic he defines rhetoric as a *scientia* and not as a *virtus*, as the Stoics do." Thus surely as an *epistēmē*, not an *aretē*.¹⁰ One might have expected that the Peripatetics would have preferred the Aristotelian term *dynamis* as the species of rhetoric, but earlier in the chapter (2.15.4) Quintilian says that *dynamis* derives from a handbook doubtfully attributed to Isocrates. Aristotle's definition of rhetoric is quoted, in Latin, in this same chapter (2.15.3)

⁶ Thus *rhetores* in 3.1.15 need not mean followers of Isocrates any more than it means followers of Theodectes. Hellenistic *rhetores*, at least before Hermagoras, were not easily grouped into one school.

⁷ Jean Cousin, ed., *Quintilien, Institution Oratoire*, vol. II (Paris 1976) 261.

⁸ Peripatetics to whom some work on rhetoric is attributed include Heraclides Ponticus, Ariston of Ceos, Critolaus, and Critolaus' students Ariston the Younger and Diodorus; see the testimonia and scanty fragments collected by Fritz Wehrli, *Die Schule des Aristoteles*, 10 vols. (Basil 1944-59) *passim*.

⁹ Wehrli, X, 83-4.

¹⁰ According to Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. rhetoricos* 6, the Stoic definition was also *epistēmē*; to compound the confusion, cf. *ibid.* 61.

with Latin *vis* used for the original *dynamis* without comment that *dynamis* had earlier been identified as Isocratean. As Professor Wolfram Ax pointed out in his comments on my paper at the conference at Rutgers, Quintilian is perhaps conflating two separate doxographic traditions, one historical, the other philosophical.

This is only the beginning of confusions. Since Ariston is described as a student of Critolaus and, *because he was a Peripatetic*, as having defined rhetoric as *scientia* (= *epistēmē*), one might reasonably assume that Quintilian thought that the same term was used by Critolaus. However, a few sections later (2.15.24) it emerges that Quintilian had reason to believe that Critolaus called rhetoric *tribē*, which he glosses as *usus dicendi*. Now *tribē* is one of the words used in the pejorative description of rhetoric in Plato's *Gorgias* (463b4). That Critolaus might have used this word receives some support from Quintilian's remarks on Critolaus' attack on rhetoric in 2.17.14, where we are told that Aristotle in the *Gryllus*, for the sake of argument, advanced some subtle objections to viewing rhetoric as an art, *technē* in Greek, but then wrote three books on the art of rhetoric in the first of which he not only admits that rhetoric is an art but regards it, like dialectic, as a division of politics. Against this, Quintilian says, Critolaus and Athenodorus of Rhodes brought many objections. Critolaus is usually regarded as one of the outspoken philosophical critics of rhetoric mentioned by Cicero in *De oratore* 1.46 and by others.¹¹

Quintilian's discussion of the nature and definition of rhetoric in chapters fifteen and seventeen of Book Two has a clear purpose in leading the reader to understand his own definition of rhetoric as *scientia bene dicendi*, but the chapters are so filled with internal contradiction as to render them—as a source for the history of rhetoric in the Hellenistic period—totally confused. His method of research seems to have contributed to this in that he picked out isolated terms in earlier discussions, some of which may have been debating controversial issues, and also in that he sometimes used the Greek originals and sometimes Latin translations without consideration of the original. In 2.15.21, for example, he says he is quoting the definition of rhetoric by Theodorus of Gadara from published translations (plural), and this is probably his method in other cases as well, whether translations of complete works or more often translations of specific passages he found in his Latin sources, such as Celsus. Quintilian could and did read Greek, but like many persons he relied on sources in his own language whenever he could.

The one remaining specific reference to the Peripatetics offers some support for my observation that Quintilian sometimes quotes definitions that were in the original intended to be theses for debate rather than authoritative utterances. The reference occurs in 12.2.25, where we are told that the Peripatetics boast of their oratorical *studium*: "for the custom of speaking 'theses' for the sake of practice was more

¹¹ Cf. Ludwig Rademacher, "Critolaus und die Rhetorik," in "Supplementum" to Siegfried Sudhaus's ed. of *Philodemus, Rhetorica* II (Leipzig 1895) p.ixff.

or less instituted by them." By "theses" are meant general propositions which might conceivably include "rhetoric is a science" or "rhetoric is not a science"; "rhetoric is a virtue" or "rhetoric is not a virtue." I do not see the need to conclude from Quintilian's references to Peripatetic rhetoric that he personally knew of practical treatises or handbooks on rhetoric by Peripatetics after Theophrastus, though a few such works existed; what Peripatetics appear to have chiefly done is to engage in debate about rhetoric. In doing so, to judge from citations I have mentioned, they drew on the precedents of Plato's *Gorgias* and Aristotle's *Gryllus* and perhaps other dialogues by Plato and Aristotle or epideictic speeches of the fourth century. Their failure to continue the kind of philosophical research, including study of rhetorical theory, developed by Aristotle and Theophrastus, is accounted for in the famous story told by Strabo (13.1.54), though not mentioned by Quintilian, about the loss of the works of these philosophers, a story which I believe is at least in part true. Even Critolaus' criticism of Aristotle may have been directed against arguments made in the *Gryllus*, not in the *Rhetoric*; Quintilian probably assumed that Critolaus knew the *Rhetoric*. All his comment really says is that Critolaus responded to the argument that rhetoric was an "art," thus resuming the debate at the stage found in the first half of the fourth century. We might remember that a somewhat parallel phenomenon occurred in the case of the Hellenistic Academics, who entered a skeptical phase at the end of the fourth century that is more Socratic than Platonic and took the form of debate focused on refuting the epistemology and dogmatism of Stoics and Epicureans.

Quintilian's somewhat casual method in quotation can be seen in the case of his quotation of Aristotle's definition of rhetoric. Within a few lines he gives it in two slightly different Latin versions (2.15.13 and 16), neither of which is a literal translation of the Greek original. He is primarily interested in pointing out that the definition seems to limit rhetoric to invention. He criticizes the definition by the Peripatetic Ariston as "rather verbose." Ariston's definition, which I quoted in Latin earlier, might be literally translated "the science (or form of knowledge) of seeing and acting (=pleading?) in civil questions through a speech of popular persuasion." Given Quintilian's casualness in quotation, especially in translation, there is no guarantee that this is literally what Ariston wrote, but if it approximates the original it can be regarded as a revision of Aristotle's definition designed to meet certain objections. *Scientia* implies that rhetoric is a legitimate form of knowledge, though not necessarily an exact science, a position which *tribē* as used by Plato and Critolaus seems to deny. *Videndi*, "seeing," is Aristotle's *theorēsai*, which seems to limit rhetoric to a theoretical level of knowledge or a potentiality for speech, an idea also inherent in Aristotle's *dynamis*. The addition of *agendi* in Ariston's definition actualizes this in speech. *Quaestionibus civilibus* is more limited than Aristotle's *per hekaston*, "on each subject," but consistent with the treatment of rhetoric by Aristotle and most other classical writers as predominantly manifest in the three species of deliberative, epideictic, and judicial oratory.

Quintilian, however, objects to *quaestionibus civilibus* on the ground that it excludes epideictic. Here he takes a somewhat too technical, Roman view of what constitutes a *quaestio*. He also objects strongly to the concluding phrase of Ariston's definition, *per orationem popularis persuasionis*; this is, he says, an insult to rhetoric in that it implies it is not likely to persuade the learned. The criticism suggests that Quintilian does not really understand the importance to Aristotle and the philosophical traditions of rhetoric generally of distinguishing between rhetoric on the one hand as addressed to a popular audience and on the other hand philosophy and specific disciplines of knowledge derived from first principles; but of course the thrust of Cicero's major writings on rhetoric, to Quintilian the most important discussions of the subject, was to obscure this distinction, or more accurately to merge philosophy and rhetoric into a new Roman synthesis of knowledge and technique. Quintilian consistently viewed professional philosophy with distrust: in the Preface to Book I (sect. 15) he cannot resist saying that though the older philosophers had excellent principles and lived as they preached, in his own time the greatest vices are disguised under the name of philosophy. He had little inclination to attribute advances in rhetorical theory to philosophers.

I have said that Ariston's definition of rhetoric is a revision of Aristotle's. Does this mean that Ariston knew the text of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*? As with the case of Critolaus, we cannot definitively rule that out (and if one knew it, the other probably did also); even if not published and not generally known, it is possible that some texts of the *Rhetoric* were in the hands of some Peripatetics before their publication by Andronicus. But I would caution again that this is not an absolutely necessary conclusion, and Ariston's use of the term *epistēmē* in defining rhetoric is perhaps evidence that he did not know the original text. One possibility, as with Critolaus, is that he was drawing on the *Gryllus* in which different characters defended different views, among them possibly the definition of rhetoric as *epistēmē*. Even Aristotle himself was sometimes casual in the use of that term. There is another possibility that I tend to favor. The Aristotelian text was certainly available in the Peripatetic Library down to the death of Theophrastus in 286 B.C. Various scholars of the late fourth and early third century probably read it there and made some use of it in their own writings, introducing some Aristotelian ideas into common knowledge. Aristotle's lectures on rhetoric had been attended by students in Athens, and some of his ideas were probably expressed in their writings. When Cicero wrote *De inventione* he had almost certainly not read Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, but he knew that Aristotle had taught rhetoric and he attributed to Aristotle the division of rhetoric into three species (*De inv.* 1.7). To try one's hand at a better definition is a recurring feature in the history of rhetoric, at least as old as Plato. One can thus hypothesize a chain of definitions, often with minor variants, reaching from Aristotle into later works but not directly derived from Aristotle. At some point in that chain, almost inevitably, someone inserted *epistēmē* as a better term than *dynamis*. Ariston, not knowing that it was not Aristotelian, kept *epistēmē* in

the general sense of a body of knowledge, but tinkered with other terms in the definition.

In pursuit of the Aristotelian tradition, Solmsen seems to me to have exaggerated its presence in Quintilian and to imply that Quintilian was aware of following Aristotle, when he probably was not. Thus, when Quintilian says (3.3.1) that *plurimi maximique auctores* teach that rhetoric has five parts (invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery), Solmsen (p.47) speaks of this as "following the footsteps of Aristotle." Yes, in a way, but at a considerable distance, since Aristotle did not identify five parts of rhetoric and Quintilian does not mention Aristotle in this chapter. He didn't think of the division as Aristotelian. Similarly, Solmsen says (p.169) that Quintilian "reverts" to the Aristotelian theory of the enthymeme in 5.14.5-9 (the correct reference; Solmsen says 5.13). Quintilian shows no awareness of doing so; he does not mention Aristotle and is discussing his own view of the *epicheireme*, not the enthymeme.

One subject to which Aristotle made a special contribution was prose rhythm. Quintilian devotes a long chapter (9.4) to this subject, repeatedly drawing on Cicero but occasionally registering some disagreement. It is not until sections 87-88 that he mentions Aristotle. Here he is arguing against those who thought some metrical feet should be sought and some avoided in prose. The paeon, he says, was discovered by Thrasyllus and approved by Aristotle, a reference to *Rhetoric* 3.8.4. He goes on to mention and reject Aristotle's criticism of the dactyl, iambus, and trochee, and adds that Theodectes, Theophrastus, and Dionysius of Halicarnassus agree with Aristotle. (Actually, Dionysius does not agree; cf. *De comp. verb.* 17-18). This might possibly be said to represent awareness of a specifically Aristotelian tradition on this limited topic. Note that no Peripatetic after Theophrastus is mentioned. To judge from Quintilian's account, there were over two centuries of silence on the subject of prose rhythm until Cicero and Dionysius took up the subject as part of the Aristotelian revival of the first century B.C.

Quintilian does not expressly recognize the existence of a distinctive Aristotelian tradition in rhetoric. But he does specifically refer to Aristotle's *Rhetoric* twenty-three times and may have it in mind in other passages. Moreover, he mentions Aristotle's name another ten times in different connections. When he discusses concepts that are features of Aristotelian thought but does not name Aristotle, I become suspicious that he is using an intermediate source, and this can well be true even when he names Aristotle. Book 2, chapter 18, is an excellent discussion of whether rhetoric is a theoretical, practical, or productive art. These are of course basic Aristotelian concepts, though Aristotle in the *Rhetoric* avoids use of them and prefers to view rhetoric as a combination of dialectic and a branch of politics. Quintilian does not mention Aristotle in this chapter. Some later thinker (Peripatetic?) is likely to have discussed this subject, possibly in connection with how individual treatises should be catalogued or arranged in Andronicus' edition. In partial contrast to this, Quintilian specifically attributes the theory of ten categories

to Aristotle (3.6.23), but soon reveals that he is relying on a translation or discussion in Latin by the Stoic Sergius Plautus. He says that the *Rhetoric* was in three books (2.17.14), and in giving a summary of Aristotle's propositions on ethos and pathos (5.10.17) he specifies that it is from Book 2. But this chapter is revealing in its way. Its subject is argumentation, where reference to Aristotle might be expected. The sources Quintilian cites, however, are "the Greeks," plus the Romans Cornificus, Valgius, Cicero, Caecilius, and Celsus, until we come to the reference in section 17 to Aristotle. After the short summary of *Rhetoric* 2.1-17 Quintilian dismisses it with the words "I refrain from following out this subject; for it is not only long, but an impossible or rather infinite task; moreover, it is within the common understanding of all." So much for Aristotle. He then continues with a long discussion of topics, another Aristotelian concept, but with no mention of Aristotle. Two chapters later (5.12.9) Quintilian says "Aristotle thinks that it is the strongest argument in favor of a speaker if he is a good man." This is an apparent reference to *Rhetoric* 1.2.4: "we believe fair-minded people (*tois epieikest*) to a greater extent, and more quickly [than we do others], on all subjects in general and completely so in cases where there is no exact knowledge, but room for doubt." Quintilian has recast Aristotle's statement in terms of his own principle that only a good man can be a good orator.

Quintilian refers to Theophrastus by name eight times. His name occurs after that of Aristotle in 3.1.15 as a writer on rhetoric in the list I discussed at the beginning of my remarks. In 3.7.1 Theophrastus is again coupled with Aristotle as wrongly having separated praise and blame from practical oratory. In 3.8.62 we learn that Theophrastus thought the language of deliberative oratory should be as far as possible free from affectation. In taking this position, Quintilian says, Theophrastus agrees with Aristotle, "although he is accustomed to dissent from him without timidity" (*quamquam dissentire ab eo non timide solet*). This suggests that Quintilian felt he had a knowledge of the works of each (the rhetorical works, that is, possibly some logical works) and that he did not regard Theophrastus as a doctrinaire Aristotelian. In other words, it is some slight evidence against the perception in later times of a distinctive Aristotelian or Peripatetic tradition in rhetoric. In 4.1.32, on sources of the *exordium*, we are told that Theophrastos adds that it can be drawn from the speech of one's opponents. Theophrastus is then not mentioned for four whole books, including all the discussion of proof and argument. In 8.1.32 Quintilian tells a story about an old woman who thought Theophrastus was a foreigner because his speech was too Attic for Athens. The story comes from Cicero, *Brutus* 172. The reference to Theophrastus in 9.4.88 is the passage I have mentioned earlier about the avoidance of certain rhythmical feet. Finally, Theophrastus is mentioned twice in Book 10, Chapter 1. In section 27 he is praised for saying that the reading of poets is of great service to the orator. I know of no earlier source for this, but there may have been one. In section 83 Theophrastus is said to have had such a divine brilliance of style that he acquired his name from it. Diogenes Laertius

(5.38) reports that Aristotle called him "Theophrastus" from *theos* and *phrasis*. Since Diogenes can hardly be drawing on Quintilian, the story must have an earlier Greek source. These are Quintilian's references to Theophrastus. There is, it should be noted, a remarkable omission. Although Quintilian structures his account of style, running from the beginning of Book 8 through the first chapter of Book 11, around an adaptation of the virtues of correctness, clarity, ornamentation, and appropriateness, he never attributes this system to Theophrastus, even though he knew very well Cicero's *De oratore* and *Orator* which provide the basis for the reconstruction of Theophrastus' *Peri lexeōs* by modern scholars. Thus again Quintilian does not seem to recognize the existence of a specifically Peripatetic rhetorical tradition.

To conclude, Quintilian had some knowledge of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, but it is not directly a major source for him, and he did not appreciate the significance of Aristotle's teaching on rhetoric as we do today. Probably Aristotle did not seem to him entirely relevant to the subject as he applied it in his own times, in which declamation was a major form. Stasis theory and the theory of tropes and figures were not discussed by Aristotle (though they have some anticipation in his work) and were now central to the teaching of rhetoric. Quintilian was also aware that Theophrastus and later Peripatetics had discussed aspects of rhetoric, or at least his sources said so, but his direct knowledge of these works is slight or non-existent. Despite the reference to Peripatetic contributions after Theophrastus in 3.1.15, he does not identify the existence of a distinctive Peripatetic rhetorical tradition. Although he regularly approaches each part of his work with an historical survey of what earlier authorities had said, and in the Preface to Book 1 says that one of the reasons his friends urged him to write a treatise was to pass judgment on these, his interest in previous discussions is not really historical. As he also says in the Preface, the subject proved more extensive than he expected. He picks and chooses, usually from Latin sources, what is useful in constructing his own picture of the *bonus orator* and the training needed to fulfill that ideal.

Quintilian 6.2.8-9: *Ethos* and *Pathos* and the Ancient Tradition

William W. Fortenbaugh

horum autem, sicut antiquitus traditum accepimus, duae sunt species: alteram Graeci πάθος vocant, quod nos vertentes recte ac proprie adfectum dicimus, alteram ἥθος, cuius nomine, ut ego quidem sentio, caret sermo Romanus. . . . (9) . . . adfectus igitur hos concitatos, illos mites atque compositos esse dixerunt:¹ in altero vehementes motus, in altero lenes, denique hos imperare, illos persuadere, hos ad perturbationem, illos ad benivolentiam praevalere.

They (emotions), however, as we have learned from the ancients, are of two kinds: the Greeks call the one πάθος, which we, translating correctly and properly, speak of as *adfectus*; they call the other ἥθος, for which the Roman language, in my opinion, lacks a name. . . . (9) . . . They said, therefore, that these (the πάθη) are intense emotions, those (the ἥθη) mild and composed: in the one there are strong movements, in the other gentle; finally these command, those persuade; these lead to disturbance, those to goodwill.

After discussing the peroration to judicial speeches (6.1), Quintilian proposes to study emotional response. His reasons for doing so are straightforward: emotions are fundamental to the peroration (6.2.1) and their nature is not simple (*eorum non simplex natura* 6.2.2), so that the orator will benefit from a thorough analysis. In many ways the study itself is also straightforward. Introductory remarks on the

¹ I follow J. Cousin, *Quintilien*, Institution oratoire (Budé ed.), vol.6, Paris 1977, 25 and M. Winterbottom, *M. Fabi Quintiliani Institutionis oratoriae libri duodecim* (OCT), vol.1, Oxford 1970, 330, who print the manuscript reading. H. Butler, *The Institutio oratoria of Quintilian* (Loeb ed.), vol.2, London 1921, 420-2 prints an emended text: "adfectus igitur πάθος concitatos, ἥθος mites atque compositos esse dixerunt."

importance of emotions (6.2.2-7) are followed by a discussion of kinds of emotional response (6.2.8-28), and that in turn is followed by a consideration of how an orator can arouse emotion in himself (6.2.29-36). But if the general outline of the study is clear, details are often puzzling. This is especially true of Quintilian's use of earlier sources, both in regard to the nature of emotional response and for setting out the best means of arousing emotion in the orator himself. The latter case has recently been the subject of a thoughtful discussion by Pieter Schrijvers;² the former has been discussed as part of a larger study of *ethos* and *pathos* by Christopher Gill.³ Much of what Gill has to say is certainly correct. I am, however, uncomfortable with the claim that the distinction between weak and strong emotions—the former called *ethos* (ἦθος) and the latter *pathos* (πάθος)—“is not based on any psychological theory about character and emotion, but on his [Quintilian's] awareness of the various alternative modes available to the orator.” I do not want to deny that Quintilian has much to say about “the orator's repertoire of techniques.”⁴ He contrasts eloquence with argument (6.2.4), makes explicit reference to different styles (6.2.19) and considers the extent to which an orator will make his speech ethical and emotional.⁵ But even if Quintilian is interested in the qualities of a speech, he does not ignore emotion *qua* affect felt by the auditor. That is the emphasis of Quintilian's introductory remarks (6.2.1-7) and the focus of his initial characterization of emotional response (6.2.8-9).

At one time I was tempted to dismiss Quintilian's remarks concerning the ancient tradition as a careless error, but I am no longer so inclined. In the preface to the first book of his work on *Oratorical Education*, Quintilian tells us that he taught rhetoric for twenty years (1.pr.1), and in a letter to his publisher Trypho, he says that he spent two full years composing the work and that during this time he devoted himself not so much to actual writing as to research and reading what other authors had to say on the subject (*To Trypho* 1). Quintilian, therefore, had ample opportunity to inform himself concerning an ancient division of emotional response into *ethos* and *pathos*. That does not prove that his report is correct, but there is further reason for taking it seriously. The division of emotion into *ethos* and *pathos* is already found in Dionysius of Halicarnassus. I am thinking of the treatise on *Demosthenes*, in which Thucydides and Demosthenes are not only said to effect *pathos* but also contrasted with Lysias and Isocrates who produce *ethos* (2 p.131.5-

² *ACTUS: Studies in Honour of H.L.W. Nelson*, ed. by J. den Boeft and A.H.M. Kessels, Utrecht 1982, 395-408.

³ Chr. Gill, “The Ethos/Pathos Distinction in Rhetorical and Literary Criticism,” *Classical Quarterly* 34 (1984) 158-60.

⁴ Gill (above, note 3) 159.

⁵ Here Quintilian is influenced by Cicero (cf. G. Kennedy, *Quintilian*, New York 1969, 75 and *The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World from 300 B.C. to A.D. 300*, Princeton 1972, 505 with 222-3), whose emphasis on stylistic features is well known (*De or.* 2. 182-4).

6 U-R and 22 p.176.13, 17).⁶ I give the passages here in translation:

As the highest note on the musical scale relates to the lowest, so is the style of Lysias in political oratory related to that of Thucydides. The latter is able to startle the mind, the former to please it; the one (is able) to strain and tense the intellect, the other to relax and soothe it; that one (is able) to lead to *πάθος*, this one to conduce to *ῥῆθος*. . . . (22) When I read a speech of Isocrates, whether it be a forensic, deliberative or <epideictic> speech, I become serious in *ῥῆθος* and possess great stability of mind, like those who listen to libation-music played on the *aulos* or Dorian and enharmonic melodies. But when I take up one of Demosthenes speeches, I am filled with enthusiasm and am led here and there, experiencing one *πάθος* after the other, feeling disbelief, anguish, fright, disdain, hate, pity, goodwill, anger, envy—experiencing all the *πάθη* which take control of a man's capacity for understanding.

In these two passages Dionysius is interested in the effect that different styles have on the mind of the listener or reader. When the effect is a strong emotion that sways judgment, he calls it a *pathos*; when it is relaxed and stable, he speaks of *ethos*. That is a clear anticipation of the *ethos-pathos* distinction found in Quintilian. Dionysius belongs, therefore, among the Greeks to whom Quintilian refers ("alteram Graeci *πάθος* vocant, . . . alteram *ῥῆθος*" 6.2.8), but I doubt that he is the originator of the ancient tradition mentioned by Quintilian ("sicut antiquitus traditum accepimus" 6.2.8). In my judgment, the tradition is likely to go back to the early Peripatos.⁷ Dionysius may well have begun his study of rhetoric with members of this school;⁸ and in the treatise on *Demosthenes*, he may be applying a distinction that had become part of rhetorical instruction within the Peripatos. In what follows, I want to develop this idea, pointing out that difference of degree was used by early Peripatetics to distinguish between different kinds of emotion. In addition, I shall call attention to the fact that within the sphere of rhetoric Peripatetics worked with a narrow notion of *pathos*. It was restricted to strong emotions which affect judgment, so that mild emotions needed another designation. Finally I shall suggest

⁶ Gill (above, note 3) 158.

⁷ I think that J. Cousin, *Études sur Quintilien*, vol.1, Paris 1936, is on the right track, when he speaks of an Aristotelian origin (318); but I am not happy with his argument and reject his assessment of "the more and less." Citing 6.2.12: "ita ut illud (*πάθος*) maius sit, hoc (*ῥῆθος*) minus," he says that the question of degree of difference is an impropriety of expression and not a subtlety of doctrine (320). On the contrary, the Peripatetics quite properly introduced the more and less, in order to distinguish between closely related kinds.

⁸ That is the suggestion of Kennedy, *The Art of Rhetoric* (above, note 5) 346, who refers to S.F. Bonner, "Dionysius of Halicarnassus and the Peripatetic Mean of Style," *Classical Philology* 33 (1938) 257-66. See also C. Wooten, "The Peripatetic Tradition in the Literary Essays of Dionysius of Halicarnassus," in this volume, chapter 8.

several different factors which may have encouraged early Peripatetics to select *ethos* as a suitable label for weak emotions. I am thinking of Aristotle's account of persuasion through character, the orator's concern with maintaining the audience's goodwill throughout an entire speech and the ethical-pathetic dichotomy of musical theory.

In order to guard against possible confusion, I want to distinguish straightway between an emotion that admits difference in degree and two closely related emotions that differ in degree. The former case may be illustrated by the person who is angry and subsequently becomes angrier, or by one who feels goodwill and then feels it even more intensely. The latter case is exemplified by the man whose anger is so intensified that it is transformed into rage, or whose goodwill develops and becomes friendship or love. It is the latter case which concerns Quintilian. He speaks of different kinds (*species* 6.2.8) and illustrates the idea by reference to goodwill and love (*caritas* and *amor* 6.2.12). When our fondness for another person is strong, then we are affected by love, and when the affection is weak, we feel goodwill. The two emotions are closely related—Quintilian says that they arise from the same nature (*ex eadem natura* 6.2.12)—but nevertheless differ in kind.

The idea that difference in degree can play an important role in distinguishing between kinds is well known to students of Peripatetic zoology and botany.⁹ Its application to psychology and in particular to emotion is less well known but of equal importance. A passage in Simplicius' commentary *On Aristotle's Categories* 8 8b26-7 (CAG vol.8 p.253.7-13 Kalbfleisch) is especially instructive. I give it here in translation.¹⁰

⁹ In regard to zoology, I refer to the opening chapter of Aristotle's *Historia animalium*, where the Stagirite makes clear that within the larger classes different kinds are distinguished by difference in degree: e.g., various kinds of birds are marked off by a difference in length of beak (*HA* 1.1 486a22-b17). In regard to botany, the programmatic introduction to Theophrastus' *Historia plantarum* may be mentioned. Here we learn that different kinds of plants have the same parts, e.g. leaves and roots, but the parts differ by the more and less (1.1.5-6). This is not to overlook the fact that both Aristotle and Theophrastus recognize other factors which play a role in distinguishing between closely related kinds. Parts may be present in one kind and absent in another; and the same parts may have different positions in different kinds. We need not concern ourselves with these factors. The latter has no application in case of emotions. The former does—e.g., pain is absent in the case of hate (*Arist., Rhet.* 2.4 1382b13)—but it plays no role in Quintilian's report concerning the ancient tradition. For our purposes, the important point is that the ancient tradition involves an application of difference in degree which is strikingly Peripatetic. And when Quintilian says that *pathos* and *ethos* are sometimes of the same nature (*eadem natura* 6.2.12), he expresses himself like Aristotle, who says of the larger classes: "They have one common nature (*μία φύσις κοινή*) and contain species that are not far removed from each other (*PA* 1.4 644b4).

¹⁰ The Greek text (L1) together with commentary can be found in my *Quellen zur Ethik Theophrasts*, Amsterdam: Grüner/Benjamin 1984, 15 and 145-50.

Suppose some people object to the classification which does not make the one many, as (they say) is necessary, but brings together the many into one and makes one class of habit and disposition on the grounds that the former is intensified and the latter slackened, while maintaining the same specific character. And suppose they should say that it is possible that nothing prevents even some things which differ in kind from differing in respect of the more and less. And suppose they should adduce as examples fault-finding and anger and rage, which Theophrastus in his work *On Emotions* says differ in respect of the more and less and are not identical in kind. Similarly, too, friendship and goodwill are intensified and relaxed and each is different in kind; savagery and bestiality in relation to anger, and appetite and lust are distinguished in the same way, and in general the more shameful of the emotions, when intensified, change into another kind.

In this passage, Simplicius is not advancing a view of his own; rather he presents a possible objection in order to respond to it. What interests me is the fact that Simplicius refers to Theophrastus' work *On Emotions* and reports what the Eresian said concerning fault-finding, anger and rage: namely, that these emotions differ in respect of the more and less and are not identical in kind (κατὰ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον ἔχειν τὴν διαφορὰν καὶ μὴ εἶναι ὁμοειδῆ). Friendship and goodwill are also mentioned in Simplicius's commentary. They are said to be intensified and relaxed and each different in kind (ὁμοίως καὶ φιλία καὶ εὐνοία ἐπιτείνεται καὶ ἀνιέται καὶ ἄλλο εἶδος ἑκάτερα ἐστίν). It is not entirely clear whether this statement, too, is taken from Theophrastus' work *On Emotions*, but it certainly represents Peripatetic thinking. For in the *Nicomachean Ethics* 9.5, Aristotle argues that goodwill lacks tension and desire (οὐ γὰρ ἔχει διάτασιν οὐδ' ὄρεξιν 1166b33). He says that it may be the beginning of friendship (ἀρχὴ φιλίας 1167a3), but he insists that it is different (οὐ μὴν ἐστὶ γε φιλία 1166b30). Simplicius goes on to mention savagery and bestiality (ὠμότης τε καὶ θηριώτης). One is reminded of *Nicomachean Ethics* 7.1 and 7.5, where bestiality is characterized as an intensification that goes beyond vice and differs from it in kind (1145a22-33, 1148b34-1149a20). Next Simplicius tells us that appetite and lust differ in the same way (ἐπιθυμία τε καὶ ἔρως ὡσαύτως διέσθηκεν). That is especially interesting, for Theophrastus' definition of lust is preserved by Stobaeus: "Lust is an excess of an unreasoning appetite, whose coming is swift and parting slow" (ἔρως δὲ ἐστὶν ἀλογίστου τινὸς ἐπιθυμίας ὑπερβολὴ ταχέϊαν μὲν ἔχουσα τὴν πρόσοδον, βραδεῖαν δὲ τὴν ἀπόλυσιν 4.20.64).¹¹ Here difference in degree is built into the definition. Moderate appetite becomes lust through excess; it actually changes in kind. At least that is the point Simplicius makes at the end of the

¹¹ The text (L117) with commentary can be found in *Quellen* (above, note 10) 80 and 314-16.

quoted passage: "and in general the more shameful of the emotions, when intensified, change into another kind" (καὶ καθόλου τὰ δυσφημότερα τῶν παθῶν ἐπιτεινόμενα εἰς ἄλλο μεταβάλλει εἶδος).¹²

We can, I think, say with confidence that the early Peripatetics offered an account of emotions that fits neatly with Quintilian's remarks on weak and strong emotions, but did they speak of the former as *ethe* and the latter as *pathe*? I know of no text which proves without question that they did, but there are reasons for believing that they may have done so—at least within the sphere of rhetoric, for there Peripatetics worked with a narrow notion of *pathos* which excludes weak emotions. I refer to Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, where *pathe* are defined as "those (feelings) on account of which men so change that they differ in their judgments" (ἔστι δὲ πάθη δι' ὅσα μεταβάλλοντες διαφέρουσι πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις 2.1 1378a19-20). Weak feelings which do not affect judgment may be emotions; but within rhetorical theory, they do not count as *pathe*. The reason Aristotle offers such a restrictive definition is straightforward. In rhetoric, he is interested in persuasion and thinks of emotional appeal as a technical mode of persuasion coordinate with rhetorical argument and persuasion through character. Only strong emotions which influence judgment are relevant; all others are excluded. That is not true of ethics. Here both strong and weak emotions count as *pathe*. Good men feel both, and so do bad men.¹³ But ethics is not rhetoric, and Peripatetics were adept at shifting their concepts and frameworks to suit the subject matter.¹⁴ They adapted their notion of *pathos* to suit the rhetorical situation and may have done the same with *ethos*.

One reason for thinking that Peripatetic teachers of rhetoric may have referred to weak emotions as *ethe* concerns goodwill. The Greek word *eunoia* (εὐνοία) is used ambiguously for both strong and weak emotions,¹⁵ but in the Simplicius passage discussed above it clearly refers to a weak emotion—that of goodwill—which differs in kind from strong feelings of friendship (φιλία). The one is relaxed and the other intense. As a weak emotion goodwill is compatible with sound judgment, so that Isocrates can speak of it as desirable in an impartial jury.¹⁶

¹² For further discussion of the Simplicius passage and other texts recording Theophrastus' view of emotions, see my "Theophrastus on Emotion," *Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities* 2 (1985) 209-29.

¹³ The difference is that good men feel strong and weak emotions on the right occasions, and bad men on the wrong occasions.

¹⁴ A clear case of shifting frameworks is the bipartite psychology which Aristotle employs in ethical discussion and abandons in favor of three faculties when doing biology. See, e.g., my *Aristotle on Emotions*, London 1975, 26-7.

¹⁵ It is used for a strong emotion in the passage from Dionysius Halicarnassus, *Demosthenes* 22 quoted above. See also Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 3.14 1415a35-6, where the cognate adjective (εὖνους) refers to a condition parallel to that of anger.

¹⁶ In *Antidosis* 22, Isocrates criticizes the Athenians for not exhibiting common goodwill (κοινὴ εὐνοία) toward competing parties. They are prejudiced, and as a result they do not

Similarly Aristotle makes it an important attribute of the credible orator. In his account of persuasion through character (διὰ τοῦ ἥθους), Aristotle lists goodwill alongside wisdom and virtue (φρόνησις and ἀρετή) and tells us that speakers say what is false because one or the other of these attributes is missing. When all three are present or appear to be present, then the speaker is believable (1378a6-15).¹⁷ Here Aristotle unequivocally treats goodwill as a part of the orator's *ethos*. It gives the speaker an orientation or proper concern for the welfare of the audience, but it does not affect his capacity to render a correct judgment or to offer useful advice. If it did, it would not be part of the orator's *ethos*. For the credible orator is one whose judgment is unaffected by intense emotions. Goodwill, therefore, contrasts with strong feelings of friendship.¹⁸ It is not a *pathos* in the rhetorical sense but rather a stable condition which belongs to the *ethos* of a credible orator.

The account of persuasion through character in *Rhetoric* 2.1 is quite brief. Aristotle chooses not to discuss how an orator creates the impression of wisdom, virtue and goodwill. Instead he refers to other sections of his treatise. For wisdom and virtue, he points to the preceding discussion of virtue in 1.9; regarding goodwill, he directs us to the subsequent account of *pathe* in 2.2-11. That is striking. An important part of the orator's *ethos* is mentioned along with friendship, and a discussion of both is promised in the account of the individual *pathe* (περὶ δὲ εὐνοίας καὶ φιλίας ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰ πάθη λεκτέον 1378a18-19). An account of friendship does indeed follow in 2.4, but goodwill is not mentioned. Perhaps Aristotle lapsed and failed to include the promised remarks on goodwill; alternatively his remarks may have been lost or removed by a later editor. Whatever the case, the situation seems to me intelligible. Goodwill is a feeling or weak emotion which can be conveniently discussed along side strong feelings of friendship. To do so is not to confuse goodwill with a *pathos* in the rhetorical sense. It is rather to distinguish two closely related feelings that differ by the more and less. If Aristotle did discuss goodwill in a lost portion of 2.4, he is likely to have taken pains to mark it off from friendship and *pathe* in general. If he failed to do so, then a subsequent editor may have deleted his remarks on goodwill as inconsistent with the earlier account of persuasion through character. My own preference is to believe that

give each side their full attention and an equal opportunity to state its case. The desired situation is one in which the audience feels goodwill toward all parties.

¹⁷ Cf. *Rhetoric* 1.8 1366a11, where the persuasive power of goodwill is recognized along with that of moral goodness.

¹⁸ Quintilian does not miss the point. Love (*amor*) is said to be a *pathos* and goodwill (*carietas*) an *ethos* (6.2.12). An audience which feels goodwill may wish the speaker well—it may have feelings of *benivolentia* (6.2.9)—but it does not thereby lose the capacity to render impartial judgment. Cf. 6.2.6. Here in the introductory portion of the chapter, Quintilian compares the emotional response (= *pathos*) of an audience to that of erotic lovers (*amantes*) whose passion so affects their sight that they are no longer capable of judging the beauty of the beloved.

Aristotle simply failed to include remarks on goodwill and later Peripatetics were not confused by this omission. They understood that goodwill is a feeling or emotion, and that it is not a *pathos* in the rhetorical sense. They labeled it an *ethos* and extended the label to weak emotions generally.

We should also take note of the fact that audiences may feel weak emotions throughout an entire speech. Recognition of this fact was not restricted to the Peripatetics, but their own concern with goodwill may have heightened their interest in the persistence of weak emotions. For in the case of goodwill, it is not only possible but also desirable that the feeling be present in the audience from beginning to end. Typically an orator tries to awaken goodwill straightway in the introduction (cf. ps. Arist., *Rhet. ad Alex.* 29 1436a39, b22-6; Cic., *Inv.* 1.22), and then he seeks to maintain it throughout his speech (cf. *Rhet. Her.* 1.11; Cic., *De or.* 2.80-1; Quint. 4.1.5). The same is not true of pity, fright and other strong emotions. They are normally aroused late in a speech, especially in the epilogue. There is then a temporal distinction. In contrast with typical *pathe*, a weak emotion like goodwill is long lasting, and as such it may be appropriately referred to as an *ethos*.¹⁹

A final reason for thinking that Peripatetics may have referred to weak emotions as *ethe* is suggested by the passages from Dionysius of Halicarnassus cited above. There Dionysius not only makes use of the *ethos-pathos* distinction; he also introduces an analogy with music. In the first passage, he refers to the musical scale; and in the second, he mentions different melodies. It is the second passage that especially interests me. Reading Isocrates is said to result in a serious *ethos* and a stable frame of mind similar to that induced by a Dorian melody. This comparison recalls Aristotle's interest in musical education and his description of the Dorian mode as ethical and stable (*Politics* 8.7 1342a28-30, 1342b12-13). It produces good character and differs from, say, the Phrygian mode which is orgiastic and pathetic (1342b3). The analogy with oratory is, I think, straightforward. Just as some harmonies work an ethical effect while others induce enthusiasm (1342a3-4), so Isocrates puts one in an *ethos* while Demosthenes fills one with enthusiasm. I want to suggest that this comparison may have found its beginning in the Peripatos and been encouraged by Peripatetic interest in the ethical and pathetic effect of music.²⁰ But having said that, I also want to be clear that correspondence between musical and rhetorical theory is not simple. The Aristotelian passages that I have mentioned all concern education with a view to civic virtue (1341a1, 38). And while Aristotle does contrast the ethical with the pathetic, his doctrine of the mean prompts him on occasion to say that the Dorian mode puts people into a middle state. This middle state is said to be stable (*μέσως δὲ καὶ καθεστηκός* 1340b3),

¹⁹ Cf. Quintilian 6.2.10, where however Quintilian refers to certain unnamed persons who add a temporal distinction.

²⁰ For Theophrastus' interest in the ethical effect of music see texts L32-3 in *Quellen zur Ethik Theophrasts* (above, note 10) 30-1 and the commentary 196-8.

and that recalls Dionysius' characterization of the effect Isocrates has on him (καὶ πολὺ τὸ εὐστοιθὲς ἔχω τῆς γνώμης 22). But this stability may also be regarded as a mean between relaxation and enthusiasm (1340b2-5). It is a matter of framework and ultimately of one's sphere of interest.

In conclusion, I want to underline that a Peripatetic origin for the *ethos-pathos* distinction found in Quintilian and before him in Dionysius of Halicarnassus has not been proved. But perhaps the preceding arguments have made a Peripatetic origin plausible and even probable. Indeed, if the ancient tradition is not Peripatetic, then what is its origin? No serious alternative comes to mind.

Das Nachleben der *Technon synagoge* bei Cicero, Quintilian und in den griechischen Prolegomena zur Rhetorik

Klaus Schöpsdau

Seit Aristoteles als erster griechischer Philosoph damit begonnen hatte, sich systematisch mit den Leistungen und Resultaten seiner Vorgänger auseinanderzusetzen, und zu diesem Zweck problemgeschichtlich orientierte Materialsammlungen anlegte, wurde das wissenschaftshistorische Interesse zu einem Kennzeichen des Peripatos, wobei dieses Interesse nicht auf die Philosophie im engeren Sinn beschränkt blieb, sondern sich auch auf die Fachwissenschaften ausdehnte.¹

Für die Rhetorik hat Aristoteles die Leistungen seiner Vorgänger in einem zwei Bücher umfassenden Werk aufgearbeitet, das in den Schriftenverzeichnissen bei Diogenes Laertios (Nr. 77) und in der Hesychvita (Nr. 71) als Τεχνῶν συναγωγή aufgeführt wird.² Der Titel des Werkes ist sonst nirgends belegt.³

¹ Für Aristoteles vgl. z.B. die Auseinandersetzung mit den Vorgängern *Met.* A 3-6, *Phys.* A 2-5; für den Peripatos seien beispielshalber genannt Theophrasts Geschichte der Naturphilosophie und Eudemos' Geschichte der Geometrie, der Arithmetik und der Astronomie. Zur Frage der Materialsammlung vgl. I. Düring, Aristoteles. Darstellung und Interpretation seines Denkens, Heidelberg 1966, 22, 226, 513, 607.

² Sammlung der mutmaßlichen Fragmente (keines ist wörtlich überliefert) bei V. Rose³, *Aristotelis Fragmenta*, Leipzig 1886 (Nachdruck 1967), Fr. 136-141; bei O. Gigon, *Aristotelis opera III: Librorum deperditorum fragmenta*, Berlin/New York 1987, Fr. 123-134. Das Verhältnis des bei Diogenes 5.24 genannten Titels Nr. 80 ἄλλη τέχνη α'β' (ἄλλη τεχνῶν συναγωγή α'β' cod. F) zu Nr. 77 τεχνῶν συναγωγή α'β' wird von P. Moraux (*Les listes anciennes des ouvrages d'Aristote*, Louvain 1951, 97) und O. Gigon (a.a.O. 389) als Nebeneinander zweier verschiedener Fassungen desselben Werkes gedeutet. Skeptisch I. Düring, *Aristotle in the ancient biographical tradition*, Göteborg 1957, 46, zu Diog. L. Nr. 79-81 ("nihil pro certo de his afferri potest").

³ Am nächsten kommt dem Titel die Formulierung in der *Vita Isocr.* anon., ed. Dindorf, Oxford 1852, p. 105.22 (= Aristot. Fr. 141 Rose³; Fr. 129 Gigon): 'Αριστοτέλης ... συναγωγῶν τέχνας ῥητορικὰς (vgl. *conduxit* Cic., *De inv.* 2.6).

Den Inhalt des Werkes skizziert Cicero (*De inv.* 2.6) wie folgt: *veteres quidem scriptores artis usque a principe illo atque inventore Tisia repetitos unum in locum conduxit Aristoteles et nominatim cuiusque praecepta magna conquisita cura perspicue conscripsit atque enodata diligenter exposuit.* Aristoteles hatte demnach in diesem Werk alle Technographen der Rhetorik, angefangen von Teisias, zusammengestellt und ihre jeweiligen Lehren aufgeschrieben und erläutert;⁴ das Werk stellte also eine Kombination von Materialsammlung und Doxographie dar. In der antiken rhetorischen Fachliteratur hat die *Technon synagoge* trotz der großen Verbreitung, die Cicero dem Werk bezeugt (*De inv.* 2.6), nur wenige sichtbare Spuren hinterlassen, die sich im wesentlichen auf Cicero, Quintilian und die spätantiken (und byzantinischen) Prolegomena zur Rhetorik beschränken. An Hand dieser Texte soll im Folgenden das Nachleben der *Technon synagoge* etwas eingehender untersucht werden.⁵

I. CICERO

Unter den Zeugnissen für das Nachleben der *Technon synagoge* ist am wichtigsten der Abriß der griechischen rhetorischen Theorie, den Cicero im *Brutus* 46-48 als ein Referat aus Aristoteles vorträgt:⁶

Itaque ait Aristoteles, cum sublatis in Sicilia tyrannis res privatae longo intervallo iudiciis repeterentur, tum primum, quod esset acuta illa gens et controvers(i)a natura, artem et praecepta Siculos Coracem et Tisiam conscripsisse — nam antea neminem solitum via nec arte, sed accurate tamen et descripte plerosque dicere —; scriptasque fuisse et paratas a Protagora rerum illustrium disputationes, qui nunc communes appellantur loci; (47) quod idem fecisse Gorgiam, quem singularum rerum laudes vituperationesque conscripsisse, quod iudicaret hoc oratoris esse maxime proprium, rem augere posse laudando vituperandoque rursus affligere; huic Antiphontem Rhamnusium similia quaedam habuisse conscripta; quo neminem umquam melius ullam oravisse capitis causam, cum se ipse defenderet, se audiente, locuples auctor

⁴ Vgl. auch Cic., *De or.* 2.160 (Antonius spricht): ... Aristotelem, cuius ... illum legi librum in quo exposuit dicendi artes omnium superiorum.

⁵ Dabei stütze ich mich weitgehend auf die diesbezüglichen Ergebnisse meiner Dissertation von 1969: K. Schöpsdau, *Antike Vorstellungen von der Geschichte der griechischen Rhetorik*, Diss. (masch.) Saarbrücken 1969.

⁶ Der Abriß, der ja nur die Entstehung und Entwicklung der rhetorischen Theorie (*ars*) darstellt, wird von Cicero als Beleg für seine These benutzt, daß die Rede-Kunst (als theoretisch reflektierte Praxis) erst spät entstand, weil sie stabile politische Verhältnisse voraussetzt (*pacis est comes otique socia et iam bene constitutae civitatis quasi alumna quaedam eloquentia Brut.* 45). Vgl. Schöpsdau 113-134; K. Heldmann, *Antike Theorien über Entwicklung und Verfall der Redekunst* (= *Zetemata* 77), München 1982, 17-21.

scripsit Thucydides; (48) nam Lysiam primo profiteri solitum artem esse dicendi; deinde, quod Theodorus esset in arte subtilior, in orationibus autem ieunior, orationes eum scribere aliis coepisse, artem removisse; similiter Isocratem primo artem dicendi esse negavisse, scribere autem aliis solitum orationes, quibus in iudiciis uterentur; sed cum ex eo, quia quasi committeret contra legem 'quo quis iudicio circumveniretur', saepe ipse in iudicium vocaretur, orationes aliis destituisse scribere totumque se ad artes componendas transtulisse.

Zwar gibt Cicero als Quelle nicht ausdrücklich die *Technon synagoge* an; da jedoch dieses aristotelische Sammelwerk nach *De inv.* 2.6 praktisch das Standardhandbuch über die voraristotelische Rhetorik war, ist die Zuweisung des Referats an die *Technon synagoge* so gut wie sicher. Zweifel sind allerdings bezüglich der Frage angebracht, in wie weit man Cicero eine profunde Kenntnis der *Technon synagoge* zutrauen darf; ja ob ihm dieses Werk überhaupt noch in der ursprünglichen aristotelischen Fassung vorlag, ist keineswegs ausgemacht.⁷ Denn für mindestens drei Details des Abrisses ist aristotelische Provenienz unwahrscheinlich oder unmöglich:

Sicher nicht von Aristoteles stammt der Hinweis auf Thukydides' Urteil über

⁷ Zu dem Bekenntnis des Antonius in *De oratore* (verfaßt 55 v. Chr.), er habe die *Technon synagoge* gelesen (2.160 *legi*), gibt W.W. Fortenbaugh zu bedenken, daß daraus nicht ohne weiteres der Schluß gezogen werden kann, daß Cicero selbst das Werk intensiv studiert hat (Cicero's Knowledge of the Rhetorical Treatises of Aristotle and Theophrastus, in: W.W. Fortenbaugh und P. Steinmetz [Hrsg.], Cicero's Knowledge of the Peripatos [= Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities vol. IV], New Brunswick/London 1989, 43). Auch die Behauptung Ciceros (*De inv.* 2.6), daß niemand mehr die Originalschriften der älteren Theoretiker studiere, sondern sich jeder über deren Lehren an Hand der *Technon synagoge* informiere, spricht nicht zwingend für eine direkte Kenntnis der *Technon synagoge* durch Cicero. Denn wenn Cicero *De inv.* 2.8 erklärt, daß er selbst die *artes* der jüngeren, nacharistotelischen und die der älteren Theoretiker, soweit möglich (*quoad facultas tulit*), benutzt habe, ist die wahrscheinlichere Annahme die, daß sich Cicero bei der Abfassung von *De inventione* (er war damals gerade 20 Jahre alt) an ein relativ spätes Handbuch gehalten hat (so auch Fortenbaugh a.a.O. 42). Eine noch radikalere Lösung ergibt sich, falls K. Barwicks These zuträfe (Philol. 105, 1961, 307ff.), daß die Präfatia zum 2. Buch von *De inventione* mit Ausnahme der §§ 9-10 gar nicht ciceronisch ist, sondern aus der *Ars* des Hermagoras von Temnos stamme (dagegen glaubt D. Matthes, Lustrum 3, 1958, 83, daß Cicero diese Präfatia, da sie beim Auctor ad Herennium fehlt, selbst hinzugefügt habe); ein gewichtiges Argument Barwicks ist der Widerspruch zwischen dem Anspruch Ciceros, die gesamte frühere rhetorische Literatur herangezogen zu haben, und seiner tatsächlichen Arbeitsweise in *De inventione*, da er in dieser Schrift praktisch nur einer einzigen Quelle, eben Hermagoras, folgt; verdächtig wird dieser Anspruch auch dadurch, daß Cicero seine angebliche Leistung in *De inv.* 2.8 mit ähnlichen Worten beschreibt, wie er in *De inv.* 1.8 die Leistung des Hermagoras beschrieben hatte (1.8: *satis in ea videtur ex antiquis artibus ingeniose et diligenter electas res collocasse et nonnihil ipse quoque novi protulisse*. 2.8: *quos ipsos [sc. posteriores artis scriptores] simul atque illos superiores nos nobis omnes, quoad facultas tulit, proposuimus et ex nostro quoque nonnihil in commune contulimus*).

Antiphon (47), da er sprachlich die Form der Oratio obliqua durchbricht; er dürfte eine Hinzufügung Ciceros (oder seines Gewährsmannes) sein.⁸

Der Passus über Isokrates (48) enthält einen Hinweis auf ein römisches Gesetz *quo quis iudicio circumveniretur*,⁹ der selbstverständlich spätere Zusatz ist. Überhaupt ist fraglich, ob der Abschnitt über Isokrates in der bei Cicero vorliegenden Fassung als aristotelisch gelten darf, da er sachliche Ungenauigkeiten über die Entwicklung des Isokrates enthält, die man seinem Zeitgenossen Aristoteles nur ungern zutrauen möchte.¹⁰

Die Bemerkung über Isokrates ist letztlich das Gegenstück zu der Bemerkung über Lysias: während Isokrates anfangs bestreitet, daß es eine rhetorische *Technē* (*ars dicendi*) gebe, und erst nach Beendigung seiner Tätigkeit als Logograph sich der Abfassung von *artes* widmet, gibt Lysias zunächst die Existenz einer *ars* zu,¹¹

⁸ Dafür könnte auch das sachlich anstößige *se audiente* sprechen (Thukydides befand sich während des Prozesses gegen Antiphon außerhalb Athens im Exil). Nach der Vermutung von A. Ronconi, *La Parola del Passato* 13, 1958, 146, hätte Cicero (oder sein Gewährsmann) das thukydeische μέχρι ἐμοῦ = 'bis zu meiner Zeit' (8.68.2) als 'solange ich in Athen war' mißverstanden und daraus auf Anwesenheit des Thukydides beim Prozeß geschlossen. Vielleicht hat bei diesem Mißverständnis auch die falsche Deutung einer Tradition mitgewirkt, in der Thukydides durch das Subst. ἀκροατής (wörtl. 'Hörer') oder das Verb ἀκούειν ('hören') als Schüler des Antiphon bezeichnet war (wie z.B. in der *Vita Thucydidis* des Marcellinus §22: ἤκουσε δὲ διδασκάλων Ἀναξαγόρου μὲν ἐν φιλοσόφοις..., Ἀντιφώντος δὲ ῥήτορος...). Eine solche Tradition dürfte aber kaum auf Aristoteles zurückgehen, sondern höchstwahrscheinlich einer rhetorischen Quelle entstammen; denn die Rhetoren hatten natürlich ein besonderes Interesse daran, ihren Anteil an Literatur und Bildung gebührend herauszustellen. Zwar läßt sich diese Tradition explizit erst für die augusteische Zeit nachweisen (durch die *Vita Antiphontis* 7, die hier auf Kaikilos von Kale Akte fußt), doch kann sie durchaus schon Cicero (oder dessen Gewährsmann) bekannt gewesen sein; weitere Belege für Antiphon als Lehrer des Thukydides bei L. Radermacher, *Artium scriptores* (Reste der voraristotelischen Rhetorik) SBWien 227.3, Wien 1951, in der Anm. zu B X 2.

⁹ Eine Anspielung auf dieses Gesetz findet sich nur noch Cic., *Pro Cluent.* 151.

¹⁰ Die bei Dion. Hal., *De Isocr.* 18, referierte Behauptung des Aristoteles, daß angeblich viele Bündel von Gerichtsreden des Isokrates im Handel seien, wird zwar von Rose³ als Fr. 140 der *Technon synagoge* (ebenso Gigon Fr. 128) zugewiesen, doch sehen J. Bernays (Die Dialoge des Aristoteles in ihrem Verhältniss zu seinen übrigen Werken, Berlin 1863, 157), Fr. Solmsen (Die Entwicklung der aristotelischen Logik und Rhetorik [= Neue Philol. Untersuchungen 4], Berlin 1929, 204-206) und zuletzt R. Laurenti (Aristotele, I frammenti dei dialoghi, a cura di R.L., I, Neapel 1987, 418) darin wohl richtiger ein Fragment aus dem *Gryllos*. Mag sich auch Aristoteles in diesem Jugendwerk kritisch und herabsetzend über Isokrates geäußert haben, so fehlt doch in der aristotelischen *Rhetorik* jede Spur einer Polemik gegen Isokrates; noch weniger Anlaß zu persönlicher Verunglimpfung bot ein technisches Handbuch wie die *Technon synagoge*. Daher wäre nach der Vermutung von Fortenbaugh (a.a.O. 58 Anm. 21) am ehesten ein Schüler des Aristoteles für die polemische Verdrehung der Fakten verantwortlich zu machen.

¹¹ Vgl. *similiter Isocratem primo artem dicendi esse negavisse und Lysiam primo profiteri solutum artem esse dicendi*. Die Parallelität der Formulierungen zwingt praktisch

beschränkt sich dann aber darauf, Reden für andere zu schreiben. Hintergrund dieser Ausführungen ist der Streit um die Frage, ob die Redekunst eine *Techne* (*ars*) sei, der mit voller Schärfe erst in nacharistotelischer Zeit um die Mitte des 2. Jhs. v. Chr. entbrannte.¹² Berücksichtigt man noch, daß Lysias sowohl in Quintilians Abriß der rhetorischen Theorie (*Inst. or.* 3.8ff.) wie in dem Abriß des Sopatros in dessen Einleitung zu seinem Hermogeneskommentar (*Rhet. Gr.* V 6.12ff. Walz = *Art. script.* A V 16) fehlt, und daß Lysias in der aristotelischen *Rhetorik* nur eine marginale Rolle spielt,¹³ so sind Zweifel angebracht, ob Lysias ursprünglich in der *Technon synagoge* überhaupt berücksichtigt war.

Bereits diese Beobachtungen nötigen zu der Schlußfolgerung, daß Cicero (oder sein Gewährsmann) die aristotelische *Technon synagoge* kaum in ihrer originalen Form benutzt hat,¹⁴ sondern höchstwahrscheinlich in einer nacharistotelischen Fassung, die von einem Schüler des Aristoteles stammte;¹⁵ selbst diese Fassung hat er möglicherweise nicht direkt benutzt, sondern sie wurde ihm vielleicht durch ein rhetorisches Handbuch vermittelt.

Eine solche Vermutung legt sich auch nahe, wenn man die knappe Bemerkung des Aristoteles in *Soph. el.* 34, 183b29ff. (= *Art. script.* A V 6) über die Entwicklung der rhetorischen *Techne* berücksichtigt. Aristoteles unterscheidet dort zwischen der allerersten Erfindung bzw. den ersten Erfindern (b20 τὰ δ' ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς εὐρισκόμενα bzw. b28-29 οἱ τὰς ἀρχὰς εὐρόντες), denen nur kleine, aber um so nützlichere Fortschritte gelingen, und denjenigen, die diese Erfindungen von anderen übernehmen (παραλαβόντες) und sie Schritt für Schritt (κατὰ μέρος) weiterentwickeln und ausbauen (αὐξάνειν). Als Beispiel für die zweite Gruppe nennt Aristoteles die 'heute berühmten' rhetorischen Techniker Teisias, Thrasymachos und Theodoros, die die *Techne* gleichsam als Erbe (οἶον ἐκ διαδοχῆς) von vielen Vorläufern (παρὰ πολλῶν) übernahmen und sie dann nacheinander weiterentwickelten: Τεισίας (Τεισίας Raderm.) μὲν μετὰ τοὺς πρώτους, Θρασύμαχος δὲ μετὰ Τεισίαν (Τεισίαν Raderm.), Θεόδωρος δὲ μετὰ τοῦτον (183b32-33); die

dazu, die Äußerung über Lysias so zu verstehen, daß er lediglich die Existenz einer artifiziellen Redekunst zugab; die weitergehende Deutung, daß er als Theoretiker oder Lehrer der *Techne* tätig war (*profiteri* = 'als Beruf ausüben'), setzt überdies, wie A.E. Douglas (M.T. Ciceronis Brutus, Oxford 1966 z.St.) richtig bemerkt, eine ziemlich gekünstelte Wortstellung voraus. Allerdings läßt die abschließende Bemerkung über Lysias (*artem removisse*) durchaus die Auffassung zu, als habe Lysias später die theoretische Beschäftigung mit der Redekunst aufgegeben.

¹² Vgl. dazu Schöpdau 63ff.

¹³ Im Unterschied zu dem öfters genannten Isokrates wird Lysias in der *Rhetorik* nirgends namentlich erwähnt; Zitate aus seinen Reden finden sich nur spärlich und bedeutend seltener als Zitate aus Isokrates-Reden (vgl. den Index auctorum in Kassels Ausgabe, *Aristotelis ars rhetorica*, Berlin/New York 1976).

¹⁴ So z.B. auch Solmsen, *Gnomon* 26, 1954, 218; Fortenbaugh a.a.O. 46.

¹⁵ So A.E. Douglas, *Latomus* 14, 1955, 539; Fortenbaugh a.a.O.

Gruppe der Vorläufer wird dagegen ohne Namensnennung mit τοὺς πρώτους nur angedeutet.

Daß der Abriß in Ciceros *Brutus* hiermit nur schwer vereinbar ist, dürfte auf der Hand liegen. Im *Brutus* 46-48 fehlt Thrasymachos ganz und Theodoros wird eher beiläufig am Ende der Entwicklung im Zusammenhang mit Lysias erwähnt. Auf der anderen Seite läßt die Formulierung in *Soph. el.* 34 keine Zwischenglieder in der Abfolge Teisias-Thrasymachos-Theodoros zu; der im *Brutus* zwischen Teisias und Theodoros genannte Gorgias wird erst später (*Soph. el.* 34, 183b38) genannt, aber ohne jeden Bezug zur Entwicklung der *Techne* lediglich als Beispiel für eine bestimmte Lehrmethode (nämlich das Auswendiglernen-Lassen von Musterreden). Außerdem rechnet Aristoteles, wie der Plural τοὺς πρώτους zeigt, mit mehreren Vorgängern des Teisias (neben Korax kommt vor allem Empedokles in Frage, dem Aristoteles im *Sophistes* eine Rolle bei der Entstehung der Rhetorik zugeschrieben haben soll).¹⁶ Da es schwer fällt zu glauben, daß Aristoteles in der *Technon synagoge* den Thrasymachos übergangen hat (sein Werk über die Affekte wird *Rhet.* 3.1, 1404a14f. zitiert), sind für sein Fehlen im *Brutus* folgende Erklärungen denkbar: Entweder waren die Theoretiker in der *Technon synagoge* nicht einfach in chronologischer Reihenfolge, sondern systematisch nach sachlichen Gesichtspunkten angeordnet, so daß Thrasymachos unter der Rubrik 'Erregung der Affekte'¹⁷ aufgeführt war; Cicero (oder sein Gewährsmann) mußte dann im *Brutus* einen Ausschnitt aus der *Technon synagoge* ausgewählt haben, in welchem Thrasymachos gerade nicht berücksichtigt war. Oder Cicero (bzw. seinem Gewährsmann) lag nur eine gekürzte Fassung der *Technon synagoge* vor, die sich auf die bekanntesten Rhetoren beschränkte und den Thrasymachos übergang.

Aber selbst wenn Cicero nur eine spätere Fassung der *Technon synagoge* referiert, läßt sein Bericht noch die wichtigsten Grundzüge der aristotelischen Darstellung erkennen. Es sind folgende:

1) Die Rhetorik als eine lehr- und lernbare theoretische Disziplin (τέχνη, *ars*) entstand in Sizilien. Anlaß zu ihrer Entstehung waren die Eigentumsprozesse, die der Sturz der sizilischen Tyrannis (z.B. des Thrasybul in Syrakus 466/465) nach sich zog.

2) Die ersten Verfasser eines Lehrbuches (*artem et praecepta*) waren Korax und Teisias;¹⁸ Gegenstand ihres Lehrbuches kann unter diesen Umständen nur die

¹⁶ Diog. L. 8.57; vgl. Sext. Emp., *Adv. math.* 7.6. Auch Quintilian (s. das folgende Kapitel) erwähnt *Inst. or.* 3.1.8 ohne bestimmte Quellenangabe (*dicitur*) Empedokles als Anreger auf rhetorischem Gebiet.

¹⁷ Spuren solch systematischer Anordnung zeigt auch Quintilians Abriß *Inst. or.* 3.1.8ff., in dem Thrasymachos zusammen mit Prodikos, Hippas und Protagoras eine Gruppe von Theoretikern bildet, die als erste die Erregung von Affekten untersucht haben.

¹⁸ Der Anteil beider an diesem Lehrbuch ist wohl so zu bestimmen, daß Teisias die (im Unterricht mündlich vorgetragenen oder von Teisias aus den Reden des Korax

Gerichtsrede gewesen sein (so explizit Aristoteles, *Rhet.* 1.1, 1354b16ff.).

3) In die Geschichte der *Technē* waren auch Leistungen wie die der Sophisten Protagoras und des Gorgias einbezogen, die keine Handbücher mit theoretischen Regeln hinterließen, sondern ihre technischen Innovationen in Gestalt von Reden weitergaben, die als praktische Musterstücke dienen und, wie Aristoteles (*Soph. el.* 183b38ff.) im Falle des Gorgias ausdrücklich bezeugt, von den Schülern auswendig gelernt werden konnten.¹⁹

4) Als eine Zusammenstellung der Lehren der voraristotelischen Rhetoren endete die *Technon synagoge* naturgemäß mit Isokrates, dem unmittelbaren Zeitgenossen und Rivalen des Aristoteles, der seine Rhetorikvorlesungen angeblich in bewußter Konkurrenz zu Isokrates abhielt (vgl. Cic., *De or.* 3.141, Quint., *Inst. or.* 3.1.14). Auch Isokrates verdankte seinen Platz in der Geschichte der *Technē* wohl kaum der Abfassung eines rhetorischen Lehrbuchs, sondern der Tatsache, daß sich in seinen Reden theoretische Reflexionen und Maximen eingestreut finden; solche Reden konnten dann, was auch die pluralische Formulierung bei Cicero (*se ad artes componendas contulisse*) erklärt, von Späteren als τέχναι bezeichnet werden (so *Epist. Socratic.* 30.4 und 10 = *Art. script.* B XXIV 15 und 16). Von hier war es nur ein kleiner Schritt zu der Behauptung, daß Isokrates ein regelrechtes Lehrbuch (τέχνη, *ars*) verfaßt habe, die aber verschollen sei.²⁰

II. QUINTILIAN

Quintilian eröffnet das dritte Buch seiner *Institutio oratoria* mit einem längeren Überblick über die Geschichte der Schulrhetorik. Dieser Abriß, von dem hier natürlich nur der Abschnitt über die voraristotelische Rhetorik interessiert, zeichnet folgende Entwicklung (*Inst. or.* 3.1.8-15):

(8) Nach einer (unwissenschaftlichen) Vorstufe, von der wir nur durch die Dichter etwas wissen,²¹ gingen erste Anstöße zur Rhetorik von Empedokles

abstrahierten?) Lehren des Korax schriftlich fixierte (dazu Schöpsdau 16f.).

¹⁹ Auch Th. Cole, *The Origins of Rhetoric in Ancient Greece*, Baltimore/London 1991, 81, 86, stellt sich die angeblichen τέχναι des Antiphon, Gorgias und anderer als eine Sammlung von Musterreden vor, der vielleicht eine Art Praefatio vorangestellt war, in der der Verfasser für seine Kunst warb.

²⁰ Z.B. *Vita Isocr. anon.*, p. 105.22 Dindorf (= Aristot. Fr. 141 Rose³ = Fr. 129 Gigon = *Art. script.* B XXIV 11); Cic., *De inv.* 2.7; Zweifel an der Echtheit einer unter Isokrates' Namen umlaufenden *ars* klingt an bei Quint., *Inst. or.* 2.15.4. Von den Modernen glaubt L. Spengel (*Τεχνῶν Συνοψωγὴ sive Artium Scriptores*. Composuit L. Sp., Stuttgart 1828, 169) an die Existenz einer (verschollenen) *Technē* des Isokrates; bestritten wird sie u.a. von W. Kroll (*Rhetorik*, RE Suppl. VII, 1940, Sp. 1049), L. Rademacher (zu *Art. script.* B XXIV 16), V. Buchheit (*Untersuchungen zur Theorie des Genos Epideiktikon von Gorgias bei Aristoteles*, München 1960, 38), K. Barwick (*Philol.* 107, 1963, 43-60).

²¹ Hierbei hat man vor allem an die bei Homer als Redner auftretenden Heroen zu

aus.²² Die ältesten Technographen (*artium scriptores*) waren jedoch Korax und Teisias, auf die ihr Landsmann Gorgias von Leontinoi, angeblich ein Schüler des Empedokles, folgte. (9) Er wurde 109 Jahre alt und überlebte dadurch den Sokrates. (10) Gleichzeitig mit ihm wirkten Thrasyrachos, Prodikos von Kos, Protagoras (von dem Euathlos für 10.000 Denare die *ars* gelernt haben soll), Hippias von Elis und Alkidamas aus Elaia (den Platon 'Palamedes' nannte²³); (11) ferner Antiphon, der erstmals eine Rede schriftlich aufzeichnete, aber auch eine *ars* verfaßte und eine glänzende Rede zu seiner eigenen Verteidigung gehalten haben soll, dann Polykrates (der eine Rede gegen Sokrates schrieb) und Theodoros von Byzanz, ebenfalls einer der von Platon als λογοδοῖδαιλοι bezeichneten Rhetoren²⁴. (12) Von diesen haben Protagoras und Gorgias erstmals die *communes loci*, und Prodikos, Hippias, Protagoras und Thrasyrachos die Erregung der Affekte behandelt. (13) Die genannten Rhetoren fanden viele Nachfolger, unter denen Isokrates, der Schüler des Gorgias, der berühmteste war. (14) Mit ihm gabelt sich die Entwicklung: Auf der einen Seite stehen die Isokrateer, die sich in allen Disziplinen hervortaten; auf der anderen Seite Aristoteles, der, als Isokrates schon alt war, in Nachmittagsvorlesungen selber die Rhetorik zu lehren begann, um nicht Isokrates das Feld zu überlassen, wofür er sich auf einen Vers aus dem euripideischen Philoktet berief ('*turpe esse tacere et Isocratem pati dicere*'²⁵).

Bevor die allgemein verbreitete Herleitung dieses Abrisses aus der aristotelischen *Technon synagoge*²⁶ geprüft werden kann, ist zunächst zu zeigen, daß Quintilian

denken, von denen Odysseus, Nestor und Menelaos kanonisch geworden sind (vgl. Cic., *Brut.* 40 und 50; Quint., *Inst. or.* 2.17.8; 12.10.64; Gellius, *Noct. Att.* 6.14.7, [Plut.] *Vit. Hom.* 172; Strabon 1.2.5, *Prolog. art. rhet. anon.* in: *Prolegomenon Sylloge* ed. H. Rabe, Leipzig 1935, Nr. 4 p. 22.14, und die Parallelen in Radermachers Anmerkung zu *Art. script.* A III 7). Diese von Homer bezeugte 'vorwissenschaftliche' Rhetorik wurde in der Kontroverse, die etwa in der Mitte des 2. Jh. v. Chr. zwischen Philosophen und Rhetoren um die Technizität der Rhetorik ausgefochten wurde, als Argument verwendet, um den Status der Rhetorik als einer *Techné* (*ars*) in Frage zu stellen (vgl. Quint., *Inst. or.* 2.17.6-8); zum ganzen Komplex der Vorstellung einer Rhetorik der Heroen s. Schöpsdau 56-86.

²² *primus post eos, quos poetae tradiderunt, movisse aliqua circa rhetoricen Empedocles dicitur.*

²³ Plat., *Phaedr.* 261D: Platon meint mit dem 'eleatischen Palamedes' aber wahrscheinlich den Zenon; der Fehler bei Quintilian beruht wohl auf Verwechslung des unteritalischen Elea mit dem kleinasiatischen Elaia.

²⁴ Plat., *Phaedr.* 266E.

²⁵ Eur. Fr. 796 Nauck²: ὑπὲρ γε μέντοι παντός Ἑλλήνων στρατοῦ / αἰσχροὺν σωπαῖν, βαρβάρους δ' εἰς λέγειν. Die angeblich von Aristoteles abgewandelte Form überliefert Philodem (*Vol. rhet.* ed. S. Sudhaus, II p. 50 col. XLVIII cap. 36.3ff.): αἰσχροὺν σωπαῖν, Ἰσοκράτην δ' εἰς λέγειν. (vgl. ferner Syrian, *In Hermog. comm.* II p. 60.3 Rabe; Diog. L. 5.3; Plut., *Adv. Col.* 1108B).

²⁶ Rose³ verweist zu Cic., *Brut.* 46-48 (= Fr. 137 der *Technon synagoge*) in Klammern

mit seinem Abriß eine von Cicero unabhängige Darstellung gibt;²⁷ denn nur dann kann Quintilian überhaupt als selbständiger Zeuge für das Nachleben griechischer und speziell aristotelischer Tradition in Betracht gezogen werden. Gegen die Abhängigkeit Quintilians von Cicero sprechen folgende Fakten und Überlegungen:²⁸

Zunächst enthält Quintilians Abriß eine ganze Reihe von Informationen, die sich nicht bei Cicero belegen lassen;²⁹ hierzu gehören insbesondere: der Hinweis auf Empedokles zu Beginn des Abrisses (8); die Nachricht, daß Gorgias ein Schüler des Empedokles war und ein Alter von 109 Jahren erreichte (8/9); die Erwähnung des Euathlos als Schüler des Protagoras (10); die Nennung des Alkidamas und der Hinweis auf Platons *Phaidros* 261D (10); die Nachricht, daß Antiphon erstmals eine Rede schriftlich aufzeichnete und eine *ars* verfaßte (11); die Notiz über Polykrates (11); der Hinweis auf die Erforschung der Affekte durch Prodikos, Hippias, Protagoras und Thrasymachos (12).

Auch Partien, die auf den ersten Blick mit Cicero übereinstimmen, zeigen bei näherer Prüfung Abweichungen oder sind mit Informationen durchsetzt, die nicht aus Cicero stammen; besonders aufschlußreich sind der Abschnitt § 9-10 und die Ausführungen über die Rivalität zwischen Isokrates und Aristoteles:

Die in § 9-10 aufgezählten Rhetoren Gorgias, Thrasymachos, Prodikos, Protagoras, Hippias begegnen als eine Gruppe zwar auch bei Cic., *Brut.* 30. Aber bei Quintilian wird Gorgias von den anderen abgehoben und zu den sizilischen Rhetoren gerechnet; ferner weicht Quintilians Reihenfolge von derjenigen Ciceros ab, der chronologisch korrekt Protagoras vor Prodikos anführt. Schließlich umfaßt die Gruppe bei Quintilian noch den bei Cicero nicht erwähnten Alkidamas und weitere Details, die bei Cicero fehlen (s. oben). Der Abschnitt über die Rivalität zwischen Isokrates und Aristoteles zeigt Berührungen mit Cic., *De inv.* 2.7-8 und vor allem mit *De or.* 3.141, wo auch

auf Quint., *Inst. or.* 3.1.8-13; Gigon druckt den Text von *Inst. or.* 3.8.1-15 als Fr. 126 der *Technon synagoge* ab; vgl. ferner W. Steidle, *Anz. Alt.* 7, 1954, 161 Anm. 22; G. Kowalski, *De artis rhetoricae originibus quaestiones selectae*, Lwow 1933, 43; ders., *De arte rhetorica* I, Lwow 1937, 69; vorsichtiger S. Wilcox, *Corax and the Prolegomena*, *AJPh* 64, 1943, 11-14 (der die Benutzung der *Technon synagoge*, falls eine solche überhaupt anzunehmen sei, auf die Übereinstimmungen mit Cicero beschränkt) und Radermacher zu *Art. script.* A V 10; J. Cousin (*Etudes sur Quintilien I. Contribution à la recherche des sources de l'institution oratoire*, Paris 1936, 164) läßt die Frage offen.

²⁷ Dieser Nachweis ist erforderlich, weil Adamietz in seinem Kommentar zur Stelle (J. Adamietz, M. F. Quintiliani Institutionis oratoriae liber III [= *Studia et testimonia antiqua* 2], München 1966) Quintilians Abriß im wesentlichen aus Cicero herleitet, und zwar vor allem aus dem Abriß im *Brutus* (s.o. Kap. I) sowie aus Passagen in *De inventione*, *De oratore* und im *Orator*, neben denen Quintilian noch Material unbestimmter Herkunft benutzt habe.

²⁸ Zum folgenden s. die ausführlicheren Darlegungen bei Schöpsdau 144-158.

²⁹ Dieses Plus gegenüber Cicero hat natürlich auch Adamietz nicht übersehen.

der abgewandelte Philoktetvers zitiert wird. Aber während Cicero in *De inv.* 2.7-8 von Aristoteles und seinen Nachfolgern ausgeht und erst dann die Isokrateer einführt, ist es bei Quintilian umgekehrt: Isokrates und seine Schüler schließen die Reihe der voraristotelischen Redner und Rhetoren ab, denen dann Aristoteles gegenübergestellt wird, mit dem die Reihe der Philosophen beginnt, die sich mit Rhetorik befaßten (in 3.1.15 folgen *Theophrastus, Stoicorum ac Peripateticorum principes*). Die Übereinstimmung zwischen Quintilian und Cicero beschränkt sich also auf die Nachricht vom gleichzeitigen Wirken des Isokrates und des Aristoteles, die aber als Allgemeingut ohne Beweiskraft ist. Was den abgewandelten Philoktetvers αἰσχρὸν σιωπᾶν, Ἰσοκράτην δ' ἔδν λέγειν (vgl. Anm. 25) betrifft, so fällt auf, daß Quintilians Formulierung mit ihren zwei Infinitiven dem griechischen Wortlaut näher steht als Ciceros Formulierung *De or.* 3.141 (*ille [= Philoktet] enim turpe sibi ait esse tacere, cum barbaros, hic [= Aristoteles] autem, cum Isocratem pateretur dicere*); daß Quintilian Ciceros Wortlaut so modifizierte, daß er die Syntax des griechischen Originals genau traf, wäre schon ein großer Zufall. Hinzu kommt, daß die präzise Angabe des Alters des Isokrates und das Detail, daß Aristoteles seine Rhetorikvorlesung am Nachmittag hielt, nicht aus Cicero stammen. Dieser Befund läßt sich ganz zwanglos durch die Annahme erklären, daß Cicero und Quintilian unabhängig voneinander und mit unterschiedlicher Detailtreue aus derselben Tradition schöpfen. Die Existenz einer solchen Tradition beweist schlagend der Passus bei Philodem, *Vol. rhet.* II p. 50 Sudhaus col. XLVIII cap. 35.21ff., der nicht nur den Philoktetvers zitiert, sondern auch die Vorlesungszeit mit τῆς δεῦλη[ς] angibt. Die Formulierung Philodems ἐκ' ἐ]κεῖν[ο βα]δίζωμεν, ὁ περὶ Ἀριστοτέλους ἀναγγέλλουσιν zeigt, daß dies eine verbreitete Überlieferung war, deren Fortleben in den Rhetorenschulen z.B. Syrian, *In Hermogen. comm.* II 59.21ff. Rabe dokumentiert, wo gleichfalls Philoktetvers und Nachmittagsvorlesungen erwähnt werden.

Es dürfte ferner einleuchten, daß sich auch die unbestreitbaren Übereinstimmungen zwischen Quintilian und Cicero auf diese Weise durch Benutzung einer gemeinsamen im Rhetorikunterricht vermittelten Tradition erklären lassen; an zwei Fällen läßt sich besonders gut zeigen, daß es verfehlt wäre, aus einer Übereinstimmung Quintilians mit Cicero eine Abhängigkeit von Cicero zu folgern:

Quintilians Hinweis auf die von Platon im *Phaidros* 266E so genannten λογοδαῖδαλοι (*Inst. or.* 3.1.11 zu Theodoros) berührt sich eng mit Cic., *Or.* 39 (...*Theodorum inde Byzantium multosque alios, quos λογοδαῖδάλους appellat in Phaedro Socrates*). In Quintilians Abriß geht jedoch bereits eine Anspielung auf *Phaedr.* 261D voraus (10: *quem Palameden Plato appellat, Alcidas Elaites*), zu der es bei Cicero nichts Vergleichbares gibt. Dieser Befund ist am

einfachsten so zu deuten, daß beide Anspielungen Quintilians auf Platons *Phaidros* von Cicero unabhängig sind. Quintilian dürfte sie der Tradition der Schulrhetorik verdanken, die den Platonischen *Phaidros* ebenso wie dessen Gorgias als Zeugnisse der platonischen Auffassung von der Rhetorik nicht unberücksichtigt ließ.³⁰

Für die Notiz, daß Isokrates Schüler des Gorgias war (*Inst. or.* 3.1.13), hätte sich Quintilian auf Cicero, *Or.* 176, berufen können (*Isocrates... cum audivisset adulescens in Thessalia senem iam Gorgiam*); aber er beruft sich gerade nicht auf Cicero, sondern auf Aristoteles als Gewährsmann.

Schließlich verdient die Vermutung, daß Quintilian auf einem in der rhetorischen Schultradition weitergegebenen Abriß fußt, auch im Hinblick auf die Arbeitsweise Quintilians den Vorzug. Denn die Annahme, daß Quintilian seinen Abriß aus verschiedenen Cicero-Passagen kompiliert hat (für die Notiz über Isokrates z.B. müßte Quintilian dann drei Cicerostellen, nämlich *De inv.* 2.7-8, *De or.* 2.94 [oder *Brut.* 32 bzw. *Or.* 40] und *De or.* 3.141, kombiniert haben³¹) und diesen dann noch durch Material unbestimmbarer Provenienz angereichert habe, mutet Quintilian eine Mosaikarbeit zu, die wenig wahrscheinlich ist. Denn zweifellos standen Quintilian durch die Tradition der Rhetorenschule literarhistorische Abrisse zur Verfügung,³² und so ist die Annahme am natürlichsten, daß er zu Beginn des 3. Buches einen der in Rhetorenkreisen verbreiteten Abrisse der *Techne* benutzt (aus dem sowohl das Plus gegenüber Cicero wie die Übereinstimmungen mit Cicero stammen) und hierzu, wo nötig, die Abweichungen bei Cicero notiert (so erklärt sich die Polemik gegen Cic., *Brut.* 27 in § 12 und die in *Inst. or.* 3.2.4 folgende Kritik an der von Cicero in *De inv.* 1.2 und *De or.* 1.33 vorgetragenen Auffassung über die Anfänge der Beredsamkeit).

Nachdem sich so Quintilians Abriß der voraristotelischen Rhetorik mit großer Wahrscheinlichkeit als eine von Cicero unabhängige Darstellung erwiesen hat, bleibt noch die Frage zu erörtern, ob dieser Abriß, wie vielfach angenommen, auf die aristotelische *Technon synagoge* zurückgeht. Eine sichere Antwort hierauf ist nicht möglich, doch scheinen einige Details des Abrisses zumindest auf die Verwertung aristotelisch-peripatetischen Materials hinzudeuten:

³⁰ Vgl. die *Phaidros*-Zitate und -Anspielungen bei Quint. *Inst. or.* 2.15.29.31; 2.21.4; [Dion. Hal.] *Ars rhet.* II 364.14 Usener-Rademaker; *Proleg. Syll.* Nr. 21, p. 320.16ff. Rabe (~ Sopatros W. V. 17.27ff.); Nr. 23.III p. 347.6 Rabe.

³¹ So ausdrücklich Adamietz z.St.

³² Eine vergleichbare Unterschätzung der Selbständigkeit Quintilians gegenüber Cicero, die zu wenig mit dem Einfluß der rhetorischen Fachwissenschaft rechnet, liegt dem Versuch von Fr. Kühnert zugrunde, Quintilians Erörterung über den Witz (*Inst. or.* 6.3) im wesentlichen aus Cicero herzuleiten (*Philol.* 106, 1962, 29-59, 305-314).

- a) Die Einbeziehung des Empedokles in die Geschichte der rhetorischen *Technē* geht mit Sicherheit letztlich auf Aristoteles zurück, für den sie Sextus Empiricus (*Adv. math.* 7.6 = *Art. script.* A V 2) ausdrücklich bezeugt: Ἐμπεδοκλέα μὲν γὰρ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης φησὶ πρῶτον ῥητορικὴν κεκινήκεναι (vgl. *movisse* bei Quintilian); Diogenes Laertios (8.57) weist diese Feststellung dem aristotelischen *Sophistes* zu, geht aber vielleicht über Aristoteles hinaus, wenn er Empedokles geradezu die 'Erfindung' der Rhetorik zuschreibt: Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ ἐν τῷ Σοφιστῇ φησὶ πρῶτον Ἐμπεδοκλέα ῥητορικὴν εὐρεῖν, Ζήνωνα δὲ διαλεκτικὴν (ähnlich Diog. L. 9.25 = Aristot. Fr. 65 Rose³ = Fr. 39,1.2 Gigon).³³
- b) Aristotelische Tradition steht auch hinter der Nachricht von Korax und Teisias als den *artium scriptores antiquissimi*, wie die Übereinstimmung mit Cic., *Brut.* 46 (*tum primum...artem et praecepta Coracem et Tisiam conscripsisse*) zeigt;³⁴ hierfür dürfte letztlich die aristotelische *Technon synagoge*, die ja auch hinter Ciceros Abriß steht, die Quelle gewesen sein.
- c) Die Angabe, daß Protagoras und Gorgias als erste die *loci communes* behandelt hätten, dürfte wegen der Kongruenz mit Cic., *Brut.* 46/47 wiederum auf die *Technon synagoge* zurück gehen.
- d) Da Quintilian im selben Satz auch die ersten Theoretiker der Affekterregung erwähnt, erscheint es denkbar, daß auch diese in Ciceros Abriß fehlende Notiz aus der *Technon synagoge* geflossen ist, die dann vermutlich nach technischen Gesichtspunkten angelegt war.
- e) Ausdrücklich beruft sich Quintilian für die Nachricht, daß Isokrates Schüler des Gorgias war, auf Aristoteles. Hieraus darf nicht geschlossen werden, daß Quintilian sonst nicht der aristotelisch-peripatetischen Tradition folgt; vielmehr war nur hier ein Hinweis auf seinen Gewährsmann unumgänglich, da über die Lehrer des Isokrates verschiedene Meinungen bestanden.³⁵

³³ In welchem Sinne Aristoteles Empedokles einen Anteil an der rhetorischen *Technē* zuschrieb, muß offen bleiben. H. Diels (Gorgias und Empedokles, SBBerlin 1884, 343f.) stützt sich auf das Zeugnis des Satyros bei Diog. L. 8.58, wonach Gorgias Schüler des Empedokles gewesen sein soll, und nimmt an, daß Gorgias nicht nur in der philosophischen Lehrmeinung, sondern gerade auch in der Verwendung der Klangfiguren von Empedokles beeinflusst sei (ähnlich zieht O. Navarre, *Essai sur la rhétorique grecque avant Aristote*, Paris 1900, 11, eine Linie von Empedokles zur späteren Epideiktik; vgl. ferner G. Thiele, *Ionisch-attische Studien*, Hermes 35, 1901, 219). E. Norden (*Die antike Kunstprosa I*, Darmstadt ³1958 [= ²1909], 17) bestreitet eine stilistische Abhängigkeit des Gorgias von Empedokles, da für Aristoteles die Leistung des Empedokles, wenn er ihn *Soph. el.* 34, 183b31 zu den Vorläufern des Teisias rechnet, nicht auf stilistischem Gebiet (λέξις), sondern wie die des Teisias nur auf technischem Gebiet (εὐρεσις) gelegen haben könne.

³⁴ Wilcox (*AJPh* 64, 1943, 13) konstatiert einen Widerspruch zwischen Quintilian und Cicero, da letzterer beiden eine gemeinsame *Technē*, Quintilian jedem eine *Technē* zuschreibe. Doch findet diese Auffassung am Text keinen Anhalt, da sowohl Ciceros wie Quintilians Formulierung auch die gegenteilige Deutung zuläßt.

³⁵ S. die Belege bei Adamietz z. St.

Ob man über die unter b) - d) aufgeführten Details hinaus, bei denen Herkunft aus der *Technon synagoge* möglich, wenn nicht gar wahrscheinlich ist, auch die unter a) und e) aufgeführten Nachrichten auf das aristotelische Sammelwerk zurückführen darf, läßt sich nicht mit Sicherheit sagen, aber auch nicht ausschließen. Bejaht man die Frage, würde dies im Falle des Empedokles bedeuten, daß Aristoteles die in seinem *Sophistes* über Empedokles geäußerte Meinung auch in der *Technon synagoge* vertreten hat.³⁶ Daß Empedokles im Abriß des ciceronischen Brutus nicht genannt ist, ließe sich dann damit erklären, daß er von Cicero ausgelassen wurde, weil es diesem auf die erste Abfassung rhetorischer Lehrbücher (vgl. *artem et praecepta*, Brut. 46) ankam. Schwerer wiegt das ausdrückliche Zeugnis in *De inv.* 2.6, daß die *Technon synagoge* mit Teisias begonnen habe; doch ist es durchaus denkbar, daß Aristoteles in seinem Sammelwerk dem Referat der einzelnen *Technai* (in welchem für Empedokles natürlich kein Platz war) einen Überblick über die vorwissenschaftlichen Ansätze (diese dürften mit *κεκνηκέναι* gemeint sein) voranstellte, der auch Empedokles berücksichtigte. Daß Aristoteles solche Vorstufen annahm, zeigt die Unterscheidung *Soph. el.* 34, 183b29 zwischen Teisias und seinen Vorläufern (... *Τεισίας μετὰ τοὺς πρώτους*), zu denen Aristoteles wohl auch den Empedokles rechnete. Die gleiche Differenzierung zeigt Quintilians Darstellung, derzufolge Empedokles zwar Anstöße gab (*movisse*), die ersten Technographen (*artium scriptores*) aber Korax und Teisias waren. Wenn Quintilian allerdings die Nachricht über die rhetorische Bedeutung des Empedokles nicht dem Aristoteles, sondern mit *dicitur* einer anonymen Tradition zuschreibt, wäre dies als Indiz dafür zu werten, daß ihm die *Technon synagoge* nicht mehr direkt zugänglich war, sondern nur in einer durch die rhetorischen Schultradition vermittelten und weiterentwickelten Fassung.

Was die Notiz über Gorgias als Lehrer des Isokrates angeht, so ist ihre Herkunft aus der *Technon synagoge* freilich nicht beweisbar; da man aber derartige Angaben über die Schulbeziehungen zwischen den einzelnen Rhetoren am ehesten in einem Werk wie der *Technon synagoge* erwartet, ist eine Zuweisung dieser Notiz an die *Technon synagoge* jedenfalls plausibler als eine Zuweisung an den *Gryllos*.³⁷ Da es über die Lehrer des Isokrates nach Quintilians Aussage verschiedene Versionen gab, wurde die aristotelische Version in der rhetorischen Schultradition anscheinend stets mit Aristoteles als Quellenangabe weitergeben, was auch die Erwähnung des Aristoteles bei Quintilian erklären könnte.

Natürlich enthält Quintilians Abriß der voraristotelischen Rhetorik über die vermutlich auf peripatetischer Tradition fußenden Bestandteile hinaus noch Material, dessen Herkunft sich nicht näher bestimmen läßt; das meiste davon dürfte, was auch

³⁶ So W. Steidle, *Anz. Alt.* 161, A. 22.

³⁷ Bei Rose³ als Fr. 139 *Technon synagoge*; für die *Technon synagoge* plädiert auch Laurenti 417 gegen W.D. Ross (*Aristotelis Fragmenta selecta*, Oxford 1955), der die Notiz als Fr. 3 dem *Gryllos* zuweist.

durch anderweitige Bezeugungen nahegelegt wird, aus der Tradition der Schulrhetorik stammen.³⁸

III. DIE SPÄTANTIKEN GRIECHISCHEN PROLEGOMENA

Abrisse der Geschichte der griechischen Rhetorik finden sich auch in den spätantiken bzw. byzantinischen griechischen Prolegomena zur Rhetorik.³⁹ Diese Einleitungen beginnen ihren Überblick über die Entwicklung der Rhetorik gewöhnlich mit einem Kapitel über die Beredsamkeit der Götter und einem Kapitel über die (vor allem durch Homer belegte) Beredsamkeit der Heroen, die hier außer Betracht bleiben können.⁴⁰ Daran schließt sich ein Kapitel über die Rhetorik unter den Menschen, das den historischen Abriss über die Geschichte der Rhetorik enthält. Bei diesen hier zu betrachtenden Abrissen handelt es sich um folgende Texte (vorangestellt sind die Sigla, mit denen sie im folgenden zitiert werden; in Klammern ist die von Rabe vorgeschlagene Datierung beigelegt):

R 4: Προλεγόμενα τῆς τέχνης ῥητορικῆς, Nr. 4 p. 24.5 - p. 28.16 Rabe (4./5. Jh.);

R 5: Προλεγόμενα τῆς ῥητορικῆς Ἑρμογένους des Troilos, Nr. 5 p. 51.24 - p. 53.17 Rabe (nicht nach dem 6. Jh.);

R 6A: Excerpta corporis P, Nr. 6A p. 60.2-17 Rabe (5./6. Jh.);

R 7: Προλεγόμενα τῆς ῥητορικῆς des Maximos Planudes, Nr. 7 p. 67.1-26 Rabe (13. Jh.);

R 9: Ῥητορικαὶ ὁμιλίαι εἰς τὰ τοῦ Ἀφθονίου προγυμνάσματα des Ioannes Doxapatres, Nr. 9 p. 91.18-21 Rabe (11. Jh.);

R 13: Προλεγόμενα τῶν στάσεων, Nr. 13 p. 189.7 - p. 190.5 Rabe (spätestens im 10. Jh. geschrieben, aber im Kern wesentlich älter);

R 17: Συναγωγή σχολίων ἐκ διαφόρων τεχνογράφων εἰς τὰ προλεγόμενα τῆς Ἑρμογένους ῥητορικῆς, Nr. 17 p. 269.4 - 273.22 Rabe (im Kern von Marcellinus [4./5. Jh.]; aber von einem späteren Redaktor überarbeitet);

³⁸ Einzelnachweise für diese Details, die hier außer Betracht bleiben können, bei Adamietz im Kommentar und bei Schöpsdau 154-155.

³⁹ Mit dem Terminus 'Prolegomena' werden im folgenden der Einfachheit halber sowohl die ausdrücklich als 'Prolegomena' betitelten Introduktionen zur Rhetorik als auch die einleitenden Partien in Kommentaren zu rhetorischen Werken bezeichnet. Die von Chr. Walz (*Rhetores Graeci* I-IX, Stuttgart 1832-1836) edierten Texte wurden (mit Ausnahme des Sopatros) von H. Rabe neu ediert in der Sammlung *Prolegomenon Sylloge* (= *Rhetores graeci* XIV), Leipzig 1931; Teile davon hat Radermacher in seine *Artium scriptores* aufgenommen.

⁴⁰ Näheres zum Dispositionsschema der einzelnen Einleitungen und zum Sitz des Abrisses in diesem Schema bei Schöpsdau 3f.; zur Rhetorik der Heroen und der Götter und der Herkunft des entsprechenden Materials s. ib. 56-86 und 87-95.

Sopatros: Ὑπόμνημα εἰς τὴν Ἑρμογένους τέχνην (Kommentar zu Hermogenes), bei Walz vol. V. p. 1ff. mit dem Abriß p. 6.12 - p. 8.26 (4. Jh.).

Nach dem Umfang des dargestellten Zeitraums lassen sich innerhalb der Abrisse ein längerer Typ (A) und ein kürzerer Typ (B) unterscheiden, die auch hinsichtlich ihres Gegenstands voneinander differieren.

(A) Der längere Abriß-Typ liegt am ausführlichsten bei Sopatros vor (R 6A bietet eine komprimierte Fassung; R 13 zeigt Einflüsse des kürzeren Typs). Sopatros läßt die Rhetorik in Sizilien beginnen,⁴¹ wo Phalaris durch eine Volksrede (δημογωγικός λόγος) die Sympathie des Volkes gewann und so zur Tyrannis gelangte. Danach habe Korax als erster Unterricht in der Rhetorik erteilt.⁴² Sein Schüler wurde Teisias, mit dem es zu dem bekannten Prozeß um das Honorar kam.⁴³ Korax und Teisias wurden wegen dieser Kunst sehr bewundert; Gorgias brachte anläßlich einer Gesandtschaft die von Korax oder Teisias verfaßte *Techne* nach Athen und fügte selbst noch eine eigene hinzu;⁴⁴ nach ihm sollen noch Antiphon und

⁴¹ Voraus geht bei Sopatros ein Stück, in dem berichtet wird, daß in Athen Menestheus als erster eine Anklagerede gehalten habe, und zwar gegen Theseus wegen des Todes des Hippolytos (R 13 gibt als Anlaß die Ermordung der Pallantiden an), daß aber danach die Rhetorik jener Zeit infolge des Auftretens der Tyrannen wieder erloschen sei. Dieser Passus bildet offenbar den Schluß des Abschnittes über die Rhetorik der Heroen (am deutlichsten in R 13, wo Menestheus' Teilnahme am trojanischen Krieg erwähnt und er so gleichsam zu den homerischen Heroen-Rednern gerechnet wird); sein Zweck dürfte die Verherrlichung Athens sein, wo schon in mythischer Zeit die Beredsamkeit blühte.

⁴² πρῶτον ἀπάντων συνεστήσατο διδασκαλίαν περὶ ῥητορικῆς.

⁴³ In der ältesten bekannten Fassung bei Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. math.* 2.96, verspricht der Schüler (der bei Sextus namenlos bleibt), das Unterrichtshonorar zu entrichten, sobald er seinen ersten Prozeß gewonnen habe. Als nun Korax nach einiger Zeit den Lohn verlangt, der Schüler aber die Zahlung verweigert, kommt es zu einem Prozeß, in welchem Korax darauf besteht, daß er bei jedem Ausgang des Prozesses seinen Lohn bekommen muß (weil nämlich bei einem Spruch zugunsten des Korax der Schüler zur Zahlung verurteilt wird und bei einem Spruch zugunsten des Schülers dieser seinen ersten Prozeß gewonnen und damit zur Einlösung seines Zahlungsverprechens genötigt ist), während der Schüler gerade umgekehrt argumentiert (ein Spruch zu seinen Gunsten befreit ihn von der Zahlung; bei einem Spruch zugunsten des Korax hat er seinen ersten Prozeß verloren). Die Richter können dieses Dilemma nicht lösen und jagen daraufhin Korax und seinen Schüler aus dem Gerichtshaus mit dem Ruf ἐκ κακοῦ κόρακος κακὸν φόν ('von einem schlechten Raben [Anspielung auf den Namen Korax] kann nur ein schlechtes Ei kommen'). Dieselbe Geschichte wird von Apuleius (Flor. 18 p. 30 K.), Gellius (*Noct. Att.* 5.10; hier als Beispiel für die sog. *argumenta reciproca*) und Syrian (*In Hermog. comm.* II p. 42.2 Rabe) über Protagoras und Euathlos erzählt; es dürfte sich also um eine weitverbreitete Wanderanekdote handeln. Vgl. dazu und zu den Unterschieden zwischen den Darstellungen der einzelnen Prolegomena Schöpsdau 15-16. 29.

⁴⁴ τὴν τέχνην τὴν συγγραφείσαν παρ' αὐτοῦ ἐκόμισεν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐτέραν προσέθηκε. Spengel (*Τεχνῶν Συναγωγή*) [s. oben Anm. 20] 82) schreibt παρ' αὐτῶν, da vorher mit

Isokrates jeweils eine *Technē* verfaßt haben.⁴⁵ Ihre Blüte erlebte die Beredsamkeit in Athen zur Zeit des Demosthenes und des Hypereides; ein gewaltsames Ende fand sie unter Antipatros, der zahlreiche Rhetoren verfolgte und töten ließ.⁴⁶ Erst im römischen Imperium, besonders unter den Kaisern Hadrian und Antoninus, heißt es bei Sopatros weiter, erlebte die Rhetorik einen neuen Aufschwung; von den jetzigen Technikern nennt Sopatros Lollian, Hermagoras,⁴⁷ Minukian und Hermogenes von Tarsos, dessen Bios den Abriß beschließt.

Das Interesse dieses Abrisses konzentriert sich deutlich auf die Entwicklung der rhetorischen *Technē*, also der *theoretischen* Rhetorik. Es werden außer Demosthenes und Hypereides nur solche Rhetoren namentlich aufgeführt, die als Verfasser einer *Technē* galten. Von einer praktischen Tätigkeit dieser Rhetoren erfährt man überhaupt nichts; sie werden nur als Redelehrer und als Theoretiker gewürdigt. Dem entspricht auch die längere Digression p. 7.18 - p. 8.5, in der Sopatros nachweisen will, daß überhaupt die 'Alten' in ihren Reden bereits eine *Technē* anwandten. Der Bericht des Sopatros läßt auch noch erkennen, welcher Teil der rhetorischen Theorie den Schöpfer des Abrisses besonders interessierte: es ist die Stasislehre. Dies wird ganz klar am Schluß des Abrisses, wo Sopatros bei Lollian, Hermagoras und Minukian jeweils vermerkt, wie viele Staseis jeder von ihnen annahm; ein weiteres Indiz hierfür ist die Feststellung, daß die aufgezählten *Technai* von Korax bis Isokrates ausnahmslos Lehrbücher für die Volksrede (*δημογωγικαὶ τέχναι*) gewesen seien und keinen Abschnitt über die Staseis enthalten hätten (p. 7.15-18), sowie der Hinweis, daß die (nicht namentlich genannten) 'Alten' (*παλαιοί*) in ihren Reden bereits die *στοχαστική* und die *προματική* στάσις anwandten (p. 7.18-23). Rabe ist daher sicherlich im Recht, wenn er diesen Abrißtyp auf Porphyrios' Kommentar

τούτους Korax und Teisias genannt sind; Radermacher (*Art. script.* A V 22) behält *αὐτοῦ* bei und bezieht es wie auch A. Gercke (Die alte τέχνη ῥητορική und ihre Gegner, Hermes 32, 1897, 345) und P. Hamberger (Die rednerische Disposition in der alten τέχνη ῥητορική [= Rhet. Studien 2], Paderborn 1914, 32) auf Korax. Da jedoch die vorausgehende Anekdote vom Prozeß zwischen Korax und Teisias als eine Geschichte über *Teisias* eingeführt wird (τούτου δὲ τοῦ Κόρακος Τισίας γέγονε μαθητής, περὶ οὗ λέγεται τοιοῦτόν τι), liegt es näher, *αὐτοῦ* auf Teisias zu beziehen; eine Stütze kann man in der Notiz in R 17 p. 272.31f. sehen, wonach Gorgias Schüler des Teisias gewesen sei.

⁴⁵ Ἀντιπῶν ὁ Ῥαμνοῦσιος ... λέγεται τέχνην γράναι· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα δὲ Ἰσοκράτης ὁ ῥήτωρ.

⁴⁶ Als getötete oder an Antipatros ausgelieferte Redner werden genannt von Sopatros Demosthenes, Hypereides und 98 weitere aus Attika, 'sehr viele' aus Hellas; R 6A: zwei aus Athen (womit offensichtlich Demosthenes und Hypereides gemeint sind) und 100 aus Hellas; R 13: 98 aus Attika und 1800 aus Hellas.

⁴⁷ Nicht Hermagoras von Temnos und auch nicht der Quint., *Inst. or.* 3.1.17 erwähnte Theodorer, sondern ein jüngerer Hermagoras um 150 n. Chr. Vgl. S. Glöckner, *Quaestiones rhetoricae. Historiae artis rhetoricae qualis fuerit aeo imperatorio capita selecta* [= Breslauer philol. Abh. 8.2], Breslau 1901, 54f.; D. Matthes in der Praefatio seiner Hermagoras-Ausgabe (Leipzig 1962) p. V. Schöpsdau 174, Anm. 10.

zur *Technē* Minukians, d.h. zu dessen Stasislehre, zurückführt.⁴⁸ Das bedeutet natürlich nicht, daß Porphyrios den gesamten Abriß selbst geschaffen hat (lediglich die Erwähnung der späten Rhetoren des römischen Imperiums kann auf ihn selbst zurückgehen); denn selbstverständlich hat er Material verwendet, das ihm durch die Tradition vorgegeben war.

(B) Der *kürzere* Abriß-Typ wird am reinsten durch R 4 und R 17 vertreten (R 5 weist eine Kürzung am Ende auf; in R 9 ist der Abriß auf einen einzigen Satz komprimiert; R 7 ist ein Exzerpt aus R 13 und R 5). Er beginnt mit der Entstehung der Beredsamkeit in Sizilien, wo nach dem Sturz der Tyrannen ein gewisser Korax in der Ekklesia auftrat und das Volk durch eine (in bestimmte Teile gegliederte) Rede beeinflußte. Sein Schüler war Teisias; zwischen ihm und Korax kam es zu dem bekannten Prozeß um das Unterrichtshonorar (s. oben). Schüler des Teisias war Gorgias (dieses Detail berichtet nur R 17); als Gesandter der Leontiner kam Gorgias nach Athen, wo er die Athener durch seine Redegabe so beeindruckte, daß sie ihn dabehielten und ihm ihre Söhne zur Unterweisung in der Rhetorik anvertrauten. Aus den Athenern gingen dann die bekannten zehn attischen Redner Antiphon, Lysias, Isokrates, Isaios, Andokides, Demosthenes, Aischines, Lykurg, Hypereides und Deinarchos hervor.

Wie der Überblick zeigt, interessiert den Schöpfer dieses Abrisses vor allem die Geschichte der *praktischen* Beredsamkeit. Korax, Teisias und Gorgias werden zwar auch als Lehrer der Rhetorik erwähnt, aber von keinem wird berichtet, daß er eine regelrechte schriftliche *Technē* verfaßt habe; auch innerhalb der attischen Redner wird nicht unterschieden zwischen reinen Praktikern und solchen Rhetoren, die wie Antiphon und Isokrates nach antiker Tradition auch als Theoretiker oder gar Verfasser einer *Technē* galten.

Neben diesen Unterschieden weisen die beiden Abrißtypen aber auch Übereinstimmungen auf. Zunächst fällt auf, daß beide Typen ihrer Darstellung dasselbe dreistufige Schema zugrunde legen: 1. Begründung der Rhetorik in Sizilien durch Korax (der *lóγος* des Phalaris kann als Vorstufe außer Betracht bleiben); 2. Verpflanzung der Rhetorik nach Athen durch Gorgias (und [so im längeren Typ] Weiterentwicklung durch Antiphon und Isokrates); 3. Blütezeit (*ἀκμή*) zur Zeit des Demosthenes. Am deutlichsten zeigt dieses Schema der Abriß des Sopatros. In R 4 und R 17 bildet die Blüte in Athen einen eigenen Punkt (*κεφάλαιον*): *πῶς ἐν Ἀθήναις ἤκμασεν ἡ ῥητορικὴ*; (p. 27.11 bzw. p. 273.3); die Frage wird beantwortet durch die Aufzählung der zehn attischen Redner, so daß Antiphon und Isokrates zur dritten Stufe gezählt werden. Sopatros hat die ersten beiden Stufen noch dadurch enger verknüpft, daß er Gorgias die *Technē* des Korax oder Teisias nach Athen bringen läßt. In analoger Weise ist in R 17 Gorgias zum Schüler des Teisias gemacht (p. 272.31f.).

⁴⁸ Rabe, *Prol. Syll. praef.* p. XIII f.; zustimmend Wilcox, *AJPh* 64, 1943, 20. Porphyrios wird von Sopatros p. 9.14 Walz namentlich erwähnt.

Eine weitere Übereinstimmung besteht darin, daß beide Abrißtypen der symbuleutischen Redegattung den Vorrang vor den anderen Gattungen zuweisen. In den Abrissen des kürzeren Typs sind sowohl die Rede des Korax vor der syrakusanischen Ekklesia wie die Rede des Gorgias vor dem athenischen Volk Demegorien; Doxapatres (R 9 p. 150.12ff.) wertet daher die Rede des Korax ausdrücklich als Beweis für die Priorität der symbuleutischen Rede. Auch in dem längeren Abrißtyp dominiert diese Sehweise: Sopatros berichtet über die *Technai* des Korax, Gorgias, Antiphon und Isokrates, daß sie ausnahmslos *δημοαγωγικά* gewesen seien und gelehrt hätten, wie man das Volk beeinflussen (*ὑποαργέσθαι*) könne (p. 7.15ff.); die Hochblüte in Athen war eine Blüte *ἐν τῇ δημοαγωγίᾳ* (p. 8.5/6); auch schon die Rede des Phalaris war ein *δημοαγωγικός λόγος*, mit dem er das Volk für sich gewann (*ὑποαργέσθαι* p. 6.19). Allerdings wird diese klare Ausrichtung des Abrisses auf die Demegorie bei Sopatros gestört durch den Hinweis auf die Gerichtsrede (*δικανικός λόγος*) des Menestheus und vor allem durch die in den Abriß eingefügte Partie p. 7.18 - p. 8.5, in der Sopatros aus einer Bemerkung des Isokrates (*Or.* 13.19) folgert, daß von den 'Alten' auch *δικανικά τέχνη* (mit Ansätzen einer Stasislehre) verfaßt worden seien, die sich aber nicht erhalten hätten. Diese Hinweise auf die Gerichtsrede lassen sich jedoch leicht als sekundäre Zufügungen erweisen.⁴⁹

Es liegt auf der Hand, daß für eine Untersuchung über das Nachleben der aristotelischen *Technon synagoge* primär die Abrisse des längeren Typs in Betracht kommen, da nur diese eine Geschichte der rhetorischen Theorie bieten, während sich die kürzeren Abrisse auf die Geschichte der praktischen Beredsamkeit beschränken.⁵⁰ Vergleicht man diese längeren Abrisse (für die im folgenden

⁴⁹ Dazu s. unten. Getrübt wird die Ausrichtung des Abrisses auf die symbuleutische Rede auch in den Abrissen des kürzeren Typs, und zwar dadurch, daß die Prolegomena R 5 und R 17 dem Korax als rhetorische Leistung die Erfindung einer sieben- bzw. fünfgliedrigen Rede-Disposition zuschreiben, die nur auf eine Gerichtsrede paßt. In R 13 dagegen erscheint als Leistung des Korax eine Gliederung in die vier (später durch Isokrates kanonisch gewordenen) Redeteile *προοίμιον*, *διήγησις*, *πίστεις* und *ἐπίλογος*, welche auch für die symbuleutische Rede gilt. Es spricht vieles dafür, daß dies die in der Tradition des kürzeren Typs ursprünglich dem Korax zugeschriebene Disposition war (die in R 4 auf eine Dreigliederung reduziert wurde); die Zuweisung einer forensischen Disposition an Korax in R 5 und R 17 dürfte als sekundäre Umformung der Tradition zu werden sein; vgl. Schöpsdau 27-29. — Davon zu trennen ist natürlich die auf die historische Glaubwürdigkeit dieser späten Berichte zielende Frage, welche Redegattung denn in Wirklichkeit Gegenstand der *Techne* des Korax und Teisias gewesen ist. Aufgrund entsprechender Zeugnisse von Platon und Aristoteles (gesammelt bei Rademacher B II), die vor allem den Wahrscheinlichkeitsbeweis (*εἰκός*) betreffen, ist anzunehmen, daß die sizilische *Techne* die forensische Rede zum Gegenstand hatte; vgl. Schöpsdau 23-23; Cole (s. oben Anm. 19) 82.

⁵⁰ Die Abrisse des kürzeren Typs werden daher im folgenden nur am Rande berücksichtigt, soweit sie für die Interpretation des längeren Typs von Bedeutung sind. Als Quelle für die Nachrichten des kürzeren Typs über die Erfindung der Rhetorik durch den

stellvertretend der Abriß des Sopatros betrachtet werden soll, da er die ausführlichste Fassung bietet) mit dem letztlich auf der *Technon synagoge* fußenden Abriß in Ciceros *Brutus*, so zeigen sich sowohl Übereinstimmungen wie Abweichungen.

Unbestreitbar sind die folgenden Übereinstimmungen: (1) Wie Ciceros Abriß sind auch die griechischen Abrisse des längeren Typs primär an der Geschichte der Theorie (*ars, τέχνη*) interessiert. (2) Die Reihenfolge Korax/Teisias - Gorgias - Antiphon - Isokrates begegnet auch in Ciceros *Brutus*. Allerdings vermißt man bei Sopatros den Protagoras, Lysias und Theodoros. Für das Fehlen dieser drei Namen gibt es jedoch außer der generellen Tendenz zur Vereinfachung und Reduktion der Entwicklung auf die bekanntesten Rhetoren auch eine spezielle Begründung: Protagoras erscheint in der Darstellung des *Brutus* nicht als Nachfolger des Korax/Teisias, sondern eher als gleichzeitig mit ihnen (vgl. *scriptas fuisse et paratas a Protagora... disputationes*) und konnte somit als die gradlinige Sukzession störend beiseite gelassen werden; für Lysias ist fraglich, ob er ursprünglich in den aristotelischen Abriß gehörte (s. oben Kap. I); Theodoros schließlich steht bei Cicero gleichfalls nicht in der Entwicklungslinie der *ars*, sondern wird nur als Konkurrent des Lysias genannt. (3) Die Charakterisierung der unwissenschaftlichen Vorläufer des Korax bei Sopatros (οἱ γὰρ πρὸ αὐτοῦ ἐπιτηδεύοντες τὴν τέχνην ὡς ἐμπειρία τινὶ καὶ ἐπιμελείᾳ χρώμενοι ἐπετήδευον, καὶ οὕτως μὲν οὐ μετὰ λόγου καὶ αἰτίας, οὐδὲ τέχνης τινός) weist eine frappierende Ähnlichkeit mit der bei Cicero auf (*nam antea neminem solitum via nec arte... dicere*).⁵¹ (4) Beide Abrisse nennen im Zusammenhang mit Antiphon den Thukydides, Cicero dessen Urteil über die Verteidigungsrede Antiphons, Sopatros seinen Unterricht bei Antiphon. Wie Ciceros Erwähnung des Thukydides kein ursprünglicher Bestandteil der *τεχνῶν συναγωγή* gewesen sein kann (s. Kap. I), so dürfte auch seine Erwähnung bei Sopatros aus späterer Tradition, vermutlich der Rhetorenschule, herzuleiten sein.

Abweichend von Cicero wird im Abriß des längeren (und des kürzeren) Typs die attische Rhetorik über die Gesandtschaft der Leontiner direkt an die sizilische Rhetorik angeschlossen; bei Sopatros ist diese Verknüpfung von Athen und Sizilien besonders eng, weil er Gorgias die von Teisias oder Korax verfaßte *Techne* nach Athen bringen läßt.⁵² Auf den ersten Blick möchte man diese Angabe des Sopatros

Volksredner Korax und ihre Verpflanzung nach Athen durch Gorgias darf, wie schon L. Radermacher (Studien zur Geschichte der griechischen Rhetorik I: Timäus und die Überlieferung über den Ursprung der Rhetorik, RhM 52, 1897, 412ff.) vermutete, vielleicht der sizilische Historiker Timaios gelten; vgl. Schöpsdau 24-32 (mit Diskussion der älteren Literatur); skeptisch K. Heldmann 24.

⁵¹ Ähnlich wird in dem Abriß der Musikgeschichte des Aristoxenos Fr. 83 Wehrli die Leistung des Olympos, des 'Erfinders' der enharmonischen Tonart, von seinen Vorgängern abgehoben: τὰ γὰρ πρὸ ἐκείνου πάντα διάτονα καὶ χρωματικά ἦν.

⁵² Dem gleichen Zweck diene es, wenn Lysias oder Isokrates zu Schülern des Teisias gemacht wurden, vgl. [Plut.], *Vit. X orat.* 835C-D (= *Art. script.* B II 3), 836F (= *Art. script.* B II 5), Dion. Hal., *De Isocr.* 1, I p. 54.10f. Usener-Radermacher (= *Art. script.* B II 4).

aus der in den kürzeren Abrissen benutzten Tradition über Gorgias herleiten; aber bei näherem Zusehen verflüchtigen sich die Gemeinsamkeiten bis auf das bloße Faktum der Gesandtschaft, das als Allgemeingut zu betrachten ist; die kürzeren Abrisse berichten von einer Rede des Gorgias und deren Eindruck in Athen; Sopatros dagegen weiß nichts von der Redetätigkeit, sondern erwähnt Gorgias nur als Vermittler der sizilischen *Technē*, die er in Form eines schriftlichen Lehrbuchs mitbrachte, und als Verfasser einer eigenen *Technē*. Als Quelle für eine solche Notiz kommt daher eher ein Abriß der Theorie als eine Geschichte der praktischen Beredsamkeit in Betracht, wobei man natürlich sogleich an die aristotelische *Technon synagoge* oder sonst eine wissenschaftshistorische Darstellung der rhetorischen Theorie denkt. Was Aristoteles betrifft, so wird weder in dem vermutlich auf die *Technon synagoge* zurückgehenden Abriß in Ciceros *Brutus* noch in der Skizze am Schluß der *Sophistici elenchi* dem Gorgias eine solche Mittlerrolle zugewiesen. Die in *Soph. el.* 34,183b31ff. vertretene Sukzession Teisias - Thrasymachos läßt zwischen beiden keinen Platz für Gorgias (s. Kap. I); im *Brutus* steht Gorgias hinsichtlich seiner technischen Leistung in der Nachfolge des Protagoras; nicht einmal seine Herkunft aus Sizilien wird erwähnt. Immerhin gibt es aber vergleichbare literatur- oder wissenschaftshistorische Konstruktionen peripatetischer Provenienz, die die Möglichkeit eröffnen, daß die Vorstellung einer durch Gorgias nach Athen verpflanzten Rhetorik peripatetisch ist.

Zu erinnern ist zunächst an die aristotelische Theorie vom Ursprung des Dramas, die für die Komödie gleichfalls eine Entwicklungslinie von Sizilien nach Athen zieht und auch den Ursprung der Tragödie außerhalb Attikas ansetzt (vgl. *Poet.* 3, 1448a29ff., 5, 1449b6ff.; Themistius, *Or.* 27, 337b). Nach der Darstellung der *Geometrike historia* des Eudemos von Rhodos bringt Thales die Geometrie erstmals aus Ägypten nach Griechenland und macht selbst noch viele Entdeckungen (Fr. 133 Wehrli p. 54.18ff.): *Θαλῆς δὲ πρῶτον εἰς Αἴγυπτον ἐλθὼν μετήγαγεν εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα τὴν θεωρίαν ταύτην καὶ πολλὰ μὲν αὐτὸς εὗρεν* (vgl. Sopatros p. 7.12 καὶ αὐτὸς ἑτέραν [sc. τέχνην] προσέθηκε), *πολλῶν δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς τοῖς μετ' αὐτὸν ὑφηγήσατο*. Auch der auf Varro⁵³ zurückgehende Bericht Suetons (*De gramm.* 2), wonach die Grammatik anlässlich einer Gesandtschaft durch Krates von Mallos nach Rom importiert wurde, ist hier zu nennen; denn Varro setzt in Rom die von den Alexandrinern übernommene aristotelisch-peripatetische Tradition des biographischen Zweiges der technologischen Literatur fort,⁵⁴ so daß Suetons Bericht eine peripatetische Konstruktion zugrunde liegen könnte. Die Vermutung dürfte daher nicht ganz abwegig sein, daß bereits der nacharistotelische Peripatos ein solches Modell der Verpflanzung einer *ars* auch auf die Rhetorik übertrug und in

⁵³ Vgl. Fr. Leo, *Plautinische Forschungen*, Berlin 1912, 30 Anm. 1; Fr. Wehrli, *Die Schule des Aristoteles X (Kritolaos)*, Basel 1959, 63f.; H. Dahlmann, *Studien zu Varro 'De poetis'*, AbhMainz 1962 Nr. 10, Mainz 1963, 35 (= 587).

⁵⁴ Dahlmann a.a.O. 26 (= 578)f.

einer auf der *Technon synagoge* fußenden Geschichte der Rhetorik Gorgias die Funktion zuwies, in der er bei Sopatros erscheint. Das von Sopatros erwähnte Detail, daß Gorgias das Lehrbuch des Korax/Teisias nach Athen mitbrachte, macht allerdings wegen seiner Singularität und Simplizität den Eindruck einer späten, allzu durchsichtigen Konstruktion.

Das bei Sopatros (und auch im kürzeren Abriß) vorliegende dreiphasige Entwicklungsschema (1. Erfindung der Rhetorik in Sizilien; 2. Verpflanzung nach Athen durch Gorgias; Antiphon und Isokrates; 3. Blüte zur Zeit des Demosthenes) rückt, wenn man die 2. Phase als Phase der Weiterentwicklung auffaßt, in die Nähe des Schemas εὑρεσις - ἀύξησις - ἀκμή, das seinen letzten Ursprung in der peripatistischen Technographie hat.⁵⁵ Von Aristoteles selbst wird dieses Schema bekanntlich auf die Entwicklung der Tragödie angewandt, wobei er allerdings statt von ἀκμή von der Erreichung der φύσις spricht (*Poet.* 4, 1449a9ff.). Bei der Entwicklung der Rhetorik unterscheidet er in der Skizze *Soph. el.* 34, 183b31ff. deutlich die Phase der εὑρεσις von der des προάγειν und ἀυξάνειν; was die Nichterwähnung einer ἀκμή der Rhetorik betrifft, so ist zu bedenken, daß die Konstatierung einer Blütezeit, da sie gewöhnlich mit dem Bewußtsein der Überschreitung des Höhepunkts verbunden ist, zumeist einen gewissen zeitlichen Abstand von der Blütezeit voraussetzt und überdies kaum von jemandem zu erwarten ist, der wie Aristoteles noch selbst an der Weiterentwicklung der rhetorischen Technē mitarbeitet. Man wird jedoch kaum fehlgehen, wenn man aufgrund der Ansätze bei Aristoteles und der Parallelen in der übrigen artigraphischen Literatur des Peripatos annimmt, daß der Peripatos das dreigliedrige Schema auch auf die Entwicklung der Rhetorik angewandt hat. Ob allerdings das Schema des Sopatros hierfür als Zeugnis gelten darf, ist zweifelhaft; denn dies würde voraussetzen, daß schon im Peripatos Demosthenes an den mit Isokrates endenden aristotelischen Abriß der Technē angefügt wurde, was mehr als fraglich ist (s.u.). Es empfiehlt sich daher, die Herkunft des Dreierschemas bei Sopatros offen zu lassen, was angesichts der späteren allgemeinen Verbreitung dieses Schemas in den Einleitungen artigraphischer Werke ohnehin ratsam ist.

Mit der Bemerkung, daß die *Technai* von Korax bis Isokrates durchweg δημιουργικαὶ τέχναι waren und Anweisungen enthielten, wie man das Volk für sich gewinnen kann (ὑποκρυβεσθαι) könne, steht Sopatros in offenem Widerspruch zu Aristoteles, der nicht nur für Korax und Teisias (*Cic., Brut.* 46), sondern für die ihm vorliegenden *Technai* generell bezeugt, daß sie nur das εἶδος δικανικόν berücksichtigten (*Rhet.* 1.1, 1354b16ff. = *Art. script.* A V 37). Hierin darf man sicherlich die auch bei anderen späten Rhetoren zu beobachtende Tendenz zur Hervorhebung der symbuleutischen Rede wirksam sehen, die z.B. bei Doxapatres der Absicht entspringt, den Nutzen der Rhetorik für das menschliche Leben zu

⁵⁵ Vgl. Dahlmann a.a.O. 5 (= 557)f.; W. Steidle, Einflüsse römischen Lebens und Denkens auf Ciceros Schrift *de oratore*, MH 9, 1952, 38.

unterstreichen;⁵⁶ zu diesem Zweck wird die Geschichte der Rhetorik so dargestellt, als ob sie mit der beratenden Rede begonnen habe,⁵⁷ wofür natürlich die in den kurzen Abrissen bezeugte Tradition von einem Volksredner Korax eine willkommene Bestätigung lieferte. Ob Sopatros von dieser Tradition beeinflusst ist, läßt sich nicht sicher entscheiden, da er von einer praktisch-politischen Beredsamkeit des Korax nichts weiß (man hat den Eindruck, als ob bei ihm der Volksredner Korax durch den 'Volksredner' Phalaris ersetzt worden wäre, wodurch die Macht der Rede allerdings in zwiespältigem Lichte erscheint). Bei Sopatros scheint die Charakterisierung der frühen *Technai* als *δημοαγωγικαί* vielmehr eine Folge davon zu sein, daß der Abriß mit der Blüte der Rhetorik zur Zeit des Demosthenes endet; denn diese Blüte war nach Sopatros' Worten eine Blüte ἐν τῇ δημοαγωγίᾳ (p. 8.5f.). Da Demosthenes und der anschließend genannte Hypereides sowie die Redner ihrer Zeit unter den im Abriß genannten Rhetoren die einzigen sind, auf die die Bezeichnung *δημοαγωγία* zutrifft, und da die Rhetorik dieser Zeit als Höhepunkt und Endpunkt der Entwicklung erscheint, wurde offenbar die ganze vorausgehende Geschichte zur Rhetorik in eine Geschichte der *δημοαγωγικὴ τέχνη* umgedeutet. Damit ist zugleich gesagt, daß die Notiz über Demosthenes und Hypereides der jüngste Bestandteil des (von den Anfängen bis in die Makedonenzeit reichenden) Abrisses ist und nachträglich an die bei Isokrates endende Darstellung der Entwicklung der *Technē* angefügt worden ist; dies ist schon deshalb anzunehmen, weil in einem Abriß der rhetorischen Theorie für Demosthenes eigentlich kein Platz ist (weshalb die aristotelische *τεχνῶν συνωργή* nach Ausweis von Ciceros *Brutus* mit Isokrates endete).

Über die Herkunft der Notiz über Demosthenes lassen sich nur Vermutungen anstellen. Da sie nicht so sehr die rhetorische Leistung als vielmehr das Schicksal des Demosthenes und der attischen Redner betrifft, wird sie kaum einer technographischen Quelle entstammen, sondern dürfte am wahrscheinlichsten auf die historisch-biographische Demosthenes-Tradition zurückgehen, in der das Ende des Demosthenes zusammen mit dem Ende des Hypereides und der anderen Redner dargestellt gewesen zu sein scheint.⁵⁸ Der Terminus *δημοαγωγία* läßt dabei an Autoren denken wie Theopomp, der von Demosthenes wahrscheinlich in dem Exkurs des 10. Buches seiner *Philippika* mit dem Titel *Περὶ τῶν Ἀθηνῶσι δημοαγωγῶν* (FGrHist 115 F 85-100) gehandelt hat, ferner an Idomeneus von Lampsakos, der als einer der ersten Vertreter der Demosthenesbiographie eine Schrift *Περὶ δημοαγωγῶν* verfaßte, und vor allem an Demetrios von Phaleron: dieser hat in mehreren Schriften (bei Wehrli Fr. 131-138) seine eigene Politik verteidigt und sich

⁵⁶ Vgl. Doxapatres (= R 9), *Prol. Syll.* p. 149.11ff. Rabe.

⁵⁷ Vgl. Doxapatres l.c. p. 150.12f.

⁵⁸ Vgl. [Plut.], *Vita X or.* 859A (= *Demosth.* 28), *Suda* s.v. Ἀντίπατρος und Δημοσθένης (I 241.24ff. bzw. II 47.8ff. Adler). Zum folgenden vgl. Schöpsdau 42-44.

dabei vermutlich auch kritisch mit der Rolle der Redner und vor allem des Demosthenes befaßt; Fr. 133 Wehrli berichtet von der Annahme persischen Geldes durch Demosthenes und Fr. 134 Wehrli (aus der pseudoplut. *Demosthenesvita*) von der auch bei Sopatros erwähnten Verstümmelung und dem Ende des Hypereides; man darf daher vermuten, daß er den Demosthenes auch in der Schrift *Περὶ δημοκρατίας* nicht unberücksichtigt ließ. Sollte die Notiz über die Demostheneszeit in Sopatros' Abriß auf diese Tradition zurückgehen (die dem Demosthenes durchaus nicht günstig gesonnen war⁵⁹), hätte man möglicherweise auch eine Erklärung für die in einem rhetorischen Werk doch recht unpassende Nachricht, daß Phalaris, der durch seine Grausamkeit berüchtigte Tyrann Agrigents, durch eine Volksrede (*δημοκρατικὸς λόγος*) das Volk für sich gewann und so zur Tyrannis gelangt sei; denn nach aristotelischer Auffassung ist unter den vier Wegen zur Tyrannis der Weg vom Demagogen zum Tyrannen der meistbegangene (*Pol.* 5.10, 1310b14ff.).⁶⁰ Dies könnte auf peripatetische Provenienz der bei Sopatros überlieferten Notiz über Phalaris deuten, deren Quelle in Schriften *Περὶ δημοκρατίας* oder *Περὶ δημοκρατῶν* zu suchen wäre; daß aus dieser Tradition auch die Nachricht über Demosthenes und Hypereides stammt, wäre dann eine naheliegende Vermutung.

Daraus darf allerdings nicht geschlossen werden, daß schon im Peripatos des 3. oder 2. Jh. v. Chr. der bis Isokrates reichende Abriß um Demosthenes und seine Zeit erweitert worden wäre, wodurch der gesamte Abriß des Sopatros von Korax bis Demosthenes zu einem peripatetischen Produkt würde. Hiergegen spricht allein schon der Umstand, daß Ciceros Abriß im *Bruus*, der in der Schilderung der theoretischen Leistungen der einzelnen Rhetoren der peripatetischen Tradition wesentlich näher steht als Sopatros, mit Isokrates endet; da Demosthenes kein Theoretiker war, war eben für ihn in einem Abriß der rhetorischen Theorie kein Platz, weshalb er auch in Quintilians Abriß fehlt, der gleichfalls noch Spuren peripatetischer Tradition erkennen läßt (s. Abschn. II); dies überrascht um so weniger, wenn die Nachrichten über Demosthenes, wie oben vermutet, nicht aus einem rhetorischen Handbuch, sondern aus der historisch-biographischen Tradition stammen. Auch die mit der Anfügung des Demosthenes verbundene Umdeutung der gesamten voraristotelischen *Technē* in eine *δημοκρατικὴ τέχνη* ist für den frühen und wahrscheinlich den Peripatos überhaupt unvorstellbar, da sie der aristotelischen Tradition widerspricht.

So erscheint es ratsamer, die Erweiterung des Abrisses um die Epoche des Demosthenes in wesentlich spätere Zeit zu datieren (was auch durch die maßlos übertriebenen Zahlenangaben für die getöteten oder ausgelieferten Redner nahegelegt wird); am ehesten kommt hierfür die römische Kaiserzeit, speziell die Zeit der sog.

⁵⁹ Vgl. E. Drerup, *Demosthenes im Urteile des Altertums*, Würzburg 1923, 241ff.

⁶⁰ Phalaris wird von Aristoteles in diesem Zusammenhang allerdings als ein *ἐκ τιμῶν* zur Macht gelangter Tyrann erwähnt (1310b28), während als *ἐκ δημοκρατίας* emporgeworfene Tyrannen andere Namen genannt werden.

zweiten Sophistik in Frage, für die Demosthenes als der Redner schlechthin galt. Hierfür spricht auch der Umstand, daß in der Darstellung des Sopatros zwischen der Epoche des Demosthenes und der Zeit Hadrians eine Lücke klappt; denn Cicero und Quintilian verraten noch eine sehr gute Kenntnis der hellenistischen Rhetorik.

Ein letztes Problem betrifft die Hinweise des Sopatros auf die Existenz von mittlerweile verschollenen *Technai* der 'Alten' zur forensischen Rhetorik (δικονυκὶ τέχναι). Daß hier Einfluß peripatetischer Tradition greifbar wäre, wie Radermacher vermutete,⁶¹ ist sehr unwahrscheinlich. Vielmehr handelt es sich hierbei um sekundäre Einfügungen, die ebenso wie die Hinweise auf die in diesen frühen *Technai* enthaltene Stasislehre und auf die Stasislehren der kaiserzeitlichen Theoretiker damit zu erklären sind, daß der Abriß nach Rabes überzeugender Vermutung ursprünglich als Einleitung zur Stasislehre Minukians verwendet wurde. Als Redaktor des ganzen bis in die Kaiserzeit reichenden Abrisses kommt mit großer Wahrscheinlichkeit Porphyrios in Betracht, der ihn vermutlich als Teil einer allgemeinen Einleitung seinem Kommentar zur *Technē* des Minukian vorangestellt hatte.⁶² Wenn aber die Hinweise auf die unterschiedlichen Stasislehren der Rhetoren der hadrianischen und der Antoninenzeit auf Porphyrios zurückgehen, liegt es nahe, diesem auch die Bezugnahmen auf die Stasislehren im ersten Teil des Abrisses zuzuschreiben; das könnte bedeuten, daß es Porphyrios war, der den gesamten Abriß des längeren Typs unter Verwendung älteren Materials komponiert hat. Wenn bei Sopatros und in R 6A an Minukian noch Hermogenes wie ein Nachtrag angeschlossen wird, so ist dies damit zu erklären, daß der porphyrianische Abriß von einem Hermogeneskommentator übernommen und um Hermogenes erweitert seinem Kommentar vorausgeschickt wurde.⁶³

Versuchen wir ein Resümee zu ziehen, so müssen wir uns mit der Feststellung begnügen, daß von der aristotelischen *Technon synagoge* nur noch sehr undeutliche Spuren greifbar sind. Für Cicero läßt sich noch eine (wenn auch kaum mehr unmittelbare) Kenntnis der Sammlung annehmen; er kennt sie noch als ein Werk des Aristoteles und trägt den Abriß im *Brutus* unter dem Namen des Stagiriten vor. Bei Quintilian und bei Sopatros ist mit stärkerem Einfluß der Schulrhetorik zu rechnen, der zur Folge hat, daß sich der Anteil der peripatetischen Tradition (in der das aristotelische Werk wohl inzwischen aufgegangen war) und der Anteil

⁶¹ *Artium scriptores* S. 16 (zu A V 16).

⁶² Rabe, *Prolog. Syll.* p. XII-XIII.

⁶³ Die Vermutung, daß Sopatros selbst dieser Hermogeneskommentar ist (und die anderen Prolegomena mit ihrem Abriß von ihm abhängen), scheitert an den Divergenzen in den Zahlenangaben für die an Antipatros ausgelieferten Rhetoren (s. oben Anm. 46); denn diese sind am besten damit zu erklären, daß alle drei Abrisse unabhängig voneinander auf die gleiche Vorlage zurückgehen (in der vermutlich von '100 attischen Rednern, unter diesen Hyperdeides und Demosthenes' die Rede war).

der rhetorischen Tradition nicht mehr sauber voneinander trennen lassen. Die *Technon synagoge* erlitt gewissermaßen das gleiche Schicksal, das sie selbst der voraristotelischen *Techne* bereitet hatte; wie sie die Schriften jener früheren Theoretiker verdrängt hatte (vgl. Cic., *De inv.* 2.6), so wurde sie selbst in einer höchstwahrscheinlich sehr komprimierten und auf ein bloßes Fakten- und Datengerüst reduzierten Fassung von der Schulrhetorik in ihre Handbücher integriert und absorbiert, wodurch sie als selbständige Informationsquelle entbehrlich wurde.

Notes on the Byzantine Reception of the Peripatetic Tradition in Rhetoric

Thomas Conley

The century and a half following the resolution of the controversy over images witnessed a remarkable level of interest in the works of Aristotle and Theophrastus. Ninth century manuscripts include *Par.suppl.gr.* 1362 (containing *SE*), *Laur.* 84.11 (*EN*, *MM*), *Ambr.* L 93 sopp. (*Organon*), and *Vind.ph.gr.* 100 (*GC. Cael.*, *Phys.*, *Meteor.*, *Metaph.*, and parts of the *Metaphysics* of Theophrastus). In the following decades, Arethas copied (or had copied) a text of the *Organon* (*Urb.gr.* 35), among other works. We find also a text of the *Organon* in *Marc.gr.* 201, completed in 954; the huge collection of Aristotle's major works, along with Theophrastus' *Metaphysics*, in *Par.gr.* 1853; *Urb.gr.* 61, containing Theophrastus' botanical works; and *Par.gr.* 1741, which contains the texts of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and *Poetics*, and originally contained the *Characters* of Theophrastus as well. I mention only a few.

Such a proliferation of manuscripts of Aristotle and Theophrastus may explain the rather common notion that there was a general renaissance of Aristotelian scholasticism that in turn allows some scholars to suppose that teachers in Constantinople taught Aristotle and Theophrastus in their rhetoric and philosophy classes.¹

It is pretty clear, however, that whatever renaissance there may have been in Peripatetic ideas, it did not extend to the field of rhetoric. There is no firm evidence

¹ See, for instance, O. Schissel, *RE* Ser. 2, 3.2, s.n. "Stephanos 11," col. 2367, citing in turn F. Fuchs, *Die höheren Schulen von Konstantinopel im Mittelalter*, *Byzantinisches Archiv* 8 (1926) 38, 51; G. Podskalsky, *Theologie und Philosophie in Byzanz*, *Byzantinisches Archiv* 15 (Munich, 1977) 68f.; and G. Kustas, *Studies in Byzantine Rhetoric*, *Analekta Vlatadon* 17 (Thessalonike, 1973) 41f., 117f. seem to assume that the *Rhetoric* was taught. It is an impression given also by the Byzantine *testimonia* supplied by Kassel (*Aristotelis Ars rhetorica* [Berlin/New York, 1976]) in his critical apparatus. Cf. also A. Vasilikopoulou-Ioannidou, [*Hē anagenēsis tōn grammatōn kata ton IB' aïōna eis to Byzantion kai ho Homeros*] (Athens, 1972) 53f., 114.

that the rhetorical works of Aristotle and Theophrastus were studied in the rhetorical curriculum.

In an essay published two years ago,² I suggested that the reasons why Byzantine rhetoricians show little interest in or understanding of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* might be summed up in a single sentence: "They didn't need him and they couldn't read him." I stand by the general conclusions of that paper. Here, I want to consider the evidence attesting to the presence of Peripatetic concepts in Byzantine rhetorics from some different angles. I will argue that a good look at that evidence not only supports the general contentions of my earlier essay, but turns up some interesting paradoxes and chastening discoveries, not the least of which is the enormity of the work yet to be done. My method of argumentation, I should add, is far from "Peripatetic." So complex is the material, and so vast, I can at this stage offer only a set of more or less connected "notes" in what probably amounts more to an act of *bricolage* than a coherent analysis.

I

It is well known that Byzantine readers had access to a number of texts that have since disappeared, as a result, for instance, of acts of outright censorship by Byzantine authorities or of the depredations of the crusaders during the sack of Constantinople in 1204. Photios was familiar with some of these lost works: e.g., fifteen speeches by the Attic orator Lykourgos (cf. *Bibl. cod.* 268) and possibly a treatise by Aenisidemos (cod. 212). Sikeliotēs seems to have read Longinus' *Philological Discourses* (cf. *Schol. eis ideōn*, 6.119.21ff.W). That, however, does not entitle us to assume that when a Byzantine author cites or quotes or alludes to a work no longer extant, that work was then available. For instance, Psellos had probably not read all the Sappho and Alkaios he claims to have done (Sathas *MB* 5.57, 59). And we should probably regard with skepticism also his claim (cf. his encomium of his mother, Sathas *MB* 5.57ff.), for instance, that the family library contained the works of Orpheus, Zoroaster, Parmenides and Empedocles "*en epei synegrapsanto*," as well as those of Plato and Aristotle.³ Such claims seem to have been commonplace since the fourth century (cf., e.g., Themistius, *Or.* 6 60B-C). In light of that, it is hard to know whether to take Doxapatres at his word when, having noted the large number of works on rhetoric already written, he claims to have read them all (*Prol.in Aphth.*, PS 82.6ff.).⁴ Let me give a few examples.

² "Aristotle's *Rhetoric* in Byzantium," *Rhetorica* 8 (1990) 29-44.

³ On the other hand, it is possible that Theodore Prodromos spoke the truth when he included a copy of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* in his description of books to be found in the patriarchal library in his speech to John Agapetos (*Vat.gr.* 305, f.75r; text published by S. Papadimitriou, *Feodor Prodromo* [Odessa, 1905] 158-9; also published by Manaphes, *EEBS* 41 [1974] 241.334ff.).

⁴ On the books Byzantine readers claimed to have had access to, see K. Manaphes, [*Hai en Konstantinopolei Bibliothekai*] (Athens, 1972).

In the anonymous scholia to Hermogenes' *On Ideas*, the text of which is found in *Par.gr.* 3032 (10th/11th c., probably of Italian origin), we find a passage (7.2 862.28ff.W) making reference to some questions discussed by Herminos, a minor later Peripatetic writer who is known to have composed commentaries on Aristotle's *Categories* and *De Interpretatione*. If we are tempted to believe that the works of Herminos were still available in the 11th century, we need first to realize that those scholia were originally collected long before, certainly prior to 600 CE. Moreover, the information there can be found in Porphyry (*Proem. in Cat.*, CAG 4.1 59.10-60.30, e.g.) and Simplicius (CAG 8 30.5ff.) on the *Categories*. These were of course widely read—indeed the author names Porphyry and Alexander (of Aphrodisias) at 7.2 863.4f.—appearing in, among others, *Marc.* 201 and *Ambr.* L 93 sop., both mentioned before as examples of MSS. reflecting the renaissance of interest in Aristotle. Similarly, when Gregory of Corinth refers in passing to the story of Eurybates the Thief (7.2 1277.17ff.W), he need not have had a text of Aristotle's *On Justice* at his elbow, for the story can be found in the *Suda* (2.490f. no.3718 Adler). In another passage in the same work—his commentary on the *Peri methodou deinotētos*—we find the definition of a *gnomē* attributed to Theophrastus that Rabe showed long ago was earlier given by John the Deacon (cf. the text offered by Fortenbaugh, *CP* 81 [1986], 137f. = 676 FHS&G), from whom (among many others) Gregory borrows extensively. What Rabe does not mention is that the same definition appears also in the scholia to Hermogenes' *Peri heuresēōs* probably composed by George of Alexandria (George "the One and Only [*Monos*]") in the fifth or sixth century, but attributed there to Alexander Numenios (see 7.2 765.11ff.).

II

The evidence for or against the proposition that there was a continuous tradition in rhetoric that might be called "Peripatetic" has yet to be sorted out properly. We have Walz's volumes to look to, but the shortcomings of *Rhetores graeci* are almost insurmountable. For one thing, Walz's selection of authorities was far from adequate; and while we must stand in awe of what he did accomplish, his control even of those manuscripts was less than complete. A century's efforts to straighten things out have produced some clarification of how the tradition developed and of the main contributors to it, due mainly to the efforts of Rabe, Glöckner, Kowalski, and others.⁵ The clarification, however, often gives rise to other questions. For

⁵ For Rabe, see the introduction to *PS*, along with his preliminary studies, such as the "Aus Rhetoren-Handschriften" series that appeared in *RhM* 62 (1907) 247-64, 559-90; 63 (1908) 121-51, 512-29; 64 (1909) 284-309, 539-90; and "Rhetoren-corpora," 67 (1912) 321-62. For Glöckner cf., e.g., *Quaestiones rhetoricae*, Breslauer Philologische Abhandlungen 8 (Breslau, 1901); "Über den Kommentar des Johannes Doxopatrias [sic] zu den *Staseis* des Hermogenes" I and II, *Bunzlau Progr.* 244 (1908), 258 (1909); "Die

instance, Walz published in 7.1 a compendious set of "anonymous" scholia on Hermogenes found in *Par.gr.* 1983 and 2977, both dated to the late tenth/early eleventh centuries. Much of the material contained there has been attributed to George of Alexandria. But just before the War, two students of Kowalski found in *Par.suppl.gr.* 670 (11th c.) treatments of Hermogenes' *Staseis* attributed to Neilos, founder of the monastery at Grottaferrata who we know died in 1004.⁶ The question is, did Neilos add to the commentary already in circulation; or did he "appropriate" what was already there; or do both; or is the attribution in the MS. (at f.32^v) simply incorrect?⁷

There is a common misapprehension that should be mentioned in connection with this commentary literature. The received wisdom represents Byzantine commentators as mindless imitators of past generations of scholars. The analytic and argumentative sophistication of those authors is, however, obvious to anyone who takes the trouble to read their comments. Keil shows this in detail for the anonymous scholia in 7.1W (op.cit. 177-80). Sikeliotēs is a particularly lively writer who is not afraid to take issue with the ancients: e.g., in his scholia on *Peri ideōn*, he addresses his reader, saying, "look here (*idou gar*), it simply isn't true that all statements are either true or false," offering examples concerning bats (6 202.18-203.8W); addresses an imaginary interlocutor ("*ō gennaie!...*," 6 262.20ff.); and in

handschriftliche Überlieferung der "*Diairesis zētēmatōn*" des Sopatros" I and II, Bunzlau Progr. 267 (1913), 273 (1914). J. Kowalski's contributions can be found in, e.g., "Ad Georgii Moni in Hermogenis status commentarii capita scholiis P adiecta adnotationes criticae," *Eos* 40 (1939) 49-69; "De commentarii in Hermogenis status e tribus interpretibus confecti (Rh.gr. IV Walz) recensione in codice Par.gr. 2923 (P.) obvia," *Eos* 41 (1940-46) 46-80; and his edition of the commentary material in *Palat.gr.* 113, *Analecta hermogeniana*, Prace Wrocławskiego Towarzystwa Naukowego, Ser. A, No.42 (Wrocław, 1951) 7-16. See also L. Schiller, *Quaestiones rhetoricae selectae* (Leipzig, 1903); B. Keil, "Pro Hermogene," *NGG*, Phil.-hist. Kl. 1907, 176-222.; M. Jumeaux, "Une matière d'enseignement: les figures de pensée et de style," *Mélanges offerts à A. M. Desrousseaux* (Paris, 1937) 239-51.; and, most recently, L. Pernot, "Anecdota rhetorica: un résumé d'Hermogène et d'Aphthonius," *Revue d'Histoire des Textes* 10 (1980) 55ff.; and D. Innes and M. Winterbottom, *Sopatros the Rhetor: Studies in the text of the [Diairesis zētēmatōn]*, *BICS* Suppl. 18 (1988).

⁶ See L. Rychlewska, "In anonymum Hermogenis Statuum interpretem (Rh.gr. VII.397-442 W.) cum Nilo (Par.gr. 670, ff. 36^v-65^r) collatum observationes criticae," *Eos* 41 (1940-6) 173-84; 42 (1947) 195-211; V. Borzemska-Lesnikowska, "De anonymo Hermogenis statuum interprete (Rh.gr. VII.320-397 W.) cum Nilo (Par.gr. 670, ff. 1^r-36^r) comparato," in *Analecta Hermogeniana* 19-43. These post-War papers report results of research done before the Nazi invasion in 1939.

⁷ R. Romano has recently re-examined this material, arguing that Neilos was the author of the commentary there. On palaeographical grounds, *Par.suppl.gr.* 670 can be dated to his lifetime; and the cultural milieu in which he operated suggests that he would have been quite capable of producing a commentary, even if his chief claim to fame rested on theological accomplishments. See "Il Commentario a Ermogene attribuito a S. Nilo di Rossano (*Par.suppl.gr.* 670, ff. 1179^v)," *EEBS* 47 (1987/9) 253-70.

apparent frustration seems to take Hermogenes himself to task (6 282.18ff.), posing difficult questions and then explaining at 283.27ff. Doxapatres (*PS* 309f.) works through the question of whether "*Peri staseōn*" was the original title of Hermogenes' work, citing the opinions of Photios; and wonders why, of all the books written on rhetoric, only those of Hermogenes were commented on (317.12ff.). On the question of the definition of rhetoric, he points out that "there are many"; and the differences are important enough to discuss at length (*PS* 96.25ff.). It is possible to continue at enormous length on this matter.

III

The bearing of questions about transmission on the issue of whether there was any "Peripatetic" tradition influencing Byzantine conceptions of rhetoric becomes clear when we observe in 7.1 320-442W a number of citations of Aristotle (e.g., 322.13ff., 396.12ff., 401.6ff.) and some extended discussions that seem to be structured along lines suggested by Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (e.g. 336.7ff. and 343.1f., on the functions of an epilogue; 342.18ff., on those of the *prooimion*; 371.1ff. on *semeia*, etc.). Are these additions made possible by new access to the text of the *Rhetoric*, as Neilos may have had in MSS. such as *Par.gr.* 1741 (c.954)—not very likely, as I shall argue later—or are they citations and topics that had been commonplace for centuries? On the one hand, it is possible to assert that on some subjects, it is indeed Aristotle's authority to which Neilos (if it was Neilos) appeals (as on the subject of "definitions" at 396.12ff.), even sometimes wrongly (as at 322.13ff.: the "featherless biped" example is not from Aristotle, but "Plato," *Def.* 415A, *Platonis opera* 5.2 [ed. Burnet; Oxford, 1905] or, more likely, Elias, *CAG* 18 89.11-29, e.g.; and cf. Pseudo-Elias [ed. Westerink; Amsterdam, 1967], §44.4. I still do not know when the "*alektryōn*" entered the picture). But Neilos's elucidations are in any event drawn from the *Topics*, or commentaries on the *Topics*, not the *Rhetoric*. As for the discussions of prologues and epilogues, we find more precise, and less amplified, discussions in, e.g., the scholia attributed to Markellinos, a student of Olympiodoros, in 4 424ff.W. Thus, either the "Aristotelian" material in 7.1 is itself old, and not a contribution by Neilos; or it is a contribution by Neilos, but nevertheless still old, collating information found in two sets of scholia on Hermogenes available to him.

That the latter explanation is probably right seems to be confirmed by the fact that the vast majority of citations of or references to Aristotle or Theophrastus or the Peripatetics found in commentaries on Hermogenes can be traced back to the same Athenian and Alexandrian milieux that produced the commentaries on the *Organon*, the *Topics*, and most of the rest of Aristotle's works—excluding the *Rhetoric*, on which there was no commentary tradition as far as we can tell. For instance, in the prologue of Markellinos (4 16.6ff.W = *PS* 273.30ff.) and in the

Anonymous (6 27.10ff. = PS 40.4ff.), we find apparent allusions to Aristotle *Rhetoric* 1.8 1365b28ff.; but the more likely source may be found in Ps-Elias (ed. Westerink; Amsterdam, 1967), p.44, §22.10-11. We shall look at some seeming exceptions—and some real exceptions, viz., the twelfth century commentaries on the *Rhetoric* produced most likely under the patronage of Anna Comnena—later. At present, however, it may be possible to state confidently that between the middle of the sixth century and the middle of the eleventh—indeed, up to the end of the fourteenth—there is no evidence of any substantial interest in Peripatetic rhetoric as such, and only a little evidence of peripheral interest in it.

IV

Even if the whole body of evidence were properly edited, cross-referenced, and put right in terms of who said what when, we would still be required to face up to a question that is inevitable in any consideration of “traditions.”⁸ Let me give an example. In composing his critique of Isokrates’ style (*Bibl. cod.* 159, 101b4ff.), Photios seems to have had Hermogenes (cp. *Peri ideōn* 397.14-17R) at his elbow. But the sentence that runs from “*atonos...*” to “*aitiatai*” (102a14-16) is probably based on what Dionysios of Halicarnassos said about Isokrates at *Dem.* 20. Dionysios’ characterization there of Isokrates’ style as *atonos* apparently derives from an observation made by Hieronymos of Rhodes, a near-contemporary of Theophrastus: cp. DH *Isokr.* 13 and the fragment in Philodemos’ *Rhetorica* 4, col. XVI*13-XVIII*8, 1.198-200 Sudhaus.⁹ Theophrastus, we are told by Athanasios (PS 177.3ff. = 712 FHS&G; cp. 6 35.3-36.4W, not printed in PS), held that successful delivery is a function of the integration of composition, emotional effect, and tone of voice. Athanasios’ version is very close to Dionysios’ version of Hieronymos. Hence, we can probably trace back the critical notion of *tonos/atonos* from Photios back to Dionysios, who in turn got it from Hieronymos (so he says), who in his turn got it from Theophrastus. It seems, then, that we have discovered a Peripatetic scholastic “tradition” that Photios has appealed to in the process of supplementing the remarks of his chief authority, Hermogenes. But in repeating something from Dionysios of Halicarnassos, was Photios bearing witness to a specifically *Peripatetic* tradition? It seems a little extreme to put it that way.

There are many examples of the difficulty of establishing the existence of a (continuous) tradition to be found in the commentary literature we are here considering, most of them as it happens clustering around discussions by Byzantine

⁸ Some idea of how painfully difficult the task of crossreferencing can be can be seen in V. DeFalco, “Trattato retorico bizantino,” *Att.Soc. Linguistica Scienze e Lettere (Genova)*, n.s. 9 (1930) 71-124.

⁹ The text can be found in F. Wehrli, *Die Schule des Aristoteles* 10, 21f.; and see J. Bateman, “The Critique of Isocrates’ Style in Photius’ *Bibliotheca*,” *Illinois Classical Studies* 6 (1981) 182-96.

authors of other "Peripatetic" critical doctrines—that of the "virtues of style," for instance, and that of the three "levels" of style. There are many passages in Byzantine rhetorical commentaries that discuss, sometimes at great length, the four "virtues of style." Some might be tempted to see in such discussions a continuation of the Theophrastean refinement of Aristotle, in spite of the fact that they almost invariably arise in the context of the chapter in Aphthonios devoted to narrative (*diēgēsis*). The virtues enumerated in those discussions do indeed bear some resemblance to those attributed to Theophrastus (*saphēneia*, *prepon*, *kataskeuē*, and *hellenismos*, in most accounts; cf. 684 FHS&G): in Aphthonios (on *diēgēsis*) we find *saphēneia*, *syntomia*, *pihanotēs*, and *hellenismos* (1 61.8-10W). "*Pihanotēs*" might be equated with either *prepon* or *kataskeuē*, but what of *syntomia*, and what about the fact that Aphthonios is talking about *diēgēsis*? In the midst of his long discussion of the Aphthonios passage in his *Homiliai*, Doxapatres notes (2 228.12ff.W) that some *exēgetai* have drawn attention to the function of *syntomia* in working on the emotions of the audience; and a little later (230.9ff.) he explains the emotional effect of the opposite of *syntomia*. Emotional affect is connected by some with Theophrastus' *kataskeuē*; a connection that is hinted at by Athanasios (PS 177.14ff.) and the anonymous author of the prolegomenon to *On Staseis* found in *Par.gr.* 1983 and 2977 (PS 201.20f.), who calls them "virtues" not of narration but of "expression" (*hermēneia*) generally. In that latter connection, the author of the Anonymous Seguerianus reports (§103, p.20.8ff. Graeven) that, according to Theodoros of Gadara, *syntomia* "may be most appropriate to narration but need not be restricted to it," (and cp. DH *Dem.* 34 fin.). Thus (it could be argued) despite superficial differences, what we are seeing in those later commentators on Aphthonios, if not in Aphthonios himself, is a Hellenistic revision of the Theophrastean virtues. If that is the case, however, we are once again faced with a set of texts that can be construed by us as exhibiting "Peripatetic" influence, but were not so construed by the writers we have named. They seem to be following, instead, authorities such as Dionysios of Halicarnassos and Demetrios. In short, they may have been influenced by Peripatetic doctrine, but they didn't know it. And if it is the case that Aristotle in fact recognized a single virtue of style that was a blend of clarity, propriety, etc. (as Doreen Innes has argued),¹⁰ Byzantine writers on the subject got Aristotle "wrong," but that was because their chief interest was in shedding light on Hermogenes.

A similar case could be made concerning the "levels" doctrine. In Doxapatres (*Prol.in Aphth.*, PS 141.9ff., and *Prol.in Id.*, PS 373.3f.), we find *hadros*, *tapeinos*, and *mesos*: the first is characteristic of Lykophron, the second of Gregory Nazianzus, and the last of John Chrysostom. Here Doxapatres seems to follow an earlier authority such as the author of the anonymous prolegomenon to Aphthonios found

¹⁰ See "Theophrastus and the Theory of Style," in *Theophrastus of Eresus. On His Life and Works*, ed. W. Fortenbaugh et al. (New Brunswick, NJ, 1985) 255f.

in *Vat.gr.* 107 (PS 79.25-80.4); or perhaps "Phoebammon" in his prolegomenon to Hermogenes' *Peri ideōn* (PS 377.10ff.), listing *austēron*, *meson*, and *ischnon*; or perhaps Sikeliotes, who lists *ischnos*, *mesos*, and *hadros* in his introduction to *Peri ideōn* (PS 411.10ff. = 6 72.2ff.W). On this subject, too, the authorities these writers had in view were Dionysios (cf., e.g., *Dem.* 1-3) and Demetrios (who does mention Theophrastus, *Eloc.* §222 [= 696 FHS&G], on *pihanoitēs*), both of whom are mentioned specifically by "Phoebammon" (at PS 377.6ff., 380.7f.) and Sikeliotes (413.5f.) alike.

Their chief interest was not in preserving Peripatetic lore, however, but in making sense of Hermogenes. Believing, as they did, that in spite of superficial differences, all ancient authorities were talking about the same "rhetoric," Byzantine readers had a hard time reconciling "*charaktēres*" with Hermogenes' "*ideai*." On that subject, on which they found nothing in Hermogenes, they cannot have found much clarification in, e.g. Dionysios' *Demosthenes* (1, 1.127.6f. U-R) or in the *Techne* of Aristeides (2 460.5f.Sp), for both of them use "*areiz*," "*charakter*," and "*idea*" in ways that served only to confuse matters more. Thus, "Phoebammon" devotes considerable attention to this question, pointing out, on the one hand, how "*charaktēr*" and "*idea*" may be seen as related "*metaphorikōs*" (383.28f.) but stating very concisely how they differ: the one refers to "a whole," the other to a "quality" of expression (388.4), which explains why Hermogenes gave the title he did to his work (386.10ff.). Sikeliotes follows this explanation, for the most part (6 78.14ff.W), after examining various opinions, including those of Demetrios (71.6ff.) and Dionysios (73.24ff.).

It is, I think, commonly accepted that Hermogenes' "ideas" developed out of the "characters" of style discussed by Dionysios and Demetrios; and that Hermogenes simply "worked them out in more detail,"¹¹ thus making it possible for us to reconcile Hermogenes with a Peripatetic tradition. But Byzantine readers did not have such an easy time of it. They did not in any event seem to think of either Dionysios or Demetrios as "Peripatetic." The important point, however, is that the purpose of all their discussions is to clarify Hermogenes' observation in the first chapter of *Ideon* that imitative zeal alone will not suffice: one needs to discover a system that will allow one to discern *akribōs* the elements (*stoicheia*) and principles (*archai*) of *ideai*, "how many there are, how they can be mixed, and what those mixtures are capable of achieving" (217.11ff. Rabe). Thus, once again we are seeing a "tradition" that Byzantine readers arguably did not.

¹¹ G. Kennedy, *Greek Rhetoric Under Christian Emperors* (Princeton, 1983) 96: Kennedy probably misspoke himself when he said that the ideas developed out of the "virtues of style." But he is not alone—Stroux also seems to confuse the two. See also the discussion of M. Patillon, *La théorie du discours chez Hermogène le rhéteur* (Paris, 1988) 107ff.

V

The opening chapter of *Peri ideōn* posed different problems for different generations of commentators in the Byzantine tradition. The appearance in that chapter of terms such as *idea* (215.5, 10, 14R), *logos* (esp. at 215.18), and *mixis* (215.4, 14) and their various combinations brought a whole host of associations into the mind of Athanasios, for instance. Believing, as those of his generation and milieu did, that *philosophia* was a unitary thing and that rhetoric needed to be fitted into the scheme of *philosophia*, Athanasios offers a gloss of "the species of *logos*" that calls up the Peripatetic doctrine (so he tells us, PS 186.17ff.) of five types of proposition (*logoi*). This classification he places in the context of two other distinctions, neither of them Peripatetic: that between the *logos endiathetos* and the *logos prophorikos* and (on another dimension) between *logos theōretikos* and *logos praktikos*.¹² The five-way classification of *logoi* apparently goes back to the remark Aristotle made at *De int.* 17a1 about the difference between a proposition (a *logos apophantikos*) and a prayer. The roots of the classification, in other words, were in dialectic (see the treatment in Ammonios *In de int.*, CAG 4.5 2.5ff.); but here it is brought in to clarify rhetoric.¹³ Like much else in those prolegomena composed in the "university" setting in 4th and 5th century Athens, the point seems to be to legitimate rhetoric by demonstrating its close ties to dialectic.¹⁴

It is in the context of the distinction between the two kinds of *logos* that Athanasios reports that "others have elaborated the matter of the *endiathetos logos*, including Lollianos and Theophrastus" (PS 188.7f. = app. 673A FHS&G. I follow Rabe's punctuation. The alternative, a full stop after "*kosmouai*," would make Theophrastus the source of a distinction usually regarded as Stoic—not impossible, but resting on a circular argument in this case). Athanasios seems to be the source of the prolegomena found in *Par.gr.* 3032 (no.14 PS, pp.228.20ff.). But the reference

¹² Such distinctions seem to have been Stoic in origin, assimilated to some degree by later "Peripatetics." See the discussion in G. Nuchelmans, *Theories of the Proposition*, North-Holland Linguistic Series 8 (Amsterdam/London, 1973) 62ff., 101-3. Carlo Natali has referred me to *Pol.* 7.14 1333a25, where a distinction is made between the *logos theōretikos* and the *logos praktikos*. I note here that Susemihl brackets that line.

¹³ It also shows up in grammar. See Apoll. Dysc., *Syntax.* 349.1-10 Uhlig; *Schol. in Dion. Thr.* 245, 399, 558 Hilgard; Choïroboskos, *GG* 4.4-9, etc.

¹⁴ This raises the issue of "context theory" (on which see Deborah Black's *Logic and Aristotle's Rhetoric and Poetics in Medieval Arabic Philosophy* (Leiden/New York, 1990). To get into this question in any detail would be beyond the scope of the present paper. But it should be noted that, if it is true that Ammonios et al. sought to ground rhetoric in dialectic in a systematic way, later Byzantine rhetoricians were not altogether comfortable with the idea. See, e.g., the comments by Doxapatres, PS 88.20ff., where he says rhetoric is necessary for the ordering (*systasis*) of all the other arts and sciences; see also 109.25ff., 110.11ff.

made at 232.4ff. (= 673A FHS&G) to the "arts" on the epicheireme and enthymeme by Lollianos and Theophrastus which addressed the question of "what sorts of enthymemes one should use for accusing or counseling or praising" does not appear in Athanasios. That question the author holds to pertain to the *logos endiathetos*; by contrast, the elaboration of the *logos prophorikos* treats of beauty of expression (*kallopismon tēs phraseōs*) and eurhythmia of composition (*synthesis*). The same framework—including the enumeration and exemplification of the types of proposition—is, however, brought to bear on a quite different matter in the anonymous scholia to Aphthonios (2 565-684W), where the commentator works it into his introduction to the rhetorical exercise dealing with the *thesis* (see 661.3-63.27; the five-part passage runs from 661.25-62.26). By the eleventh century, then, the various dialectical doctrines distinguishing "inner" and "outer" speech and the rest seem to have been separated completely from their original functions. In the same century, moreover, we find Doxapatres, for instance, taking issue with the proposition that rhetoric is concerned only with *logos prophorikos* (PS 123.17ff.).

VI

The extended discussion on the term at 7.2 762.17ff.W shows clearly that Byzantine rhetoricians had trouble also with "*enthymēma*," mainly because an important exegetical tradition regarding enthymemes—the one based on commentaries on Aristotle's dialectical treatises—was at variance with the use of the term by Hermogenes. Thus, we find the commonplace notion of the enthymeme as a *sylogismos atelēs* often repeated in works copied all the way down to the fifteenth century. That definition appears to have originated with comments made by Alexander of Aphrodisias on *An.Pr.* 2.27 (see CAG 2.1 23.16ff.). It is repeated by Ammonios (CAG 4.3 p.8.8ff.) and shows up in prolegomena to the works of Hermogenes (e.g., *Anon.in Staseis*, 7.1 14f. and *Anon.* II, 7.1 36.22W [= PS 240.24f.] and in Planudes' excerpts from that prolegomenon at 5 403.11ff.W; PS 234.5, from *Par.gr.* 3032; PS 324.15f., from a 14th century pastiche of passages from Sikeliotēs, Doxapatres, and others). These passages all go back to the milieu of late classical "Peripatetic" schools and nothing like them appears in the commentaries proper. There are two passages in Walz that are of interest. Minoukianos (9 605.8ff.) seems to suggest that an enthymeme is a "compressed induction, which is called an enthymeme when what is missing is supplied by the listener." This is echoed in John the Deacon's explanation of *epenthymemes* in the passage excerpted by Gregory of Corinth in his commentary on *Peri methodou deinotētos* (7.2 1153ff.W) where such a view is attributed to Theophrastus (= *app. crit.* 675 FHS&G); but it is also close to Demetrios *Eloc.* §222, on the one hand, and Alexander of Aphrodisias on *Topics* 1.1, CAG 2.2 9.1ff., on the other. Aristotle, of course, makes a similar observation at *Rhet.* 1.2 1357a16ff. The other passage is found in the anonymous commentary on Hermogenes' *On Invention*, where the author notes that enthymemes

are especially useful when you know the *gnomē* against which you speak, reminiscent of *Rhetorica Ad Alexandrum* 10, 1430a23ff. This passage, in turn, may go back to Syrianos, whose commentary on the same work contains a number of passages echoing the *Ad Alexandrum* (e.g., 2.11.17-12.2; 12.10-13; 127.4-12; 176.17-177.8, etc. [ed. Rabe (Leipzig, 1893)]). As a rule, however, the "Peripatetic" notion—indeed, the properly Aristotelian notion even more—of *enthymēma* and *epenthymēma* alike is irrelevant to what Hermogenes is talking about in *On Invention* 3. pp.150.17-54.8R; and such passages as we do find are evidence not of erudition but of exegetical desperation.

VII

On the subject of delivery, it might be said that the Peripatetic "tradition" is contradictory. Aristotle, of course, viewed it as peripheral, more the art of the actor than the rhetor; while by contrast, Theophrastus, we are frequently told, considered it the most important part of the art. Support for both positions can be found in Byzantine rhetorical treatises. The Anonymous at 7.1 17W (= PS 202.5ff.), which appears in both *Par.gr.* 1983 and 2977, says, "Some add two [parts] to these ... memory and delivery (*hypokrisis*); but these we say are not consistent (*systatika*) with the art, for they are not products of practice (*meletē*), but accessories of nature." On the other hand, we find in the excerpt from one of the prolegomena found in *Par.gr.* 3032 (fol.601^vf.; see PS 299.17ff.) an enumeration of the (five) parts of rhetoric that includes memory and delivery. This last the author has already defined as "the persuasive coordination (*diathesis*) of voice and posture (*schēma*) appropriate to the persona assumed and the issue" (299.15f.). Similarly, in his account of the origins of rhetoric, Markellinos tells the old story about Hieron's harsh strictures on the Syracusans, "going so far as to forbid them to speak at all, but rather to signify (*sēmainein*) what they wanted to say, or what happened to need saying, by means of their feet and hands and eyes. There, they say, one can find the origins of orchestral [art] (*tēn orchestikēn*)."¹ In the course of his discussion of the definition of rhetoric in his introduction to Aphthonios, Doxapatres points out that *ennoiai* expressed in the *logos prophorikos dia phthengou* can also be expressed *di' orcheseōs* (see PS 122.18-123.5). And we find the story of how Demosthenes said that the most important part of his art was delivery frequently repeated in sources read by Byzantine students of rhetoric (PS 176.12-177.8, a passage from the prolegomenon to *On Staseis* by Athanasios that brings Theophrastus into the picture [177.3 = 712 FHS&G]; cp. Longinus, *Technē* 195.6 Sp-H, of Demosthenes; Photios, *Bibl.*, cod. 265, 493b8f., etc.).

VIII

Scholars combing through the available scholia on Hermogenes found on

occasion references to the teachings of Demetrios, Dionysios of Halicarnassos, Minoukianos, and Menander Rhetor; the *technai* of Longinus and Apsines; and the opinions of Aristotle and Theophrastus. Statistically speaking, references to such ancient authorities are not very frequent; and, as we can see, they are often not very accurate. The example that comes to mind is the confusion about whether it was Dionysios of Halicarnassos (as in Anon. *Prol.*, PS 30.12) or Dionysios Thrax (Doxapatres *In Aphth.*, PS 106.21ff.) or, indeed, Lollianos (Sopatros, 5 17.17W) who defined rhetoric as "the *dynamis technikē* " of persuasive discourse. One reason for this sort of problem may be that there were no texts of those works in circulation. If that was the case, readers of the older scholia by Syrianos, Markellinos, George Monos and the like must have felt no little frustration.

We find in a remarkable manuscript, probably produced during the reign of Constantine Porphyrogenitus (945-59 CE), an attempt to correct that situation. *Par.gr.* 1741 provided scholars with texts by a large number of authors whose works were apparently ignored by the scholarly community until then. In it we find the *technē* attributed to Dionysios, Menander's work on epideictic, Aristeides on political rhetoric, Dionysios' *On Composition*, "Demetrios" *On Elocution*, and other treatises on rhetorical matters, including, of course, the earliest versions we have of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and *Poetics*. In view of the fact that Aristotle is just one of many authors whose works were copied for this manuscript, it is hard to say that *Par.gr.* 1741 is evidence for a specifically "Aristotelian" renaissance.

Missing from the MS. we possess are various works by Theophrastus that were originally included, according to the *pinax* inscribed on the verso side of the last folio leaf (f.301^v). There we read that, between the end of the *Poetics* (f.199^v, which has just a few lines) and the beginning of Dionysios' *On Composition*, there were texts of the *Physiognomika* (attributed by many scholars to Theophrastus, not Aristotle), *On signs*, *De ventorum situ*, and *The Characters*.¹⁵

Elisabetta Matelli has argued recently,¹⁶ on the basis of some rather complex calculations, that *Par.gr.* 1741 may have contained the texts of all thirty of the "Characters" (p.376). If that is the case, then the text in 1741 would have been the oldest extant, had it survived—the same status, we might add, as that accorded to the texts of the *Rhetoric* and *Poetics*, as well as Menander, Apsines, and the rest in this compendium of texts. And if it did contain thirty of the characters, it would have been also the most complete text. When and why was it removed? (The same question holds for the *Physiognomika*, of which more later.)

Matelli conjectures that the text of *The Characters* and the *Physiognomika* were removed from 1741 some time during the 13th century, possibly by Planudes or

¹⁵ For a description and discussion of this MS., cf. D. Harlfinger/D. Reinch, "Der Aristotelica des Parisinus Gr. 1741," *Philologus* 114 (1970) 28-50. See Plate IV for fol.301^v.

¹⁶ In "Libro e Testo nella Tradizione dei Caratteri di Teofrasto," *Scrittura e Civiltà* 13 (1989) 329-86.

some other member of his circle. In the meantime, one can conjecture that those texts remained available to scholars. Parts of *Characters* appear in *Par.gr.* 1983 (chs.1-15) and 2977 (chs.16-30), from shortly after the production of 1741, which Navarre thinks was the source of the texts in those; *Vat.gr.* 110 (13th) contains chs. 16-30; and the "Planudean" manuscripts, *Laur.S.Marc.* 294 (14/15th) and *Par.gr.* 2920 (15th) contain the texts of 1-15. Whether 1741 was the source of those partial texts or not (Matelli thinks there were many different recensions in circulation; but Navarre groups all those MSS. in the same family), we need to remind ourselves that those manuscripts are collections of Hermogenean texts and commentaries. In other words, quite soon after the production of 1741, we find *Characters* (alone) assimilated into the *Hermogenean* corpus.¹⁷ Moreover, it was assimilated quite thoroughly, as the contents of the proximate folia of *Par.gr.* 1983 make clear:

- fol. 285^r.1-20: = 7.1 52-4W.
- fol. 284^r.20-287^r.28: = 7.1 55-74W.
- fol. 287^r.29-287^v.10: = 7.1 74-6W.
- fol. 287^v.11-25: = *PS* 388-90.
- fol. 287^v.26-289^r.26: Outlines and diagrams of *Peri ideōn* I and II.
- fol. 289^r.27-290^v.9: = Syrianos 1 96-112 Rabe.
- fol. 290^v.10-292^r.15: = *Characters* 1-15.
- fol. 292^v.1 6-95^v: = 3 110-16 Spengel *RhGr.*

Whoever decided what 1983 was to contain, then, saw *Characters* as of a piece with the rest of the book's contents—which is exclusively Hermogenean, with the exception of the normal substitution of Aphthonios' *Progymnasmata* for Hermogenes'. The same holds, of course, for the "twin" of 1983, *Par.gr.* 2977. Perhaps it was the "coincidence" that *Characters* was included in *Par.gr.* 1741 with Demetrios and Dionysios, but with *Peri ideōn* in these 10th and 11th century MSS., that stimulated Sikeliotēs to spend as much time discussing the relations between "charakter" and "idea" as he did in his commentary on *Ideōn* (6 68-78W., cited before). A 13th century manuscript, *Vat.gr.* 110, shows a similar sort of assimilation, as *Characters* 16-30 is placed after excerpts from Hermogenes' *On Invention* (fol.214^r-221^v.7 = 93-108 Rabe), some diagrams and a table of contents (fol.221^v9-223^r), and an anonymous treatise *On Hermogenes on Methods of Prooimia, According to the Three Species of Rhetoric* (fol.223^v-252^r). *Characters* 16-30 follows immediately at 253^r-255^v.18; and is followed immediately by Ammonios' commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge*. In the Planudean MSS., the assimilation is even more complete, as the text of *Characters* 1-15 appears in the margin, next

¹⁷ Matelli thinks that the connection between *Characters* and Hermogenes went back a long way. This would seem to be implied by, e.g., the discussion in Phoebammon, *PS* 383f., cited before.

to Planudes' scholia on the chapter on *ethos* in *Peri ideōn* 2, suggesting that scholars were then calling on Theophrastus to gloss or amplify what Hermogenes wrote of there (320-22, 345-52 Rabe)! Clearly, *Characters* had early and continually thereafter been separated from a "Peripatetic" context and placed in a Hermogenean one.¹⁸

Physiognomika seems to have been included with the rhetorical works in *Par.gr.* 1741 in the belief that it contained useful information about the principles of a part of rhetoric that was almost completely overlooked in the tradition: *hypokrisis*. That idea was not without some foundation, as we find in *Phgn.* a number of passages that could be interpreted as bearing on the connections between outward appearances and *ēthos*, hence also *dianoiai* (see, e.g., 805a28f.; 806a1,22ff., etc.). Byzantine editors seem to have decided early, however, that the *Physiognomika* was out of place in rhetorical compendia, as it never again (except in the case of *Ambr.* 617) appears in them but only in collections of "scientific" and mechanical works (e.g., *Marc.gr.* IV.58 [13th]).

IX

Despite the fact that a text of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* was available to scholars in Constantinople in the eleventh century, none of them seems to have bothered to consult it to "check the references" in the older bodies of commentary on Hermogenes that they continued to work over and revise. We do, it is true, find such writers as Michael Psellos speaking with some authority about Aristotelian ideas about rhetoric (including pronouncements on Aristotle's obscure style, on which more later); but there is nothing in Psellos that shows clearly that he actually read the *Rhetoric*.¹⁹

One of Psellos' students, John Italos, is often credited with having composed an epitome of the *Rhetoric*.²⁰ In 1926 G. Cérétéli published Italos' *Methodos*

¹⁸ Another indication of how complete was the removal of *Characters* may be seen in the fact that *cod. Ambr.* 617 (P 34 *sup.*), from the late 15th/early 16th century, contains the *Rhetoric*, the *Poetics*, *Physiognomika*, and *Signis*, but not *Characters*. *Vat.Pal.* 23, a 13th century manuscript, places *Characters* 1-15 between an anonymous discussion of ambiguity and an anonymous treatise on figures. Most of this manuscript is taken up with Aphthonios and Hermogenes, but part of the *Rhetoric* has been tacked on to the beginning (ff.2r-29v), probably later.

¹⁹ Despite his claims about the family library (cited before); the apparent allusions in his speech for John Kroustoules, *Orat.Min.* (ed. Littlewood [Leipzig, 1985]) 139.48ff.; and the disputed passage from his "Letter to Aristenos" (2.266f. K-D), where he seems to express an interest in "the political and noble rhetoric" of Aristotle. On this question, cf. I. Ljubarskij, *Michail Psell. Ličnost' i tvorcestvo* (Moscow, 1978) 132f.; C. Milovanović, *Mihailo Psel kao knjižveni Teoreticar* (diss. Belgrad, 1979) 92ff.

²⁰ See, e.g., G. Kennedy, *Greek Rhetoric Under Christian Emperors* (Princeton, 1983) 318. Kennedy apparently follows P. Stephanou, *Jean Italos, philosophe et humaniste, OCA*

rhetorikē ekdotheīsa kata synopsis (*Opuscula selecta* [Tiflis, 1926], 2.33-46), the text of which he collated from three manuscripts: *Marc.gr.* 265 [14th], *Vat.gr.* 316 [14th], both of which he was able to inspect shortly before the outbreak of World War I; and *Vat.gr.* 1457 [16th], which he examined in 1924. How accurately the *Methodos* can be described as an epitome of the *Rhetoric* and how familiar Italos was with that work can be gauged by the following summary of the contents and organization of his *Methodos*.²¹

§1 (33.1-34.2): "Rhetoric is the method of seeing (*theōresai*) what is believable (*pithanon*) from accepted opinion (*ex endoxōn*) concerning particulars (*peri hekastōn*) (33.1f.)." It is the *antistrophē* of dialectic, differing from it in setting, matter (*hylē*), and *organa* (33.3-9). It is different also from arts like arithmetic, geometry; and is useful to everyone, including carpenters and leathercutters (33.13-34.2).

[C. cites four parallels from the *Rhetoric* and one from the *Topics* (and Kassel includes these citations in his *testimonia ad locc.*) All of them can be found in the prolegomena published by Walz and Rabe. The distinctions Italos makes between rhetoric and dialectic can be found in Doxapatres (*PS* 104.6ff.), who may in turn have been using some source such as the anonymous prolegomenon to *Staseis* at 7.1 36.14-22W (= *PS* 240.17ff.).]

§2 (34.3-15): *Logos* can be divided into *logos prophorikos* and *logos endiathetos*; and these in turn can be divided into *entechnos* and *atechnos*, *theōrētikos* and *praktikos* (34.39). Deliberative and dicanic rhetoric are practical; *theseis* and *enkomia* are theoretical, the former dealing with facts and actions, the latter amplifying good (*kaloī*) actions and bad (9-15).

[While there are some Aristotelian echoes here, this section also reads like the kind of thing one finds in the old prolegomena. (See, e.g., Anon. *In stas.*, *PS* 184.1ff. (= 7.1 1.20ff., from *Par.gr.* 1983 and 2977) and the "excerpta" from *Par.gr.* 3032, *PS* 228.24-29.16.). By contrast, however, even the earlier commentators seem to have been aware of the division Aristotle made on the basis of the kinds of hearers: e.g., Anon. *In Aphth.Prog.* 2.630.20ff.; the observations by Sopatros *In stas.* 4 51.26-52.25; the "excerpta" from *Par.gr.* 3032 at *PS* 235.3ff.; and cf. 7.2 1269.14ff.W, from the commentary on *Peri methodou deinoiētos* attributed to Gregory of Corinth (12th).]

§3 (34.16-35.6): In the following, we shall look into the questions of how (*pōs*) rhetoric is effective in politics; what sorts (*poia*) there are; in what (*en tini*)

134 (Rome 1949) 82, 86. I note also a reference to this opusculum as a set of "excerpts"; see O. Jurewicz, *Historia literatury bizantyńskiej* (Wrocław/Warsaw, 1984) 208.

²¹ Since this text does not seem to be very accessible, I will "summarize" at some length; and I have sketched in from time to time some notes. There is, to my knowledge, no extended discussion of it anywhere in the literature. There should be.

there may be some difficulty (*khalepon*); whence (*ek tinos*) the *organon* of rhetoric grows (*pephyken*); to what extent (*mekhri tinos*) it has a peculiar power (*dynamis*); how we might benefit from knowing it; what its order (*taxis*) is within logic; and what is the best (*kalliston*) thing about it.

[The questions to be addressed are clearly influenced by the approach used in the old prolegomena as well as by, e.g., Doxapatres. This section provides a preview of the organization of the next ten sections.]

- §4 (35.7-15): Rhetoric deals with questions about political *aretē* and good laws; but only those issues that are disputed and for which there are good arguments on both sides.

[Here, as in the distinctions drawn between rhetoric and dialectic in §1, we hear echoes of standard prolegomena material: cf. e.g., *PS* 29.10-30.6 and in Doxapatres, *loc. cit.*]

- §5 (35.16-23): Given the ways in which virtue comes about, we conclude that rhetoric can lead to it by accusing those who need to be accused or deliberating on the basis of probabilities (*eikota*) and opinions, making speeches on such subjects.

- §6 (35.24-36.5): The hardest part concerns (human) actions, and requires *phronesis* and intellectual energy (*logou energeia*). It is also difficult to deal with future events (*peri mellontōn*).

- §7 (36.6-37.5): Given the importance of the issues with which rhetoric deals, it is crucial to understand the methods rhetoric uses in common with ethics and dialectic, for rhetoric is not just a knack of getting one's way (*etyche ... peithein*, 37.1f., quoting Euripides' *Orestes* 897f.). Rhetoric is not the same as politics; but a rhetoric separated (*khōris*) from political concerns would be useless as well as mindless (37.3-5).

- §8 (37.6-38.7): The peculiar power (*oikeia dynamis*) of rhetoric is its ability to deal with any question turning on particulars (*hekaterōthen*) (37.14ff.). Rhetoric uses the enthymemic syllogism and the paradigm-induction; and its mode of argumentation is divided three ways (*trikhōs*) into the "ethical," the "emotional," and the "logical" (38.2f.). It is sometimes necessary to rouse the spirit (*thymon*) and to put down anger in these matters.

[On rhetoric dealing with "particulars," cp., e.g., the Anonymous at 6.16f.W (found in *Par.gr.* 3032, among other MSS.); and on the use of enthymemes, etc.—in the *Rhetoric*, to be sure—see, e.g., Alexander on the *Topics*, *CAG* 2.2 86.4ff.]

- §9 (38.8-39.12): To the species (*eide*) *theōrētikos/praktikos* should be added a third, *exetastikos* (38.8-10). That means we sometimes (but not always) need to begin with an effective *prooimion* with a view toward the opposition. Such *prooimia* are not useful before the Areopagus, however, not when the judges are rulers (*basileis*) or church authorities (*archiereis*) (38.15-20). The narration (*diēgēsis*) and argument (*pistis*), by contrast, are always required; although

sometimes the *diēgēsis* itself amounts to an argument (38.22-39.3).

[Two points to be noticed: Italos seems to follow "Aristotle" in the *Ad Alexandrum* by bringing in *exetastikos*. The same lore can be found in Syrianos, however, e.g., at 2.11.21ff. Rabe; 4 60.9-14W. Italos seems to follow Aristotle 3.19 in pointing out that *prooimia* are not always necessary (although Aristotle has nothing to say about *basileis* or *archiereis*); but Aristotle certainly did not believe that a narration was virtually a *pistis* in itself (cf., to the contrary, 3.13 1414a30ff.)]

- §10 (39.13-18): Some of the older authorities say the best (*kalliston*) part resides in composition (*synthesis*), others in persuasiveness (*piuthanon*), and so on. But it appears to be none of the aforementioned. The more agreeable (*chariesteroi*)—indeed many—say it is delivery (*hypokrisis*), for that is what enchants (*thelgei*) the average hearer (*hōs epipan ton akroatēn*, 39.17f.).

[For this peculiar power of delivery, see the similar observation by Athanasios, *PS* 177.5ff. (citing Theophrastus = 712 FHS&G). One of the "older authorities" Italos refers to may be his teacher, Psellos; cf. 5 598.4-7W, from Psellos' *Peri synthēkēs*. Psellos says elsewhere, however, just what Italos does: see the "*Peri rhetorikēs*" attributed to him, ed. P. Gautier, "Michel Psellos et la rhétorique de Longin," *Prometheus* 3 (1977), text at 196-199, line 61, p.199.]

- §11 (39.19-40.14): A speaker's *gnomē*, *lexis*, and *technē* follow upon his *ēthos*. *Ēthos* may be divided along the lines of race (*ethnos*), lineage (*genos*), age (*hēlikia*), allegiances (*proairesis*), fortunes (*tychas*), and accomplishments (*epitēdeumata*) (40.4ff.). One's diction is a sure sign of what sort of person one is (e.g., cruel [*agrios*] or craven [*deilos*]) or of one's native culture (7-14).

[Note the similarity here between the "components" of *ēthos* and the topics of epideictic in, e.g., Hermogenes: cf. *Progymn.* 15.18-17.1 Rabe. We find a similar discussion in Syrianos at 6 320.12ff.W and Sikeliotēs, 6 376.17ff.W. In the sections that follow, *gnomē* is taken up in §13, *lexis* in §15, *technē* in §14.]

- §12 (40.15-41.19): Lineage, age, and the rest determine one's style and delivery, hence one's believability if they are all consistent with one another. One must keep in mind the mode of delivery of the speaker, to whom, and about what he is speaking (41.4ff.). The appearance of good moral character depends on these. This is important not only for *rhētores*, but also for kings and lawmakers, for they speak not just for the sake of pleasure or of fooling the hearer, but also to set them on the road to virtue (10-15).

[Cérételi notes the parallels in this section with Hermogenes *Peri stas.* 3 2.6f.W (= 29.4f. Rabe) and *Peri ideōn* 2, 3 304.5ff.W (= 321.5ff. Rabe).]

- §13 (41.20-42.18): As for *gnomē*, we may ask what it is: it is the good judgement (*krisis orthē*) of a reasonable man (*epieikēs*) (42.1ff.). This definition is neither too elliptical nor too broad nor self-contradictory. The main consideration here

is the ability to size up the situation (cf. *kairois*, 42.7) and stick to the point. [The definition of *gnomē* comes from *EN* 6.11, 1143a20f.]

§14 (42.18-43.4): Turning now to *technē*: technical ability lies mainly in respect of the mean in making technical judgements. This enables one to begin rightly (*orthōs*), lay out the narrative precisely, and argue (*epicheirēsai*) persuasively.

§15 (43.5-15): There are two basic kinds of *diēgēsis*: poetic or tragic and dicanic or historical. The ancients did not let their choice of words determine their thoughts (*noēmata*), but set out orally (*en tei phonei*, 43.11) *symbola* of what they felt in their souls.

[On this way of dividing kinds of *diēgēsis*, see, e.g., Hermogenes *Progyrn.* 2, 4.16ff. Rabe; Anon. in *Aphth.* 2 13.10ff.W.]

§16 (43.16-44.21): Now we should say something about the kinds of *problēmata* that are proper to rhetoric (as opposed to sophistic and dialectic). A “*problēma*” is an inquiry bearing on theory or practice based on accepted opinions (*ex endoxōn*, 43.19) on an issue about which there seem to be contrary propositions—that is, giving rise to a *stasis* (cf. 43.19f.). A rhetorical *problēma* is like a dialectical one in that, since every *problēma* is a *logos apophantikos*, we need to proceed by defining and dividing (terms?). The difference between rhetoric and sophistry lies in the fact that rhetoric “philosophizes” (*philosophousa*, 46.7f.)

[Compare the lore about rhetorical *problēmata* with e.g., *PS* 208.4ff., 256.3ff. The notion of a *rhetorikē philosophousa* is hardly Aristotelian; but we find such a notion in, e.g., the prologue of (again) Athanasios (*PS* 179.25-80.1)]

§17 (44.22-45.17): In general, we should argue as “logically” as possible. Perhaps this is hard when dealing with pathos or ethos; but “logic” can be a check against political abuses (45.14ff.)

§18 (45.18-26): It is hard to argue decisively about such issues, so let a rhetorical demonstration (*apodeixis rhetorikē*, 22f.) be recognized when someone effectively counters the opposing case, even if he does not always persuade completely, but is a man of good sense (*phronimos*, 45.25) and technically sharp (*akribēs*).

§19 (46.1-21): On the three rhetorical “proofs” (*apodeixeis*)—the ethical, the pathetic, and the logical—let it be observed that if the speaker has a good ethos (*ēthos agathos*), he will be more worthy of belief (*axiopistoteros*) than one who is not, even if he doesn’t argue logically (*k’an mē logikōs epicheirēseien*), especially if he seems to have the interests of the city at heart. [While it might be argued that this echoes *Rhet.* 2.1, Aristotle does not go quite this far.]

Italos is best known, perhaps, as a champion of the dialectic taught by “the ancients,” chiefly Aristotle. “The ancients,” he wrote in a defense of the art, “fittingly called dialectic a power in itself since it is the medium (*mesē*) of demonstrative and sophistic art alike” (*Opera*, ed. N. Kečakmadze [Tiflis, 1966], 1, §2). “[Dialectic]

is useful (*chrēsimos*) both for conversation between individuals and for the discussion of beliefs (*dokountōn dialegesthai*)" (2, §5). If Anna Comnena is to be believed, he was enormously successful in his role as *hypatos tōn philosophōn*, a position he "inherited" from his teacher, Psellos. "When he took up the chair," she writes (*Alexiad* 5.8.9), "all the young flocked to him, for he opened up to them the teachings (*dogmata*) of Plato ... and Porphyry ... and especially the arts of Aristotle."

For having applied the methods of dialectic to theological matters, it seems, he got into trouble with ecclesiastical authorities in 1076/7, when he was tried and condemned, and in 1082, when he was condemned again. Italos recanted after the trial of 1076/7, and got off with a warning, probably because he had close connections with the ruling Doukas family. A native of South Italy, he was sent as an envoy by Michael VII Doukas to Robert Guiscard in an effort to stabilize relations with the West. In 1082, however, Italos was regarded with some suspicion in the court of Alexios I Comnenos, who regarded Guiscard as a dangerous enemy. This time, Italos was forced to stop teaching, almost lynched by a Constantinopolitan mob, and retired to a monastery. Thus, there was more at stake in Italos' case than matters of doctrine. Anna records, moreover, that Italos, however skillful in the art of dialectic, "was not very clever in the other arts of language. His command of grammar was awkward, and he had not imbibed the nectar of rhetoric. His style was unbalanced" (5.8.6).²² So perhaps his bias in favor of dialectic proved his undoing in the end.

Although Italos' notion that rhetoric should be checked against standards of dialectical rigor is crudely "Aristotelian," a glance at the contents of his *Methodos* shows that he was by no means promoting Aristotle's *Rhetoric* as an ideal, much less trying to compose an epitome of that work. Indeed, the *Methodos* supplies us with no evidence that he had a text of Aristotle before him or in the back of his mind when he wrote it. All of the echoes of Aristotle can be found in the traditional prolegomena; and in fact the "spirit" of what Italos says is very close to the position taken by the anonymous author of the prologue at 7.1 1-20W, one of several similar prologues long in circulation in scholarly circles, all of which can be traced back to such authorities as Syrianos, Athanasios, and George of Alexandria. In short, while it may be that his applications of dialectic to Christology or questions about the nature of souls resurrected at the Last Judgment were heretical, his "Method" of rhetoric is hardly "unorthodox."

X

Byzantine commentators had mixed feelings about Aristotle and the Peripatetics. On some matters, Aristotle is recognized as an indisputable authority. His *Categories* was universally admired, for instance, so much that we sometimes find justifications

²² Contrast what Psellos says of his eloquence in his *epainos*, 1.50-4 K-D.

of Hermogenes' method of analysis in *Peri ideōn* (e.g., Sikeliotes at 6 80.24ff.W)—indeed, that of the entire Hermogenean corpus (see the observations of Doxapatres *Prolog. in stas.*, PS 304.14-306.9; 316.20ff.)—cast in terms of comparisons with it. *De interpretatione* (cf. e.g. Sikeliotes *In id.*, 6 202.7ff.W) and various discussions in the *Topics* are regularly accorded the final word on some subjects: on the causes of *asapheia* (Sardianos *In Aphth.*, 20.7ff. Rabe) or on "definition," for instance (see, e.g., Syrianos *In stas.*, 4 474.13ff.W; Anon. [Neilos?] at 7.1 322.13f., 396.13ff., 401.6f.W).

On the other hand, we find evidence of a sort of wariness, sometimes outright dislike for Peripatetic philosophy and its proponents, for various reasons. Markellinos, in an apparent allusion to *Rhet.* 3.19 1419b10ff., "quotes" Aristotle as saying that there are four parts to an epilogue (4 424.30ff.W), hastening to add that among the *archaioi* conventions were different (425.3ff.). Sopatros, in a curious passage, observes that the ancients have handed down a variety of definitions of rhetoric (5 15.15ff.W). The Stoics, he says, called it the *antistrophē* of dialectic (!). Others call it a theoretical faculty (*dynamis theoretikē*) of persuasiveness (*to pithanon*) concerning anything (*peri hekasta*); and that seems to be Aristotle's definition. But (16.26ff.) "those who so define it are ignorant of the nature of the art." Everyone understood that syllogisms were inappropriate in rhetoric, but usually either because Hermogenes concentrates on epicheiremes or because, quite simply, they belong to the art of dialectic. The anonymous author of one of the prolegomena in *Par.Gr.* 3032, however, offers a different explanation: "Orators should not use syllogisms lest they be seen to be trying to compel their listeners by some cunning (*deinos*) device, and not to persuade (*peithein*) them (PS 234.5f.)." Suspicion of syllogisms was of course particularly intense in theological contexts, as is evident from sources ranging from Gregory Nazianzus (*Or.* 23.12, PG 35.1164C; cp. Theodoretus *Gr.affect.* 5, PG 83, 948A.) to the members of the synod which in 1117 condemned John Italos' pupil, Eustratios of Nicaea, for holding that Christ "syllogized" in an Aristotelian fashion (*syllogizetai aristotelikōs*).²³

Perhaps the main reason Byzantine scholars were wary of Aristotle was because they found him hard to read. References to the "labyrinths" of his style are commonplace over the centuries. On the matter of Aristotle's obscurity, we find in comments made after the 10th century an interesting shift away from views expressed earlier. The neoplatonizing Aristotelians of the 4th and 5th centuries, for whom the issue was a conventional one to raise, saw Aristotle's obscurity as intentional. Ammonios explains, however (CAG 4.4 7.714), that Aristotle chose to be obscure in order to inspire the souls of the serious student while repelling the lazy. In this, Ammonios was followed by his students, Simplicius (CAG 8 6.30f., CAG 9 8.26ff.) and Elias (CAG 18 124.26ff.), who alludes elsewhere to

²³ See the text published by P. Joannou, "Eustrate de Nicée: Trois pièces inédits de son procès," *REB* 10 (1952) 24 (no.24).

the image from *Metaph.* a, 993b9f., comparing those who try to behold things in their true reality to bats blinded by the light (15.28-30; 24.5ff.). Arethas alludes to the same image (*Scr.min.*, ed. Westerink, 1 188.13f.) in defending himself against charges of *asapheia*. Psellos was familiar with this notion, as his letter defending "philosophical rhetoric" to the patriarch (Sathas, *MB* 5 441.24-42.2, explaining Aristotle's *asapheia*) seems to suggest. Doxapatres, however, seems to take a rather less tolerant view in his complaint about the "density" of Aristotle's ideas (2 269.15f.W). In the 12th century, we see Michael of Ephesos warning his students that Aristotle is overly elliptical at times and "turns his sentences upside down" (*Schol.ad Pol.*, ad Δ, 1299b23ff., E 1301b17f., Z 1317b23, etc.).²⁴ Theodore Prodromos brings up the charge that Aristotle's style is a "labyrinth" in his "On Great and Small" (113.22)²⁵ in the course of refuting the section of Aristotle's *Categories* that deals with quantity (*Cat.* 6 5b11ff.)—taking on one of the Peripatetic works generally most admired by his fellow scholars.²⁶ Gregory of Corinth expresses admiration for Themistius "for having clarified a great deal in his paraphrases of Aristotle" (7.2 1294W, probably from an earlier source since there is no evidence that those paraphrases were still accessible in the mid-12th c.). In the 13th century, we are told (*Vita*, *PG* 142 25CD), George Akropolites was busy penetrating Aristotle's "labyrinths." By the 14th century, we find Theodore Metochites convinced that Aristotle wrote labyrinthine prose in his unwarranted attacks on Plato because he wanted to conceal the fact that he really had nothing to say (*Miscellanea* [ed. Müller (Leipzig, 1821; rpt. Amsterdam, 1966)] 25 pp.170ff.; see also, e.g., 5 p.46f., where Metochites is confident that Aristotle was ignorant of the rhetorical arts; and 10 p.77-8, where Aristotle is compared to Thersites).

XI

So overwhelming was the amount of material that needed sorting out by the first decades of the eleventh century, Sikeliotes (*PS* 394.13f.) and Doxapatres (*PS* 80.13f.) both write of the "great mystery" of rhetoric.²⁷ We must remember that, although there must have been at least one text of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* available to them, there were no commentaries on it that they needed to take into account along with the vast Hermogenic corpus. How much greater the "mystery," then, when Aristotle's *Rhetoric* was first addressed by scholars brought together by Anna

²⁴ Texts in O. Immisch's Teubner edition (Leipzig, 1909) as an appendix, 317.11f., 318.25ff., 325.1ff.

²⁵ Text ed. P. Tannery, *Annuaire de l'association pour l'encouragement des études grecques en France* 21 (1887) 104ff.

²⁶ Prodromos also wrote a piece, "Xenedemos, or On the Five *Phonai*," taking issue with another classic, the *Isagoge* of Porphyry; text in Cramer, *Anecdota ... Oxoniensa* 3 (1836) 204-15.

²⁷ Kustas, *Studies* 124, takes these passages too literally.

Comnena after her father's death and her exile to a convent, ordered by her brother.²⁸ We know the names of some of those scholars. Michael of Ephesos (surely the "sage of Ephesos" referred to by George Tornikes at 283.9f.) was one; Stephanos Skylitzes another;²⁹ the recently anathematised, but still admired by Anna years later (*Alexiad* 14.8), Eustratios of Nicaea (d.1120?) a third; and perhaps George Tornikes himself, as well.

Two commentaries on the *Rhetoric* were apparently produced under Anna's patronage: the "Anonymous" (CAG 21.2 1-262, probably by Michael, who is said by Tornikes [283.11ff.] to have ruined his eyes working day and night on Aristotle) and the one attributed to Stephanos (263-322). The Anonymous is rather more complete and comprehensive than the one by Stephanos, which has all the earmarks of a set of glosses meant for beginners (e.g., 287.36f., 292.31ff., 301.17ff., 310.30ff.). Both indicate the availability of more than one manuscript of the *Rhetoric* (see, e.g., Anonymous (= A) 162.22ff., 171.28, 172.1, 179.15, 204.2, 217.2, and 218.28 [where A refers to some "wormeaten books"]; Stephanos (= S) 282.17, 293.23 [A 148.32 seems to refer not to a copy of the *Rhetoric* but of Pindar]), hence of a serious effort to establish a reliable text (even to the extent of preserving the received text while arguing that it does not clearly convey Aristotle's intended meaning (see, e.g., A 41.17ff., *ad* 1365a35). Both also exhibit a wide range of exegetical material brought to bear on the text, including "parallel" passages from works by and scholia on Hermogenes and Aphthonios;³⁰ authors of treatises on figures and tropes (e.g., A 171.1ff., 219.20ff.); and scholia to classical authors (e.g., A 198.8f., 203.27, 206.28, 230.6, 233.33, 260.2, etc.—all to passages in *Rhetoric* 3). There are also frequent attempts to interpret Aristotle *ex Aristotele*,³¹ and references to material found in commentaries on Aristotle's other works, some of them produced in Anna's

²⁸ There is no reason to believe that George Tornikes was exaggerating when he says in his eulogy for Anna (ed. J. Darrouzès, *Georges et Démétrios Tornikès: Lettres et discours* (Paris, 1970) 283.4ff.) that Anna's circle produced commentaries (*hypomnēmatismoi*) on works by Aristotle for which there were none in circulation.

²⁹ On this identification, I am persuaded by W. Wolska-Conus' argument in "Scholies de Stephanos à la Rhétorique d'Aristote," *Actes du XIV^e congrès international des études byzantines* 3 (Bucharest, 1979) 599-606.

³⁰ E.g., Hermogenes: A 35.23f., 158.2ff., 164.18ff., 191.8ff., etc.; S 298.22f., 308. 14 and 17, 312.30ff., 322.1f. Perhaps the most interesting is S's reference at 277.28f. to a set of scholia to Hermogenes' *Peri methodou deinotētos* in a "xylokhartion kontakion"—a papyrus booklet? Aphthonios: A 57.3f.; S 281.30-282.14, 299.13, etc. (other citations in Wolska-Conus, 605 nn. 52-54).

³¹ Rabe gives some two dozen citations in his *index locorum*; but a close reading seems sometimes to turn up allusions—e.g., at A 16.34ff., to *Pol.* 1.12 1274a22f.; 17.23-28, to *Pol.* 2.9 1269b12f.; 20.114, to *Phys.* 2.5, etc. Carlo Natali pointed these out to me and suggested that there are no doubt many more such "embedded" citations. He is probably right; but the task is a daunting one.

salon.³²

In both, we find many attempts to relate the *Rhetoric* to the contemporary setting that reveal peculiarly Byzantine concerns and cultural biases: e.g., A 16.6ff., where the commentator points out that in a democracy everyone rules, "even buffoons, madmen, vagabonds, and fools"; 45.21f., on kingship; 47.7ff., comparisons with Gregory Nazianzus and Basil the Great; references to Slavs (A 191.30), Celts (A 77.24, S 277.27), and Venetians (S 285.12); observations on contemporary legal practice (A 73.3ff.); to different kinds of wine (74.10ff.); and mention of terms from Romano-Byzantine law (*praitores*, 17.6; *libella*, 75.15; *nekessarios*, S 289.35, etc.). Such concerns may also explain why certain parts of the *Rhetoric* receive disproportionate attention in A. For instance, on the analogy of the amount of space A allots to Book 1 (86pp. of commentary to 46 Bekker columns), one would expect over 100 pages for Book 2; but there are only 70. Book 3 gets 104 pages where we might expect, on the same analogy, only 60. A's commentary/paraphrase of 1.4-8 takes up 22 pages, which might lead us to expect 4 or 5 on 1.9; but we get 11. Book 2.19, 2.5 Bekker columns, gets 1.5 pages; but 3.1-2, 5 Bekker columns, get 15.5 pages and 3.16, just over 2 Bekker columns, gets almost 9 pages. All of these instances where we note disproportionate treatment make sense against the background of the emphases in Hermogenes and Aphthonios.

In short, by most standards, these two commentaries, particularly the "Anonymous," are learned, rich, and multifaceted. Yet they do not on the whole add much to erase old prejudices and incomprehensions: we find again the enthymeme discussed as a *sylogismos aielēs* (A 130.18ff., 147.34), the doctrine inherited from old commentaries on the *Organon*; and the sections devoted to 2.23 do not shed much more light on the nature of enthymematic *topoi* than material in *Par.gr.* 1983 and 3032. And they do not seem to have influenced subsequent Byzantine rhetorical scholarship, as we shall see.

The reason why the commentaries sponsored by Anna did so little to alter Byzantine views (or misperceptions) of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is not hard to imagine. Anna, after all, was "out" during her brother John's reign; and so were her scholars—Eustratios, for instance. Skylitzes seems to have been part of her circle early on (his commentary appears to have been completed by 1122), but was evidently appointed Metropolitan of Trebizond in 1126—a post he was not able actually to take until 1140. Nothing much is known about Michael; but he seems not to have had much respect for John (if that is the "despot" referred to in his note on *Pol.* 4.3, 1290a27 [ed. O. Immisch (Leipzig, 1909), p.313.27f.]), and he seems to have

³² E.g., S 270.3ff. seems to rely on Michael's note on *EN* 10.6 1146a30f. (*CAG* 20 571.30ff.); 272.4-6, relying on Eustratios on *EN* 6.12 1143a32 (*CAG* 20 375.33-376.5). At 277.21f., S refers to his own scholia to "the Ethics" (?). Is Eustratios the "*metropolitēs*" referred to by A at 176.15, 212.24?

stayed with Anna until 1138 or so, when she put aside the Aristotle project in the interests of completing her *Alexiad*.³³ After John's death and the accession of her nephew Manuel I Comnenos, however, Anna was "rehabilitated." Tornikes was appointed *didaskalos tōn psaltōn* in 1145/6, after which he rose in the ranks of the Patriarchal School. Skylitzes died about 1145 or 1146, when Prodhromos—who had been close to John II Comnenos—composed his *monōdia* on the sad occasion.³⁴ In other words, the work done on Aristotle by Anna's circle was done outside of officially sanctioned institutions. Interestingly, there are many references and allusions to Aristotle's works in speeches delivered during Manuel's reign—none of them to the *Rhetoric*.³⁵

XII

The fall of Constantinople to Venetian Crusaders in 1204 forced Byzantine scholars out to the territories, where they did their best to preserve the heritage they saw as setting them apart from the barbarous "Latins." Between 1204 and the Palaiologan restoration of 1261, there were scholars such as Nikephoros Blemmydes at work, trying to consolidate the elements of the traditional *enkyklios paideia*. It is noteworthy, perhaps, that Blemmydes' *Eπιτομή* of logic (in PG 142) is a conscious synthesis of Aristotle, but restricted to the *Organon* proper, with no mention of "enthymeme," much less of the *Rhetoric*. From 1261 until the end of the 14th century, there was a remarkable proliferation of new manuscripts of the works of Aristotle. Of those manuscripts extant—the Laurentian library alone contains over four dozen; the Bibliothèque Nationale twice that number; and the Vatican libraries three times—scarcely half a dozen contain the *Rhetoric*, or even

³³ Our main sources for this group, a monody for Skylitzes by Theodore Prodhromos (ed. L. Petit, *IRAİK* 8 [1902] 1-14, text at 6-14) and George Tornikes' eulogy of Anna (ed. Darrouzès, 220-323, with facing translation), do not give much precise information. On Anna's milieu, see R. Browning, "An Unpublished Funeral Oration on Anna Comnena," *PCPS* n.s. 8 (1962), 1-12; revised version in *Aristotle Transformed*, ed. R. Sorabji (London, 1990) 393-406; and, again, Wolska-Conus, *op. cit.*

³⁴ About the same time, Prodhromos composed monodies on the occasion of the death of Alexios Aristenos, whom he praises for his knowledge of Peripatetic philosophy (PG 133 1299B); but the reference to Aristenos' familiarity with the doctrines of Xenokrates (1267B) suggests that his knowledge of the Peripatos may have been restricted to Aristotle's *Topics*.

³⁵ Euthymios Malakes cites Aristotle favorably in his speech to Manuel on the occasion of the Sultan Arslan's visit to Constantinople in 1162, for instance (cf. Papadopoulos-Kerameus, *Noctes petropolitanæ* [St. Petersburg, 1913] 171.1ff.), but the allusions seem to be to the *Ethics* and *Politics*. In the inaugural speech delivered by Michael Anchialos on the occasion of his elevation to the post of *hypatos tōn philosophōn* in 1167 (cf. text publ. by R. Browning, "A New Source on Byzantine-Hungarian Relations in the Twelfth Century," *Balkan Studies* 2 [1961] 183-203), Anchialos is careful to restrict his Aristotle references to the works on natural history.

parts of it. In a school text found in *Ambr.* C 222, from the 13th or 14th century (ed. M. Treu, "Ein byzantinisches Schulgespräch," *BZ* 2 [1893], 96-105), we find Aristotle's entire corpus recommended to the aspiring student: the organon, physics, meteorology, parts of animals, rhetoric, politics, and the *exēgetai*. But the sections on rhetoric are distinctly Hermogenean. Planudes seems to have had some interest in applying "Peripatetic" rigor to the study of rhetoric (among other disciplines)—see his Prologue, 5 214.15ff., 218.6ff.W—but his commentaries are all excerpted from earlier materials on Hermogenes. His emendations of Theophrastus' *Characters* 16-28 (as evident in the marginalia mentioned before) are notorious for the "drastic alterations" he made in the text (P. Steinmetz, *Theophrast: Charakteres* [Munich, 1960] 38ff.). We have already seen what Metochites thought of Aristotle. And late in the 14th (early in the 15th?), Chortasmenos composed a *Synagōgē* of rhetorical authors (the text of which, in *Vind. Suppl. gr.* 75, is yet unedited) composed in the main of bits and pieces of Planudes and Doxapatres, but evidently alluding to Aristotle's *Rhetoric* 1.1-14. In another manuscript, *Cod. Ricc. gr.* 58, we find a set of excerpts from the *Rhetoric* 1-3 (f.33^v-42^r), which Chortasmenos begins with "*Rhetorikē esti dynamis theoretikē tou peri pithanou*"—reminiscent of the erroneous versions we saw before in the old Hermogenean commentaries!³⁶

It is therefore clear that even in the last decades of the Byzantine empire, the Peripatetic tradition was not taken very seriously by scholars of rhetoric. Increasing contact, most of it hostile, with the Latin West; and a grudging admiration for some Western intellectuals (e.g., Aquinas whose *Summa contra gentiles* was rendered in Greek by D. Kydonēs) may have resulted in renewed appreciation for syllogistic reasoning—a departure from much in traditional orthodox theology. But, as in the five or six hundred preceding years, the Peripatetic tradition(s) in rhetoric fared considerably less than well.

ABBREVIATIONS

<i>BICS</i>	<i>Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies.</i>
<i>CAG</i>	<i>Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca</i> , 23 vols. (Berlin, 1882-96).
<i>EEBS</i>	<i>Epeteris Hetaireias Byzantinon Spoudon</i> (Athens).
<i>GG</i>	<i>Grammatici graeci</i> , ed. A. Hilgard, 4 vols. (Leipzig, 1883-1910).
<i>IRAIK</i>	<i>Izvestija ruskago archeologiceskago instituta v konstantinopole</i> (Sofia).

³⁶ See H. Hunger, *Johannes Chortasmenos: Briefe, Gedichte und kleine Schriften*, Wiener Byzantinische Studien 7 (Vienna, 1969) 30f. In his analysis of the correspondence of Theodoros Hyrtakenos, Nikephoros Choumpos, and Michael Gabras, A. Karpozilos (in "Books and Bookmen in the 14th C.: The Epistolographical Evidence," *JÖB* 41 [1991], 255-76) turns up no evidence of any interest in the *Rhetoric* among those writers.

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- JÖB** *Jahrbuch der österreichischen Byzantinistik.*
MB *Mesaiōnikē Bibliothēkē*, ed. K. Sathas, 7 vols. (Venice, 1872-94).
NGG *Nachrichten von der königlichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen.*
OCA *Orientalia christiana analecta.*
PCPS *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society.*
PG *Patrologiae cursus completus, Series graeca*, ed. J. Migne.
PS *Prolegomenon sylloge*, ed. H. Rabe (Leipzig, 1935).
RE *Real-encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft* (Pauly-Wissowa).
REB *Revue des Études Byzantines* (Paris).
RhM *Rheinisches Museum.*
Sp-H. *Rhetores graeci*, ed. L. Spengel/C. Hammer (Leipzig, 1894).
W *Rhetores graeci*, ed. C. Walz, 9 vols. (London/Stuttgart, 1832-36).

Syriac Rhetorical Theory and the Syriac Tradition of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*

John W. Watt

When Alexander's armies conquered Syria and Mesopotamia, the dominant language of that area was Aramaic, in various dialectal forms. For the next thousand years, the cultural life of the region was shaped by Greek and Aramaic, the native name of the latter largely giving way over time, especially in Christian circles, to its Greek designation, Syriac. In the early centuries of the Christian era, the local dialect of Edessa came to be widely used as a literary language throughout the entire area, and to be called "Syriac" without further qualification. Many who employed it were also familiar with Greek, and these bilingual Syrians played a decisive role in the transmission of Greek learning to the Near East. Most extant Syriac literature is of a theological or religious nature, and the Syrians made translations of the Bible and some of the leading Greek Christian theologians, but from the sixth century onwards they also translated and commented upon works of secular Greek knowledge, especially logic, philosophy, and medicine. This process continued into the eighth, ninth, and tenth centuries, during which time the Christian Syrians made translations both into Syriac and Arabic, and thus to a considerable extent determined the form of the renaissance of classical learning in Islam.¹

The Syrians therefore occupy an important place in the history of the translation and transmission of Greek philosophy and science, most notably of the logical works of Aristotle and the medical treatises of Galen. However, when we turn to the history of classical rhetoric, they do not on the face of it appear to have played such a significant role, modern histories of Syriac literature generally giving the

¹ For a recent survey of Syriac translation activity, covering the period to the eighth century, cf. S. Brock, "From Antagonism to Assimilation: Syriac Attitudes to Greek Learning," in *East of Byzantium: Syria and Armenia in the Formative Period*, ed. N.G. Garsoian, T.F. Mathews and R.W. Thomson (Washington D.C. 1982) pp. 17-34. For the translations of the ninth and tenth centuries, cf. A. Baumstark, *Geschichte der syrischen Literatur* (Bonn 1922) [hereafter: Baumstark, *Geschichte*] pp. 227-32.

impression that they had little taste for oratory.² Of course, since in Arabic Aristotle's *Rhetoric* was read as a work on logic in the *Organon*, one could still ask about its influence in Syriac, even on the assumption that the Syrians had no interest in classical eloquence. I should like to begin, however, by questioning this assumption. The Syrians could well have found rhetoric useful in a number of ways. Certainly, they had little occasion or incentive to employ secular panegyric, but they did wish to praise the saints and celebrate the feasts of the church, persuade or dissuade their congregations, defend their theological heroes, and accuse or vituperate heretics. If in Byzantium, as has been said, "Christianity gave rhetoric the application it lacked, namely the sermon,"³ there is no reason why that should not also have applied in the case of the Syrians.

A number of recent studies have in fact claimed to uncover evidence of rhetorical learning in works of Syriac literature. The anonymous author of the *Liber Graduum*, which probably belongs to the fourth century, according to one analysis of the book constructed his exhortations to spiritual perfection after the pattern of classical, more especially deliberative rhetoric, here directing it not to specific "political," but to general "philosophical" questions.⁴ The oration of Narsai on the three Nestorian teachers, which comes from around the end of the fifth century, may be a speech of defence structured according to the disposition of judicial rhetoric.⁵ In the exegetical homilies of the seventh century Nestorian Catholicos Mar Aba II, we encounter a style of preaching reminiscent of John Chrysostom, making much use of rhetorical figures.⁶ Extensive use of figures has also been noted in the Arabic translation of Aetius made by the Syrian Christian Qusṭā, and the study of rhetoric in the Syriac schools has been suggested as a means by which this and some other aspects of rhetorical knowledge, including panegyric, were transmitted to the Islamic world.⁷ Finally, two Syriac speeches of praise have been analysed in terms of

² Cf. R. Duval, *La littérature syriaque* (Paris 1907) p. 219, n. 2; 299. Cf. also F. Rosenthal, *The Classical Heritage in Islam* (London 1975) p. 10.

³ C. Mango, *Byzantium: The Empire of New Rome* (London 1980) p. 134. Cf. further G.A. Kennedy, *Greek Rhetoric under Christian Emperors* (Princeton 1983) [hereafter: Kennedy, *Greek Rhetoric*] pp. 180-264 and index s.v. preaching.

⁴ A. Böhlig, "Zur Rhetorik im Liber Graduum," in *IV Symposium Syriacum*, ed. H.J.W. Drijvers, R. Lavenant SJ, C. Molenberg, and G.J. Reinink (*Orientalia Christiana Analecta*, 229) (Rome 1987) pp. 297-305.

⁵ K. McVey, "The Memra of Narsai on the Three Nestorian Doctors as an Example of Forensic Rhetoric," in *III Symposium Syriacum*, ed. R. Lavenant (*Orientalia Christiana Analecta*, 221) (Rome 1983) pp. 87-96.

⁶ G.J. Reinink, "Rhetorik in der Homilie zu Jes. 52, 13 - 53, 12 des Katholikos Mar Abba II von Kaškar," in *IV Symposium Syriacum* (above, n. 4) pp. 307-16.

⁷ H. Daiber, *Aetius Arabus: Die Vorsokratiker in arabischer Überlieferung* (Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur, Mainz, Veröffentlichungen der Orientalischen Kommission, 33) (Wiesbaden 1980) pp. 61-74; cf. G.E. von Grunebaum, "Observations on City Panegyrics in Arabic Prose," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 64 (1944) pp. 61-5.

Greek panegyric and interpreted as encomia of saints in the tradition of epideictic rhetoric: the oration on Severus of Antioch by George, bishop of the Arabs (8th century),⁸ and that on Philoxenus of Mabbug by Eli of Qartamin (13th century).⁹

Even if not all these proposals are found convincing, taken as a whole they provide quite weighty evidence that rhetoric had a place in Syriac education, a possibility, it may be noted, which had earlier been mooted in respect of the School of Nisibis.¹⁰ It should be remembered that no theologian was more highly esteemed by the Syrians than Gregory of Nazianzus. In Byzantium his orations were admired as the outstanding model of Christian eloquence, and the Syrians could hardly have failed to notice that he was a master of the art of rhetoric. Gregory's orations were translated twice into Syriac,¹¹ and one Syriac author, Antony of Tagrit, designated him not only by his usual title of "The Theologian," but also as "The prince of rhetors and chief of sophists."¹² The classical eloquence admired by the Syrians was that of Gregory, rather than Demosthenes, and very few pagan orations were translated into Syriac.¹³ However, that in principle among the Syrians a love for words could be detached from Christian associations is shown by the fact that even Homer was translated into their language.¹⁴

SYRIAC TEXTS ON RHETORIC

Yet the prevalent view, that the Syrians had little interest in rhetoric, is supported by the fact that there are hardly any texts in the language on rhetorical theory, whether original productions or translations from Greek. Eloquence, of course, can be learned by imitation and practice, as well as from books on theory, but it would be surprising if a culture which endeavoured to understand and assimilate Greek eloquence took no note at all of Greek rhetorical theory. However, there are a few Syriac texts on rhetoric. We have evidence of three originally written in Syriac, and one translation from Greek.

⁸ K.E. McVey, *The Memra on the Life of Severus of Antioch Composed by George, Bishop of the Arab Tribes* (Unpublished Thesis, Cambridge, Mass. 1977). Cf. the review of A. de Halleux, *Le Muséon* 94 (1981) pp. 208-11.

⁹ J.W. Watt, "Syriac Panegyric in Theory and Practice: Antony of Tagrit and Eli of Qartamin," *Le Muséon* 102 (1989) pp. 271-98.

¹⁰ A. Vööbus, *History of the School of Nisibis* (Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium, 266) (Louvain 1965) p. 105.

¹¹ Cf. Baumstark, *Geschichte*, pp. 77; 190; S.P. Brock, *The Syriac Version of the Pseudo-Nonnus Mythological Scholia* (Cambridge 1971) pp. 28-44.

¹² Cf. below, p. 253. On the rhetorical status of Gregory of Nazianzus in Greek Christianity, cf. E. Norden, *Die antike Kunstprosa* (Leipzig/Berlin 1915-18) pp. 562-9.

¹³ One oration of Isocrates was translated and two of Themistius. Histories of Syriac literature usually classify them as works of popular philosophy; cf. Baumstark, *Geschichte*, p. 169 and Brock, "From Antagonism" (above, n. 1) p. 27.

¹⁴ Cf. below, pp. 254-5.

The earliest and most important of the original Syriac works is the *Rhetoric* of Antony of Tagrit, a large treatise in five Books.¹⁵ Unfortunately, we know virtually nothing about the author. The manuscripts describe him as a monk and a Syrian of Tagrit, and the other works attributed to him are a treatise on the sacrament of anointing, a collection of metrical panegyrics, consolations, and hymns, and a book on Providence.¹⁶ The medical knowledge exhibited in the last of these has led to the suggestion that he may have been a physician,¹⁷ but it was as the author of the *Rhetoric* that he was chiefly known, as is evident from his designation in the manuscripts, "Anton Rhetor."

The only chronicler to mention him was Bar-Hebraeus (d. 1286), who in his *Ecclesiastical Chronicle* assigned him to the early ninth century.¹⁸ While for a number of reasons this period seems quite reasonable, it cannot be regarded as certain, and a somewhat later date is possible.¹⁹ It is striking that Bar-Hebraeus, the greatest representative of the late phase of Syriac Aristotelian studies, in his *Nomocanon* placed Antony's treatise at the head of his list of the secular books he wished to see read in the West Syrian schools, before the logical works of Aristotle.²⁰

In the thirteenth century, two Syriac writers discussed rhetoric. The earlier of them, Jacob Bar-Shakko (d. 1241), included a section on it in his secular encyclopaedia, *The Book of Dialogues*.²¹ However, this section is mostly an (unacknowledged) epitome of the *Rhetoric* of Antony.²² A third Syriac text is from

¹⁵ Only Book Five has been edited: J.W. Watt, *The Fifth Book of the Rhetoric of Antony of Tagrit* (Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium, 480-1) (Louvain 1986) [hereafter: Watt, *Fifth Book*, Text (480) or Translation (481)]. For Book One, cf. the unpublished Harvard dissertation of P.E. Eskenasy, *Antony of Tagrit's Rhetoric Book One* (Cambridge, Mass. 1991). An edition of Book One is being prepared by Eskenasy and myself.

¹⁶ Cf. Baumstark, *Geschichte*, p. 278.

¹⁷ Cf. H.J.W. Drijvers, "Antony of Tagrit's Book on the Good Providence of God," in R. Lavenant (ed.), *V Symposium Syriacum* (Orientalia Christiana Analecta, 236) (Rome 1990) pp. 163-72, esp. p. 167.

¹⁸ J.B. Abbeloos—Th.J. Lamy, *Gregorii Barhebraei Chronicon Ecclesiasticum* I (Louvain 1872) cols. 361-3.

¹⁹ Cf. Watt, *Fifth Book*, Translation, pp. v-x; Drijvers, in *V Symposium Syriacum* (above, n. 17) pp. 163-6.

²⁰ P. Bedjan, *Nomocanon Gregorii Barhebraei* (Paris/Leipzig 1898) p. 106.3. Bar-Hebraeus also cited Antony twenty-four times in his *Grammar*; cf. W. Strothmann, "Die Schrift des Anton von Tagrit über die Rhetorik," in *Paul de Lagarde und die syrische Kirchengeschichte*, hrsg. vom Göttinger Arbeitskreis für syrische Kirchengeschichte (Göttingen 1968) pp. 206-7.

²¹ Cf. Baumstark, *Geschichte*, p. 312.

²² Cf. J. Bendrat, "Der Dialog über die Rhetorik des Jakob Bar Shakko," in *Paul de Lagarde* (above, n. 20) pp. 19-26. It is interesting to note that Bar-Shakko was a near contemporary of the Byzantine encyclopaedist Joseph Rhakendytes (d. c. 1330), who also

Bar-Hebraeus' large philosophical work, *The Cream of Wisdom*, and is a commentary on Aristotle's *Rhetoric* in the context of the *Organon*,²³ but Bar-Hebraeus for the most part appears to have followed Avicenna.²⁴

We know that Aristotle's *Rhetoric* was translated into Syriac, but no manuscript of this version is extant, and the date of translation is uncertain. For long it was widely believed that its existence was presupposed in a letter of Severus Sebokt from the seventh century, but more recent study has shown that this is not the case.²⁵ Three Arabic translations are mentioned by Ibn-al-Nadīm, but he does not indicate whether any of them were made from Syriac, as he does for the Arabic version of the *Poetics* by Abū-Bishr Mattā.²⁶ The unique Paris manuscript (BN Ms. Arabe 2346) of the Arabic *Rhetoric* reveals the existence of a Syriac version, for two notes in it mention that it was transcribed from a copy of Ibn-al-Samḥ, and that for his text he used two Arabic manuscripts and also one in Syriac.²⁷ If both the death of Ibn-al-Samḥ and the transcription of the Paris manuscript occurred in 1027,²⁸ that would be the *terminus ante quem* for the Syriac version, but some barely legible notes at the end of the manuscript make the question of dating very difficult. The latest editor of the Arabic *Rhetoric* inclines to an earlier period, proposing an Umayyad dating for the Arabic translation and an earlier Syriac version as its basis, but his arguments, although possible, are not compelling.²⁹ Earlier than the suggested period of Ibn-al-Samḥ, we have a letter from Timothy I, Catholicos from 780-823, to a priest named Pethion, requesting him to inquire whether or not in the monastery of Maṣ Mattai there existed any commentaries or scholia, like those in Syriac, on the *Topics*, *Sophistical Refutations*, *Rhetoric*, and *Poetics*. Timothy had previously mentioned that he and Abū-Nūḥ had just

has a place in the history of rhetoric as an epitomiser of an earlier work (Menander Rhetor). Cf. Kennedy, *Greek Rhetoric*, p. 324. On Bar-Shakko, cf. further below, p. 259.

²³ Cf. Baumstark, *Geschichte*, p. 316. I have used the Ms. Florence, cod. Palatinus Mediceus Orientalis 186, and cite the work by folio of this manuscript. Cf. S.E. Assemanus, *Bibliothecae Mediceae Laurentianae et Palatinae ... catalogus* (Florence 1742) p. 328.

²⁴ Cf. D. Margoliouth, *Analecta Orientalia ad Poeticam Aristotelem* (London 1887) pp. 43-4.

²⁵ Cf. G.J. Reinink, "Severus Sebokts Brief an den Periodeutes Jonan: Einige Fragen zur Aristotelischen Logik," in *III Symposium Syriacum* (above, n. 5) pp. 97-107.

²⁶ Cf. B. Dodge, *The Fihrist of al-Nadīm*, II (New York 1970) pp. 601-2.

²⁷ Cf. M.C. Lyons, *Aristotle's "Ars Rhetorica": The Arabic Version* (Cambridge 1982) pp. i-iv.

²⁸ Cf. S.M. Stern, "Ibn al-Samḥ," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (1956) pp. 31-3, 41-4.

²⁹ Lyons, "Ars Rhetorica" (above, n. 27) pp. i, iv-vi. Cf. the review by W. Heinrichs, *Zeitschrift für Geschichte der Arabisch-Islamischen Wissenschaften* 1 (1984) pp. 313-14. For a synoptic account of the Syriac translation of the *Rhetoric*, with full bibliographical references, see M. Aouad, "Versions syriaques," in *Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques* (Paris 1989), I, pp. 456-7.

completed an Arabic version of the *Topics* from the Syriac.³⁰ It is tempting to deduce from this that Timothy would also have known the *Rhetoric* in a Syriac version, but it is not certain.

Apart from these indications of a Syriac version of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (and *Poetics*), there is no evidence for the translation of any other work of Greek rhetorical theory. None of the works on rhetoric of other Greek writers appears anywhere in Syriac or Syro-Arabic tradition, although the Progymnasmata of Theon and Aphthonius were both rendered into Armenian, the latter being falsely attributed to Moses Khorenatsi.³¹ Plato was not entirely unknown in Syriac³² or Arabic;³³ but from the little of him that was known to Syriac or Arabic readers, they could hardly have learned very much about the details of rhetorical theory.

Prior to the thirteenth century, therefore, a version of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (and *Poetics*) and the treatise by Antony of Tagrit are the only rhetorical texts known to have existed in Syriac. While the date of both of them is uncertain, these are the two Syriac sources utilised by Bar-Shakko and Bar-Hebraeus. The relevant sections of Bar-Shakko's *Dialogues* are for the most part an epitome of Antony's *Rhetoric*, although he also cited Aristotle's *Poetics*;³⁴ those of Bar-Hebraeus' *Cream of Wisdom* are a commentary on Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and *Poetics*, following Avicenna, although elsewhere he cited Antony's *Rhetoric*.³⁵ Whether Antony knew Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is a question we shall naturally wish to consider, but as only the Fifth (and final) Book of Antony's work has yet been published, it is appropriate first to present an outline of the rest of his treatise. Although only a brief summary can be offered here, both its principal points of contact with the classical tradition of rhetoric and also some of its differences should nevertheless become clear.

THE RHETORIC OF ANTONY OF TAGRIT³⁶

Classical rhetoric attributed eloquence to three (or four) factors: nature, art,

³⁰ Cf. O. Braun, "Briefe des Katholikos Timotheus 1," *Oriens Christianus* 2 (1902) pp. 4-8.

³¹ Cf. R.W. Thomson, "The Formation of the Armenian Literary Tradition," *East of Byzantium* (above, n. 1) pp. 145-6; A. Terian, "The Hellenizing School," *ibid.* pp. 175-7.

³² Cf. Baumstark, *Geschichte*, pp. 170, 231; further below, p. 253 n. 55.

³³ Cf. F. Klein-Franke, "Zur Überlieferung der platonischen Schriften in Islam," *Israel Oriental Studies* 3 (1973) pp. 120-39. Some of the works translated into Arabic may have passed through Syriac; cf. *ibid.* p. 128.

³⁴ Cf. below, p. 259.

³⁵ Cf. above, n. 20. In rhetoric and poetics the relation between Bar-Shakko and Bar-Hebraeus is therefore the same as that described for philosophy by A. Baumstark, *Aristoteles bei den Syrern vom 5. bis 8. Jahrhundert* (Leipzig 1900) p. 183: "Bar—'Ebrōjō ist Übersetzer aus dem Arabischen, Severus [Bar-Shakko] ein syrischer Compiler"

³⁶ In what follows, references to Book 1 are by Book and chapter, while those to

and exercise (to which imitation was sometimes added).³⁷ Antony attributes it primarily to nature, art, and power, although he adds that both exercise and custom may also contribute. The Greeks, he writes, have systematised the three arts of grammar, rhetoric, and poetry³⁸ to a far greater degree than have Syrians, Persians, and others. Arabs may praise or blame, persuade or dissuade, yet never have learned the fair art of Demosthenes; while Persians, Syrians, Armenians, and others compose poems and songs, but do not make their metres akin to those of Homer (5 pp. 3-7). In the proem to Book Five, Antony claims to be the first to write an art of Syriac poetry (5 pp. 7-8), but he is more cautious in his claim in relation to rhetoric, and in the proem to Book One refers approvingly to "predecessors and old masters, philosophers and upholders of speech, whoever they may be, either from our own ranks or from another religion" (1.1).

He begins his treatment of rhetoric (1.2) with a definition and its exegesis: "Rhetoric is a faculty of persuasive speech, possessing proper sequence (ἀκολουθία), on any subject to which it takes the impulse, either theoretical or practical,³⁹ having the power and ability to persuade the multitude and bring the crowd to attention and assent [by] what is said."

To the best of my knowledge, this definition as a whole is unique to Antony, but almost all its component parts are known from other definitions or statements concerning rhetoric. He is in accord with Aristotle in calling rhetoric a faculty, allowing any subject whatever to fall within its scope, and noting its persuasive effect (upon the multitude), but Aristotle's definition is of course rather different: "a faculty of observing on any subject the possible means of persuasion" (*Rhetoric* 1.2 1355b26-27). The opening phrase of Antony's definition echoes rather that usually attributed to Dionysius of Halicarnassus, although Dionysius limits rhetoric to political subjects. His definition appears frequently in late antique prolegomena to rhetoric, notably those of Sopatros, Marcellinus, and a fourth or fifth century anonymous prolegomenon: "an artistic faculty of persuasive speech"⁴⁰ on a political

Book 5 are by Book and page of the published translation (cf. above, n. 15). For the manuscripts of the work, cf. *Fifth Book* (*ibid.*), Text, pp. xi-xxv.

³⁷ Cf. J. Martin, *Antike Rhetorik: Technik und Methode* (Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft 2:3) (Munich 1974) p. 7; and H. Lausberg, *Handbuch der literarischen Rhetorik: Eine Grundlegung der Literaturwissenschaft* (Munich 1960) §§4-6, 37-9.

³⁸ The combination of grammar, rhetoric, and poetry, as the constituents of the ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία (Arabic *al-muḥīl*), also appears in the biography of Aristotle by al-Mubāṣṣir b. ʿAṭīk. Cf. Daiber, *Aetius Arabus* (above, n. 7) pp. 69-70; Baumstark, *Aristoteles* (above, n. 35) pp. 127-9.

³⁹ Literally: from sciences or actions. Cf., e.g., Cicero, *De part. or.* 62 (*propositum ... scientia ... actionis ...*); Hermogenes, *Progyrnasmata* p. 25.3-12 Rabe (τῶν δὲ θέσεων ... πρακτικὰς ... θεωρητικὰς ...).

⁴⁰ δύναμις τεχνικὴ πιθανοῦ λόγου. Antony's phrase is *ḥaylā d-melā mpīṣānūtā*, which is a Syriac rendering of δύναμις πιθανοῦ λόγου.

subject, having as its goal to speak well."⁴¹

Whether or not rhetoric was limited to political subjects was frequently discussed,⁴² and Antony adds that some say that rhetoric has to do only with matters of πολιτεία, since this was originally its concern. By its form it differs from dialectic, for proper ἀκολουθία requires an orator to develop his argument in an unimpeded speech, not by dialogical question and answer.⁴³ It is persuasive not to the few who are interested in philosophy and the sciences, but to the multitude, as had of course been generally recognised since the time of Isocrates and Plato, although Quintilian objected to the inclusion of this point in Ariston's definition of rhetoric.⁴⁴ The power (*hayla*, δύνανμις) of rhetoric to win the assent of the multitude on any subject it wishes seems to be the point of the final phrase of Antony's definition, and in stressing this he uses language somewhat reminiscent of Plato's *Gorgias*.⁴⁵

After definition, Antony turns to division (1.3). There are six species of rhetoric, forming three pairs: praise and blame, persuasion and dissuasion, and accusation and defence. The first pair arises from the appetitive part in us, the second from the passionate, and the third from the rational. The triple division of oratory was one of the theories in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (1.3) accepted by almost all later rhetors,⁴⁶ but the association of the genera of rhetoric with the Platonic tripartition of the soul is not found until the Neoplatonist prolegomena to Hermogenes and Aphthonius, and the particular combination made by Antony is unusual.⁴⁷ The "parts in us" are the only basis he gives for the triple division of rhetoric, and he mentions neither the hearer nor the times, nor uses any Syriac terms corresponding to epideictic, deliberative, or judicial. How these terms might have been translated in the Syriac

⁴¹ Cf. C. Walz, *Rhetores Graeci* vol. 3, p. 611.3ff.; vol. 5 p. 17.17ff. (attributed to Lollianus); H. Rabe, *Prolegomenon Sylloge* no. 4, p. 30.9ff.; no. 5, p. 65.14ff.; no. 17, p. 283.13ff. (anonymous). Cf. Kennedy, *Greek Rhetoric*, pp. 108, 113, 118.

⁴² Cf. Martin, *Antike Rhetorik* (above, n. 37) pp. 5-6; Lausberg, *Handbuch* (above, n. 37) §33.

⁴³ Cf., e.g., Plato, *Protagoras* 329A-B; *Gorgias* 465E, 471D; *Sophistes* 225B, 268B; Cicero, *Orator* 113-14; Quintilian 2.20.7; 2.21.13; 5.14.17; Diogenes Laertius 7.42; *Prolegomenon Sylloge* no. 4 p. 30.1-6 Rabe.

⁴⁴ Cf. Quintilian 2.15.19-20 and the discussion of this passage in G.A. Kennedy's article in this volume. Cf., e.g., Isocrates, *Nicocles* 8; Plato, *Gorgias* 456B-C; Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1.1 1355a24-9; Cicero, *Orator* 117; Quintilian 5.14.28-9.

⁴⁵ *Gorgias* 452E-453A, 455D-456C, 457A. Cf. Cicero, *De inv.* 1.7; *De orat.* 1.31; *Brutus* 185; *Auct. ad Herennium* 1.2 (cum adensione auditorum quoad eius fieri poterit); Quintilian 2.15.10-12.

⁴⁶ Cf. F. Solmsen, "The Aristotelian Tradition in Ancient Rhetoric," *American Journal of Philology* 62 (1941) pp. 180-1, reprinted in *Aristotle: The Classical Heritage of Rhetoric*, ed. K.V. Erickson (Metuchen, NJ 1974) pp. 293-4.

⁴⁷ Cf. T.C. Burgess, *Epideictic Literature* (Chicago Studies in Classical Philology 3) (Chicago 1902) p. 92; H. Rabe, "Aus Rhetoren-Handschriften. 3. Die Quellen des Doxapates in den Homilien zu Aphthonios," *Rheinisches Museum* 62 (1907) pp. 582-3 (= p. 581, n. 2); Kennedy, *Greek Rhetoric*, pp. 114, 118.

version of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* we can only guess from Bar-Hebraeus' commentary, where they are rendered *mhawyānāyā* (ἐπιδεικτικόν), *melkānāyā* (συμβουλευτικόν), and *dīqaniqāyā* or *maṣṣūānāyā* (δικανικόν).

The prolegomena completed, Antony proceeds to discuss each of the three types of speech, devoting most attention to the laudation (1.4), which he tacitly assumes to be confined to the praise of a human being. The grounds of praise he divides into *propria* (*baytāyā* = τὰ οἰκεῖα), i.e., "those things which belong by nature to the individual subject of praise," and *aliena* (*nukrāyā* = τὰ ἀλλότρια), namely native city, family, and possessions. *Propria* are triply divided into dispositions of soul, body, and the conjunction of both. The first of these is made up of sciences, impulse, and actions, while the last group comprises the three cardinal virtues of temperance, courage, and justice. The tripartition of "goods" into those of soul, body, and external fortune is very common in classical epideictic (and philosophy, from where it is derived), but Antony's classification is slightly different. While classical epideictic groups the goods of the soul by the four cardinal virtues, Antony has a tripartition of the soul's goods by sciences, impulse, and actions, and places three cardinal virtues under a fourth heading of goods of "the conjunction of soul and body." The tripartition into sciences, impulse (*hepā*), and actions seems to reflect a Stoic or Stoic-inspired division of ethics into θεωρία, ὁρμή, and πράξεις,⁴⁸ but I know of no other rhetorical treatise which employs this division in the presentation of epideictic. Turning for a moment to the later Syriac writers, it is not surprising to find that while Bar-Shakko follows Antony (*Dialogues* 1.2.3), the usual tripartition of soul-body-fortune appears in Bar-Hebraeus (*Cream of Wisdom*, fol. 222bβ, 7ff.) in his commentary on Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (1.5 1360b24-28), with the four cardinal virtues under the goods of the soul.

The chapters devoted to deliberative (1.6) and judicial (1.7) speeches are much more sketchy. In the former, he divides contests into dialectic, war, and athletics. In terms of stasis theory, he could be said to use the "heads" of the expedient, the honourable, the possible, and the anticipated result, but he does not employ this technical terminology. In judicial oratory, he gives the defendant three options to argue his case, which correspond to the stases of *stochasmos* (fact), *horos* (definition) or *poiotes* (quality), and *metastasis* (transfer of blame) or *antenklēma* (transfer of cause). Again, no stasis terminology is employed, and the few lines that he devotes to this bear more resemblance to those passages in Aristotle where it is possible to see the antecedents of stasis theory than to the formal expressions of the developed theory.⁴⁹ In this chapter on accusation and defence, Antony gives

⁴⁸ Cf. Eudorus from Arius Didymus in Stobaeus, *Ecl.* 2.42 Wachsmuth; Seneca, *Ep.* 89.14.

⁴⁹ Cf. W.N. Thompson, "Stasis in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 58 (1972) pp. 134-41, reprinted in *Aristotle: The Classical Heritage* (above, n. 46) pp. 267-77. For the widespread use in deliberative oratory of the headings of expediency, honour,

us for the first time examples of speeches to illustrate his theoretical exposition. Since his theory is obviously grounded in classical rhetoric, it comes as a mild surprise that his examples are drawn from the Bible: Paul and Tertullus before Felix (*Acts* 24), and Job and his comforters.

The contrast between the growth of epideictic oratory from Hellenistic times onwards and its comparative neglect in favour of judicial rhetoric in works of rhetorical theory has often been noted. Instruction in epideictic was provided in the progymnasmata and in the handbook of Menander Rhetor, but not in the *Ars* of Hermogenes. In its overall design, Antony's work is very different from both Menander and Hermogenes, but since it concentrates on epideictic, it is with the former that it can be compared on particular points of teaching. When later in his treatise (1.28) Antony comes to discuss disposition (*η�ιπυα, τάξις*), the only disposition he has in mind is that of a speech of praise. The arrangement he prescribes falls within the general pattern of the progymnastic encomium and the epideictic forms found in Menander.⁵⁰ By contrast, the disposition of the judicial or deliberative oration is never discussed.

The remainder of Book One presents some further oratorical techniques,⁵¹ Book Two examines the utility of praise, and Book Four the praise of friendship and love. Book Three is a discussion of subject matter, disposition, and ornamentation (*mhabbatā*), the Aristotelian triad (*Rhetoric* 3.1) with the common late Greek monopolisation of style (*λέξις*) by ornament (*κόσμος* or *κατασκευή*).⁵² Book Five is devoted to ornamentation, and deals with poetic metres, assonance, and figures. Antony offers a definition of figure similar to that found in Greek and Latin rhetors, but unlike the late Greek manuals he knows only a small number of figures, principally five: fable, sentence, bare figure (without fable or sentence), personification or characterisation, and metaphor or metonymy. At the end he adds that comedy (*κομωδία*) belongs to sentence. For examples of figures he refers to the fables of Aesop and the sentences of Pythagoras among other popular sources, but his favourite quarry, even more than the Bible, is the *Iliad*.⁵³

and possibility, cf. Quintilian 3.8.22-25; and for Hermogenes' six headings *Peri Pragmatikēs*, cf. *On Staseis*, p. 76 Rabe.

⁵⁰ Cf. Watt, "Syriac Panegyric" (above, n. 9) pp. 276-85.

⁵¹ These include induction (*ἐπαγωγή*, 1.16), consequents (*ἀκόλουθα*, 1.17), silence (*ἀποσιώπησις*, 1.20), modesty in the prooemium (1.19), division into species (1.17), play on names (1.23) and comparison (*ἀντίθετον*, 1.22). He also discusses the composition of prooemium and epilogue (1.21), and the use of poetry, grammar, and comedy (1.25-7).

⁵² Cf. Solmsen, "The Aristotelian Tradition" (above, n. 46) p. 183 (reprint, p. 295). Effectively he deals with invention in 1.4-24, disposition (of an encomium) in 1.28, and ornament in 5, but he does not indicate this to the reader.

⁵³ Cf. J.W. Watt, "Antony of Tagrit on Rhetorical Figures," in *IV Symposium Syriacum* (above, n. 4) pp. 317-25.

THE BACKGROUND OF ANTONY'S RHETORIC

"Art is the offspring of eloquence," but it is incredible to suppose that Antony created this particular Art *de novo* by "noting and collecting the doings of men who were naturally eloquent" (Cicero, *De oratore* 1.146). He tells us who for him is "the prince of rhetors and chief of sophists": Gregory of Nazianzus.⁵⁴ But neither from the Syriac translations of Gregory nor those of other Greek Christian orators could he have derived so much knowledge of Greek rhetorical theory. He must surely have learned that from teachers or books, either in Greek, Syriac, or conceivably Arabic.

The Syriac or Arabic version of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is the only Syriac or Arabic text known to us from which Antony could have learned very much about Greek rhetorical theory. I do not exclude the possibility that he knew it, but he never mentions Aristotle by name,⁵⁵ and it is quite clear that at least he did not learn *everything* from that source. His definition of rhetoric, for instance, is not that of Aristotle, while the coordination of the three types of oratory with the three Platonic faculties of the soul is found only in later Greek rhetorical theory.⁵⁶ However, what Antony appears to know of later theory is on the whole quite limited. Judicial oratory dominated Greek rhetorical theory, but for examples of accusation and defence Antony turns to the biblical book of Job! Greek influence on him is most striking in epideictic, yet to epideictic Greek higher rhetorical education paid comparatively little attention. Furthermore, even in epideictic there is a surprising idiosyncrasy in his fourfold division of goods in place of the usual tripartition, and his location of three cardinal virtues under "goods of the conjunction of body and soul" rather than four under "goods of the soul."⁵⁷

If Antony learned his theory directly from a Greek handbook, it must have been very different from any manual known to us, or he must have treated it with considerable freedom. Since in philosophy Syriac has preserved versions of late antique compilations of which the originals have been lost,⁵⁸ it is by no means impossible that behind Antony's treatise lies some lost Greek rhetorical Art. But the curious mixture of the familiar and the strange which this work presents to

⁵⁴ 5 pp. 47, 55, 58, 62, 66.

⁵⁵ Plato is mentioned on two occasions; cf. E. Lanz, "Syrische Platonzitate in der Rhetorik des Anton von Tagrit," in *Paul de Lagarde* (above, n. 20) pp. 129-34. The opening sentence of Book 2 ("Justice is to praise friends only when they have gone before and toiled and brought in something praiseworthy ..."), whatever its proximate source, is ultimately Platonic (cf. *Rep.* 332D; 335A; *Laws* 801E), although Antony gives no indication of the fact.

⁵⁶ Cf. above, p. 250.

⁵⁷ Cf. above, p. 251.

⁵⁸ Cf. H. Daiber, "Semitische Sprachen als Kulturvermittler zwischen Antike und Mittelalter," *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* 136 (1986) pp. 301-6.

us also makes it possible to suppose that in the Syro-Mesopotamian area there was a tradition of rhetorical teaching which had developed in its own particular way. Evidence of knowledge of rhetoric on the part of a number of Syriac writers of different periods, to which I referred earlier,⁵⁹ lends some support to this hypothesis.

There is one passage where Antony gives us a hint concerning the source of his teaching. In his discussion of figures in Book Five, he tells us that he had a teacher, who explained to him the meaning of *Iliad* 20.67-73:

"Virtues and vices arise against each other," said my teacher, "for Ares is considered to be senseless and stupid, Athena wisdom and prudence, Leto forgetful error, and Hermes memory and reason. (Homer) also touches on natural things and narrates the division of the elements from each other, saying, "Against Poseidon arose king Apollo," (which means that) the sun arose against watery nature, (while) Artemis is the moon and Hera air" (5 pp. 66-67).

The poets, and Homer in particular, were widely used in the Greek schools of the grammarians and rhetors, especially as a source of figures, and the scholia to Homer show the wide currency of this physical and ethical allegorical interpretation of the battle of the gods.⁶⁰ Unfortunately, Antony does not tell us where he received this instruction, or in what language. Given how little was known of Homer in Arabic,⁶¹ only Greek or Syriac seems possible. It would be rash to rule out Greek completely, for not only may Antony have attended a bilingual school in Mesopotamia, but we also have the example of Hunain, who apparently spent some years in Byzantium and there acquired perfect facility in Greek and an excellent knowledge of Homer.⁶² It is striking, however, that as far as I have been able to discover, all the identifiable works of Greek literature cited by Antony, whether classical or patristic, were known in Syriac versions prior to the ninth century, and where these versions are extant, it is clear that he used them.⁶³ We have no Syriac

⁵⁹ Cf. above, pp. 244-5.

⁶⁰ Cf. Schol. Hom. A & B in *Il.* 20.67 (ed. Dindorf vol. 2 p. 195.9-14 & vol. 4 p. 231.12-30); [Plutarch], *De vita et poesi Homeri* 102 (ed. Bernardakis vol. 7 pp. 383-4); [Héraclite], *Problèmes Homériques* 54-8 (ed. Buffière, pp. 62-5); Porphyry, *Quaest. Homer. ad Il. pert.*, pp. 240-3 Schrader. On the poets and oratorical training, cf. H. North, "The Use of Poetry in the Training of the Ancient Orator," *Traditio* 8 (1952) pp. 1-33.

⁶¹ Cf. J. Kraemer, "Arabische Homerverse," *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* 106 (1956) pp. 259-316, and "Zu den 'Arabischen Homerversen'," *ibid.* 107 (1957) pp. 511-18.

⁶² Cf. G. Strohmaier, "Homer in Bagdad," *Byzantinoslavica* 41 (1980) pp. 196-200; *idem*, "Byzantinisch-arabische Wissenschaftsbeziehungen in der Zeit des Ikonoklasmus," *Studien zum 8. und 9. Jahrhundert in Byzanz*, hrsg. v. H. Köpstein (Berlin 1983) pp. 179-83.

⁶³ Cf. Watt, *Fifth Book*, Translation, pp. xvii-xx.

manuscript of Homer, but we know that Theophilus of Edessa made a partial or complete version in the eighth century.⁶⁴ Antony indeed refers to "those who translated Homer,"⁶⁵ so there can be no doubt that one or more versions existed in his day. My proposal, therefore, assuming that Antony's teacher is no literary fiction, is that he gained his knowledge in a Syriac school where poetry and rhetoric were part of the curriculum. As some puzzling aspects of the logical works of al-Fārābī have been envisaged "as an outcome of a Syrian teaching tradition based on Syriac summaries of late Greek works,"⁶⁶ so I conceive Antony's treatise as essentially an outcome of a Syriac (or Graeco-Syriac) tradition of teaching in literature and rhetoric.

I therefore conclude from Antony's treatise that elements of Hellenistic literary and elementary rhetorical education lived on in Syriac (or bilingual Graeco-Syriac) schools, in particular the exegesis and criticism of Homer, the study of figures, Syriac metre, and Syriac poets, elementary composition comparable to that found in some of the exercises of the progymnasmata, and instruction in epideictic (encomium). Together with technical grammar, this poetical and basic rhetorical education would have formed (part or whole of) a Syriac ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία.⁶⁷ The first stages of philosophical study may have run concurrently with it, for in his enumeration of the sciences in his chapters on praise (1.4; 8), Antony follows precisely the divisions of philosophy set out in the *General Prolegomenon to Philosophy* of David and the *Logic* of Paul the Persian.⁶⁸ It would seem, therefore, that he expected his readers to be familiar with the material that came at the start of the philosophy curriculum, as established in Alexandria and followed in the Syrian schools.

Judicial and deliberative rhetoric are much less well represented in Antony's work than epideictic, but his inclusion of them, however briefly, suggests that they were not outside the range of the Syrians' interest. Antony's first three chapters

⁶⁴ Cf. Baumstark, *Geschichte*, p. 341; H. Raguse, "Syrische Homerzitate in der Rhetorik des Anton von Tagrit," in *Paul de Lagarde* (above, n. 20), pp. 162-75.

⁶⁵ Cf. Raguse, "Syrische Homerzitate," pp. 167-8.

⁶⁶ F.W. Zimmermann, "Some Observations on al-Fārābī and Logical Tradition," *Islamic Philosophy and the Classical Tradition. Essays presented ... to R. Walzer*, ed. S.M. Stern, A. Hourani, V. Brown (Oxford 1972) p. 528.

⁶⁷ Technical grammar could have been taught from the Syriac version of Dionysius' *Techne* (cf. Baumstark, *Geschichte*, p. 117). As is well known, dialectic and the mathematical arts were often neglected at this level. Cf. above, n. 38.

⁶⁸ Antony divided the sciences into those on immaterial, material, and intermediate things, i.e., theology, physics, and mathematics; he further subdivided mathematics into the usual four disciplines (arithmetic, geometry, music, and astronomy), and theology, more unusually, into things relating to God, to angels, and to the soul. Cf. D. Gutas, "Paul the Persian on the classification of the parts of Aristotle's philosophy: a milestone between Alexandria and Bagdād," *Der Islam* 60 (1983) [hereafter: Gutas, "Paul the Persian"] pp. 245-6, 261.

are an introduction to the *whole* of rhetoric, and it would make little sense to define rhetoric as "a faculty of *persuasive* speech" if the students were never to make a proper study of judicial or deliberative oratory. While it is possible that rhetorical education in Syriac never went beyond the level represented by Antony's work, it does give the impression of being an elementary treatise, at the end of which the student would be ready to attack the "logical art" of "judicial and deliberative rhetoric" (Sopatros).⁶⁹

The literary and elementary rhetorical education which seems to lie behind most of Antony's treatise need not have been dependent upon any particular Greek teaching manuals, but could well have been absorbed by the Syrians over a period from the widespread Hellenistic system of secondary education, to which in bilingual Syria and Mesopotamia they were long exposed. But for more advanced studies they used and made translations of those Greek texts which were or had been in use in centres of higher education such as Alexandria. In the sixth century, philosophers there studied Aristotle's *Organon*, which included the *Rhetoric* and the *Poetics*, while rhetoricians mainly used Hermogenes, especially his treatise *On Staseis*. We know that the Syrians translated Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, but we have no evidence for a translation of Hermogenes. The question thus arises as to whether they might have used Aristotle's *Rhetoric* as a textbook for the higher levels of rhetorical study, as they used the early books of the *Organon* for logic.

THE SYRIAC VERSION OF ARISTOTLE'S *RHETORIC*

Aristotle's *Rhetoric* received little attention from Byzantine rhetoricians, for advanced rhetorical study there was dominated by Hermogenes and his commentators.⁷⁰ Since their names, however, make no appearance in extant Syriac literature, it is most unlikely that Hermogenes was intensively studied even by bilingual Syrians. To the best of our knowledge, the only Greek work on rhetoric mentioned by a Syriac writer or translated into Syriac was Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. Nevertheless, since Alexandrian Neoplatonist philosophers and their Arab successors considered the *Rhetoric* and the *Poetics* to be part of the *Organon*,⁷¹ we cannot

⁶⁹ Sopatros called rhetoric a logical art (λογική τέχνη) (cf. Walz, *Rhet. Gr.* vol. 5 p. 1.1) and agreed with Porphyry and Minucianus that the study of it can be limited to the examination of judicial and deliberative oratory (*ibid.*, pp. 9.14-11.20). Cf. already Quintilian 2.1.2. On the other side, Menander, *On Epideictic* (Treatise I) 331.16-18 Spengel, explicitly excluded the declamations of sophists from his subject.

⁷⁰ Cf. T.M. Conley, "Aristotle's *Rhetoric* in Byzantium," *Rhetorica* 8 (1990) pp. 29-44; and the same author's article in this volume.

⁷¹ Cf. R. Walzer, "Zur Traditionsgeschichte der aristotelischen Poetik," in (*idem.*) *Greek into Arabic* (Oxford 1962) pp. 129-36; P. Moraux, *Les listes anciennes des ouvrages d'Aristote* (Louvain 1951) [hereafter: Moraux, *Listes anciennes*] pp. 172-83; D.L. Black, *Logic and Aristotle's Rhetoric and Poetics in Medieval Arabic Philosophy* (Leiden 1990) [hereafter: Black, *Logic*].

simply assume without question that it was for the study of rhetoric that Aristotle's treatise was translated into Syriac.

In what is apparently the earliest mention of the *Rhetoric* and *Poetics* in Syriac, by the logician Paul the Persian, although extant only in a later Arabic citation by Miskawaih, they are seen as the last two books of the *Organon*, in line with the Alexandrian precedent.⁷² Paul may have been "somewhat of a maverick,"⁷³ his classification of Aristotle's works, unlike his *Logic*, was not known to later Syriac authors, and his reference does not necessarily imply the existence of a Syriac version of the *Rhetoric*, especially if his classification was originally written in Persian. For a long time the Syriac *Organon* reached only to the *Prior Analytics*, although Arabic sources tell us that Athanasius of Balad (d. 686) and Theophilus of Edessa (d. 785) worked on the *Topics* and the *Sophistical Refutations*.⁷⁴ However, the reference of Timothy I, around the beginning of the ninth century, to "commentaries and scholia on the *Topics*, *Sophistical Refutations*, *Rhetoric*, and *Poetics*,"⁷⁵ seems to indicate that he also took the *Organon* to include the latter two books. Nevertheless, the ancient classification of these two works not under the logical treatises (τὰ ὁργανικά or τὰ λογικά) but the productive (τὰ ποιητικά), was also known in Syriac, for it appears in the *Catalogue* of Ptolemy (al-Ganb), which was translated into Arabic from a lost Syriac version.⁷⁶

It is therefore a reasonable supposition, although by no means certain, that the *Rhetoric* and *Poetics* were translated in order to produce a Syriac *Organon* of the same length as that of the Alexandrian commentators. But even if these two books were generally assumed to be part of the *Organon*, the rather negative logical function assigned to them in the Alexandrian scheme⁷⁷ would not have been the only possible one if rhetoric was studied in the Syriac schools,⁷⁸ for in that case

⁷² Cf. Gutas, "Paul the Persian," p. 234.

⁷³ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 250.

⁷⁴ Cf. Brock, "From Antagonism" (above, n. 1) pp. 25-6; F.E. Peters, *Aristoteles Arabus* (Leiden 1968) pp. 14-26. Before George of the Arabs (d. 724), the *Prior Analytics* had only been translated up to 1.7.

⁷⁵ Cf. above, pp. 247-8.

⁷⁶ Cf. Baumstark, *Aristoteles* (above, n. 35) pp. 13-15, 53-61, 64, 101; Moraux, *Listes anciennes*, pp. 24-5, 149, 304.

⁷⁷ In the Alexandrian scheme, the last four books of the full *Organon* all merely protected genuine from apparent demonstration. Cf. Moraux, *Listes anciennes*, p. 180; Gutas, "Paul the Persian," pp. 242, 264-6; Black, *Logic*, pp. 34-6, 50.

⁷⁸ Cf. Kennedy, *Greek Rhetoric*, pp. 318-20, on the two Greek commentaries (12th century) on Aristotle's *Rhetoric*: "Both commentators clearly viewed the *Rhetoric* as a part of the *Organon* and to be studied primarily as a work on logic. Yet both commentators show an interest in rhetoric for itself and make an effort to integrate Aristotle's thought with the authoritative teaching of Hermogenes" (p. 319). On the Arabic commentators on the *Rhetoric* and *Poetics*, cf. Black, *Logic*, p. 11 and n. 35: "These philosophers are keenly aware that the logical aspects of the *Poetics* do not exhaust the scope of Aristotle's interest."

there would surely have been a desire to have available a translated Greek work on this subject, as on others. Syriac culture was very much a "translation culture"; in those subjects of Greek origin which appealed to them, we usually find beside their own writings translations from Greek. For "agonistic" rhetoric, only lightly touched on by Antony, Hermogenes would have been the obvious candidate for translation, but Aristotle was familiar through his logical works and may have been more attractive to them as a teacher of advanced rhetorical theory than Hermogenes. Olympiodorus appears to presuppose as a general assumption in his time that as Homer and Demosthenes represented the peaks of poetry and oratory, so Aristotle's *Poetics* and Hermogenes' *Rhetoric* established the poetic and rhetorical methods respectively.⁷⁹ The Syrians may have preferred Aristotle, in his *Poetics* and *Rhetoric*, as the authority for *both* methods, as there is no indication that they ever translated Hermogenes. If the lack of a discussion of stasis theory in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* was a factor in its neglect by later Greek rhetoricians,⁸⁰ that need not have applied to the Syrians, who presumably prior to the sixth century had no tradition of *advanced* rhetoric and for whom, therefore, stasis theory did not have the same weight. They may well have preferred a treatment of rhetoric based on or at least related to the syllogism,⁸¹ which they learnt about from the *Prior Analytics*, over one based on stasis. Furthermore, as preachers involved in public speaking, they may have warmed to Aristotle's estimation of deliberative oratory as more befitting to them than judicial (*Rhetoric* 1.1 1354b22-29), and felt that stasis theory, with its almost exclusive concern for the latter, condemned what was most useful to them "to a rather obscure existence in a corner."⁸²

⁷⁹ "Homer and Demosthenes needed neither Aristotle's *Poetics* nor Hermogenes' *Ars (Rhetorica)*, but rather (Aristotle and Hermogenes) needed their writings in order to establish the (poetical and rhetorical) methods" (Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena et In Categorias commentarium*, ed. A. Busse, CAG 12.1 (Berlin 1902) p. 18.7-10), cited by Gutas, "Paul the Persian," p. 258. With this positive poetical function of the *Poetics*, contrast the negative logical one in the following: "But some ask, towards what do the *Sophistical Refutations*, *Topics*, *Rhetoric*, and *Poetics* contribute, and for what reason does the Philosopher consider them? To them we say that just as the followers of Asclepius taught not only knowledge of health, but also of illnesses, either for detecting them or curing them, likewise the Philosopher, knowing that some sophistical syllogisms have been produced in the attempt to overturn and conceal the truth, has deemed it necessary to teach about them, not in order to provide for them, but in order that we, by knowing them, do not embrace these very things" (*ibid.*, p. 8.19-27, transl. Black, *Logic*, p. 35.)

⁸⁰ Cf. Kennedy, *Greek Rhetoric*, p. 73.

⁸¹ Ammonius and Philoponus considered rhetoric to be asyllogistic, while the other Alexandrian commentators located the rhetorical syllogism between the dialectical and the sophistical. Cf. Moraux, *Listes anciennes*, pp. 179-80; Black, *Logic*, pp. 34-41.

⁸² Solmsen, "The Aristotelian Tradition" (above, n. 46) p. 181 (reprint, p. 294). They would probably have found it hard to understand the other undoubtedly genuine treatise of Hermogenes, *On Ideas*, unless they were quite familiar with Demosthenes and many other classical authors.

Shortly before Bar-Hebraeus in his *Cream of Wisdom* wrote the only known Syriac commentary on the *Rhetoric* or the *Poetics*, borrowing heavily from Avicenna, Jacob Bar-Shakko composed his *Book of Dialogues*. The first part has three sections, on grammar, rhetoric, and poetics; the second has two, on logic and philosophy. The sections on rhetoric and poetics are for the most part taken from Books One and Five of Antony's *Rhetoric*, but while on the subject of figures Antony dealt with "comedy" (i.e., the rhetorical use of irony), Bar-Shakko in his poetics wrote on both "comedy" and tragedy. Since he found nothing on tragedy in Antony, Bar-Shakko had to look elsewhere: he named Aristotle as his source and cited *Poetics* 6 1449b24-1450a9.⁸³ We may smile at Bar-Shakko's juxtaposition of Antony's "comedy" (irony) with tragedy, but it shows that in the thirteenth century at least, a Syrian teaching poetry was prepared to look not only to Antony's *Rhetoric*, but also, where that failed him, to Aristotle's *Poetics*.

It is clearly possible that the Syriac translators and most readers of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and *Poetics* were interested in these books only from the perspective of their logical function in the *Organon*. But since Alexandrian, Byzantine, and Arab commentators, as well as Bar-Shakko, were all aware that the interest of one or other of these works was not confined to logic,⁸⁴ it is also possible that Syrians who admired the poetry of Homer⁸⁵ and the eloquence of Gregory of Nazianzus, and had received the basic training in poetry and rhetoric which is found in Antony's handbook, may have valued them for their contribution to rhetoric and poetics. Solmsen invited the historian of ancient rhetorical theory to take a clue from the celebrated passage in Quintilian on the Isocratean, Aristotelian, and Hermagorean types.⁸⁶ If we may apply this suggestion in a modified form to the period of late antiquity, during which a tradition of basic prescriptive teaching was embodied in the progymnasmata, Aristotle's *Rhetoric* survived only as an "appendix" to logic, and Hermogenes dominated higher rhetoric, then it is not inappropriate to ask whether in Syriac schools, where the teachers were presumably not appointed to "chairs" either of philosophy or rhetoric, advanced rhetorical theory may have been

⁸³ The Syriac text of the citation is published by Margoliouth, *Analecta Orientalia* (above, n. 24) pp. 77-9 (Arabic sequence). The context in Antony is Book 5 p. 69.22 (cf. p. 53, n. 13).

⁸⁴ Cf. above, n. 78 and 79.

⁸⁵ Although Theophilus of Edessa (d. 785) is the only known translator of Homer (cf. above, p. 255), the citation of the *Iliad* by Athanasius of Balad (d. 686) shows that bilingual Syrians were reading Homer long before Theophilus. Cf. G. Furlani, "Una introduzione alla logica Aristotelica di Atanasio di Balad," *Rendiconti della Reale Accademia dei Lincei, Classe di Scienze morali, storiche e filologiche*, ser. 5, vol. 25 (1917) pp. 732f. (text)/769 (translation).

⁸⁶ Cf. Solmsen, "The Aristotelian Tradition" (above, n. 46) p. 35 (reprint, p. 278), with reference to Quintilian 3.1.14-16. See the discussion in G.A. Kennedy's article in this volume.

of the second type, the Aristotelian, and taught together with logic.⁸⁷ If we consider that Antony's *Rhetoric* and Aristotle's *Rhetoric* might at some time have been Syriac textbooks for the elementary and advanced levels of rhetoric respectively⁸⁸—roughly comparable to the late Greek and Byzantine use of the progymnasmata on the one hand,⁸⁹ and the *Art* of Hermogenes (especially his *On Staseis*) on the other—then in Syriac Aristotle's *Rhetoric* could have served not merely to sharpen the logician's understanding of the syllogism,⁹⁰ but also to train the orator in persuasive public speech.

The architect of our oldest Greek manuscript containing the *Rhetoric*, *Parisinus* 1741 (10th century), was evidently interested in rhetorical texts, and "put together a codex which was to form something like an anti-corpus to the dominant rhetorical writings in Byzantium, those of Aphthonius, Hermogenes and their commentators."⁹¹ It is not beyond the bounds of possibility that for the *Rhetoric* (and the *Poetics*) the exemplar of *Parisinus* 1741 came from a Graeco-Syriac collection in the East,⁹² and if that were so, these Syriac scholars may also have read the *Rhetoric* primarily as a work on rhetorical theory. Be that as it may, the leaders of the Syrians presumably had every reason "to discover the possible means of persuasion on any subject," not least to strengthen the resolve of their communities and prevent their defection to the official religion of the state, whether Byzantine Orthodoxy, Zoroastrianism, or Islam. If the *Art* of Hermogenes hardly met their needs, the Syriac Aristotelians could well have jettisoned it and turned instead to the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle.

⁸⁷ Advanced rhetoric, i.e., following the study of the progymnasmata, was already a "logical art" with the Neoplatonists. Cf. above, n. 69, and on the general integration of advanced rhetoric into a philosophical education, G.L. Kustas, *Studies in Byzantine Rhetoric* (Thessaloniki 1973) pp. 6-11; Kennedy, *Greek Rhetoric*, pp. 73-9, 105-15.

⁸⁸ Cf. G. Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece* (Princeton 1963) p. 123: "Probably no one would learn how to speak in the first instance from reading Aristotle, but any speaker might well profit from much of his advice." The differences noted between Aristotle's and Antony's *Rhetoric* (above, pp. 248-52) clearly do not preclude the possibility that both could have been used in rhetorical education.

⁸⁹ From the ground covered by the progymnasmata, Antony in effect deals with fable, narrative, anecdote, sentence (5 pp. 55-8), encomium (1.4; 28), vituperation (1.5), characterization (5 pp. 59-62), and possibly comparison (1.22). The notable omissions are those which are particularly relevant to judicial oratory: confirmation, refutation, commonplace, and introduction of a law. His material on the praise of cities (1.4) has some similarity to *ekphrasis* (description), that on persuasion or dissuasion (1.6) to *thesis*.

⁹⁰ Cf. above, n. 77.

⁹¹ Cf. D. Harlfinger and D. Reinsch, "Die Aristotelica des Parisinus graecus 1741," *Philologus* 114 (1970) pp. 29-37, the citation p. 32.

⁹² Cf. Conley, "Aristotle's *Rhetoric* in Byzantium" (above, n. 70) pp. 34-8.

Les fondements de la *Rhétorique* d'Aristote reconsidérés par Averroès dans l'abrégé de la rhétorique, ou le développement du concept de "point de vue immédiat"¹

Maroun Aouad

I LA TRADITION ARABE DE LA RHÉTORIQUE ²

Selon les biobibliographes, la *Rhét.* d'Aristote aurait été traduite plusieurs fois en arabe. Mais on ne dispose aujourd'hui que d'un *unicum* comportant une traduction

¹ Cette contribution est le texte remanié d'une communication présentée au Symposium *Peripatetic Rhetoric after Aristotle* (Rutgers University, 20-22 septembre 1991). On trouvera, à la fin de cet article, une liste des sigles.

² Bilan de la recherche plus détaillé dans M. Aouad, "La *Rhétorique*. Tradition syriaque et arabe," dans R. Goulet (éd.), *Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques* (Paris, 1989), vol. I, pp. 455-72. Ce travail a néanmoins une limite, due à l'objectif même du *Dictionnaire*: ce qui ne se rapporte pas, d'assez près, à la restauration ou à une éventuelle restitution d'oeuvres antiques, ayant un rapport avec *Rhét.*, n'a pas été retenu. Dans le présent article, nous nous bornerons à mentionner, dans le panorama de la section I, les principaux textes de philosophie arabe ayant abordé la rhétorique d'origine aristotélicienne et, dans les autres sections, ceux seulement qui ont un rapport avec l'examen que nous entreprendrons du concept de point de vue immédiat dans l'abrégé de la rhétorique par Averroès. Chemin faisant, il nous arrivera, bien entendu, d'évoquer des publications parues après le bilan de la recherche susmentionnée. Signalons d'ores et déjà quelques travaux importants: Deborah L. Black, *Logic and Aristotle's Rhetoric and Poetics in Medieval Arabic Philosophy* (Leiden, New York, København et Köln, 1990); Renate Wütsch, *Avicennas Bearbeitungen der aristotelischen Rhetorik: ein Beitrag zum Fortleben antiken Bildungsgutes in der islamischen Welt*, «Islamkundliche Untersuchungen», 146. (Berlin, 1991) (c. r. par M. Aouad, dans *Bulletin Critique des Annales Islamologiques*, no. 10 – sous presse); M. Blaustein, "The Scope and Methods of Rhetoric in Averroes' *Middle Commentary on Aristotle's Rhetoric*," dans Ch. E. Butterworth (éd.), *The Political Aspects of Islamic Philosophy. Essays in Honor of Muhsin S. Mahdi* (Cambridge, Mass., 1992): 262-303.

anonyme,³ sans doute ancienne, c'est-à-dire antérieure à l'époque de Hunayn (m. 873). C'est de celle-ci que dépendent manifestement les commentaires arabes conservés. Ce fait est d'une grande importance, car la terminologie incertaine, les nombreuses translittérations, les obscurités et les contresens de cette traduction ont souvent constitué le cadre des interprétations originales des commentateurs arabes.

Malgré les défauts de leur principale source, les philosophes arabes qui ont repris l'héritage grec se sont, en effet, très sérieusement employés à l'étude de *Rhét.* D'une façon plus générale, on peut subdiviser en six catégories les travaux dans lesquels ils ont abordé les questions oratoires.

1) Les traités dits "originaux."⁴ La rhétorique est alors surtout envisagée comme un moyen privilégié pour les élites de communiquer avec le peuple et comme l'une des manières d'expliquer le discours des religions révélées comparé à celui de la philosophie. Cette approche politico-religieuse de la rhétorique, attestée, par exemple, dans les *Opinions des habitants de la cité vertueuse*⁵ de Fārābī (m. 950) et dans le *Traité décisif*⁶ d'Averroès (m. 1198), entre néanmoins peu dans le détail des règles techniques de la discipline oratoire; elle les présuppose plutôt et s'occupe surtout des rapports de la rhétorique avec la politique, la religion et la philosophie. Aussi le texte même de *Rhét.* est-il peu mis à contribution dans cette sorte de traité.

2) Les commentaires d'ouvrages antiques non consacrés à la logique, comme, par exemple, *Le Livre des lettres* de Fārābī⁷ ou *L'Abrégé de la République*⁸ par Averroès: ici la situation de *Rhét.* est assez voisine de celle qui est la sienne dans la catégorie précédente.

3) Certaines doxographies, comme *Al-Sa'āda wa-al-Is'ād* (*On seeking and causing happiness*) d'al-'Amīn (m. 992), où l'on trouve quatre citations explicitement rapportées à *Rhét.* et d'autres, assez nombreuses, qui en sont tirées sans y être référées expressément.⁹

³ Éditions: *Aristotelis Rhetorica in versione Arabica vetusta*. Recognovit et Adnotatione Critica auxit 'A. Badawi (Le Caire, 1959; réédition Al-Kuwayt et Beyrouth, 1979); TAL.

⁴ Le mot est de L. Gauthier, *Ibn Rochd* (Averroès) (Paris 1948), p. 15.

⁵ *Al-Farabi on the Perfect State*. Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī's *Mabādī' arā' ahl al-madīna al-fāḍila*. A revised text with introduction, translation and commentary by R. Walzer (Oxford 1985).

⁶ Ibn Rushd (Averroes), *Kitāb Faṣl l-maqāl with its Appendix (Dāmīna) and an Extract from Kitāb al-Kaṣh' an Manāhij al-Adilla*. Arabic text, edited by George F. Hourani (Leiden, 1959); *Averroes On the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy*. A translation with introduction and notes of Ibn Rushd's *Kitāb Faṣl al-maqāl with its appendix (Dāmīna)* and an extract from *Kitāb al-kaṣh' an manāhij al-adilla*. by George F. Hourani (London, 1961).

⁷ *Alfarabi's Book of Letters (Kitāb al-Hurūf)*. Commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. Arabic text edited with introduction and notes by M. Mahdi (Beyrouth, 1969). M. Mahdi prépare une nouvelle édition - avec traduction - de ce texte.

⁸ *Averroes' Commentary on Plato's "Republic"*, éd. et trad. E.I.J. Rosenthal (Cambridge, 1956); *Averroes on Plato's "Republic"*, trad. Ralph Lerner (Ithaca and London, 1974).

⁹ Voir Aouad, "La Rhétorique," pp. 462-3.

4) Des résumés plus ou moins amples de la philosophie, par exemple, d'al-Kindī (m. vers M IX^es.), *L'épître sur la quantité des livres d'Aristote et sur ce dont on a besoin pour acquérir la philosophie*¹⁰ et, de Fārābī, *l'Épître sur ce qu'il faut connaître avant d'apprendre la philosophie*¹¹ ou encore plusieurs des traités d'Avicenne (m. 1037) que nous mentionnons ci-dessous dans la section V.

5) Les commentaires des différents ouvrages d'Aristote qui constituent la logique, *Rhét.* exceptée., notamment *APr* et *APo*, ainsi que *Top.*¹²

6) Les commentaires de *Rhét.*, proprement dits:

– Les grands commentaires. Il y en aurait eu au moins deux, l'un de Fārābī et l'autre d'Ibn al-Tayyib (m. 1043).¹³ Les deux sont perdus, mais du premier il reste plusieurs fragments, le plus important d'entre eux étant *Didascalia in Rethoricam Aristotelis ex glosa Alpharabii*.¹⁴ Il s'agit de la traduction entreprise par Hermann l'Allemand, au cours de la période 1243–1256, du début d'un grand commentaire de Fārābī, plus précisément du prologue de cet ouvrage (*FDG* §§ 1–57, pp. 150–250), prologue composé selon un schéma alexandrin, ainsi que du *textus* du commencement de *Rhét.* (*Rhét.* I 1, 1354a1–4), d'une explication générale de celui-ci et, ensuite, d'une explication terme à terme (*FDG* § 58, pp. 250–2).

– Les commentaires du type "commentaire moyen." Ainsi, *Le Commentaire moyen de Rhét.*¹⁵ terminé en 1175 par Averroès, appartient à une série de commentaires du même type consacrés à l'*Organon*. Il porte sur l'ensemble de *Rhét.*, à l'exception de *Rhét.* II 15–17, 1390b14–1391b7. De tous les commentaires arabes conservés de *Rhét.*, c'est le plus proche de celle-ci. L'explication porte sur le sens du texte d'Aristote. Averroès, lisant ce texte, cherche à en expliquer la signification le mieux possible. On ne trouvera pas ici de *textus*, suivi d'explications, mais l'exposé direct de l'intention d'Aristote. Pour parvenir à cette fin, le Commentateur recourt aussi bien aux termes mêmes de *TAL*, quand ils semblent convenir, qu'à des substitutions et à des ajouts qu'il mêle aux premiers. Si l'ordre d'apparition des

¹⁰ M. Guidi et R. Walzer (édit. et trad.), "Studi su al-Kindī. I. Uno scritto introduttivo allo studio di Aristotele," dans *MAL*, anno CCCXXXVI, ser. VI, vol. VI, fasc. V (Roma, 1940): 375–419; trad. de la partie sur la logique dans N. Rescher, "Al-Kindī's Sketch of Aristotle's Organon," *NSchol* 37 (1963): 44–68 [cet article a été reproduit dans *id.*, *Studies in the History of Arabic Logic* (Pittsburgh, 1963), pp. 28–38].

¹¹ *Alfārābī's philosophische Abhandlungen*, éd. et trad. F. Dieterici (Leiden, 1890; reprint Osnabrück, 1982), *Risāla li-Abī Naṣr al-Fārābī fī-mā yanbagī an yuqaddam qabl ta'allum al-falsafa*, § 2, pp. 52 (texte ar.); 87 (trad. all.). Ce passage est également traduit dans C. Hein, *Definition und Einteilung der Philosophie. Von der spätantiken Einleitungsliteratur zur arabischen Enzyklopädie* (Frankfurt-am-Main, Bern et New York, 1985), pp. 333; 458; 454; 477, qui indique aussi les références d'autres éditions et traductions.

¹² Voir, par exemple, ci-dessous dans la section V, la note où est présentée la liste des ouvrages d'Avicenne que nous avons été amené à dépeuiller.

¹³ Voir Aouad, "La Rhétorique," pp. 462; 464–5.

¹⁴ Édition: *FDG*.

¹⁵ Éditions: *Comm. moyen Rhét.* Badawi; *Comm. moyen Rhét.* Salem.

propos d'Aristote est respecté, le mélange implique cependant, pour les citations elles-mêmes, de fréquentes modifications stylistiques et de nouveaux découpages. Les passages auxquels les termes de *TAL* ne sont pas étroitement mêlés sont rares, quoique les applications aux problèmes suscités par la civilisation islamique soient fréquentes (injections de concepts, exemples nouveaux, etc.). Proche de cette méthode est aussi celle d'Avicenne dans la partie consacrée à la rhétorique de sa monumentale somme philosophique, le *Šifā'*.¹⁶ En effet, Avicenne suit d'assez près, dans cette *Rhétorique*, l'ensemble du texte d'Aristote, mêlant aussi les termes de la traduction arabe à d'autres qui ne s'y trouvent pas tels quels. Mais le philosophe iranien intervient plus qu'Averroès tant au niveau de la structuration générale du texte du Stagirite que des exposés de détail. Ainsi, par exemple, il constitue, en livre autonome, les deux premiers chapitres de *Rhét.* et l'intéressante section, qu'il ajoute au début, sur l'utilité de la rhétorique relativement à celle des autres disciplines logiques.

— Les abrégés. Les biobibliographes en mentionnent un grand nombre qui n'ont pas été retrouvés.¹⁷ Ils auraient pour auteur Kindī (m. vers m ix^e s.); Muḥammad b. Mūsā (m. 873); Ġābir (ix^e-x^e s.); Ibn Badr (m. ca 1020); Ibn al-Hayṭam¹⁸; 'Abdallāf al-Baġdādī (m. 1231-2); l'auteur d'un abrégé du grand commentaire d'Ibn al-Ṭayyib (m. 1043). D'autres abrégés ont été conservés. Celui d'Avicenne, intitulé *Fī ma'ānī kitāb Riḥīṭiqā ay al-balāġa fī al-ḥukūma wa-al-ḥayāba* (*Des significations du livre Rhétoriké, c'est-à-dire l'éloquence dans les affaires judiciaires et la rhétorique*) et présenté dans une *summa* rédigée dans la jeunesse de cet auteur, se distingue nettement de ceux de Fārābī et d'Averroès. Il s'agit d'un exposé assez schématique de la quasi totalité de *Rhét. I* et de la partie de *Rhét. II* qui traite des passions.¹⁹ Avicenne y propose une sorte de rhétorique minimale, un manuel

¹⁶ Édition: *SR*. Le premier livre de cette partie a été traduit, sur manuscrits, dans Wütsch, *Avicennas Bearbeitungen*.

¹⁷ Voir Aouad, "La Rhétorique," pp. 460-2.

¹⁸ Il ne s'agirait pas du grand mathématicien (Alhazen). A la suite d'une argumentation serrée, R. Rashed établit, dans un ouvrage à paraître (*Mathématiques infinitésimales*, vol. II: *Ibn al-Hayṭam*, éd. et trad. R. Rashed, éditions Peeters), que, dans sa notice sur Ibn al-Hayṭam, Ibn Abī Uṣaybi'a, *'Uyūn al-anbā' fī ḥabaqāt al-aqibba'* [Ibn Abī Useibia, éd. A. Müller (Leipzig, Königsberg, 1882-1884), vol. II, pp. 90-8], aurait confondu deux personnages: Abū 'Alī al-Ḥasan b. al-Ḥasan b. al-Hayṭam (m. après 1040), le célèbre mathématicien, physicien et astronome, et Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan b. al-Hayṭam (naissance vers 354/965), philosophe et médecin ayant accessoirement composé des ouvrages d'astronomie, d'optique et de mathématiques à visée plutôt didactique. C'est donc ce dernier qui serait l'auteur d'une série d'abrégés des "sept livres de logique."

¹⁹ Le manuscrit d'Uppsala 364 ne présente pas, à la suite l'une de l'autre, les parties de cet ouvrage portant respectivement sur *Rhét. I* 1-14, 1354a1-1375a21 et *Rhét. II* 1-10, 1377b16-1388a28, mais il s'agit manifestement du même traité [voir D. Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition. Introduction to reading Avicenna's philosophical works* (Leiden/New York/Köbenhavn/Köln, 1988), pp. 92-3]. Édition de la première partie: *FMR* Salem. Édition de la deuxième partie: *FMR* Rémondon.

facilement utilisable. Le livre qu'Abū al-Barakāt Hibatallāh b. 'Alī b. Malkā al-Baghdādī (m. après 1165) consacre aux "syllogismes rhétoriques, qui sont ceux que l'on appelle en grec *rḥūrīqā*" dans son *Kiṭāb al-mu'tabar* dépend manifestement de *FMR*.²⁰ En revanche, *Kiṭāb al-ḥaṭāba* de Fārābī²¹ semble être une tentative de dégager les principes ultimes de la discipline oratoire demeurés pour ainsi dire implicites ou insuffisamment mis en valeur dans *Rhét.* Fārābī suit essentiellement, dans cet ouvrage, le plan du chapitre 2 du premier livre de *Rhét.*, mais s'emploie à mieux structurer ce chapitre, véritable introduction à tout l'ouvrage du Stagiritte, autour du concept de point de vue immédiat et commun, que l'on n'a pas dans Aristote.²² Quant à l'abrégé d'Averroès,²³ nous verrons non seulement que *Rhét.* I 2 demeure l'une de ses sources principales, mais aussi que ce passage est systématiquement lu à travers *FH*, auquel est manifestement emprunté le concept de notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat.

Ce rapide panorama montre qu'une tradition d'explication et d'utilisation de *Rhét.*

²⁰ Abū al-Barakāt Hibatallāh b. 'Alī b. Malkā al-Baghdādī, *Al-Kitāb al-mu'tabar fī al-hikma*, 3 vol., Haydarabad, 1357-1358 H, vol. I, pp. 269-76. C'est Wütsch, *Avicennas Bearbeitungen*, pp. 11; 63; 77; 79; 217, qui a attiré notre attention sur ce texte. Il est effectivement très dépendant de *FMR* dont il reprend souvent la formulation elle-même. Seulement, il en diverge aussi sur quelques points fondamentaux. Ainsi, curieusement, la 'umda devient les procédés extérieurs au discours (Baghdādī, *Al-Kitāb al-mu'tabar*, vol. I, pp. 269, 21-270, 1), alors que, selon la plupart des commentateurs arabes, le pilier ('amūd) de la rhétorique est constitué de l'enthymème et de l'exemple: voir ci-dessous section V.

²¹ Éditions: *FHL*; Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī, *Kiṭāb fī al-manṭiq. Al-Ḥaṭāba*, éd. M.S. Salem (Le Caire, 1976); *Al-Manṭiqiyyāt li-l-Fārābī*. Vol. I: *al-Nuṣṣ al-manṭiqiyya*, éd. M. T. Daneche Pajuh (Qom, 1408 H.), *Kiṭāb al-ḥaṭāba*.

²² M. Aouad, "Les fondements de la Rhétorique d'Aristote reconsidérés par Fārābī, ou le concept de point de vue immédiat et commun," *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy. A Historical Journal*, 2 (1992): 133-80, aux pp. 134-43.

²³ Ce traité appartient à *L'Abrégé de la logique* par Averroès – conservé en judéo-arabe (langue arabe, caractères hébreux) –, qui porte sur toutes les parties de l'*Organon* (au sens large), ainsi que sur l'*Isagoge* de Porphyre. Seules les parties sur la dialectique, la rhétorique et la poétique ont été publiées: Averroès' *Three Short Commentaries on Aristotle's "Topics", "Rhetoric", and "Poetics"*, éd. et trad. Ch. E. Butterworth (Albany N.Y., 1977). L'édition et la traduction de l'abrégé de la rhétorique, *Al-Qawl fī al-aqāwīl al-ḥaṭābiyya* (*Des arguments rhétoriques*) sont désignées, dans le cours de ce travail, par le sigle, *AH*. Pour les autres parties de l'ouvrage de Ch. E. Butterworth (introduction, autres abrégés, plan des différents traités, etc.), nous utilisons l'abréviation Butterworth, *Three Short Commentaries*. Pour *AH* et Butterworth, *Three Short Commentaries*, les références à la traduction anglaise sont accompagnées de "tr.," celles se rapportant au texte arabe ne le sont pas.

Nous devons à l'amabilité de Ch. E. Butterworth d'avoir pu consulter le texte arabe des parties non publiées de *L'Abrégé de la logique*, parties dont il prépare l'édition-traduction. En attendant cette publication [que nous désignerons ici par Averroès, *Abrégé de la logique*, éd. Butterworth (à paraître)], on se reportera, pour le plan de *L'Abrégé de la logique*, à Butterworth, *Three Short Commentaries*, pp. 7-15.

s'est solidement établie chez les Arabes. C'est ce qu'on peut vérifier sur le cas particulièrement significatif d'un concept que l'on n'a pas tel quel dans Aristote et que nombreux parmi les textes susmentionnés posent comme fondamental en rhétorique, le concept de point de vue immédiat. Nous traitons ailleurs de l'importance, de la définition, du rôle et des origines du concept de notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat dans l'oeuvre de Fārābī²⁴ et dans celle d'Avicenne.²⁵ Nous voudrions ici poursuivre cette enquête dans *AH*, qui hérite de ces deux prédécesseurs.

II LE CONCEPT DE POINT DE VUE IMMÉDIAT DANS LE PLAN DE L'ABRÉGÉ DE LA RHÉTORIQUE

AH suit en gros l'ordre des idées de *Rhét.* I 2, qui constitue, en fait, la véritable introduction de *Rhét.*, le chap. 1 étant essentiellement polémique, mais il le fait de manière à introduire une perspective nouvelle permettant de mieux articuler le texte du Maître autour d'un pivot qui ne s'y trouve pas. Dans les lignes qui suivent, nous mettons en parallèle les paragraphes de *Rhét.* avec ceux de *AH*.²⁶ La reconnaissance de la dépendance de ces derniers à l'égard des premiers devrait apparaître, à quelques exceptions près, à la simple lecture du parallèle. Nous ajouterons, en revanche, des remarques pour montrer comment Averroès introduit sa perspective nouvelle permettant de mieux articuler le texte du Maître autour de l'idée de rang (ou de degré) de la conviction propre à la rhétorique, le concept de point de vue immédiat étant le principal moyen de déterminer ce rang.²⁷

²⁴ Aouad, "Les fondements de la *Rhétorique* d'Aristote reconsidérés par Fārābī," pp.133-80.

²⁵ Maroun Aouad, "Les fondements de la *Rhétorique* d'Aristote reconsidérés par Avicenne, ou le développement du concept de «point de vue immédiat»" [à paraître dans les Actes du Colloque *Perspectives médiévales (arabes, latines, hébraïques) sur la tradition scientifique et philosophique grecque* (C.N.R.S.-S.I.H.S.P.A.I.-I.M.A., Paris, 31 mars-3 avril 1993)].

²⁶ Le plan de *AH* que nous proposons recouvre en gros celui dégagé dans Butterworth, *Three Short Commentaries*, pp. 59-62. On retiendra cependant quelques différences. Nous faisons commencer plus tôt la conclusion de *AH* et nous n'interprétons pas de la même manière ce qu'y écrit Averroès du projet d'Aristote (voir, ci-dessous, le § N). Nous soulignons plus le rôle du concept de point de vue immédiat et le défaut de certitude des procédés extérieurs aux arguments. Ainsi, pour le témoignage, Butterworth, *Three Short Commentaries*, p. 61, met en avant la certitude à laquelle il peut parfois conduire. Or, Averroès insiste plutôt sur le fait que cette certitude n'est pas essentielle, mais accidentelle (ci-dessous, § L).

²⁷ Le sens de nombreux paragraphes de *Rhét.* se trouve réorienté dans *AH*. Cela est dû quelquefois à *TAL*, sur laquelle Averroès s'est appuyé (voir, par exemple, ci-dessous, § N). Nous ne nous arrêtons pas ici sur toutes les manifestations de cette réorientation, mais nous nous en tiendrons aux divisions les plus générales de *AH* et au recours au concept de point de vue immédiat.

A. Sans correspondant dans *Rhét.* /²⁸ Notre objectif est de traiter des choses persuasives (*al-aṣṣā al-muqni'a*) et du degré (*miqdār*) de conviction (*taṣḍīq*) qu'elles engendrent; définition de la persuasion (*qanā'a*) par la notion d'opinion qui prend le dessus (*zann gālib*) et la conscience (*ṣu'ūr*) d'un point de contention (*mu'ānada*); renvoi, au sujet de l'opinion, à des analyses antérieures (*AH* 169, 4-7; tr. 63, 6-11²⁹).

B. Distinction, à propos des technologues, des enthymèmes, comme corps de la preuve, et des questions extérieures au sujet du discours (*Rhét.* I 1, 1354a11-26) / Les choses produisant la persuasion sont soit des arguments (*aqāwīl*) – enthymèmes et exemples –, soit “des choses venant de l'extérieur qui ne sont pas des arguments”³⁰; la première sorte sera traitée avant la deuxième, car elle est plus digne d'être persuasive (*AH* 169, 8-170, 8; tr. 63, 12-28).

A et B introduisent au traité.

L'objectif de celui-ci est, dès le premier paragraphe (A), placé dans une perspective sans correspondant dans *Rhét.* Il s'agit de cerner le degré de conviction que l'on peut obtenir par les procédés persuasifs, et cela en regard de ce que donne la dialectique:

Puisque nous avons achevé de traiter des syllogismes dialectiques et du degré de conviction qu'ils produisent, traitons maintenant des choses persuasives et du degré de conviction qu'elles produisent aussi (*AH* 169, 4-6; tr. 63, 6-8).

Ce degré de conviction est immédiatement déterminé par les notions d'opinion et de conscience de la possibilité d'un opposé et, ainsi, on dispose d'emblée d'un critère permettant de distinguer rhétorique et dialectique. Cette perspective est d'ailleurs plus complètement exposée au début de l'abrégé de la dialectique (*Kiṭāb al-ḡadal* = *Le Livre de la dialectique*),³¹ auquel on est renvoyé ici [“nous avons défini dans ce qui a précédé ce qu'est l'opinion” (*AH* 169, 7; tr. 63, 10-11)]. Averroès y annonce d'abord qu'il va traiter du degré (*miqdār*) de conviction engendrée

²⁸ Ce trait oblique sépare, dans le parallèle qui suit, les indications sur le contenu des paragraphes de *Rhét.* de celles relatives aux correspondants de ces paragraphes dans *AH*.

²⁹ Nous signalerons ici les endroits du texte que nous lisons autrement que l'éditeur, dans les seuls cas où la divergence concerne directement les titres des subdivisions telles que nous les avons comprises. Pour le reste, on se reportera aux recensions de Butterworth, *Three Short Commentaries*, mentionnées dans Aouad, “La Rhétorique,” p. 469. Nous ne relèverons pas les cas où nous traduisons autrement le texte.

³⁰ Selon Butterworth, *Three Short Commentaries*, p. 117, § 2, n. 2, les choses extérieures seraient les preuves atechniques d'Aristote, en d'autres termes les lois, les témoignages, les contrats, la torture et les serments. En réalité, dans *AH* 187, 7-189, 8; tr. 73, 6-74, 7, les expressions “les choses persuasives qui ne sont pas des arguments” ou “les choses persuasives qui viennent de l'extérieur” couvrent tous les procédés qui ne relèvent pas, en tant que tels, des arguments (enthymème et exemple) et qui leur sont inférieurs quant au degré de la persuasion induite. Parmi ceux-ci, on a certes les preuves atechniques, mais aussi le recours aux passions, aux caractères, etc.

³¹ Butterworth, *Three Short Commentaries*, pp. 151, 4-152, 3; tr. 47, 5-23.

respectivement par la dialectique et la rhétorique, ajoutant: "Quant à traiter de ce par quoi ces disciplines se trouvent achevées, cela n'est pas nécessaire pour notre but." Puis il détermine le degré de conviction dialectique par la notion d'opinion proche de la certitude et l'opinion en général, comme le fait de croire qu'une chose est dans un certain état, alors qu'elle peut être autre que ce qu'on a cru – ce qui la distingue de la certitude – et il propose une subdivision: l'opinion où l'on n'a pas conscience (*yus'ar*) de l'opposé et qui est telle que si l'on en a conscience, il est difficile de trouver cet opposé – opinion dialectique –; l'opinion où l'on a conscience de l'opposé – opinion rhétorique.

Quant à B, il s'appuie sur un passage de *Rhét.* I 1, qui ne se présente pas explicitement comme l'esquisse du plan de l'ouvrage du Maître, mais qui comporte l'idée d'une hiérarchie entre l'enthymème et ce qui est extérieur à la chose dont on persuade. Averroès retenant cette idée d'hiérarchie et interprétant le couple avancé par Aristote comme signifiant la distinction entre arguments et ce qui est extérieur aux arguments s'en sert pour annoncer et justifier le plan de son traité. Une telle mise en valeur et interprétation de *Rhét.* I 1, 1354a11-26 permet d'appliquer la distinction par le degré de conviction aux rapports de tous les procédés rhétoriques entre eux et de faire du plan du traité une sorte de développement de cette distinction.

C. La rhétorique traite des sujets dont nous devons délibérer, sur lesquels nous ne possédons pas de techniques, devant des auditeurs incapables de suivre de longs raisonnements (*Rhét.* I 2, 1357a1-4) / L'enthymème défini comme un syllogisme qui conclut selon le point de vue immédiat se produisant en premier, pour tous ou pour la plupart des gens (*muntig bi-hasab bādi' al-ra'y al-sābiq li-l-ḡamū' aw li-l-aḡyar*); définition du point de vue immédiat se produisant en premier au moyen des notions d'opinion qui prend le dessus, de quiétude de l'âme et d'absence d'examen; application du concept de point de vue immédiat se produisant en premier à la forme et à la matière des enthymèmes (*AH* 170, 10-15; tr. 63, 30-64, 8).

Dans le passage correspondant, Aristote souligne déjà la non technicité et la non complexité de la rhétorique, mais on notera surtout les différences. Averroès limite la perspective à l'enthymème et exprime plus précisément la non technicité et la non complexité au moyen de la notion de point de vue immédiat se produisant en premier et commun, qu'il présente comme la condition générale de l'enthymème. Le point de vue immédiat est, en outre, défini et rattaché à l'opinion, que nous avons déjà rencontrée au § A, opinion qui, lorsqu'elle est accompagnée de la conscience de l'opposé, sert, comme on l'a vu, à déterminer le degré de conviction propre à la rhétorique. Ainsi, la notion de point de vue immédiat et commun apparaît comme le principal moyen de préciser ce degré. Enfin, elle est appliquée à la forme comme à la matière de l'enthymème.³²

Grâce à ces précisions, Averroès peut ainsi amorcer la première subdivision –

³² La distinction entre forme et matière n'est pas ici dans Aristote. Son application à la logique serait d'origine alexandrine: voir Deborah L. Black, *Logic*, pp. 42-3.

l'enthymème – de la première partie de l'abrégé et présenter le premier point de cette subdivision: la notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat comme condition générale de l'enthymème.

D. L'enthymème et l'exemple portent sur des propositions pouvant le plus souvent être autres qu'elles ne sont; ces propositions sont peu nombreuses, souvent moins nombreuses que les propositions des syllogismes de la première figure (*Rhét.* I 2, 1357a4-22) / La forme des syllogismes conclusifs selon le point de vue immédiat caractérisée par l'absence de rigueur et la suppression de la chose par laquelle il y a nécessité du rapport de conséquence,³³ et cela selon ce qui contente le peuple (*AH* 171, 2-6; tr. 64, 10-17); les syllogismes attributifs envisagés du point de vue de la distinction entre syllogismes réellement concluants et syllogismes dont on a seulement l'opinion, dans le point de vue immédiat, qu'ils sont concluants et de la prémisses à sous-entendre ou à prendre de façon indéterminée dans les différentes figures syllogistiques (*AH* 171, 7-172, 11; tr. 64, 18-65, 8); les syllogismes conditionnels, conjonctifs et disjonctifs, envisagés du point de vue de la distinction entre syllogismes non concluants et syllogismes réellement concluants et de ce qui y est sous-entendu (*AH* 172, 12-175, 12; tr. 65, 9-66, 37); le syllogisme par l'absurde envisagé du point de vue de la prémisses qu'il faut d'habitude sous-entendre. (*AH* 175, 13-176, 3; tr. 66, 38-67, 6).

E. La rhétorique utilise, comme la dialectique, l'induction, le syllogisme et le syllogisme apparent: référence, en cours de route, aux *Analytiques* (*Rhét.* I 2, 1356a35-1356b10) / Correspondance entre la forme des enthymèmes et la forme des syllogismes. (*AH* 176, 4-5; tr. 67, 7-8).

Dans D et dans E, Averroès limite aussi la perspective à l'enthymème et n'évoque pas, comme Aristote, l'exemple. En retenant, dans D, surtout l'idée de réduction des propositions de la chaîne syllogistique et en déplaçant E, notre auteur peut ainsi constituer une section autonome sur la forme des enthymèmes. On aura aussi noté que, dans Averroès et non dans Aristote, cette forme est systématiquement liée au point de vue immédiat.

³³ "La chose par laquelle il y a nécessité du rapport de conséquence" ou l'expression voisine de "prémisse déterminante pour la conclusion" sont distinguées de la prémisse qui fait la liaison et sont à identifier, dans la première figure, avec la majeure, qui est universelle (*AH* 171, 7-9; tr. 64, 18-21). Dans les autres figures, cette chose par laquelle il y a nécessité du rapport de conséquence est plus difficile à identifier (*AH* 172, 1-3; tr. 64, 29-32). Pour comprendre ce qu'est cette chose, peut-être faut-il rapprocher ces passages de celui où il est écrit que, parmi les prémisses du syllogisme, la plus propre à produire la conviction est la majeure, "car elle contient en puissance ce qui est recherché (*al-maṭlab*)" [§ 81 de l'abrégé de la démonstration, dans Averroès, *Abrégé de la logique*, éd. Butterworth (à paraître)]? De toute façon, comme le remarque Black, *Logic*, pp. 164-6, cette thèse est obscure, car on s'attendrait à ce que la nécessité de la conclusion soit attribuée à la composition formelle globale du syllogisme, mais une chose semble être assurée: pour *Farābī* et Averroès, la nécessité du syllogisme se fonde sur la prémisse la plus universelle, à savoir celle qui contient le terme le plus universel (le majeur dans la première figure).

Après la forme des enthymèmes, Averroès examine leur matière (F-I).

F. Les prémisses des enthymèmes sont, les unes, nécessaires; les autres, le plus grand nombre, seulement fréquentes (*Rhét.* I 2, 1357a22-32) / La matière des enthymèmes doit être notoire selon le point de vue immédiat et commun, surtout lorsqu'il s'agit de la majeure; distinction avec d'autres sortes de prémisses: notoires en vérité et donc dialectiques, vraies ou non vraies (*AH* 176, 7-177, 4; tr. 67, 10-26).

Au lieu de mettre en avant la modalité des prémisses rhétoriques, Averroès les caractérise en premier par la notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat et commun.

G. Détermination globale du vraisemblable (εἰκός), du signe anonyme (σημεῖον ἀνώνυμον) et du *tekmêrion*; subdivisions des signes suivant qu'ils présentent la relation du particulier à l'universel ou de l'universel au particulier et suivant leur rectitude; référence aux *Analytiques* (*Rhét.* I 2, 1357a32-b25) / Division des prémisses notoires selon le point de vue immédiat en propositions reçues (*qaḍāyā maqbūlāt*) et en signes (*dalāl'il*) et définition de ces deux catégories par le point de vue immédiat (*AH* 177, 4-6; tr. 67, 27-32); subdivision des signes en signes indiquant l'existence d'une chose absolument ou signes indiquant l'appartenance d'un attribut à un sujet, subdivision de ceux-ci suivant les trois figures du syllogisme et nomenclature (*AH* 177, 7-13; tr. 67, 33-68, 6); les signes sont ici tantôt postérieurs, tantôt antérieurs à ce qui est signifié (*AH* 177, 13-15; tr. 68, 6-8); propositions reçues et signes peuvent concerner la matière nécessaire, la matière qui est de l'ordre du plus probable et la matière aussi possible que son contraire, exemples de chaque sorte et nomenclature (*AH* 178, 1-180, 11; tr. 68, 9-69, 16); cette division n'est pas essentielle en rhétorique, car seule l'est la division en prémisses reçues selon le point de vue immédiat et en signes selon le point de vue immédiat (*AH* 180, 12-181, 10; tr. 69, 17-38).

On aura noté, dans Averroès et non dans Aristote, le recours permanent au concept de notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat pour caractériser la matière des enthymèmes, notamment l'application de celui-ci aux signes ainsi que son utilisation pour relativiser le rôle d'une caractérisation par la modalité.

H. Comparaison de la rhétorique, en tant qu'elle peut persuader de tout, avec les autres disciplines qui produisent enseignement et persuasion à propos d'un objet qui leur est propre (*Rhét.* I 2, 1355b27-35) / Rhétorique et dialectique n'ont pas d'objet propre, car elles ne prennent pas les prémisses selon le mode de leur existence à l'extérieur à l'âme, mais en tant que notoires selon le point de vue immédiat ou en réalité (*AH* 181, 11-182, 14; tr. 70, 1-25).

La thèse aristotélicienne de l'absence d'objet propre de la rhétorique est justifiée, par Averroès et non par Aristote, par la nature des prémisses oratoires, à savoir leur notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat. Cela explique le déplacement de H, qui, dans *Rhét.*, se trouve au début du chapitre 2, juste après la définition de la rhétorique, alors que dans *AH*, il est inséré dans la partie consacrée à la matière des enthymèmes. Par ce biais, l'absence d'objet propre est lui-même mis en rapport avec le degré de conviction que l'on peut obtenir en rhétorique, puisque la notoriété

selon le point de vue immédiat est révélatrice de ce degré.

I. Pas de correspondant dans *Rhét.* / Si les anciens ont divisé les prémisses des enthymèmes suivant leur nécessité ou leur degré de possibilité, c'est qu'il arrive que cela ait une influence sur le degré de force des prémisses répandues selon le point de vue immédiat (*AH* 183, 1-7; tr. 70, 26-36).

F-I traite donc de la matière des enthymèmes, c'est-à-dire de la nature de leurs prémisses, ce que faisait déjà Aristote au niveau de F-G. Seulement cette partie acquiert plus de consistance et de rigueur, dans *AH*, du fait du déplacement et de la réorientation de H, de l'addition de I et de l'insertion d'un pivot, le concept de notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat.

J. Définition de l'exemple (*Rhét.* I 2, 1357b25-58a2) / Classification des sortes d'exemples suivant que la similitude concerne les sujets, les prédicats ou les deux catégories à la fois (*AH* 183, 9-184, 3; tr. 71, 2-19); la similitude peut être entre un universel et un particulier (*AH* 184, 4-7; tr. 71, 20-25); différentes sortes de similitude (*AH* 184, 8-11; tr. 71, 26-30); l'exemple ne s'appuie pas sur un jugement universel certain, mais sur une inférence de l'ordre du point de vue immédiat et les rangs (*marātib*) de l'opinion (*zann*) dépendent de leur proximité par rapport au jugement universel (*AH* 184, 12-187, 3; tr. 71, 31-72, 38); conclusion sur le rang (*martaba*) de l'exemple et sa correspondance avec l'induction (*AH* 187, 4-5; tr. 73, 1-3).

Averroès, et non Aristote, s'attache donc longuement à montrer que le point de vue immédiat est constitutif de l'exemple et en détermine ainsi le rang par rapport à la certitude.

Avec J, s'achève la première partie de *AH*, consacrée aux arguments rhétoriques.

K. Division des preuves en preuves atechniques (témoignages, aveux sous la torture, écrits, etc.) et en preuves techniques (caractère de l'orateur, passions de l'auditeur, discours établissant la chose); la rhétorique est comme une ramification de la dialectique et de la politique (*Rhét.* I 2, 1355b35-1356a35) / Revue des choses persuasives qui ne sont pas des arguments (*aqāwīl*), soulignant le degré (*miqdār*) de conviction qu'elles entraînent: l'excellence de l'orateur et le défaut de son adversaire; les passions; les propos éthiques; grandir la chose ou la minimiser; le consensus; les témoignages; l'excitation du désir et la menace; le défi et le pari; les serments; la manière de parler, la voix, l'intonation; l'adultération des propos (de l'adversaire) (*AH* 187, 7-189, 8; tr. 73, 6-74, 7).³⁴

³⁴ *AH* annonce l'examen de treize choses persuasives qui ne sont pas des arguments, mais la liste qui suit n'en comporte qu'onze. Selon Butterworth, *Three Short Commentaries*, p. 125, § 33, n. 1, les deux procédés manquants seraient l'enthymème et l'exemple. G. Schoeler, "Averroes' Rückwendung zu Aristoteles. Die 'Kurzen' und die 'Mittleren' Kommentare zum Organon," *BO* 37, 1980, p. 298, remarque cependant que la liste ne concerne pas les arguments; ce qui manquerait – à la suite sans doute d'un accident de la transmission – ce serait les lois (dont il sera question dans *AH* 194, 8-11; tr. 76, 24-

Rhét. traite surtout, au niveau de K, des preuves qui ne sont pas des arguments: évocation des preuves atechniques et examen, parmi les preuves techniques, du caractère de l'orateur et des passions de l'auditeur. C'est ce qui explique son déplacement dans *AH*, qui, suivant le plan annoncé dans B, ne devait traiter des preuves extérieures aux arguments qu'après les arguments. On notera, parmi les autres modifications, la suppression de la référence au discours établissant la chose (donc de la référence aux arguments eux-mêmes), le fait que la liste d'Averroès est nettement plus longue que celle du Maître, ainsi que l'insertion de remarques sur le degré de conviction des différents procédés énumérés.

L. Sans correspondant dans *Rhét.* / Examen approfondi des procédés externes dont on pourrait douter qu'ils soient persuasifs seulement,³⁵ et cela pour montrer qu'ils ne sont pas certains, du moins par essence: le témoignage, qui occupe le rang (*martaba*) le plus élevé dans cette série, les lois écrites, le consensus, le défi (*AH* 189, 9-196, 11; tr. 74, 8-77, 19).

M. Sans correspondant dans *Rhét.* / Supériorité de l'enthymème, car il peut servir à établir les choses extérieures (*AH* 196, 11-197, 5; tr. 77, 19-77, 27).

En apportant des modifications dans K et en ajoutant L et M, Averroès se donne une partie entièrement consacrée aux procédés extérieurs aux arguments et centrée sur le souci de déterminer le rang de chacun d'eux. Alors que la partie sur les arguments rhétoriques a pour pivot la notion de rang de ceux-ci lié au concept de point de vue immédiat, la partie sur les procédés extérieurs aux arguments n'évoque pas explicitement ce dernier concept.

N. Enthymèmes qui relèvent du domaine de la rhétorique et enthymèmes qui relèvent du domaine des autres disciplines (*Rhét.* I 2, 1358a2-12); déduction des trois genres oratoires à partir des sortes d'auditeurs; divisions, temps et fins de chaque genre; prémisses communes aux trois genres; annonce de l'examen des prémisses propres à chaque genre (*Rhét.* I 3, 1358a36-1359a29) / Les arguments et les choses extérieures peuvent être utilisés dans toutes les disciplines discursives selon la voie suivie par les anciens, car ils les prenaient pour des méthodes certaines (*AH* 197, 5-8; tr. 77, 27-31); "quant à Aristote, lorsque le rang (*martaba*) des choses persuasives quant à la conviction lui eut apparu avec évidence et qu'il eut vu que l'utilité de ces convictions n'est que dans l'utilisation qu'en font les gens du peuple (*al-ġumhūr*) entre eux pour les choses particulières d'ordre volontaire que les juges déterminent comme biens ou maux, puisque [en outre] certaines des choses volontaires que les juges déterminent comme biens ou maux appartiennent à l'homme dans son essence et dans le temps présent, choses qui sont les excellences et les vices, que d'autres sont dans le temps présent et dans autrui, ce qui constitue le juste et l'injuste, que d'autres appartiennent à l'homme dans le futur, choses qui

29) et peut-être l'expression du visage et les gestes. Mais ne s'agit-il pas plutôt, dans le deuxième cas, des contrats?

³⁵ On pourrait être tenté de leur conférer une valeur plus grande.

sont les choses utiles et nocives – le premier cas est appelé le discours relatif à la lutte de jactance (*al-muḥābaba al-munāfirīyya*), le second, le discours de la controverse et le troisième le discours de la délibération – puisque [enfin] l'homme, en tant qu'il vit en communauté et qu'il est politique, utilise nécessairement les propos rhétoriques dans ces trois genres, Aristote, donc, commença (*šara'a*) à donner les règles et les choses par lesquelles l'homme peut persuader dans chacune des choses relevant de ces genres de la manière la plus complète (*alamm*) possible dans celles-ci" (*AH* 197, 10-198, 12; tr. 77, 33-78, 15).

Ce paragraphe a pour cadre la mise en oeuvre d'une opposition entre les prédécesseurs (d'Aristote, sans doute) et Aristote en tant que les premiers auraient utilisé les méthodes rhétoriques dans toutes les disciplines discursives, parce qu'ils auraient eu l'opinion que ces méthodes conduisent à la certitude. En d'autres termes, ils n'auraient pas été au clair quant au rang exact des méthodes oratoires. En revanche, le Stagirite ayant déterminé ce rang, a compris qu'il fallait limiter le champ de la rhétorique. Comme il a vu, par ailleurs, que celle-ci était surtout utile dans les discours populaires, relatifs aux choses de la volonté, que ces choses se répartissaient selon les trois genres oratoires, que ceux-ci sont indispensables à l'homme en tant qu'animal politique, il s'est occupé ensuite de détailler les règles propres à chaque genre.³⁶

La mise en regard avec les prédécesseurs ne vient pas ici de *Rhét.* En ce qui concerne plus précisément Aristote, ce paragraphe comporte donc cinq points:

1) Un rappel. Ce qui a précédé dans *AH* est présenté comme une réalisation d'Aristote et comme ayant permis la détermination du rang des procédés oratoires. Ce rappel, comme tel, est sans correspondant dans *Rhét.*

2) Le Maître aurait vu que l'utilité de ces procédés ne concerne que les choses particulières d'ordre volontaire. Cette remarque correspond à *Rhét.* I 2, 1358a2-12, telle que comprise par Averroès. Aristote soutient qu'il y a, en rhétorique, des syllogismes qui relèvent du domaine de cette discipline et des syllogismes qui relèvent du domaine des autres disciplines. Une précision apportée à la suite de cette distinction montre que le Stagirite vise, dans le premier cas, les lieux (formes générales permettant de constituer les raisonnements): "J'entends par syllogismes dialectiques et rhétoriques ceux que nous avons en vue quand nous parlons des lieux" (*Rhét.* I 2, 1358a10-12 Dufour).³⁷ Le rapport de *AH* avec *Rhét.* I 2, 1358a2-

³⁶ La division des paragraphes proposée par l'éditeur dans *AH* ne permet pas de saisir immédiatement l'opposition entre Aristote et ses prédécesseurs. Le passage sur ceux-ci y est inclus, en effet, dans le § 44, qui stipule essentiellement que l'enthymème peut servir à établir les choses extérieures. Quant aux réflexions sur la démarche d'Aristote, elles sont présentées à part, dans le § 45, et précédées du titre ajouté par l'éditeur de "conclusion." Il aurait fallu, croyons-nous, que la remarque sur les anciens soit placée dans le même paragraphe que celles sur Aristote, car il s'agit d'une mise en regard de deux démarches, attestée non seulement par le fond, mais aussi par la forme [l'emploi de *wa-amma* (quant à) au début des lignes sur Aristote] de ces passages.

³⁷ Aristote, *Rhétorique*, éd. et trad. M. Dufour et A. Wartelle, 3 vol. (Paris 1931, 1938 et 1973).

12, apparaît si l'on prend garde à la manière dont Averroès a compris ce passage dans le *Commentaire moyen de la Rhét.*³⁸ Certains enthymèmes peuvent porter sur les matières des différentes disciplines et d'autres sur "les questions propres à cette discipline rhétorique conformément à ce qui a été mis en évidence à partir de son utilité"³⁹ – ce sont les questions volontaires... C'est en partant de ces choses-ci qu'il faut énumérer, dans cette discipline, les choses qui sont les différences des enthymèmes, et non en partant de ces matières-là, que comprend chacune des disciplines."⁴⁰ Averroès, comme Aristote, reconnaît que la rhétorique a deux champs d'application, mais que l'un d'eux lui est plus approprié. Seulement, alors que, pour le Stagirite, ce dernier cas est constitué des lieux, pour le Commentateur, il s'agit d'un domaine délimité par l'utilité dans les questions volontaires. Cette intéressante interprétation d'Averroès a, sans doute, pour point de départ un contresens de la traduction arabe: "J'entends par syllogismes dialectiques et rhétoriques ceux que nous avons en vue quand nous parlons des lieux" (*Rhét.* I 2, 1358a10-12 Dufour) / "Je prétends donc que les lieux sont plus que le syllogisme rhétorique et dialectique (*TAL* I 14, 23-15, 1) / "Les lieux sont plus généraux que les syllogismes rhétoriques et que les syllogismes dialectiques."⁴¹ Les lieux ne pouvant, selon *TAL*, constituer le domaine propre de la rhétorique, le Commentateur a donc délimité celui-ci à partir de l'utilité de cette discipline, utilité qui porterait, selon lui, sur les choses particulières d'ordre volontaire.

3) Traits distinctifs des trois genres. Ce passage correspond manifestement à *Rhét.* I 3, 1358a36-1359a26, qui présente les trois genres oratoires.

4) Utilité à la vie en société des discours dans les trois genres oratoires. Cette justification est sans correspondant explicite dans *Rhét.*⁴²

5) Ces quatre points acquis, Aristote aurait commencé à examiner les règles permettant de persuader dans chacun des trois genres.⁴³ Une annonce analogue est faite dans *Rhét.* I 3, 1359a26-29. Ce qui est ainsi annoncé, c'est manifestement *Rhét.*

³⁸ *Comm. moyen Rhét.* Badawi, pp. 26, 6-27, 3; *Comm. moyen Rhét.* Salem, pp. 48, 1-49, 3.

³⁹ Sans doute dans *Rhét.* I 1, 1355a20-24, telle que comprise dans *Comm. moyen Rhét.* Badawi, pp. 10, 22-11, 6; *Comm. moyen Rhét.* Salem, pp. 19, 7-20, 7.

⁴⁰ *Comm. moyen Rhét.* Badawi, pp. 26, 14-18; *Comm. moyen Rhét.* Salem, pp. 48, 9-13.

⁴¹ *Comm. moyen Rhét.* Badawi, pp. 27, 2-3; *Comm. moyen Rhét.* Salem, pp. 49, 2-3.

⁴² Elle a sans doute été inspirée par *Rhét.* I 1, 1355a20-24, telle que comprise dans *Comm. moyen Rhét.* Badawi, pp. 10, 22-11, 6; *Comm. moyen Rhét.* Salem, pp. 19, 7-20, 7.

⁴³ Butterworth, *Three Short Commentaries*, p. 62, donne, dans son plan, une autre interprétation de la consécution ici proposée par Averroès: "Aristotle wrote about these things when he saw their value for public discourse about political matters." Cela signifierait que la prise de conscience de l'intérêt politique des procédés rhétoriques aurait conduit Aristote à en traiter. En réalité, la conséquence tirée ici est plus précise: la prise de conscience de l'intérêt politique des procédés rhétoriques a conduit Aristote à traiter des différentes espèces que l'on peut mettre en oeuvre dans chacun des trois genres oratoires – traitement que *Alf* ne reprend pas, mais dont il ne donne que la justification.

I4-15, 1359a30-1377a12, qui traite des espèces des différents genres oratoires.

Ainsi que l'atteste la formule: "Quant à Aristote, lorsque (*lammā*)..., il commença (*sara'a*)", Averroès se présente, dans cette longue période, comme suivant le fil de la pensée du Maître: ce que rappelle (1), puis ce qui est dit dans (2), (3) et (4), seraient des considérations antérieures, dans *Rhét.*, à ce qui est esquissé dans (5). (1) est donc forcément antérieur à *Rhét.* I4, 1359a30. Comme il ne peut s'agir de ce que résume (2) et (3), il faut que (1) précède *Rhét.* I2, 1358a2. Cela est confirmé par les correspondances que nous avons établies plus haut. Elles montrent cependant, de plus, que *Rhét.* I1 entre finalement peu en jeu, pour ce qui est du moins de la plupart des divisions de *AH*, celui-ci s'appuyant surtout sur *Rhét.* I2.

Or, la dépendance de *AH* par rapport à *FH* ne fait pas de doute.⁴⁴ De plus, ainsi que nous l'avons rappelé ci-dessus, ce dernier traité suit essentiellement le plan de *Rhét.* I2, qu'il structure plus rigoureusement autour du concept de notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat. On pourrait donc penser que les correspondances entre *AH* et *Rhét.* I2, que nous avons relevées, ne viennent pas d'une réélaboration directe par Averroès du texte du Stagirite, mais d'un travail sur *FH*. En réalité, la détermination explicite par Averroès de la place du texte de *AH* dans l'économie de *Rhét.*, détermination explicite que l'on n'a pas dans *FH*, montre qu'Averroès avait le texte d'Aristote sous les yeux en rédigeant son traité et qu'il avait parfaitement conscience que son abrégé n'était pas celui de toute la *Rhét.* ou même de *Rhét.* I, mais bien essentiellement de *Rhét.* I2. Qu'il dépende, dans son interprétation, de *FH* ne signifie donc pas qu'il s'est contenté de cet intermédiaire: celui-ci a été collationné avec le texte du Maître.

On aura, en outre, noté que, dans (1), le contenu de la quasi totalité de *AH* est présenté comme ayant servi à déterminer le rang des procédés rhétoriques. Cette idée est dans la ligne de ce qu'Averroès n'a cessé de dire dans les autres parties de *AH*, comme nous l'avons souligné ci-dessus (§§ A, J, K, L). Or, si *Rhét.* I2, qui expose les principaux points de la doctrine aristotélicienne de la rhétorique et constitue pour ainsi dire la véritable introduction à tout l'ouvrage du Maître, donne les moyens de déterminer le rang de la discipline oratoire par rapport à d'autres disciplines, elle ne le fait pas explicitement. C'est le Commentateur qui introduit cette perspective: poussant encore plus loin qu'Aristote la synthèse, il a ramené l'enthymème et l'exemple à deux concepts fondamentaux, la notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat et le point de vue médiateur, et évalué les procédés extérieurs aux arguments par rapport à la certitude, ce qui lui a permis de déterminer le rang des uns et des autres.

O. Définition de la rhétorique comme "faculté de découvrir spéculativement ce qui, dans chaque cas, peut être propre à persuader" (*Rhét.* I 2, 1355b26-27 Dufour) / "C'est pour cela qu'Aristote a défini cette discipline comme méthode par laquelle l'homme peut produire la persuasion dans chacune des choses particulières de la

⁴⁴ Voir ci-dessous la section V de cet article.

manière la plus achevée possible dans cette chose, suivant une certaine discipline"⁴⁵ (AH 198, 12-199, 2; tr. 78, 15-19).

Averroès déplace la définition de la rhétorique. Alors que dans *Rhét.* I 2, elle ouvre ce chapitre, elle se trouve, dans AH, après la fin de celui-ci et même à la suite d'un rapide résumé du chapitre suivant. Elle est ainsi présentée comme une conséquence de la détermination, dans N, du champ propre à la rhétorique à partir du rang occupé par ses procédés et de leur utilité. Rappelons qu'au cœur de cette détermination, se trouvait l'idée que la rhétorique intéresse surtout les discours populaires relatifs aux "choses particulières d'ordre volontaire." Or c'est bien sur "chacune des choses particulières" que porte la persuasion dans la définition de la rhétorique par Aristote.

P. Sans correspondant dans *Rhét.* / Ce que nous avons dit est suffisant ici à notre but (AH 199, 3-4; tr. 78, 20-21).

Bref, dans N, O, P, Averroès se sert d'idées prises à *Rhét.* ou à sa traduction, en déplace certaines, en ajoute d'autres, notamment le concept de rang, tout cela dans le but de constituer une conclusion caractérisant les procédés oratoires par leur rang et légitimant, par celui-ci, le champ propre à cette discipline et la définition de cette dernière.

Voici, reprises en un tableau, les correspondances entre le plan de AH et *Rhét.*

I 2:

	AH	Rhét.
A	169, 4-7; tr. 63, 6-11	Sans correspondant
B	169, 8-170, 8; tr. 63, 12-28	I 1, 1354a11-26: emprunt
C	170, 10-15; tr. 63, 30-64, 6	I 2, 1357a1-4
D	171, 2-176, 3; tr. 64, 10-67, 6	I 2, 1357a4-22
E	176, 4-5; tr. 67, 7-8	I 2, 1356a35-1356b10: déplacement
F	176, 7-177, 4; tr. 67, 10-26	I 2, 1357a22-32
G	177, 4-181, 10; tr. 67, 27-69, 38	I 2, 1357a32-b25
H	181, 11-182, 14; tr. 70, 1-25	I 2, 1355b27-35: déplacement
I	183, 1-7; tr. 70, 26-36	Sans correspondant
J	183, 9-187, 5; tr. 71, 2-73, 3	I 2, 1357b25-58a2
K	187, 7-189, 8; tr. 73, 6-74, 7	I 2, 1355b35-1356a35: déplacement
L	189, 9-196, 11; tr. 74, 8-77, 19	Sans correspondant
M	196, 11-197, 5; tr. 77, 19-77, 27	Sans correspondant
N	197, 5-198, 12; tr. 77, 22-78, 15	I 2, 1358a2-12; I 3, 1358a36-1359a29

⁴⁵ Butterworth, AH 199, 2; tr. 78, 18, lit *ṣinā'a* (une discipline). Dans son c.r., 'A. Badawi dans *Revista del Instituto egipcio de estudios islámicos en Madrid* 20, 1979-1980, p. 186, propose *ḥibā'a* (nature). Peut-être s'agit-il de *ḥibā' ihī* (la nature de cette chose).

O	198, 12-199, 2; tr. 78, 15-19	I 2, 1355b26-27: déplacement
P	199, 3-4; tr. 78, 20-21	Sans correspondant

Ce tableau montre que la plupart des paragraphes de *AH* ont un correspondant dans *Rhét.* I 2, dont l'ordre des idées est aussi souvent respecté. Le sens de ces paragraphes est généralement réorienté. Cependant, quatre paragraphes se trouvent déplacés: E; H; K; O. Un autre, B, est emprunté à *Rhét.* I 1. *Rhét.* I 3 est résumé dans N, la conclusion de *AH*. Cinq paragraphes sont ajoutés: A; I; L; M; P. Or, si l'on se reporte aux remarques que nous avons faites à propos de ces différents paragraphes, on constatera que les modifications ont pour résultat une structuration plus claire et plus nette de *Rhét.* I 2, et cela autour de trois concepts centraux que l'on n'y trouve pas: le rang de la persuasion oratoire, elle-même étayée, pour ce qui est des enthymèmes, sur la notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat et, pour ce qui est de l'exemple, sur le point de vue immédiat.

Voici en résumé ce plan:

La notion de rang comme objectif du traité, détermination de la persuasion à partir de la notion d'opinion et principe du plan du traité.

Examen des arguments oratoires

L'enthymème

Condition générale déterminée par le point de vue immédiat se produisant en premier, pour tous ou pour la plupart des gens.

Sa forme en tant qu'elle relève de la notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat.

Sa matière en tant qu'elle relève aussi de cette notoriété.

L'exemple en tant qu'il repose essentiellement sur une inférence de l'ordre du point de vue immédiat.

Examen des procédés extérieurs aux arguments rhétoriques en tant qu'ils ont un rang inférieur à la certitude et même aux enthymèmes.

Quant à la suppression de certains paragraphes de *Rhét.* I 2, elle peut parfois s'expliquer par le fait que ce qui a été retenu suffisait à l'objectif du traité. Ainsi, la détermination générale des lieux et des espèces dans *Rhét.* I 2, 1358a12-35 n'a, sans doute, pas paru nécessaire à l'appréciation du rang des procédés rhétoriques, la caractérisation des prémisses et de la forme des arguments étant suffisante à ce sujet.⁴⁶ De même, l'explication de la thèse selon laquelle la rhétorique, étant une

⁴⁶ *L'Abrégé de la logique* a certes une partie sur "Les règles par lesquelles on produit les syllogismes, règles qui sont appelées lieux." Mais Averroès explique, au début de cette partie [§ 1 de cette partie, dans Averroès, *Abrégé de la logique*, éd. Butterworth (à paraître)], qu'il traite alors des lieux du point de vue surtout de leur utilité pour la démonstration et que, s'il ne s'en tient pas ainsi à son intention principale de ne mentionner que ce qui est nécessaire à la détermination du rang des différents raisonnements, c'est en raison de l'éminence des disciplines théoriques et de la démonstration.

discipline, ne considère pas le probable pour l'individu (*Rhét.* I 2, 1356b26-36) a dû sembler inutile à cet égard. La comparaison entre l'enthymème et l'exemple (*Rhét.* I 2, 1356b10-26) introduit, elle, trop massivement des considérations sur l'exemple dans une partie que le Commentateur entendait réserver à l'étude de l'enthymème réservant à plus tard celle de l'autre sorte d'argument. Dans un autre cas, c'est la manière obscure dont le texte d'Aristote est rendu dans *TA*, qui pourrait avoir engagé notre auteur à ne pas retenir certains paragraphes: il en serait ainsi du passage où Aristote explique pourquoi la rhétorique ressemble à la dialectique dans le fait de ne pas considérer le probable pour l'individu (*Rhét.* I 2, 1356b36-1357a1; *TAL* I 11, 10-12).⁴⁷

Bref, *Alġ* est un commentaire qui suit le plan de *Rhét.* I 2, avec quelques emprunts à *Rhét.* I 1 et I 3, mais qui l'interprète suivant une certaine perspective, celle de la détermination du rang de la rhétorique et de la caractérisation de ses arguments au moyen des concepts de notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat et de point de vue immédiat. L'importance de ceux-ci ne vient pas de ce qu'ils prendraient le contre-pied de la théorie aristotélicienne de la rhétorique, mais, au contraire, de ce qu'ils donnent un fondement ultime aux arguments oratoires, fondement permettant de juger de leur rang.⁴⁸

Ainsi, se trouve réalisé, pour la rhétorique, le programme annoncé par Averroès dès le début de *L'Abrégé de la logique*:

Le but de ce traité est d'abstraire (*tagrīd*) de la discipline de la logique les propos nécessaires à la mise en évidence des rangs (*marātib*) des sortes de représentation (*al-taṣawwur*) et de conviction (*al-taṣdiq*) utilisées dans chacune des cinq disciplines – je veux dire la discipline démonstrative, la

⁴⁷ Sur l'obscurité de ce passage, voir Aouad, "Les fondements de la Rhétorique d'Aristote reconsidérés par Fārābī," p. 162.

⁴⁸ Selon Ġ. al-'Alawī, *Al-Maṭn al-ruṣṣī: madḥal li-qirā'a ḡadīda* (Casablanca, 1986), pp. 49-52; 64, *in fine*; 103; 133; 143; 148; 167-8; 203-42, *L'Abrégé de la logique* viserait à sauvegarder l'essentiel de la tradition scientifique musulmane dans le domaine de la logique. Il s'agirait quasiment de commentaires d'ouvrages de Fārābī, et certainement pas d'Aristote. Cette sorte d'abrégés serait à distinguer d'une autre, qui, elle, serait constituée de véritables *compendia* de traités du Stagirit (mais il n'y en aurait pas pour la logique). Plus généralement, *L'Abrégé de la logique* (œuvre de jeunesse: 1157?) n'appartiendrait pas du tout au projet d'Averroès proprement dit, projet plus tardif, plusieurs fois affiné, de ralliement à la seule philosophie d'Aristote et de restauration de celle-ci dans sa pureté. Ce n'est pas le lieu ici d'examiner, dans son ensemble, la thèse du bel ouvrage du regretté Ġamaladdīn al-'Alawī, examen qui impliquerait une comparaison systématique des différents commentaires d'Averroès. On notera seulement que cette thèse doit, de toute façon, être ajustée au point suivant: s'il est vrai que *Alġ* utilise massivement Fārābī, il s'appuie aussi directement et continuellement sur *Rhét.* I 2 (avec quelques emprunts à *Rhét.* I 1 et 3).

Butterworth, *Three Short Commentaries*, pp. 5-10, soutient que, malgré des différences évidentes, *L'Abrégé de la logique* est un abrégé d'œuvres d'Aristote. Il écrit cependant: "Averroës did not follow these works in any orderly manner" (*ibid.*, p. 18).

discipline dialectique, la discipline sophistique, la discipline rhétorique et la discipline poétique – car cette quantité de cette discipline est celle qui est, le plus souvent, nécessaire à apprendre les disciplines qui ont été achevées, ainsi que c'est le cas à notre époque de la plupart des disciplines, comme la discipline médicale et d'autres. Quant à traiter des choses par lesquelles ces propos se trouvent parachevés (*talta'im*) et produits, ou bien cela n'est pas utile à apprendre les disciplines qui ont été déjà achevées, ou bien ces choses sont utiles sur le mode du meilleur et non sur celui du nécessaire. Or la recherche du meilleur est presque impossible à notre époque. Et de toute façon, [ce que nous faisons ici] est comme une introduction pour celui qui trouvera dans son âme énergie et tranquillité et qui aimera étudier exhaustivement les parties de la discipline.⁴⁹

Ce passage soulève, relativement au concept qui nous occupe ici, de nombreux problèmes. Le nerf de l'argument semble être celui-ci: lorsque les disciplines se trouvent être déjà achevées, la logique n'est nécessaire que dans la mesure où elle permet l'appréciation du rang des raisonnements pratiqués dans celles-ci; l'ensemble de l'appareil technique mis en place par la logique ne peut amener, lui, que des perfectionnements qui ne sont pas indispensables.⁵⁰ Mais si le point de vue immédiat permet d'apprécier le rang de la rhétorique, quelle est exactement la position de celui-ci par rapport à celui des autres disciplines de la logique? Quelles sont les sciences déjà achevées à l'époque de notre auteur? L'exemple récurrent du *kalām* (théologie dialectique de tradition profondément islamique), dans *AH*, laisserait-il penser que cette discipline serait particulièrement visée du moins pour ce qui concerne la rhétorique?⁵¹ Pourquoi l'époque d'Averroès exigerait-elle que l'on se préoccupe plus des moyens fournis par l'*Organon* pour apprécier le rang des disciplines, notamment celles qui se servent de la rhétorique, que de l'ensemble de l'appareil technique permettant le perfectionnement de celles-ci?⁵² Les réponses à ces questions, outre qu'elles exigent un examen approfondi de la totalité du texte de *L'Abrégé de la logique*, encore inédit, nous éloigneraient des objectifs principaux de cet article, à savoir donner une idée globale de l'importance du concept de point

⁴⁹ §§ 1-2 de l'Introduction générale, dans Averroès, *Abrégé de la logique*, éd. Butterworth (à paraître); al-'Alawī, *Al-Matn*, pp. 50-1.

⁵⁰ Selon al-'Alawī, *Al-Matn*, pp. 161-3; 205-7; 209, qui met à contribution le *Compendium de la Physique* et *L'Abrégé de la psychologie*, dont les introductions comportent des formules analogues à celle de *L'Abrégé de la logique*, il faut entendre, par la nécessité dont il est question ici, ce qui est nécessaire à la perfection première de l'homme (par opposition à ce que requiert sa perfection dernière).

⁵¹ Cf. Butterworth, *Three Short Commentaries*, pp. 19-41.

⁵² Selon al-'Alawī, *Al-Matn*, pp. 208-9, la période de composition de l'*Abrégé de la logique* correspondrait au passage du règne almoravide au règne almohade (env. 535-555 H), période de trouble et d'incertitude où il importait de sauver l'essentiel du savoir scientifique musulman.

de vue immédiat, le définir, en signaler les origines les plus évidentes.

Voyons donc maintenant, un peu plus dans le détail, les passages concernant ce concept.

III DÉFINITION

Les expressions *maṣhūra fī bādi' al-ra'y*⁵³ (notoires selon le point de vue immédiat) ou *fī bādi' al-ra'y* (selon le point de vue immédiat), ainsi que les expressions voisines,⁵⁴ sont les termes techniques qui apparaissent le plus souvent dans *Aḥ* (25 occurrences pour un traité de 31 pages!):

– *Muntig bi-ḥasab bādi' al-ra'y al-sābiq li-l-ḡami' aw li-l-aḡṭar* (concluant selon le point de vue immédiat se produisant en premier, pour tous ou pour la plupart des gens) (*Aḥ* 170, 10–11; tr. 63, 30–64, 1); *maṣhūra fī bādi' al-ra'y al-muṣṭarak* (notoire selon le point de vue immédiat et commun) (*Aḥ* 176, 12–13; tr. 67, 17–18); *maṣhūra fī bādi' al-ra'y* (notoire selon le point de vue immédiat) (*Aḥ* 177, 2–13; tr. 67, 25); *al-maṣhūra fī bādi' al-ra'y al-sābiq* (notoire selon le point de vue immédiat se produisant en premier) (*Aḥ* 177, 4; tr. 67, 27–28); *sā'i'a fī bādi' al-ra'y* (répandue selon le point de vue immédiat) (*Aḥ* 182, 3–4; tr. 70, 9–10; 183, 3; tr. 70, 29–30).

– *Bādi' al-ra'y* (point de vue immédiat) (*Aḥ* 170, 14, 15; tr. 64, 7, 8; 171, 2; tr. 64, 10–11; 172, 6; tr. 64, 37; 175, 11; tr. 66, 34; 176, 13; tr. 67, 19; 177, 1; tr. 67, 22–23; 177, 6; tr. 67, 32; 180, 14; tr. 69, 21; 180, 15; tr. 69, 22–23; 181, 8; tr. 69, 33–34; 182, 1, 5; tr. 70, 6, 12; 183, 4; tr. 70, 32; 186, 6; tr. 72, 20), *bādi' al-ra'y al-sābiq* (point de vue immédiat se produisant en premier) (*Aḥ* 170, 11, 13; tr. 64, 1, 4–5; 177, 5; 67, 30); *bayyina min awwal al-amr* (évidente dès le début) (*Aḥ* 172, 2; tr. 64, 29).

La deuxième série d'occurrences n'est pas par elle-même identique à la première, mais a un sens plus général, puisqu'un point de vue immédiat n'est pas forcément

⁵³ D'après E.W. Lane, *An Arabic-English Lexicon* (London et Edinburgh, 1863), B. I, P. 1, pp. 164; 171, on rencontre, dans les textes arabes, non seulement *bādi' al-ra'y*, mais aussi – selon la plupart des lectures du *Coran*, XI, 29 / 27, par exemple – *bādi' al-ra'y*. Dans le premier cas, on aurait la racine *B-D-*, qui renvoie à l'idée de commencement, et le sens de l'expression serait le point de vue non réfléchi; dans le second, on aurait la racine *B-D-W*, qui renvoie à l'idée de ce qui apparaît, de la manifestation, et deux sens seraient alors possibles: le point de vue non réfléchi (ainsi, dans le passage précité du *Coran*) ou le point de vue apparent, illusoire. Dans *Aḥ* – du moins tel qu'édité par Ch. E. Butterworth – on a toujours *bādi'*. Mais, quel que soit le terme originaire, il ne peut signifier l'illusion, car, comme nous le verrons, le concept qui nous occupe ici n'est pas forcément le résultat d'un sophisme, mais concerne l'absence d'examen.

⁵⁴ Sur les différentes traductions de ce concept, on se reportera à Aouad, "Les fondements de la *Rhétorique* d'Aristote reconsidérés par Fārābī," p. 143, n. 13; J. Lameer, "Aristotelian Rhetoric and Poetics as Logical Arts in Medieval Islamic Philosophy," c. r. de Black, *Logic*, à paraître dans *BO*, section V.

commun. Il peut s'agir du point de vue d'un individu comme tel.

Voici la définition que nous propose Averroès du point de vue immédiat:

Le point de vue immédiat se produisant en premier est le point de vue qui est tel que, lorsqu'il surprend l'homme, il advient à celui-ci une certaine opinion qui prend le dessus (*zann mā gālib*) et un repos de l'âme (*sukūn nafs*) sur ce point de vue, avant que l'homme l'examine (AH 170, 11-12; tr. 64, 1-3)

Or, nous avons vu, tout au long du parallèle présenté ci-dessus, que le point de vue immédiat caractérise l'enthymème et l'exemple, arguments qui constituent, eux-mêmes, l'une des deux sortes de "choses par lesquelles on produit la persuasion (*al-qanā'a*)" (AH 169, 8-170, 4; tr. 63, 12-23). Il doit donc comporter les caractères de cette persuasion, qui est ainsi déterminée:

La persuasion est une opinion qui prend le dessus sur laquelle repose l'âme tout en ayant conscience d'un point de contention (*šū'ūrihā bi-mu'ānada*)" (AH 169, 6-7; tr. 63, 9-10).

Si l'opinion qui prend le dessus et le repos de l'âme⁵⁵ se retrouvent dans la définition du point de vue immédiat, ce n'est pas le cas de la conscience d'une opposition. Pourtant, celle-ci ne découle pas nécessairement des deux autres éléments. En effet, si le repos de l'âme semble suivre l'opinion qui prend le dessus, comme l'attestent les termes de la définition de la persuasion, cette opinion qui prend le dessus peut, elle, apparaître sans la conscience d'une opposition. De fait, il est aussi question d'opinion qui prend le dessus à propos de la dialectique,⁵⁶ dont on sait qu'elle produit une opinion qui n'est pas accompagnée de la conscience d'une opposition.⁵⁷ Cette conscience doit donc découler du troisième élément de la définition du point de vue immédiat: l'absence d'examen. Cette déduction semble confirmée par une observation d'ordre psychologique que fait Averroès, plus tard, dans le cours de AH:

La manière de se laisser convaincre à laquelle nous sommes inclinés depuis l'enfance est que toutes les choses sont possibles et qu'il n'y a rien d'impossible à tel point qu'il s'ensuit pour celui qui dit cela que son propos lui-même ne soit pas nécessaire (AH 182, 9-11; tr. 70, 19-22).

Mais ce que nous avons jusqu'ici déterminé, c'est le point de vue immédiat, envisagé en général – en dehors de toute référence à la généralité des gens – et non pas la notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat. Or cette dernière expression peut prêter à confusion. Faut-il comprendre qu'elle désigne un individu qui pense, à tort, que certaines prémisses sont notoires pour tous, alors qu'elles ne le sont

⁵⁵ Les expressions d'opinion qui prend le dessus et de repos de l'âme appartiennent aussi bien à la tradition philosophique qu'à la tradition théologico-juridique (cf. Black, *Logic*, p. 77). Nous aurons l'occasion de revenir sur ces deux points dans un travail ultérieur.

⁵⁶ Butterworth, *Three Short Commentaries*, pp. 153, 1-2; tr. 48, 6-8.

⁵⁷ Butterworth, *Three Short Commentaries*, pp. 152, 1-2; tr. 47, 21-3.

pas en réalité ou, au contraire, qu'elle se rapporte à des prémisses notoires en tant qu'il s'agit du point de vue immédiat de tous? Cette deuxième interprétation semble la plus correcte, comme l'atteste l'emploi des expressions synonymes de *muntig bi-ḥasab bādi' al-ra'y al-sābiq li-l-ḡami' aw li-l-aḡṭar* (concluant selon le point de vue immédiat se produisant en premier, pour tous ou pour la plupart des gens) (AH 170, 10-11; tr. 63, 30-64, 1), et de *mashūra fi bādi' al-ra'y al-muṣṭarak* (notoire selon le point de vue immédiat et commun) (AH 176, 12-13; tr. 67, 17-18). Toutefois, si la notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat ne signifie pas l'agrément, non précédé d'examen, du seul auditeur, il ne s'agit pas pour autant d'un point de vue qui lui est étranger. L'auditeur fait partie de la totalité ou de la majorité des gens constitutives de la notoriété. D'où l'ambiguïté fondamentale du concept qui nous occupe ici et qui renvoie à la fois au jugement d'autrui et au jugement personnel de l'auditeur. Nous verrons, cependant, plus loin qu'Averroès semble privilégier le premier de ces aspects.

L'examen du passage de AH traitant des rapports qu'il y a entre les prémisses notoires selon le point de vue immédiat et d'autres sortes de prémisses nous aidera à mieux cerner le concept de notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat.

Les prémisses utilisées dans cette sorte d'arguments (*al-aqāwīl*), en particulier la majeure, ne sont prises ici qu'en tant qu'elles sont notoires selon le point de vue immédiat et commun (*mashūra fi bādi' al-ra'y al-muṣṭarak*)...de même que les prémisses dialectiques ne sont utilisées qu'en tant qu'elles sont notoires en réalité (*mashūra fi al-ḥaqīqa*). Et, de même qu'il arrive (*yattafiq*) parfois que les prémisses notoires (*al-mashūrāt*) soient vraies (*sādiqa*) ou ne soient pas vraies, de même il arrive parfois par accident (*bi-al-'araḍ*) aux prémisses qui sont dans le point de vue immédiat (*fi bādi' al-ra'y*) d'être notoires (*mashūra*) ou vraies, et il leur arrive parfois de ne pas l'être. Mais elles ne sont en général prises ici qu'en tant qu'elles sont notoires selon le point de vue immédiat (*mashūra fi bādi' al-ra'y*), de même que les prémisses dialectiques ne sont prises qu'en tant seulement qu'elles sont notoires en réalité (*mashūra fi al-ḥaqīqa*) (AH 176, 11-177, 4; tr. 67, 16-26).

Ce passage opère un certain nombre de dissociations: prémisses notoires [en réalité] / prémisses vraies ou non vraies; prémisses selon le point de vue immédiat / prémisses notoires [en réalité] ou non; prémisses selon le point de vue immédiat / prémisses vraies ou non vraies. La relation entre les termes de ces différents couples de concepts est dite de nature accidentelle. Les prémisses notoires selon le point de vue immédiat peuvent, mais ne doivent donc pas comprendre des prémisses notoires en réalité ou vraies. L'absence d'examen n'est pas lié par essence à la notoriété en réalité ou à la vérité.

Ce principe posé, Averroès n'approfondit pas explicitement les rapports qui peuvent exister entre la qualité distinctive des prémisses rhétoriques et celles qui peuvent éventuellement les accompagner. Une indication peut néanmoins être tirée,

pour ce qui est du caractère de vérité ou de non vérité, de ce qu'écrit le Commentateur au sujet de l'objet de la rhétorique:

Cette discipline...n'a pas d'objet (*mawḍū'*) propre, de même que la discipline dialectique n'a pas d'objet (*mawḍū'*) propre, car ces deux disciplines ne prennent pas les prémisses utilisées en elles dans l'âme selon le mode selon lequel elles sont à l'extérieur de l'âme, mais on ne juge jamais [dans ces deux disciplines] de la présence d'un attribut dans un sujet (*mawḍū'*) qu'à cause de la notoriété (*al-ṣuḥra*), soit selon le point de vue immédiat (*fī bādi' al-ra'y*), soit en réalité (*fī al-ḥaqīqa*), et non pas à cause du fait qu'il serait dans la nature de l'attribut d'exister pour le sujet ou dans la nature du sujet que l'attribut existe pour lui. Cette discipline ne prend pas seulement les prémisses en tant qu'elles sont répandues selon le point de vue immédiat (*ṣū'a fī bādi' al-ra'y*) sans que soit posée en elles une condition d'existence, mais elle prend parfois le nécessaire en tant qu'il est possible selon le point de vue immédiat et de même le possible en tant qu'il est nécessaire (AH 181, 11-182, 5; tr. 70, 1-13).

La notoriété est donc un phénomène de l'âme qui n'a pas de lien intrinsèque avec les modes d'exister à l'extérieur de l'âme. Bien plus, elle peut comporter une inadéquation avec l'extérieur, puisqu'elle peut prendre le nécessaire pour le possible et le possible pour le nécessaire.

Ces précisions ne nous renseignent toutefois pas sur ce qui fait la différence entre la notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat et la notoriété en réalité, différence qui est pourtant, une fois de plus, clairement affirmée. Une chose est néanmoins certaine. Ces deux sortes de notoriété ne se distinguent pas par la conformité à la réalité externe de la notoriété en réalité: la notoriété en réalité n'est pas nécessairement une notoriété fondée sur la réalité des choses, alors que la notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat ne le serait pas. De fait, les deux passages précités attestent du fait que l'une et l'autre notoriété peuvent se rapporter à des affirmations aussi bien vraies que fausses. Une autre interprétation vient à l'esprit: la notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat ne serait pas une véritable notoriété, mais serait une erreur sur la notoriété, alors que la notoriété en réalité serait une véritable notoriété. Mais il ne peut en être ainsi, car nous avons vu, plus haut, que la notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat se rapporte à des prémisses notoires selon le point de vue immédiat de tous et que l'on ne peut pas dire qu'elle est le point de vue immédiat d'un individu qui pense, à tort, que certaines prémisses sont notoires pour tous, alors qu'elles ne le sont pas.

A défaut d'une déclaration explicite sur ce qui différencie la notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat de la notoriété en réalité, on peut avoir, par déduction, quelques indications sur ce sujet. Si la notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat est le point de vue se produisant en premier chez tout le monde ou chez la plupart des gens et si cette notoriété doit se distinguer de la notoriété en réalité, qui est aussi un concept se rapportant à la généralité des gens, c'est sans doute en tant

que, dans le premier cas, il ne s'agit que de ce qui est admis avant examen par la généralité des gens, alors que, dans le second, il s'agirait de ce qui l'est même après examen. L'examen pourrait retirer sa notoriété à la notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat, mais non à la notoriété en réalité. Dans ce dernier cas, la notoriété ne saurait être éradiquée et, en ce sens là, elle serait notoire en réalité. Si l'examen peut ruiner la notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat, cela implique qu'un certain examen est accessible à la généralité des gens. De fait, si l'examen par l'élite qui maîtrise les procédés démonstratifs peut mettre en question la validité d'un point de vue, un tel examen demeure limité et ne porte pas atteinte à la notoriété. Seuls peuvent l'affecter les résultats d'un examen accessible à la généralité des gens. En conséquence, seul un examen populaire peut mettre en péril la notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat. C'est aussi à cet examen seul que doit résister la notoriété en réalité, car la remise en question par un examen par l'élite n'affecterait en rien cette dernière notoriété. Une telle interprétation de la différence entre les deux sortes de notoriété est confirmée par les textes plus explicites de Fārābī et surtout d'Avicenne.⁵⁸

On peut aussi tirer des autres traités de *L'Abrégé de la logique* quelques renseignements sur la nature du concept qui nous occupe ici, du moins sur certains de ses éléments. Nous avons déjà signalé, au début de la section II de cet article, le passage de l'abrégé de la dialectique traitant de l'opinion. On s'arrêtera ici sur la notion de notoriété, qui y est longuement analysée:

On n'est convaincu des prémisses notoires (*al-maṣhūra*) répandues (*al-dā'i'a*) que du fait du témoignage (*ṣahāda*) de tous ou de la plupart des gens (*al-ḡamū' aw al-aḡṣar*), non du fait que la chose est ainsi en soi, à la différence de ce qui se passe dans la démonstration. En effet, la conviction certaine (*al-taṣḍīq al-yaqīnī*) ne nous vient dans celle-ci que de prémisses dont nous sommes convaincus en tant qu'elles sont dans nos âmes conformes à ce qu'elles sont à l'extérieur de nos âmes, et non en tant que cela est le point de vue d'autrui.⁵⁹

L'abrégé de la dialectique insiste donc sur la différence qu'il y a entre les prémisses certaines, qui sont les prémisses de la démonstration, et les prémisses notoires. D'une part, on aurait un jugement personnel, indépendant, dû à la conformité de nos propositions avec ce qu'il y a à l'extérieur de l'âme, de l'autre, le recours à une espèce de témoignage, à l'autorité de tous. Alors que le fait, pour une prémisses, d'être attestée par tous n'implique pas par soi, nécessairement, sa conformité avec les choses, le jugement certain signifie par soi cette conformité.

Un autre point intéressant de l'analyse de la notion de notoriété dans l'abrégé de la dialectique concerne l'élucidation de ses rapports avec la généralité des gens.

⁵⁸ Voir Aouad, "Les fondements de la Rhétorique d'Aristote reconsidérés par Fārābī," pp. 149-51.

⁵⁹ Butterworth, *Three Short Commentaries*, pp. 152, 6-11, tr. 47, 27-32.

Après avoir énuméré les six sortes de prémisses notoires,⁶⁰ à savoir les prémisses notoires pour tout le monde, les prémisses notoires pour la plupart des gens, sans qu'il y ait au sujet de celles-ci opposition du reste des gens, les prémisses notoires pour les savants et les sages ou pour la plupart d'entre eux, sans qu'il y ait opposition du reste des savants et des sages, les prémisses notoires pour la plupart de ceux-ci [et même s'il y a opposition du reste d'entre eux], les prémisses notoires pour les experts dans les différentes disciplines sans qu'il y ait opposition du peuple, les prémisses notoires pour les personnes dont l'habileté dans les disciplines est notoire sans qu'il y ait opposition des autres experts de la discipline, les prémisses notoires pour la plupart de ces habiles, le semblable au notoire, le contraire du notoire, Averroès ajoute:

Les plus éminentes de toutes ces prémisses sont celles dont témoignent (*ṣahāda*) la totalité des gens ou la plupart d'entre eux; celles qui sont en-dessous ne sont devenues notoires qu'en raison du témoignage (*li-ṣahāda*), en leur faveur, de la totalité des gens ou de la plupart d'entre eux, car les points de vue des savants ne deviennent notoires que parce que la totalité des gens ou la plupart d'entre eux considèrent qu'il faut que leurs points de vue soient admis; il en va de même pour les points de vue propres aux disciplines, et de même pour tous les autres points de vue.⁶¹

Bref, toute proposition notoire se fonde sur le témoignage de tous ou de la plupart des gens soit directement, soit indirectement, en tant que le point de vue des élites n'est notoire que parce qu'elles sont considérées par tous ou la majorité comme dignes de confiance.

Enfin, l'abrégé de la dialectique nous apprend que

Ces prémisses notoires sont nécessairement universelles – car les choses particulières sont changeantes et ne sont pas communément senties par tous – bien qu'elles ne soient prises dans ces syllogismes que d'une manière indéterminée et on ne va pas, pour les conserver, jusqu'à déclarer leur quantificateur. C'est pourquoi elles ne sont pas partiellement fausses.⁶²

On trouvera des exemples d'inférence selon le point de vue immédiat et de prémisses notoires selon le point de vue immédiat dans la section IV, à propos de la doctrine de l'exemple, et dans la section V (en note), à propos des prémisses aussi possibles que leur contraire.

⁶⁰ Butterworth, *Three Short Commentaries*, pp. 158, 4-159, 15; tr. 51, 9-52, 7.

⁶¹ Butterworth, *Three Short Commentaries*, pp. 159, 16-160, 4; tr. 52, 8-14.

⁶² Butterworth, *Three Short Commentaries*, pp. 160, 5-8; tr. 52, 15-19. Nous n'interprétons pas ce passage, comme son éditeur, qui n'a pas retenu le mot *al-aswār* (les quantificateurs) des manuscrits, mais qui l'a remplacé par *bi-al-iqmar* (rendu par "ellipsis"). Voir, à ce sujet, le c.r. de G. Vajda, *Arabica* 26, 1979, p. 197.

IV LE RÔLE DU CONCEPT DE POINT DE VUE IMMÉDIAT DANS L'ÉLABORATION DES PRINCIPALES DOCTRINES DE LA RHÉTORIQUE

Il ne s'agit pas ici de déterminer exhaustivement ce rôle dans *AH*. Pour cela, il faudrait, non seulement examiner, un à un, les treize points de doctrine fondés explicitement sur le point de vue immédiat, que nous avons relevés, mais aussi les comparer aux autres passages de l'oeuvre de notre philosophe traitant de sujets voisins. Notre but étant de souligner l'importance du concept en question dans *AH*, il suffira de présenter la liste des points, de s'interroger sur les principaux procédés oratoires pour lesquels la notoriété selon point de vue immédiat n'est pas mentionnée explicitement et de donner un exemple particulièrement significatif de l'application de ce concept.

Un rapide coup d'oeil sur la liste atteste du recours systématique au concept de point de vue immédiat. Outre le passage susmentionné définissant le point de vue immédiat (*AH* 170, 11-12; tr. 64, 1-3), voici, en effet, le contexte des différentes occurrences. A propos de l'enthymème en général: l'enthymème défini comme un syllogisme qui conclut selon le point de vue immédiat se produisant en premier, pour tous ou pour la plupart des gens (*AH* 170, 10-11; tr. 63, 30-64, 1); application du concept de point de vue immédiat se produisant en premier à la forme et à la matière des enthymèmes (*AH* 170, 13-15; tr. 64, 3-8). A propos de la forme des enthymèmes: la forme des syllogismes conclusifs selon le point de vue immédiat caractérisée par l'absence de rigueur et la suppression de la chose par laquelle il y a nécessité du rapport de conséquence, et cela selon ce qui contente le peuple (*AH* 171, 2-6; tr. 64, 10-17); comme on ne voit pas avec évidence dès le début, dans la deuxième et la troisième figure, la prémisse déterminante pour la conclusion ni celle qui fait la liaison, on peut les déclarer expressément l'une et l'autre, mais il faudra les prendre de manière indéterminée (*AH* 172, 1-5; tr. 64, 29-35); parmi les syllogismes attributifs non concluants, il y en a qui le sont dans le point de vue immédiat (*AH* 172, 5-11; tr. 64, 35-65, 8).⁶³ Sur la matière des enthymèmes (c'est-à-dire les prémisses considérées en elles-mêmes): la matière des enthymèmes doit être notoire selon le point de vue immédiat et commun, surtout lorsqu'il s'agit de la majeure (*AH* 176, 11-14; tr. 67, 16-21); les prémisses notoires selon le point de vue immédiat sont à distinguer d'autres sortes de prémisses, notoires en vérité et donc dialectiques, vraies ou non vraies (*AH* 176, 14-177, 4; tr. 67, 21-26); division des prémisses notoires selon le point de vue immédiat en propositions reçues (*qaḍāyā maqbūlā*) et en signes (*dalā'il*) et définition de ces deux catégories par le point de vue immédiat (*AH* 177, 4-6; tr. 67, 27-32); la division des prémisses en

⁶³ *AH* 172, 10; tr. 65, 6. Nous n'interprétons pas ce passage, comme son éditeur, qui n'a pas retenu le mot *bi-al-aswār* (les quantificateurs) des manuscrits, mais qui l'a remplacé par *bi-al-idmār* (rendu par "ellipsis"). Cf., à ce sujet, la note précédente.

propositions reçues et signes pouvant concerner la matière nécessaire, la matière qui est de l'ordre du plus probable et la matière où les contraires se trouvent être également possibles n'est pas essentielle en rhétorique, car seule l'est la division en prémisses reçues selon le point de vue immédiat et en signes selon le point de vue immédiat (AH 180, 12-181, 10; tr. 69, 17-38); rhétorique et dialectique n'ont pas d'objet propre, car elles ne prennent pas les prémisses selon le mode de leur existence à l'extérieur à l'âme, mais en tant que notoires selon le point de vue immédiat ou en réalité (AH 181, 11-182, 14; tr. 70, 1-25); si les anciens ont divisé les prémisses des enthymèmes suivant leur nécessité ou leur degré de possibilité, c'est qu'il arrive que cela ait une influence sur le degré de force des prémisses répandues selon le point de vue immédiat (AH 183, 1-7; tr. 70, 26-36). Sur l'exemple: l'exemple ne s'appuie pas sur un jugement universel certain, mais sur une inférence de l'ordre du point de vue immédiat et les rangs (*marātib*) de l'opinion (*zann*) dépendent de leur proximité par rapport au jugement universel (AH 184, 12-186, 10; tr. 71, 31-72, 27).

A regarder cette liste, on ne peut qu'être frappé par le fait que le critère du point de vue immédiat ou de la notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat n'est pas mentionné explicitement à propos des procédés extérieurs aux arguments. En outre, alors que, pour les enthymèmes en général, on rencontre le deuxième de ces concepts et, pour leur matière, les deux, seul le point de vue immédiat est évoqué dans le cas de la forme des enthymèmes et de l'exemple. Faut-il penser qu'Averroès renonce au critère de la notoriété, et donc à la caution du témoignage de tous, à chaque fois qu'il n'évoque explicitement que le point de vue immédiat? Nous ne le pensons pas et cela pour plusieurs raisons:

En ce qui concerne l'enthymème, il y a d'abord l'affirmation de principe qui le soumet au critère de la notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat. Cette affirmation précède l'examen de la forme et de la matière et vaut donc aussi bien pour l'une que pour l'autre:

Nous disons que l'enthymème est un syllogisme concluant selon le point de vue immédiat se produisant en premier, pour tous ou pour la plupart des gens (AH 170, 10-11; 63, 30-64, 1).

En outre, dans plusieurs cas, le contexte est tel qu'une affirmation est d'abord avancée avec mention du concept de notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat et qu'un peu plus loin, seule l'expression de point de vue immédiat est employée, comme s'il s'agissait d'éviter, pour une raison purement stylistique, de répéter l'expression la plus longue. Averroès écrit alors point de vue immédiat, mais il sous-entend manifestement: point de vue immédiat de tous ou de la plupart des gens. Ainsi après avoir écrit, dans le passage précité que l'enthymème est "un syllogisme concluant selon le point de vue immédiat se produisant en premier, pour tous ou pour la plupart des gens," Averroès reprend, un peu plus loin, la même expression, mais en l'abrégeant:

Les syllogismes ne deviennent concluant suivant le point de vue immédiat se produisant en premier que du fait de leur forme ou du fait de leur matière – du fait de leur forme, quand ils sont concluants selon le point de vue immédiat; du fait de leur matière, quand leurs prémisses sont aussi vraies selon le point de vue immédiat (*AH* 170, 13-15; tr. 64, 3-8).

Il est évident que ce passage développe le précédent et que "concluant selon le point de vue immédiat se produisant en premier, pour tous ou pour la plupart des gens" est représenté ici par "concluant suivant le point de vue immédiat se produisant en premier." Cela est d'ailleurs confirmé par le fait que la matière des enthymèmes, pour laquelle il n'est ici question que de point de vue immédiat, est dite ailleurs notoire selon le point de vue immédiat et commun (*AH* 176, 11-14; tr. 67, 16-21).

Un autre exemple de cette économie d'ordre stylistique est le suivant

Les prémisses notoires selon le point de vue immédiat se produisant en premier se divisent en proposition reçues – il s'agit de prémisses qui sont prises de manière universelle dans le point de vue immédiat se produisant en premier – et en choses senties qui sont prises comme signes d'autres choses dans le point de vue immédiat aussi (*AH* 177, 4-6; tr. 67, 27-32).

On sera donc attentif à chaque fois qu'apparaîtra la seule expression de point de vue immédiat aux raisons doctrinales ou stylistiques qui pourraient inciter à supposer qu'il s'agit en fait du point de vue immédiat de tous ou de la plupart des gens. Il en est ainsi de tous les cas où cette expression est employée à propos de l'enthymème.

Mais il est beaucoup plus difficile de faire une telle supposition, à propos de l'exemple, car il n'y a pas d'indice doctrinal ou stylistique pour l'étayer. Comme l'explique Averroès, l'exemple repose sur une similitude entre deux choses, et la similitude est constituée d'un point commun ou d'un rapport d'analogie (*AH* 183, 9-184, 11; tr. 71, 2-30). Ceux-ci vont permettre de fonder une sorte de syllogisme reposant sur une proposition indéterminée et conclusif selon le point de vue immédiat:

Lorsque nous jugeons que le ciel est engendré parce qu'il ressemble aux corps engendrés pour ce qui est de la localisation, du changement et de la continuité, etc., le ciel est alors le petit terme du syllogisme, car il est le sujet de ce qui est recherché, l'engendré est le grand terme, car il est l'attribut du sujet et le moyen terme est la localisation et le changement. D'où, en composant le syllogisme, nous dirions ceci: "Le ciel est localisé, ce qui est localisé est engendré, le ciel est donc engendré." Mais il ne suffit pas de prendre de manière indéterminée ce que nous disons, à savoir "ce qui est localisé est engendré," si nous voulons que le ciel soit subsumé nécessairement sous ce propos, mais il faut que nous le prenions de manière universelle, à savoir "tout ce qui est localisé est engendré." Si une telle universalité était obtenue lorsque nous examinons certaines choses localisées de la manière dont sont obtenues certaines prémisses de l'ordre

de l'expérience,⁶⁴ la déclaration expresse de l'exemple serait superflue ...Mais s'il ne nous advient pas de certitude universelle en sentant que certaines choses localisées sont engendrées et que cette prémisse demeure en nous indéterminée, il ne découle pas, de ce que nous sentons à cet égard, quelque chose nécessairement, mais seulement selon le point de vue immédiat. De là, il apparaît que l'obtention de la certitude sur l'universel dans de telles prémisses ne vient pas de la sensation mais d'une autre puissance, car le sens ne perçoit, relativement à ces prémisses, que des individus en nombre défini (*AH* 185, 3-186, 8; tr. 71, 38-72, 24).

C'est donc en fonction du point de vue immédiat que l'on choisit ici celles des propositions indéterminées formées à partir d'un point commun ou d'un rapport d'analogie qui permettent de fonder un syllogisme et que l'on opère la déduction. Averroès ne stipule pas que ce point de vue immédiat doit être le point de vue immédiat de tous. Le témoignage de ceux-ci n'est pas requis. Il semble donc que l'exemple ne relève pas, comme l'enthymème, du principe d'autorité, mais du jugement individuel.

Quant aux procédés extérieurs aux arguments, Averroès soutient à leur sujet que l'on recourt à l'enthymème pour établir l'existence ou le caractère persuasif de tel ou tel d'entre eux, en d'autres termes pour montrer que telle ou telle situation qui relève de ce procédé s'est bien produite ou que l'usage de celui-ci est en soi légitime (*AH* 196, 11-197, 5; tr. 77, 19-77, 27). Ainsi, si le contenu d'un témoignage est l'affirmation d'un individu, la légitimité du recours au témoignage, l'établissement de la fiabilité du témoin, etc. se fondent sur l'enthymème. Or, celui-ci relève aussi bien pour sa forme que pour sa matière de la notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat.

En somme, la notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat et le point de vue universel semblent directement opérants respectivement pour l'enthymème et pour l'exemple. Pour les procédés extérieurs, en revanche, ce n'est qu'indirectement qu'intervient la notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat.

Dans la liste des thèses mettant en oeuvre le concept qui nous occupe ici, deux d'entre elles sont particulièrement intéressantes. Elles concernent, l'une, la définition de l'enthymème, l'autre la détermination générale de sa forme:

Nous disons que l'enthymème est un syllogisme concluant selon le point de vue immédiat se produisant en premier, pour tous ou pour la plupart des gens (*AH* 170, 10-11; tr. 63, 30-64, 1).

Les formes des syllogismes ne sont concluantes selon le point de vue immédiat que lorsque l'on est indulgent à leur sujet et que l'on supprime de ces syllogismes la chose par laquelle il y a nécessité du rapport de

⁶⁴ *AH* 186, 2; tr. 72, 14. Nous n'interprétons pas ce passage, comme son éditeur, qui n'a pas retenu le mot *al-tagarrubiyya* (de l'ordre de l'expérience) du *ms.* M, confirmé par le latin, (le *ms.* P a ici une lacune), mais qui l'a remplacé par *al-guz'iyya* (rendu par "particular").

conséquence à la manière de ce qui contente les gens du peuple lorsqu'ils s'adressent les uns aux autres (*AH* 171, 2-4; tr. 64, 10-14).

L'enthymème est donc défini comme un procédé permettant de conclure selon le point de vue immédiat se produisant en premier, pour tout le monde ou pour la plupart des gens. Et de ce principe, Averroès tire, non pas déjà au niveau de la définition (comme Fārābī: *FHL* 63, 4-8; 69, 10-18), mais dans le passage consacré à la détermination de la forme de l'enthymème, la règle selon laquelle cette forme ne doit pas être rigoureuse.

On notera, à cet égard, que la formulation d'Averroès ("les formes des syllogismes ne sont concluantes selon le point de vue immédiat que lorsque l'on est indulgent à leur sujet et que l'on supprime de ses syllogismes la chose par laquelle il y a nécessité du rapport de conséquence") signifie probablement que le laxisme de la forme est la condition formelle générale pour qu'il y ait enthymème, alors que le principe de la suppression de la chose par laquelle il y a nécessité du rapport de conséquence n'en est qu'une application privilégiée. Par ce moyen, se trouve assurée la possibilité de supprimer autre chose que ce qui donne la nécessité au rapport de conséquence, par, exemple, la mineure dans certains syllogismes de la première figure (*AH* 171, 13-14; tr. 64, 26-28). De plus, il n'est pas dit que c'est la prémisse qui donne au rapport de conséquence sa nécessité qui est supprimée, mais "la chose (*al-šay'*)" qui donne cette liaison. Ainsi, s'il est préférable de supprimer toute cette prémisse, dans la première figure, il arrive aussi qu'elle ne le soit pas entièrement, mais que seule son quantificateur le soit (*AH* 171, 7-12; tr. 64, 18-26). Quand elle est ainsi prise de manière indéterminée, c'est bien ce qui donne au rapport de conséquence sa nécessité, à savoir l'universalité de la majeure, qui est supprimée, bien que cela ne soit pas toute la prémisse.

En outre, le laxisme dans la forme est présenté comme déterminant la conclusion selon le point de vue immédiat. La suppression en rhétorique n'est donc manifestement pas la simple suppression pour abréger, que pratiquent les gens de la démonstration (*AH* 171, 10-12; tr. 64, 23-26). Celle-ci n'est qu'un procédé d'amélioration de la présentation. Mais pourquoi cette suppression est-elle déterminante quand il s'agit du point de vue immédiat? Mme Black examine différents cas⁶⁵ sur lesquels nous ne reviendrons pas, mais dont nous voudrions tirer une remarque d'ordre général. La suppression sert, dans tous ces cas, à occulter le défaut d'une prémisse qui, si elle était entièrement exprimée, empêcherait la persuasion, soit que cette prémisse soit fragile (ce qui est fréquemment le sort des prémisses notoires selon le point de vue immédiat), soit que, tout en étant notoire selon le point de vue immédiat, elle remplisse aussi les conditions des propositions réellement universelles (la force contraignante d'un syllogisme ainsi fondé semble au peuple due à une astuce technique de l'orateur-logicien), soit que le syllogisme

⁶⁵ Black, *Logic*, pp. 158-71. Même si cet examen ne s'appuie pas toujours sur *AH*, on peut en appliquer, *grosso modo*, les analyses à ce traité.

soit formellement déficient (par exemple, le syllogisme de la deuxième figure dont les deux prémisses sont affirmatives). Or, si l'occultation a été possible, c'est que l'on se place ici au niveau du point de vue immédiat et non de l'examen et de la réflexion, comme dans la démonstration et dans la dialectique. Bref, si la persuasion selon le point de vue immédiat est causée par la suppression, c'est que le point de vue immédiat implique, d'une part, la mise en oeuvre d'éléments très souvent fragiles et, d'autre part, permet une occultation impossible quand on s'engage dans la voie de l'examen.

V LES ORIGINES DU CONCEPT DE POINT DE VUE IMMÉDIAT

Comme nous avons déjà eu l'occasion de le signaler,⁶⁶ le concept de notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat n'apparaît pas dans *Rhét.* Certes, dans *Rhét.* I 2, 1357a7-22, Aristote, excluant, du champ de la rhétorique, les longs raisonnements, semble recommander, pour ne pas partir de trop loin, de recourir aux prémisses admises (ἐνδοξα) [par les hommes de tels ou tels caractères, et non par les individus comme tels (*Rhét.* I 2, 1356b32-34)] et, dans *Rhét.* II 22, 1395b22-1396a3, il précise que celles-ci ne sont pas, toutes, à retenir, que ne doivent l'être que celles qui sont proches de la conclusion, quitte à ce qu'il ne s'agisse pas de propositions généralement admises, mais seulement des propositions admises par les juges ou ceux dont ils acceptent l'autorité. Toutefois, si l'on a, avec cette caractérisation, l'idée du communément admis et celle de la réduction au maximum des médiations, cette dernière est appliquée à la chaîne déductive et non pas aussi à la qualification des prémisses elles-mêmes, comme cela sera le cas du point de vue immédiat et commun. Ainsi, la spécificité des prémisses rhétoriques ne se trouve pas profondément assurée, puisque la seule différence qui leur est reconnue est pour ainsi dire relative: leur proximité de la conclusion. Une même prémisse pourra donc être rhétorique et ne plus l'être suivant que, dans le discours où elle est employée, elle est proche de la conclusion ou non. En outre, dans *Rhét.* I 2, 1357a32-b25, Aristote accueille, dans la discipline oratoire, à côté des prémisses vraisemblables, les signes qu'il ne rattache, nulle part, d'une façon ou d'une autre, aux prémisses communément admises. Bref, on ne rencontre pas, dans *Rhét.*, d'usage systématique, pour la rhétorique, des idées du communément admis et de l'immédiat.

Cela vaut également des *Top.* Aristote s'y montre soucieux d'indiquer que la notoriété d'une proposition est étrangère à sa vérité, de caractériser les propositions sophistiques comme apparemment notoires et d'établir des différences non seulement avec la démonstration, mais aussi avec la dialectique: le syllogisme est une démonstration quand le syllogisme part de prémisses vraies... Est dialectique le syllogisme qui conclut de prémisses probables (ἐξ ἐνδοξῶν)

⁶⁶ Aouad, "Les fondements de la Rhétorique d'Aristote reconsidérés par Fārābī," pp. 156-8.

...Est éristique le syllogisme qui part d'opinions qui, tout en paraissant probables, en réalité ne le sont pas; et encore, le syllogisme qui ne conclut qu'en apparence d'opinions probables ou paraissant probables: en effet, tout ce qui paraît probable n'est pas probable, car rien de ce qui est dit probable ne présente au premier coup d'oeil un caractère certain de fausseté, comme c'est le cas pour les principes des arguments éristiques, où c'est immédiatement que se révèle la nature de la fausseté, et cela, la plupart du temps, même pour des esprits doués d'une médiocre compréhension.⁶⁷

Les distinctions mises en oeuvre dans ce passage, sur lesquelles insistera d'ailleurs Alexandre d'Aphrodise,⁶⁸ ne vont pas jusqu'à cerner la spécificité des prémisses rhétoriques.

Dans l'article plusieurs fois mentionné, nous avons, en outre, rappelé que, dans l'état actuel de nos connaissances, on ne trouve pas, avant Fārābī, dans la tradition antique ou médiévale, de caractérisation de la rhétorique par la notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat.⁶⁹

Quoiqu'il en soit, *AH* est tellement proche de *FH* qu'il semble évident que c'est de ce dernier ouvrage qu'Averroès a tiré la plupart des caractéristiques de ce concept.

Les ressemblances entre les deux traités ont été déjà soulignées par G. Schoeler, à propos de la revue des choses qui ne sont pas persuasives.⁷⁰ Nous voudrions mettre ici en évidence deux points qu'il n'a pas été amené à relever: la ressemblance entre les plans de *AH* et *FH* et leur approche très voisine du concept de notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat.

⁶⁷ Aristote, *Organon. V. Les Topiques*, traduction nouvelle et notes par J. Tricot (Paris, 1974), 100a27-101a1.

⁶⁸ Celui-ci s'est préoccupé, dans son commentaire aux *Top.*, de souligner l'absence de lien intrinsèque entre ce qui est communément admis (ἐνδοξον) et ce qui est vrai (Alexandre d'Aphrodise, *In Top. Prooemium*, p. 3, 19-20; *Top.* (100a19), p. 6, 15 Wallies [CAG II 2 (1891)]) et de différencier nettement les prémisses dialectiques des prémisses sophistiques, les premières étant communément admises et les secondes, en apparence seulement communément admises (Alexandre d'Aphrodise, *In Top. Prooemium*, p. 2, 20-26 Wallies [CAG II 2 (1891)]). L'Exégète ne va cependant pas jusqu'à distinguer les prémisses dialectiques des prémisses rhétoriques, puisqu'il dit de celles-ci aussi qu'elles sont de l'ordre de ce qui est communément admis (Alexandre d'Aphrodise, *Top.* (101a36), p. 32, 1-4 Wallies [CAG II 2 (1891)]).

⁶⁹ Aouad, "Les fondements de la Rhétorique d'Aristote reconsidérés par Fārābī," pp. 176-8.

⁷⁰ Schoeler, "Averroes' Rückwendung," pp. 297-8.

AH

A.⁷¹ Notre objectif est de traiter des choses persuasives et du degré de conviction qu'elles engendrent; définition de la persuasion par la notion d'opinion qui prend le dessus et la conscience d'un point de contention; renvoi, au sujet de l'opinion à des analyses antérieures (AH 169, 4-7; tr. 63, 6-11).

B. Les choses produisant la persuasion sont soit des arguments (*aqdwl*) - enthymèmes et exemples - soit "des choses venant de l'extérieur qui ne sont pas des arguments"; la première sorte sera traitée avant la deuxième, car elle est plus digne d'être persuasive (AH 169, 8-170, 8; tr. 63, 12-28).

C. L'enthymème défini comme un syllogisme qui conclut selon le point de vue immédiat se produisant en premier, pour tous ou pour la plupart des gens; définition du point de vue immédiat se produisant en premier au moyen des notions d'opinion qui prend le dessus, de quiétude de l'âme et d'absence d'examen; application du concept de point de vue immédiat se produisant en premier à la forme et à la matière des enthymèmes (AH 170, 10-15; tr. 63, 30-64, 8).

FHL

A.⁷² Long passage dans lequel Fārābī établit les points suivants. 1) La persuasion est une opinion que l'on suscite chez autrui. 2) L'opinion et donc la persuasion sont liées aux points de contention et leur force varie en fonction de ceux-ci. 3) La rhétorique et la dialectique sont les méthodes servant à éprouver cette force et donc à produire les différentes sortes de persuasion (FHL 31, 6-57, 9).⁷³

F. Hiérarchisation - étayée sur le concept de point de vue se produisant en premier et commun à tous - des procédés de la persuasion (dans cet ordre: enthymème, exemple, choses extérieures aux arguments), signification du mot syllogisme (*qiyās*) et comparaison, à cette occasion, avec les syllogismes sophistiques (FHL 81, 5-85, 11).

C.⁷⁴ Définition du point de vue se produisant en premier et commun et de l'examen des points de vue (FHL 61, 12-18); rhétorique, dialectique et sophistique examinent les points de vue (FHL 63, 1-2); définition de l'enthymème par la suppression d'une prémisses et le point de vue immédiat et commun (FHL 63, 3-8); définition de l'exemple (FHL 63, 10-11); les prémisses des exemples et des enthymèmes doivent être, quant à elles-mêmes, leur quantité et leur composition, de l'ordre du point de vue se produisant en premier et répandu (FHL 63, 11-65, 2).

Rhét.

Distinction, à propos des technologues, des enthymèmes, comme corps de la preuve, et des questions extérieures au sujet du discours (Rhét. I 1, 1354a11-26)

La rhétorique traite des sujets dont nous devons délibérer, sur lesquels nous ne possédons pas de techniques, devant des auditeurs incapables de suivre de longs raisonnements (Rhét. I 2, 1357a 1-4)

⁷¹ Les lettres en majuscules précédant les paragraphes de cette colonne sont celles qui précèdent ces mêmes paragraphes dans le tableau de la section II du présent article, tableau reproduisant le plan de AH.

⁷² Les lettres en majuscules précédant les paragraphes de cette colonne sont celles qui précèdent ces mêmes paragraphes dans le tableau d'Aouad, "Les fondements de la Rhétorique d'Aristote reconsidérés par Fārābī," pp. 136-42, tableau reproduisant le plan de FHL.

⁷³ Il ne s'agit que d'une partie du § A, l'autre correspondant au § O de AH.

⁷⁴ Il ne s'agit que d'une partie de C, l'autre, signalée à la fin de ce tableau, étant sans correspondant dans AH.

D. La forme des syllogismes conclusifs selon le point de vue immédiat caractérisée par l'absence de rigueur et la suppression de la chose qui donne sa nécessité au rapport de conséquence, et cela selon ce qui contente le peuple (*AH* 171, 2-6; tr. 64, 10-17).

Les syllogismes attributifs envisagés du point de vue de la distinction entre syllogismes réellement concluants et syllogismes dont on a seulement l'opinion, dans le point de vue immédiat, qu'ils sont concluants et de la prémisse à sous-entendre ou à prendre de façon indéterminée dans les différentes figures syllogistiques (*AH* 171, 7-172, 11; tr. 64, 18-65, 8); les syllogismes conditionnels, conjonctifs et disjonctifs, envisagés du point de vue de la distinction entre syllogismes non concluants et syllogismes réellement concluants et de ce qui y est sous-entendu (*AH* 172, 12-175, 12; tr. 65, 9-66, 37); le syllogisme par l'absurde envisagé du point de vue de la prémisse qu'il faut d'habitude sous-entendre (*AH* 175, 13-176, 3; tr. 66, 38-67, 6).

E. Correspondance entre la forme des enthymèmes la forme des syllogismes (*AH* 176, 4-5; tr. 67, 7-8).

H. Les enthymèmes sont de l'ordre du persuasif tant que subsiste en eux un point de contention (*FHL* 89, 7-9).

Les enthymèmes attributifs envisagés en fonction de la distinction entre syllogismes en vérité et syllogismes apparents et des prémisses à sous-entendre ou à prendre de façon indéterminée dans les différentes figures syllogistiques; recours, à plusieurs reprises, au concept de point de vue immédiat (*FHL* 89, 10-95, 5); les enthymèmes conditionnels, conjonctifs et disjonctifs, envisagés en fonction de la distinction entre syllogismes concluant en vérité et syllogismes concluant en apparence et de ce qui y est sous-entendu; recours, à plusieurs reprises, au concept de point de vue immédiat (*FHL* 95, 6-101, 16); formes modifiées des enthymèmes conditionnels conjonctifs envisagés du point de vue de ce qui y est sous-entendu; recours au concept de point de vue immédiat (*FHL* 103, 1-11); précisions sur la méthode à suivre lorsqu'ils s'agit de sous-entendre quelque chose dans les enthymèmes conditionnels disjonctifs (*FHL* 103, 12-15); le syllogisme par l'absurde envisagé du point de vue de la prémisse qu'il faut d'habitude sous-entendre (*FHL* 103, 16-105, 5).

G. Les enthymèmes, étant de l'ordre du point de vue immédiat et répandu, peuvent être syllogismes en vérité ou syllogismes apparents (*FHL* 85, 12-16); rappel des divisions des syllogismes en général: syllogismes attributifs et conditionnels; matière et forme; quantité; ordonnance; qualité (*FHL* 85, 17-89, 6).

L'enthymème et l'exemple portent sur des propositions pouvant le plus souvent être autres qu'elles ne sont; ces propositions sont peu nombreuses, souvent moins nombreuses que celles du syllogisme de la première figure (*Rhét.* I 2, 1357a4-22)

La rhétorique utilise, comme la dialectique, l'induction, le syllogisme et le syllogisme apparent: référence, en cours de route, aux *Analytiques* (*Rhét.* I 2, 1356a35-1356b10).

F. La matière des enthymèmes doit être notoire selon le point de vue immédiat et commun, surtout lorsqu'il s'agit de la majeure; distinction avec d'autres sortes de prémisses: notoires en vérité et donc dialectiques, vraies ou non vraies (*AH* 176, 7-177, 4 tr. 67, 10-26).

G. Division des prémisses notoires selon le point de vue immédiat en propositions reçues et en signes et définition de ces deux catégories par le point de vue immédiat (*AH* 177, 4-6; tr. 67, 27-32); subdivision des signes en signes indiquant l'existence d'une chose absolument ou signes indiquant l'appartenance d'un attribut à un sujet, subdivision de ceux-ci suivant les trois figures du syllogisme et nomenclature (*AH* 177, 7-13; tr. 67, 33-68, 6); les signes sont ici tantôt postérieurs, tantôt antérieurs à ce qui est signifié (*AH* 177, 13-15; tr. 68, 6-8); propositions reçues et signes peuvent concerner la matière nécessaire, la matière qui est de l'ordre du plus probable et la matière aussi possible que son contraire, exemples de chaque sorte et nomenclature (*AH* 178, 1-180, 11; tr. 68, 9-69, 16); cette division n'est pas essentielle en rhétorique, car seule l'est la division en prémisses reçues selon le point de vue immédiat et en signes selon le point de vue immédiat (*AH* 180, 12-181, 10; tr. 69, 17-38).

I. Les prémisses donnant aux arguments la rectitude du rapport de conséquence doivent être notoires selon le point de vue se produisant en premier et commun à tous; distinction avec d'autres sortes de prémisses, notoires en vérité, apparemment notoires, vraies, certaines, non vraies, entièrement vraies, partiellement vraies, nécessaires, possibles, etc., employées, notamment, dans la dialectique, la sophistique, les mathématiques ou les sciences naturelles (*FHL* 105, 6-107, 11).

K. Les deux sortes de prémisses louées et leur rapport à l'opinion (*FHL* 109, 15-111, 2); définition du signe et de l'indice (*FHL* 111, 3-6); examen du signe et des indices suivant leurs figures syllogistiques et leur rectitude (*FHL* 111, 7-113, 14); hiérarchie des signes suivant qu'ils sont universels, de l'ordre du plus fréquent ou appartenant aux contraires (*FHL* 113, 15-115, 6); diverses acceptions des mots, signe et indice: 1) moyen terme (et examen de ses sources); 2) prémisses; 3) syllogisme (*FHL* 115, 7-117, 20); tous ces signes relèvent du point de vue notoire se produisant en premier (*FHL* 117, 21-119, 3).

Les prémisses des enthymèmes sont, les unes, nécessaires; les autres, le plus grand nombre, seulement fréquentes (*Rhét.* I 2, 1357a22-32).

Détermination globale du vraisemblable (*εἰς*), du signe anonyme (*σημείον ἀνόνομον*) et du *tekhnion*; subdivisions des signes suivant qu'ils présentent la relation du particulier à l'universel ou de l'universel au particulier et suivant leur rectitude; référence aux *Analytiques* (*Rhét.* I 2, 1357a32-b25).

H. Rhétorique et dialectique n'ont pas d'objet propre, car elles ne prennent pas les prémisses selon le mode de leur existence à l'extérieur à l'âme, mais en tant que notoires selon le point de vue immédiat ou en réalité (*Af* 181,11-182,14; tr. 70, 1-25).

I. Si les anciens ont divisé les prémisses des enthymèmes suivant leur nécessité ou leur degré de possibilité, c'est qu'il arrive que cela ait une influence sur le degré de force des prémisses répandues selon le point de vue immédiat (*Af* 183, 1-7; tr. 70, 26-36).

J. Classification des sortes d'exemples suivant que la similitude concerne les sujets, les prédicats ou les deux catégories à la fois (*Af* 183, 9-184,3; tr. 71, 2-19); la similitude peut être entre un universel et un particulier (*Af* 184, 4-7; tr. 71, 20-25); différentes sortes de similitude (*Af* 184, 8-11; tr. 71, 26-30); l'exemple ne s'appuie pas sur un jugement universel certain mais sur une inférence de l'ordre du point de vue immédiat et les rangs de l'opinion dépendent de leur proximité par rapport au jugement universel (*Af* 184, 12-187, 3; tr. 71, 31-72,38); conclusion sur le rang de l'exemple et sa correspondance avec l'induction (*Af* 187, 4-5; tr. 73, 1-3).

K. Revue des choses persuasives qui ne sont pas des arguments, soulignant le degré de conviction qu'elles entraînent (*Af* 187, 7-189, 8; tr. 73, 6-74, 7).

B. Détermination de la notion de persuasion oratoire par rapport aux notions plus générales de persuasion et d'opinion, et cela dans le cadre de l'examen des rapports de la rhétorique avec les autres disciplines relevant de l'opinion, mais ayant un objet propre, c'est-à-dire la prudence et les disciplines pratiques, comme la médecine, l'agriculture et la navigation. Le résultat de cette analyse est l'élaboration, pour la rhétorique, du concept de méthode commune à tous (*FHL* 57, 10-61, 11).

L. Définition de l'exemple étayée sur le concept de point de vue immédiat, répandu et commun à tous (*FHL* 119, 5-10); différentes sortes de similitude (*FHL* 119, 11-121, 8); la composition de l'exemple se fait soit sur le mode attributif, soit sur le mode conditionnel conjonctif (*FHL* 121, 9-12); quand et comment s'opère la déclaration du point de similitude dans l'exemple composé sur le mode attributif (*FHL* 121, 13-18).

E. Revue des treize choses dont la nature est que, par elles, se produit la persuasion, avec, dans la plupart des cas, des remarques permettant de distinguer le recours à ces procédés, en rhétorique, de leur usage dans les sciences, la dialectique-usage illégitime dans ces deux cas- et la sophistique (*FHL* 69, 7-81, 4).

Comparaison de la rhétorique en tant qu'elle peut persuader de tout avec les autres disciplines qui produisent enseignement et persuasion à propos d'un objet qui leur est propre (*Rhét.* I 2, 1355b27-35).

Définition de l'exemple (*Rhét.* I 2, 1357b25-58a2).

Division des preuves en preuves atechniques (témoignages, aveux sous la torture, écrits, etc.) et en preuves techniques (caractère de l'orateur, passions de l'auditeur, discours établissant la chose); la rhétorique est comme une ramification de la dialectique et de la politique (*Rhét.* I 2, 1355b35-1356a35).

L. Examen approfondi des procédés externes dont on pourrait douter qu'ils soient persuasifs seulement, et cela pour montrer qu'ils ne sont pas certains, du moins par essence: le témoignage, qui occupe le rang le plus élevé dans cette série, les lois écrites, le consensus, le défi (*Aff* 189, 9-196, 11; tr. 74, 8-77, 19).

M. Supériorité de l'enthymème, car il peut servir à établir les choses extérieures (*Aff* 196, 11-197, 5; tr. 77, 19-77, 17).

N. Les arguments et les choses extérieures peuvent être utilisés dans toutes les disciplines discursives selon la voie suivie par les anciens, car ils les prenaient pour des méthodes certaines (*Aff* 197, 5-8; tr. 77, 27-31); "quant à Aristote, lorsque le rang des choses persuasives quant à la conviction lui eut apparu avec évidence et qu'il eut vu que l'utilité de ces convictions n'est que dans l'utilisation qu'en font les gens du peuple entre eux pour les choses particulières d'ordre volontaire que les juges déterminent comme biens ou maux, puisque [en outre] certaines des choses volontaires que les juges déterminent comme biens ou maux appartiennent à l'homme dans son essence et dans le temps présent, choses qui sont les excellences et les vices, que d'autres sont dans le temps présent et dans autrui, ce qui constitue le juste et l'injuste, que d'autres appartiennent à l'homme dans le futur, choses qui sont les choses utiles et nocives- le premier cas est appelé le discours relatif à la lutte de jactance, le second, le discours de la controverse et le troisième le discours de la délibération- puisque [enfin] l'homme, en tant qu'il vit en communauté et qu'il est politique, utilise nécessairement les propos rhétoriques dans ces trois genres, Aristote, donc, commença à donner les règles et les choses par lesquelles l'homme peut persuader dans chacune des choses relevant de ces genres de la manière la plus complète possible dans celles-ci" (*Aff* 197, 10-198, 12; tr. 77, 33-78, 15).

D. Détermination des trois sortes d'auditeurs: celui qu'on tend à persuader, l'adversaire et le juge (*FHL* 65, 11-69, 6).

Enthymèmes qui relèvent du domaine de la rhétorique et enthymèmes qui relèvent du domaine des autres disciplines (*Rhét.* I 2, 1358a2-12); déduction des trois genres oratoires à partir des sortes d'auditeurs; divisions, temps et fins de chaque genre; prémisses communes aux trois genres; annonce de l'examen des prémisses propres à chaque genre (*Rhét.* I 3, 1358a36-1359a29).

Au § N de *Aff* correspondent *Rhét.* I 2, 1358a2-12 et I 3, 1358a36-1359a29, mais à D de *FHL*, ne correspond que *Rhét.* I 3, 1358a36-b6.

O. "C'est pour cela qu'Aristote a défini cette discipline comme méthode par laquelle l'homme peut produire la persuasion dans chacune des choses particulières de la manière la plus achevée possible dans cette chose, suivant une certaine discipline" (*AH* 198, 12-199, 2: tr. 78, 15-19).

P. Ce que nous avons dit est suffisant ici à notre but (*AH* 199, 3-4; tr. 78, 20-21).

A. Définition de la rhétorique par son but: persuader dans l'ensemble des dix genres; le fait pour l'auditeur d'être persuadé (*FHL* 31, 3-5).

Définition de la rhétorique comme "faculté de découvrir spéculativement ce qui dans chaque cas peut être propre à persuader" (*Rhét.* I, 1355b26-27).

C. Comparaison avec les autres disciplines relevant de l'opinion, en tant que leurs prémisses sont, quant à leur quantité et à leur composition, syllogistique en vérité, alors que la rhétorique utilise la méthode qui est fonction du point de vue se produisant en premier et répandu (*FHL* 65, 3-8); le rhéteur n'utilise pas le point de vue se produisant en premier propre à chaque individu (*FHL* 65, 8-10).

La rhétorique étant une discipline ne considère pas le probable pour l'individu: elle ressemble en cela, à la dialectique car celle-ci ne tire pas ses syllogismes des premières prémisses venues; suit une explication pour mieux justifier le rapprochement avec la dialectique: celle-ci "raisonne sur des sujets qui requièrent une discussion; et la rhétorique ne prend pour sujets que des questions qui sont déjà matière habituelle de délibération" (*Rhét.* I, 2, 1356b26-1357a1).

J. Déduction des lieux et des espèces fondée sur la notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat et commun à tous, définitions et différences (*FHL* 107, 12-109, 2); détermination du rapport entre les lieux et les prémisses particulières qui en dérivent (*FHL* 109, 3-109, 10); classification des espèces en 1) prémisses louées selon le point de vue immédiat et 2) choses nécessaires et indices selon le point de vue immédiat de tous; détermination globale de leurs sujets (*FHL* 109, 11-15).

Détermination générale des lieux et des espèces (*Rhét.* I, 2, 1358a12-35).

Ce tableau montre qu'à l'exception d'une partie de C et de J (*FH*), *AH* a, pour chaque paragraphe de *FH*, un correspondant. La proximité entre les thèmes des deux séries de paragraphes est frappante, surtout lorsqu'on constate qu'ils présentent, par rapport aux passages d'Aristote qu'ils commentent, des interprétations voisines. Les divergences aussi ne manquent pas.

Nous ne passerons pas en revue ici ces ressemblances et ces différences: un rapide examen du tableau suffit à les exhiber. Nous ne retiendrons que quelques points significatifs pour le concept qui nous occupe dans ce travail. Ainsi, dans

A (*AH*) et A (*FH*), les deux auteurs rattachent la persuasion rhétorique à l'opinion, mais Averroès ajoute qu'il s'agit alors d'une opinion accompagnée de la conscience de la possibilité d'un point de contention; de plus, *AH* se donne pour objectif principal de déterminer le degré de conviction engendré en rhétorique. Dans C (*AH*) et une partie de C (*FH*), le point de vue immédiat est défini, mais alors que, dans *FH*, le concept de point de vue immédiat et commun est appliqué à l'enthymème et à l'exemple, il ne l'est, dans *AH*, qu'à l'enthymème. Dans D (*AH*) et une partie de H (*FH*), la forme de l'enthymème est examinée et, pour cela, la division en syllogismes attributifs, conditionnels et par l'absurde est mise en avant; de plus, le concept de notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat est massivement utilisé pour expliquer les défauts de rigueur formel des enthymèmes. Dans F (*AH*) et I (*FH*), la matière des enthymèmes est rapportée à la notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat et celle-ci est distinguée d'autres caractérisations des prémisses (notoriété, vérité, etc.). Dans G (*AH*) et K (*FH*), deux sortes de prémisses sont examinées (prémisses reçues et signes, selon *AH*; prémisses louées et signes, selon *FH*) et rattachées à la notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat. Dans H (*AH*) et B (*FH*), l'absence d'objet propre de la rhétorique est attribué au fait que cette discipline ne cherche pas la conformité avec la réalité extérieure, mais l'adhésion de tous, mais alors que Fārābī évoque ici le concept de méthode commune à tous, Averroès recourt à celui de notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat. Dans J (*AH*) et L (*FH*), l'exemple est déterminé au moyen notamment du concept de point de vue immédiat, mais il n'est question, dans le premier de ces passages, que du point de vue immédiat, alors que le second recourt au concept de point de vue immédiat, répandu et commun à tous; en outre, *AH* se sert du concept de point de vue immédiat pour déterminer le rang de l'exemple. Dans K (*AH*) et E (*FH*), une énumération beaucoup plus longue des procédés oratoires que celle proposée par Aristote nous est donnée, mais Averroès se limite aux choses persuasives extérieures aux arguments, alors que Fārābī inclut aussi les arguments; de plus, dans *AH*, l'idée de degré de conviction qu'entraînent les différents procédés envisagés est mise en avant. Dans N (*AH*) et D (*FH*), l'auditeur est évoqué, mais Averroès rappelle que les analyses précédentes visaient à établir le rang des procédés persuasifs et il fonde sur cela la détermination de l'utilité de la rhétorique, dans les rapports avec l'auditeur, ainsi que les développements ultérieurs du texte d'Aristote. Dans O (*AH*) et une partie de A (*FH*), la rhétorique est définie par les choses dont on persuade, mais Averroès met en avant le fait qu'il s'agit de choses particulières, ce qui lui permet de rattacher cette définition à ce qu'il a écrit, dans le paragraphe précédent, de l'utilité de la rhétorique dans les choses particulières d'ordre volontaire.

Certains paragraphes de *AH* sont sans correspondant dans *FH*. Il en est ainsi de I (*AH*): la division des prémisses des enthymèmes suivant leur nécessité ou leur degré de possibilité est justifiée par l'intérêt qu'une telle division peut avoir pour apprécier le degré de force des prémisses répandues selon le point de vue immédiat. De même, L et M (*AH*) sont aussi sans correspondant dans *FH*: Averroès s'y attache

à détruire le préjugé trop favorable dont jouissent certains procédés externes, comme le témoignage, en insistant sur le fait qu'ils sont de rang inférieur à la certitude et même à l'enthymème, qui peut servir à les établir. P (*AH*) n'est pas non plus dans *FH*: par cette conclusion, Averroès insiste sur le fait que ce qu'il a examiné dans le traité suffit à son but, ce qui signifie que le sujet n'est pas épuisé pour autant: on est ainsi rappelé que le traité visait à établir le rang des procédés oratoires et non pas à explorer le champ de leurs applications.

De tout cela, il ressort qu'Averroès et Fārābī ont cherché à mettre en avant le concept de notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat dans la manière dont ils ont divisé leur traité. Mais alors que dans *FH*, ce concept semble dominer absolument tout le texte, dans *AH*, il doit partager ce rôle avec d'autres concepts: celui de simple point de vue immédiat (ainsi, dans la doctrine de l'exemple) et celui de rang. Notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat et point de vue immédiat se trouvent même subordonnées à l'idée de rang, puisqu'ils servent à déterminer le rang de la persuasion. Bref, si Fārābī semble chercher à saisir le principe fondamental de la rhétorique, Averroès, lui, s'efforce de déterminer son rang, et, pour y parvenir, il met à contribution deux variantes d'un même principe.

Maintenant si au lieu de comparer *AH* et *FH*, paragraphe par paragraphe, on confrontait l'ordre des paragraphes dans ces deux ouvrages, on aboutirait à des conclusions voisines concernant le concept qui nous occupe ici. Rappelons les principales étapes des deux abrégés. *FH*: d'abord, détermination de l'essence de la rhétorique à partir d'une analyse de la notion de persuasion, analyse qui aboutit à la persuasion propre à la rhétorique, celle qui s'appuie sur le point de vue immédiat et commun; ensuite, application explicite ou implicite de ce concept aux procédés du discours, au niveau de leur énumération et de leur hiérarchisation, puis au niveau des deux plus importants d'entre eux: en premier, l'enthymème étudié du point de vue des conditions communes à sa forme et à sa matière, puis du point de vue de sa seule forme et, enfin, de sa matière; en second, l'exemple. *AH*: la notion de rang comme objectif du traité, détermination de la persuasion à partir de la notion d'opinion et principe du plan du traité; examen des arguments oratoires, en premier, l'enthymème étudié du point de vue de la condition commune à sa forme et à sa matière, à savoir la notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat, puis respectivement de sa forme et de sa matière en tant qu'elles en relèvent aussi et, en second, l'exemple en tant qu'il repose essentiellement sur une inférence de l'ordre du point de vue immédiat; examen des procédés extérieurs aux arguments rhétoriques en tant qu'ils ont un rang inférieur à la certitude et même aux enthymèmes. Dans les deux cas, la partie introductive sert à déterminer l'essence de la persuasion rhétorique. Mais, dans *AH*, celle-ci est mise en rapport avec la notion de rang, l'analyse de l'essence ne conduit pas directement au concept de notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat et la hiérarchie des procédés rhétoriques est utilisée pour annoncer le plan du traité. Quant à la revue des procédés rhétoriques, elle est renvoyée, dans ce traité, à la suite de l'examen des arguments, mais il n'est alors retenu que les procédés extérieurs

aux arguments et Averroès ajoute l'examen des procédés sur le rang desquels on pourrait le plus se tromper. Un tel déplacement permet de mieux insister sur la valeur inférieure des procédés extérieurs aux arguments. Enthymème et exemple sont, eux, étudiés en suivant, *grosso modo*, les mêmes étapes dans *AH* et *FH*, si ce n'est que l'exemple est rattaché dans *AH* au point de vue immédiat et non à la notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat.

Bref, il apparaît avec évidence que, si Averroès reprend essentiellement, dans *AH*, les paragraphes de *Rhét.* I 2, il se sert, dans son interprétation, de *FH*, dont il s'inspire notamment pour faire jouer au concept de notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat un rôle clé, même si ce concept semble, dans *AH*, céder du terrain au profit du concept plus général de point de vue immédiat.

La même proximité entre les deux textes apparaît si l'on se rapporte à la détermination même qu'ils proposent du point de vue immédiat.⁷⁵ Dans les deux cas, la notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat est rattachée à l'opinion, à l'absence d'examen, au point de vue immédiat de tous ou de la plupart des gens et se trouve fondée sur le témoignage et le principe d'autorité. Dans les deux cas, elle est distinguée de la vérité, de la fausseté et de la notoriété en réalité. Sur deux points, cependant, il y a différence: *FH* ne lie pas, comme *AH*, le point de vue immédiat à la conscience de la possibilité d'un point de contention; il rapporte certes la notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat à tous ou à la plupart des gens, mais il évoque aussi le point de vue immédiat des ressortissants de telle ou telle nation (*umma*), alors que cette dernière référence disparaît dans *AH*.

Le Commentateur s'est-il réapproprié les problèmes d'interprétation de la tradition qui ont, semble-t-il, incité le Second Maître à recourir à son concept ou même à le forger. Nous en avons dégagé trois dans l'article sur Fārābī. Le premier, d'ordre philologique, est posé par un contresens de la traduction arabe de *Rhét.* (*TAL* I 11, 10-12 / *Rhét.* I 2, 1356b36-1357a1), contresens constituant un terrain favorable à une interprétation par le concept de notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat.⁷⁶ Mais ce passage n'est pas commenté dans *AH* (voir nos tableaux, ci-dessus).

Un autre problème, plus philosophique, est posé par Fārābī dans *FDG*. Nous le développons assez longuement dans l'article susmentionné.⁷⁷ Évoquant le passage de *Rhét.*,⁷⁸ où il est écrit que l'enthymème se tire soit du vraisemblable, soit du signe, Fārābī remarque que le premier cas relève du proche du certain et donc des *Topiques* et le deuxième, du certain et donc des *Seconds Analytiques*. Les prémisses

⁷⁵ Pour plus de détails sur cette détermination dans *FH*, voir Aouad, "Les fondements de la *Rhétorique* d'Aristote reconsidérés par Fārābī," pp. 143-51.

⁷⁶ Aouad, "Les fondements de la *Rhétorique* d'Aristote reconsidérés par Fārābī," pp. 162-3.

⁷⁷ Aouad, "Les fondements de la *Rhétorique* d'Aristote reconsidérés par Fārābī," pp. 163-76.

⁷⁸ *Rhét.* I 2, 1357a32-b25, correspondant à *TAL* I 12, 26-14, 3.

rhétoriques ne seraient donc pas de l'ordre du persuasif. Une des solutions proposées par Fārābī est celle de *FHL* 109, 11-12: les signes et les prémisses louées utilisés par la rhétorique sont seulement ceux qui sont de l'ordre du point de vue immédiat de tous. Nous n'avons pas trouvé, dans l'œuvre d'Averroès, de formulation explicite de ce problème, mais Averroès avance la même solution que le Second Maître (*AH* 177, 4-6; tr. 67, 27-32).

Le troisième problème que nous avons signalé⁷⁹ à la suite de Madame Black⁸⁰ tient à l'influence des justifications du rattachement de la rhétorique et de la poétique à la logique, justifications qui nous sont connues par les Alexandrins, mais dont l'origine est, sans doute, plus ancienne. Des recherches de Madame Black, il ressort que la caractérisation des prémisses rhétoriques comme notoires selon le point de vue immédiat est solidaire d'un système de classification des propos des différentes disciplines logiques (certains pour la démonstration, notoires en réalité pour la dialectique, apparemment notoires pour la sophistique, faisant imaginer pour la poétique), élaboré lui-même, par Fārābī sans doute, à partir de problèmes posés par d'autres systèmes de classification des disciplines de l'*Organon* proposés par les anciens, principalement celui que l'on trouve dans David⁸¹ (prémisses démonstratives complètement vraies, prémisses poétiques complètement fausses, prémisses dialectiques plus vraies que fausses, prémisses sophistiques plus fausses que vraies et prémisses rhétoriques également vraies et fausses). Madame Black ne se contente pas d'exposer ces divers systèmes, d'en relever les défauts et d'en souligner l'influence sur les Arabes, mais elle examine aussi un ensemble de concepts et de doctrines qui ont dû être produits pour rendre possible le système de classification où apparaissent les prémisses notoires selon le point de vue immédiat. Au centre de ce complexe, se trouverait le couple de *taṣḍīq* (assentiment, conviction, jugement ou, plus précisément, "*deeming something to be true*"⁸²) / *taṣawwur* (conception, représentation), car, en réunissant les différentes sortes de disciplines logiques au moyen du concept d'assentiment et en les distinguant les unes des autres par les différentes sortes d'assentiment qu'elles induisent,⁸³ on les classifie suivant

⁷⁹ Aouad, "Les fondements de la Rhétorique d'Aristote reconsidérés par Fārābī," pp. 178-80.

⁸⁰ Black, *Logic*, XII-290 p.

⁸¹ Elias, *In Cat. prem.*, pp. 116, 35-117, 8 Busse (CAG XVIII 1 [1900]). Ce commentaire, édité par Busse sous le nom d'Elias, serait, en réalité, de David: voir R. Goulet, "L'œuvre d'Aristote," dans R. Goulet (éd.), *Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques* (Paris 1989), vol. I, p. 438. Fārābī n'a, sans doute, pas eu entre les mains cet ouvrage, mais une version qui devait en être proche. [D. Gutas, "Paul the Persian on the classification of the parts of Aristotle's philosophy: a milestone between Alexandria and Baghdad," *Isl.*, 60 (1983), p. 257, n. 64].

⁸² Black, *Logic*, p. 75. Le couple *taṣawwur/taṣḍīq* est plus particulièrement examiné dans id., *Logic*, pp. 71-8; 94-113.

⁸³ A l'exception de l'imagination poétique qui n'entraîne pas, à proprement parler,

le mode d'acceptation qu'elles entraînent. Ce critère permet de mieux reconnaître toutes leurs propriétés et de ne pas les évaluer en fonction seulement de leur degré de proximité par rapport à la démonstration – deux défauts dont souffrent les anciens critères, tel celui fondé sur la seule valeur de vérité des prémisses.⁸⁴

Nous avons, quant à nous, remarqué que *FHL* 107, 5-11, confirme, sur un point, les idées de Madame Black, puisque, selon ce passage, les prémisses oratoires qui procurent aux enthymèmes la nécessité du rapport de conséquence sont prises en tant que notoires selon le point de vue immédiat et commun et non en tant que "partiellement vraies."

De même, dans *AH*, Averroès insiste longuement sur l'insuffisance d'une caractérisation des prémisses par leur modalité⁸⁵ et sur la nécessité de recourir au critère de la notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat. Ainsi, après avoir subdivisé les prémisses notoires selon le point de vue immédiat en prémisses reçues et en signes et subdivisé ces deux sortes en prémisses nécessaires, possibles le plus souvent ou aussi possibles que leurs contraires, Averroès écrit:

Cette division n'est pas essentielle aux prémisses des enthymèmes en tant que prémisses des enthymèmes, je veux dire leur division selon le nécessaire et le possible. En effet, les prémisses des enthymèmes ne sont prises qu'en tant que reçues selon le point de vue immédiat...ou en tant qu'indices et signes selon le point de vue immédiat, non en tant qu'elles sont dans une matière nécessaire ou possible, car les choses où les prémisses sont prises selon cette qualification sont les syllogismes démonstratifs, je veux dire que ce sont ces syllogismes qui prennent les prémisses en tant que nécessaires ou possibles le plus souvent. Quant aux prémisses relevant d'alternatives aux termes également possibles – ce sont celles dont on a

un assentiment, mais quelque chose d'analogue, puisqu'il s'agit aussi de soumission de l'esprit (*inqiyad al-dihn*) (voir Black, *Logic*, pp. 76; 181-5).

⁸⁴ Toutefois, Lameer, "Aristotelian Rhetoric," section III et conclusion, met en doute l'idée selon laquelle les philosophes arabes auraient produit un effort délibéré de justification de l'intégration de la rhétorique et de la poétique dans la logique et notamment la thèse du rôle central qu'aurait joué la notion de *taṣdīq* dans cette justification. Les textes ne témoigneraient pas d'une conciliation, au moyen de cette notion (à double face, intellectueliste et volontariste), de la caractérisation essentiellement non apophantique et, par là, non syllogistique de la rhétorique et de la poétique (Ammonius) et de la conception syllogistique de ces deux disciplines (Élias, etc.)

⁸⁵ Selon Deborah L. Black, "The 'Imaginative syllogism' in Arabic philosophy: a Medieval contribution to the philosophical study of metaphor," *Mediaeval Studies*, 51 (1989), p. 250, et id., *Log.*, pp. 43; 87-8, classification par la modalité et classification par le degré de vérité reviennent au même, car la classification par le contenu de vérité est en fait une classification modale, le nécessaire étant toujours vrai, le possible, vrai le plus souvent, etc.; le critère ne serait pas alors simplement la valeur de vérité des propositions, car une classification qui ne se contente pas de désigner une proposition comme vraie ou fausse est déjà en quelque sorte modale, en tant qu'elle qualifie le mode et l'étendue de la valeur de vérité de la proposition.

l'opinion qu'elles sont plus propres à ces propos, car elles ne sont pas utilisées par une discipline démonstrative – cette discipline, je veux dire la discipline de la rhétorique, ne les utilise pas non plus en tant qu'elles relèvent d'alternatives aux termes également possibles, car si elles les utilisait selon ce mode, une chose ne serait pas plus propre à en découler plutôt que son contraire. Bien plutôt, la discipline rhétorique n'utilise ces prémisses qu'en tant que l'un des termes se trouve avoir une prépondérance, fût-elle la plus minime, dans le point de vue immédiat, et cela à un certain moment ou en un certain état. Comme certaines personnes ont ignoré cette signification, ils ont nié que cette discipline utilise un signe dans la matière relevant d'une alternative aux termes également possibles, car ils ont prétendu qu'il n'y a pas persuasion de ce qui relève d'une alternative aux termes également possibles (AH 180, 12-181, 10; tr. 69, 17-38).

Ce passage est intéressant à plusieurs égards. L'appréciation de la nécessité et de la fréquence considérées comme telles est rapportée à la seule discipline démonstrative. A propos des prémisses aussi possibles que leur contraire, Averroès ne nie pas qu'elles soient plus propres à la rhétorique, mais il soutient qu'elles sont prises en rhétorique en tant qu'elles paraissent au point de vue immédiat comme plus fréquentes.⁸⁶ En d'autres termes, le critère alexandrin n'est pas complètement rejeté, mais simplement dépassé. Un groupe de gens non identifié, qui aurait soutenu que des prémisses aussi possibles que leur contraire il n'y a absolument pas de persuasion, est critiqué. Enfin, plus loin, Averroès soutient que si les anciens ont divisé les prémisses des enthymèmes suivant leur nécessité ou leur degré de possibilité, c'est qu'il arrive que cela ait une influence sur le degré de force des prémisses répandues selon le point de vue immédiat (AH 183, 1-7; tr. 70, 26-36). Averroès suit donc Fārābī en rejetant comme lui le critère alexandrin, mais en propose une critique beaucoup plus développée et moins radicale.

Aucun autre texte arabe ne présente, relativement au concept qui nous occupe ici, autant d'analogies avec AH que FH. Ainsi, FDG n'a pas ce concept,⁸⁷ pas plus que les commentaires de Fārābī (abrégés ou grand commentaire) aux *Analytiques*.⁸⁸ Certes, il apparaît dans d'autres ouvrages du Second Maître, mais il n'y est pas

⁸⁶ Pour cela, les exemples de prémisses aussi possibles que leur contraire sont ce qui illustre le mieux les prémisses notoires selon le point de vue immédiat, car leur admissibilité provient plus proprement de cette sorte de notoriété. L'un d'eux nous est donné à propos des prémisses reçues, "tout ce qui est plus convenable et plus facile est préférable" (AH 178, 6-7; tr. 68, 17) et l'autre, à propos des signes de la première figure, "un tel n'a pas été refoulé du lieu où il se trouvait, alors que ses compagnons ont été mis en déroute, jusqu'à ce qu'il a été abattu; il est donc courageux" (AH 179, 3-4; tr. 68, 28-30).

⁸⁷ Voir Aouad, "Les fondements de la *Rhétorique* d'Aristote reconsidérés par Fārābī," p. 164.

⁸⁸ Voir Aouad, "Les fondements de la *Rhétorique* d'Aristote reconsidérés par Fārābī," pp. 166-73. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 165; 173-6.

défini et systématiquement appliqué aux procédés oratoires.⁸⁹ Quant à Avicenne, le dépouillement de plusieurs de ses ouvrages nous a montré que sa caractérisation du fondement ultime de la rhétorique a subi des fluctuations.⁹⁰

Nous ne pensons pas que les traités dans lesquelles se trouvent présentées des listes complètes des prémisses du syllogisme en général aient eu une influence notable sur la doctrine de AH. En effet, MN caractérise les prémisses rhétoriques par le seul fait qu'elles sont aussi possibles que leur contraire. Le point de vue immédiat n'entre pas, dans 'Uy, Hidāya, IS, LS, N et SB, dans la détermination d'un caractère qui se présenterait comme la caractéristique unique des prémisses de la discipline rhétorique; ces traités ne développent pas du tout systématiquement le rôle du concept en question et n'appliquent pas la distinction du notoire selon

⁸⁹ Aouad, "Les fondements de la Rhétorique d'Aristote reconsidérés par Fārābī," p. 166.

⁹⁰ Aouad, "Les fondements de la Rhétorique d'Aristote reconsidérés par Avicenne." Nous ne pouvons donner ici que certains résultats de ce travail. Les passages sur lesquels nous nous sommes surtout appuyé caractérisent expressément les fondements ultimes de la rhétorique ou apparaissent dans des listes qui se veulent exhaustives des prémisses premières des différentes sortes de raisonnements, déterminant ainsi des caractères donnés ailleurs comme se rapportant à la rhétorique: (1) MN 361, 14-19; 406, 9-407, 7; trad. dans Gutas, Avicenna, pp. 17-18; (2) 'Uy 11-14; (3) IS 341-63; 461; Ibn Sīnā (Avicenne), *Livre des directives et remarques (Kitāb al-'isārāt wa l-tanbihāt)*. Traduction avec introduction et notes par A.-M. Goichon (Beyrouth/Paris, 1951), pp. 173-89; 224; Ibn Sīnā, *Remarks and Admonitions. Part one: Logic*. Translated from the original Arabic with an Introduction and Notes by Shams Constantine Inati (Toronto, 1984), pp. 118-28; 148. Il m'est arrivé, plusieurs fois, de suivre les variantes de l'apparat critique de S. Donyā (IS); (4) LS I 110-18; (5) Ibn Sīnā, *Kitāb al-hidāya*, "Livre de la Direction, d'Avicenne," éd. Mohamed Mohamed Ismail Abdou (Paris, 1968), pp. 109-25; (6) N 113-23; 184, 5-185, 2; (7) ŠQ 4, 6-5, 10; 7, 13-8, 8; 176, 15-177, 12; 452, 16-454, 20; 573, 1-575, 13; (8) SB 51-2; 63-7; (9) ŠG 44, 8-46, 3; (10) FMR Salem 15, 5-8; 17, 1-3; 25, 1-6; 28-30; 31, 1-3; 31, 9-13; (11) SR 1, 3-5; 2, 14-6, 8; 7, 11-12; 11, 13-12, 7; 21, 6-15; 25, 14-28, 5; 33, 10-14; 37, 6-47, 9; 58, 3-7; 73, 3-6; 171, 11-14; 173, 13-174, 5; 176, 1-178, 5; 190, 8-191, 1; 199, 13-200, 6; 244, 15-16.

Une comparaison détaillée avec al-Ġazālī (m. 1111) et Ibn Bāġa (m. 1139) ne nous a pas semblé urgente. En effet, Al-Ġazālī, *Muqaddamat Tahāfut al-falāsifa al-musammā maqāsid al-falāsifa*, éd. S. Donyā (Le Caire, 1961), pp. 102-12 suit de près le passage susmentionné de LS, et id., *Manṭiq Tahāfut al-falāsifa al-musammā mi'yar al-'ilm*, éd. S. Donyā (Le Caire, 1961), pp. 182-206 (surtout, pp. 184; 197-200), a, sur la rhétorique et les prémisses notoires selon le point de vue immédiat, une position très proche de celle de IS. Or, nous allons voir que ce n'est pas de la doctrine de ces deux ouvrages d'Avicenne que AH se rapproche le plus à propos de la question qui nous intéresse ici. Quant à Ibn Bāġa [*al-Manṭiqiyyat li-l-Fārābī*]. Vol. III: *al-Šurāḥ 'alā al-nuṣṣ al-manṭiqiyya*, éd. M.T. Daneche Pajuh (Qom, 1410 H.), Ibn Bāġa, *Ta'ālīq 'alā Kitāb al-burhān*, pp. 344-5; *Al-manṭiq 'inda al-Fārābī. Kitāb al-burhān wa-Kitāb šarḥ 'il al-yaqīn ma'a ta'ālīq Ibn Bāġa 'alā al-burhān*, éd. Maġīd Faḥrī (Beyrouth, 1987), pp. 153-4], sa détermination du point de vue notoire selon le point de vue immédiat diverge fondamentalement de celle de AH, notamment en tant qu'il soutient que ce point de vue immédiat, sur lequel s'appuie la rhétorique, est le point de vue individuel de l'auditeur (voir Aouad, "Les fondements de la Rhétorique d'Aristote reconsidérés par Fārābī," p. 146, n. 20).

le point de vue immédiat et du seul point de vue immédiat à la distinction de l'enthymème et de l'exemple; ils soutiennent que les prémisses notoires selon le point de vue immédiat résultent d'une confusion avec les prémisses notoires en réalité, alors que, dans Averroès, les prémisses notoires selon le point de vue immédiat peuvent inclure les prémisses notoires en réalité. De plus, la notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat est expressément détachée dans tous ces traités – à l'exception de *SB* – de la conscience de la possibilité du contraire, réservée aux prémisses objets d'opinion (*maẓnūnāt*). 'Uy, *Hidāya*, *IS*, *LS*, *SB* ne rapportent pas, en outre, explicitement la notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat au point de vue de la généralité des gens, et *N* en fait même un point de vue individuel sur ce qui serait loué. *ŠQ* est, quant à lui, moins étranger aux positions de *AH*. La plupart des divergences susmentionnées entre 'Uy, *IS*, *LS*, *SB* et *AH* ne sont pas attestées dans *ŠQ*. Cependant, ce traité n'applique pas non plus la distinction du notoire selon le point de vue immédiat et du seul point de vue immédiat à la distinction de l'enthymème et de l'exemple, n'affirme pas explicitement le rapport à la généralité des gens et n'explique pas systématiquement le rôle du concept en question. Par ailleurs, les prémisses louées selon le point de vue immédiat (*maḥmūdāt fī bādī al-ra'y*: expression synonyme, dans Avicenne, de prémisses notoires selon le point de vue immédiat) ne sont pas définies dans *ŠQ*.

C'est finalement des commentaires d'Avicenne à *Rhét.* que la doctrine de *AH* se rapproche le plus et non des traités dans lesquelles se trouvent présentées des listes complètes des prémisses du syllogisme en général

Certes, il y a, entre les commentaires d'Avicenne à *Rhét.* et *AH*, une différence patente. La structure des commentaires d'Avicenne à *Rhét.* présente peu d'analogie avec celle de *AH*. Alors que celui-ci s'en tient essentiellement à *Rhét.* I 2, *SR*, mise à part l'addition de la première section de son premier Livre, reprend en général le plan des trois livres de *Rhét.* Quant à *FMR* Salem, il suit celui de *Rhét.* I, avec omission du chap. 15, qui traite des procédés non techniques (lois, témoignage, contrats, torture, serments). *FMR* Rémondon, qui appartient au même traité, porte sur la partie de *Rhét.* II, qui traite des passions. L'attention ne se concentre pas exclusivement, dans ces commentaires, sur les principes les plus fondamentaux de la rhétorique pour en dégager les critères ultimes et en apprécier ainsi le rang.

Toutefois, le point de vue immédiat apparaît bien, dans *SR* et *FMR*, comme constitutif de l'unique critère des procédés rhétoriques. Certes, son rôle n'y est pas affirmé aussi fréquemment que dans *AH*. Mais il l'est pour les principes les plus généraux, ce qui implique qu'il est aussi déterminant pour Avicenne que pour Averroès. Ainsi, les enthymèmes sont soumis au concept de loué selon le point de vue immédiat dans *FMR* et *SR* et l'exemple au point de vue immédiat (*FMR*) ou au loué selon le point de vue immédiat (*SR*). De même, les procédés extérieurs aux arguments sont indirectement rattachés à la notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat, puisqu'Avicenne soutient que l'on doit recourir aux enthymèmes pour étayer ces procédés. On notera cependant que cet auteur réserve une place

particulière, en dehors de son analyse de ce qui est loué selon le point de vue immédiat, à ce qui est loué par les seuls individus. Ainsi, s'il soutient, dans *SR*, que la rhétorique ne doit traiter que des prémisses admises par la collectivité, car étant un art, elle doit enseigner des règles transmissibles et donc généralement admises, il admet aussi après une assez longue discussion: 1) que le rhéteur, à distinguer de son art, doit, dans son activité concrète, tenir compte de l'individualité de ses auditeurs; 2) que la rhétorique doit au moins comporter cette règle formelle et universelle, à savoir l'obligation pour le rhéteur de tenir compte de ce qui est loué par l'auditeur considéré dans son individualité. De tout cela, il n'est pas question dans *AH*.

Reste la détermination même du concept de notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat. Elle est, dans les commentaires d'Avicenne à *Rhét.*, sensiblement la même que dans *AH*. *FMR*, *SR*: absence d'examen, non identification de la notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat avec une confusion, lien entre la notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat et la conscience de la possibilité du contraire, les prémisses notoires selon le point de vue immédiat peuvent être des prémisses notoires en réalité; possibilité d'une remise en question par un public populaire, principe selon lequel il ne s'agit pas du point de vue immédiat d'un individu. Les deux derniers points sont explicitement développés dans *SR*, mais demeurent implicites dans *FMR*. Sur d'autres points de la détermination de la notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat, *AH* et les commentaires d'Avicenne à *Rhét.* divergent. *SR* subdivise les prémisses louées selon le point de vue immédiat en prémisses louées en réalité et prémisses qui sont prises pour des prémisses louées en réalité à la faveur d'une substitution sophistique (en raison, notamment, d'une homonymie). Cela revient à reconnaître une place importante en rhétorique à la tromperie, alors qu'Averroès se contente d'écrire que les prémisses sophistiques peuvent, comme beaucoup d'autres, être intégrées en rhétorique à condition qu'elles soient notoires selon le point de vue immédiat. En outre, selon *SR*, les prémisses louées selon le point de vue immédiat le sont par la généralité des gens ou des groupes de personnes au nombre indéterminé (cette dernière catégorie correspond, dans une certaine mesure, aux nations de *FH*), alors qu'*AH* n'évoque que la généralité des gens. Enfin, il ne semble pas possible de savoir si, dans les commentaires à *Rhét.*, Avicenne considérerait que l'effet persuasif de la notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat vaut plutôt par le témoignage de tous ou par la spontanéité de l'auditeur qui fait partie de l'ensemble défini par tous.

Les trois problèmes d'interprétation de la tradition que nous avons signalés auparavant comme ayant pu engager Fārābī à élaborer le concept de notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat sont également attestés dans Avicenne. Or, nous avons vu que seul deux d'entre eux se trouvent réappropriés par Averroès dans *AH*.

Une rapide confrontation des parallèles entrepris ci-dessus entre, d'une part, *AH* et *FH* et, d'autre part, entre *AH* et les commentaires d'Avicenne à *Rhét.* suffirait à établir que c'est bien sur *FH* qu'Averroès s'est appuyé, de manière continue, dans son interprétation de *Rhét.* I 2: la comparaison des sujets des paragraphes des

deux textes est déjà significative à cet égard. Seulement, certaines des convergences que nous avons relevées entre les commentaires d'Avicenne et *AH* ne sont pas dans *FH*: lien intrinsèque de la notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat avec la conscience de la possibilité de l'opposé; rattachement de l'exemple au seul point de vue immédiat et non à la notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat; recours aux enthymèmes pour étayer les procédés extérieurs. Bien plus, les deux premiers de ces points ne sont, semble-t-il, attestés dans aucune autre oeuvre conservée de Fārābī.⁹¹ Le troisième est, lui, envisagé dans *FDG* (§ 8, p. 163; §§ 21-22, pp. 182-5), mais ces passages, à la différence de *AH*, *SR* et *FMR*, ne font pas la distinction entre l'établissement de l'existence du procédé externe et l'établissement de son caractère persuasif et n'ont pas l'exemple du miracle. Tout cela donne à penser que la doctrine de *AH* sur le point de vue immédiat dépend aussi d'interprétations, non attestées dans l'oeuvre conservée de Fārābī, mais déjà présentes dans la tradition arabe antérieure au Commentateur. Il est même probable que celui-ci se soit directement servi des commentaires d'Avicenne. Mais il est difficile de dire lequel d'entre eux notre auteur a utilisé dans *AH*. Des indices, dans la nature des doctrines et la formulation de celles-ci, conduisent à supposer qu'il a pu recourir aux deux.

Il en est ainsi du lien intrinsèque entre la notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat et la conscience de la possibilité du contraire. La ressemblance des formules entre *AH* et *FMR* est frappante. Dès les débuts du traité, après avoir défini la rhétorique au moyen de la notion de persuasion (*FMR* Salem 15, 5-6), Avicenne définit ainsi la persuasion:

La persuasion est une conviction relative à la chose, accompagnée d'une croyance qu'il peut y avoir, au sujet de cette chose, point de contention ('*inād*) et divergence" (*FMR* Salem 15, 7-8).

Or, dans *AH*, c'est aussi au début du traité, juste après avoir fait de l'évaluation de la persuasion le thème central de son investigation sur la rhétorique (*AH* 169, 4-6), qu'Avicenne évoque, dans une définition de cette persuasion et en des termes voisins de ceux de *FMR*, la conscience d'un point de contention:

Il est manifeste que la persuasion est une certaine opinion qui prend le dessus sur laquelle repose l'âme, accompagnée de la conscience d'un point de contention (*mu'ānada*) (*AH* 169, 6-7).

Dans *SR* 3, 1-6, 8, on aboutit certes à un résultat voisin, mais cela se fait suivant un processus et une formulation différente. Au cours d'une démonstration visant à établir que le but principal de la dialectique n'est pas de produire une conviction (*taṣdīq*), mais simplement d'avoir le dessus sur l'adversaire, Avicenne évoque la persuasion que cette discipline peut accessoirement engendrer, au sujet des principes, dans l'homme de l'élite qui veut apprendre. Elle l'incline alors du côté de l'un

⁹¹ *FDG* § 2, pp. 155-6; § 3, p. 156; § 9, pp. 163-5; § 10, pp. 165-6, évoque le lien avec la conscience de l'opposé pour la persuasion, mais soutient que les prémisses rhétoriques ne relèvent pas par elles-mêmes du champ de la persuasion; elles n'en relèvent que lorsqu'elles se trouvent combinées les unes avec les autres d'une manière spécifique: voir Aouad, "Les fondements de la Rhétorique d'Aristote reconsidérés par Fārābī," pp. 163-4.

des deux termes de l'opposition (*al-naql*) montrant ainsi la possibilité du principe, mais cela ne suffit pas à déterminer la conviction de cet auditeur. La persuasion ne peut convaincre que le commun (*al-'amm*). Voici dans ce cas, le processus: l'inclination est cause ('*illa*) de la conviction et non conviction. La conviction suit: un point de vue est arrêté (*in'aqada al-ra'y*) et l'opposé / l'opposition (*al-muqabil/al-naql*) est refoulé en ce sens qu'on décide qu'il n'existe pas bien que l'on sache qu'il peut exister. Lorsque la dialectique recourt à la persuasion pour convaincre, cela ne relève pas de ses buts premiers et ne concerne qu'une petite frange incertaine (*mudabḍabūn*) de gens (entre le commun et l'élite). Outre les différences de formulation et d'argumentation, on aura noté qu'alors que, dans *AH* et *FMR*, la persuasion semble être toujours une conviction, ce n'est pas le cas dans *SR*.

Quant à l'exemple, ce n'est pas le lieu ici d'en analyser la structure dans *FMR* et *SR*, ni d'en énumérer exhaustivement les différences avec *AH*. On notera seulement qu'alors que *FMR* Salem 25, 1-6; 31, 1-3, fonde, comme *AH* (185, 3-186, 8; tr. 71, 38-72, 24), l'exemple sur le point de vue immédiat, *SR* n'en fait pas de même. L'expression en question n'apparaît pas à propos de ce procédé de raisonnement considéré en lui-même (*SR* 37, 6-38, 15). On apprend, en revanche, dans un paragraphe appliqué à l'exemple et à l'enthymème (*SR* 38, 15-43, 9), qu'ils sont fondés sur ce qui persuade par soi (les prémisses), et que ce qui persuade par soi est, dans la discipline rhétorique, ce qui est loué selon le point de vue immédiat par le peuple ou par des groupes au nombre indéterminé d'individus – car, comme discipline, la rhétorique ne peut traiter que de règles générales. Bref, l'exemple traité dans cette discipline relèverait non pas du simple point de vue immédiat, comme dans *FMR* et *AH*, mais de la notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat, comme dans *FH*.

En revanche, la justification que donne *AH* 180, 12-181, 10; tr. 69, 17-38, de l'admission en rhétorique des prémisses aussi possibles que leur contraire, justification que l'on n'a pas dans *FH*, qui inclut pourtant cette sorte de prémisses dans le champ de la discipline oratoire, est très proche de celle que donne *SR* 45, 11-47, 8: ces prémisses, quand elles sont employées en rhétorique, relèvent, pour le point de vue immédiat, de ce qui est plus fréquent. *FMR* ne traite pas de cette question.

Quant au principe selon lequel on doit recourir aux enthymèmes pour convaincre non seulement de l'existence des choses extérieures aux arguments (à savoir que telle ou telle situation qui en relève existe), mais aussi du caractère persuasif de ces procédés (à savoir de leur légitimité), il est formulé en termes généraux, dans *FMR* et *AH*, alors que, dans *SR*, il ne se présente qu'incidemment à propos du témoignage.⁹² Seulement, des quatre exemples de *AH* (l'excellence, le miracle, les

⁹² Comme le montrent les citations qui suivent, *SR* n'envisage, en termes généraux, qu'un établissement, par les arguments, des choses extérieures aux arguments, sans distinguer entre l'établissement de l'existence de ces choses et celui de la légitimité du recours à celles-ci.

témoignages, les lois), *SR* en a trois (l'excellence, le miracle, les témoignages), alors que *FMR* n'en a qu'un (l'excellence).

AH, 196, 11-197, 5; tr. 77, 19-77, 27:

Les enthymèmes ne sont plus éminents que [les choses persuasives extérieures aux arguments] et n'ont la priorité que parce qu'ils sont parfois utilisés pour établir ce qui, de ces choses, n'est pas d'une existence évidente ou d'une persuasion évidente. Ainsi, par exemple, lorsque l'excellence du locuteur n'est ni évidente ni notoire, on utilise les enthymèmes pour mettre cela en évidence; de même, lorsque quelqu'un a l'opinion que ce que l'on a prétendu être un miracle, n'est pas un miracle, on utilise, en s'adressant à cet [interlocuteur] les enthymèmes pour mettre en évidence que c'est un miracle. Il en va de même pour les témoignages, les lois et le reste lorsque l'adversaire les conteste.

FMR Salem 31, 9-13:

On a aussi besoin des enthymèmes et des exemples quand il s'agit des choses persuasives extérieures, lorsque l'on veut montrer qu'elles sont persuasives ou qu'on veut montrer qu'elles existent, par exemple: lorsque le locuteur veut mettre en évidence l'excellence de soi-même ou qu'il veut conduire progressivement les auditeurs à admettre son propos ou engendrer dans leur âme une passion en raison de laquelle ils s'empresseront d'admettre son propos.

SR 11, 13-12, 7:

Il y a donc en rhétorique des propos autres que le pilier⁹³ susmentionné. Parmi cela, des propos par lesquels on veut établir ces stratagèmes (*al-hiyal*) et des propos par lesquels on veut entraîner nécessairement la conviction au moyen des choses susmentionnées. Exemple du premier cas: le propos par lequel le rhéteur veut établir sa propre excellence auprès des auditeurs pour qu'ils en soient convaincus ou le propos par lequel il excite la colère du cadi sur son adversaire. Exemple du second cas: le propos par lequel il cherche à établir que le témoignage est persuasif, à établir que le miracle est un argument et à établir que le témoignage est évident et pur.

Cela revient à dire que les propos rhétoriques par lesquels on veut convaincre sont de trois sortes: le pilier, le stratagème et le soutien. Le pilier est le propos par lequel on veut convaincre de la chose même qui est recherchée. Le stratagème est un propos par lequel sont produites une passion relativement à une chose ou l'estimation que l'on a un certain caractère. Le soutien est un propos par lequel on soutient ce qui a de quoi convaincre.

⁹³ *Amūd* (pilier) est le terme utilisé dans *TAL* I 1, 19 pour rendre *σῶμα* (*Rhét.* I 1, 1354a15). Les auteurs arabes subsument sous ce concept l'enthymème et l'exemple: ainsi, par exemple, *SR* 35, 11-36, 4.

SR 33, 10-13:

La sorte qui est pilier et établissement est parfois dirigée vers le but lui-même et parfois vers l'affermissement de quelque chose des autres chapitres; elle devient alors pilier et établissement dans ce chapitre, comme lorsque quelqu'un met en évidence sa propre excellence ou la vilenie de son adversaire ou met en évidence que l'on doit avoir pitié de lui.

A l'issue de cette enquête sur les antécédents de *AH*, on pourrait se demander si finalement la doctrine du concept de point de vue immédiat telle que présentée dans ce traité a une quelconque originalité. Pour nous en assurer, rappelons les résultats des sections précédentes. Le plan de *AH* nous est apparu comme une restructuration de celui de *Rhét.* I 2 autour de concepts qui n'y sont pas et qui, de ce fait, prennent une importance considérable: celui de rang de la persuasion, lui-même déterminé par ceux de notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat et de point de vue immédiat tout court. La définition du point de vue immédiat nous a, elle, mis en présence de la notion d'absence d'examen et de liaison avec la conscience de l'opposé; la notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat s'est avérée distincte de la notoriété en réalité et son effet persuasif étayé sur un principe d'autorité, le témoignage immédiat de tous ou de la plupart des gens. L'importance du point de vue immédiat et de la notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat s'est trouvée confirmée quand nous avons été amené à constater le rôle du premier dans la structuration de l'exemple et celui de la seconde dans la définition et dans la plupart des caractérisations particulières de l'enthymème, ainsi que dans la fondation des choses extérieures aux arguments. Maintenant s'il est vrai qu'au cours de son élaboration le Commentateur s'est servi de *FHL* pour lire *Rhét.* I 2 et reprendre à Fārābī la plupart des déterminations de la notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat, qu'il a, par ailleurs, eu vraisemblablement recours aux commentaires d'Avicenne à *Rhét.* pour lier le point de vue immédiat à la conscience de la possibilité de l'opposé, pour limiter l'exemple au seul point de vue immédiat et pour signaler le recours aux enthymèmes quand il s'agit de convaincre du caractère persuasif des procédés extérieurs ou montrer que telle ou telle situation en relève, il n'en reste pas moins que cette jonction des doctrines des deux prédécesseurs n'est mise en relief que dans *AH*, alors qu'elle reste diluée dans les textes d'Avicenne et que c'est seulement dans l'abrégé d'Averroès que le concept de point de vue immédiat est aussi clairement rattaché au concept de rang de la persuasion.⁹⁴

⁹⁴ L'histoire du concept de notoriété selon le point de vue immédiat ne s'arrêtera pourtant pas là, puisqu'Averroès, *Comm. moyen Rhét.* Badawi, pp. 233, 13-234, 3; id., *Comm. moyen Rhét.* Salem, pp. 493, 2-494, 2, soutiendra que la persuasion oratoire s'appuie sur le point de vue immédiat de l'auditeur et que donc l'enthymème lui-même n'est pas dépendant du témoignage immédiat de tous. Seulement on apprend aussi, dans ce passage, que, même lorsque le point de vue immédiat n'est pas celui de tous, on a au moins l'opinion qu'il l'est. Pour persuader, une autorité réelle ou fictive est toujours nécessaire. Nous reviendrons plus longuement sur ce point dans un travail ultérieur.

SIGLES

- *AH*: ce sigle désigne la partie de Averroës' *Three Short Commentaries on Aristotle's "Topics", "Rhetoric", and "Poetics"*, éd. et trad. Ch. E. Butterworth (Albany N.Y., 1977), consacrée à l'édition et à la traduction de l'abrégé de la rhétorique, *Al-Qawl fi al-aqāwīl al-ḥaṣābiyya* (*Des arguments rhétoriques*). Les références à la traduction anglaise sont accompagnées de "tr.," celles se rapportant au texte arabe ne le sont pas.
- *Comm. moyen Rhét.* Badawi: Averroīs *Paraphrases in Libros Rhetoricorum Aristotelis*. *Recognovit et Adnotatione Critica* auxit 'A. Badawi (Le Caire, 1960; réimpr. Al-Kuwayt et Beyrouth, s.d.).
- *Comm. moyen Rhét.* Salem: Ibn Ruṣd, *Talḥiṣ al-ḥaṣāba*, éd. M.S. Salem (Le Caire, 1967).
- *FDG*: Al-Fārābī, *Deux ouvrages inédits sur la Rhétorique. I. Kitāb al-ḥaṣāba*, éd. et trad. par J. Langhade (dans cet article, *FHL*). *II. Didascalía in Rethoricam Aristotelis ex glosa Alpharabi(i)*, éd. par M. Grignaschi (*FDG*) (Beyrouth, 1971).
- *FH*: Al-Fārābī, *Kitāb al-ḥaṣāba*.
- *FHL*: Al-Fārābī, *Deux ouvrages inédits sur la Rhétorique. I. Kitāb al-ḥaṣāba*, éd. et trad. par J. Langhade (dans cet article, *FHL*). *II. Didascalía in Rethoricam Aristotelis ex glosa Alpharabi(i)*, éd. par M. Grignaschi (*FDG*) (Beyrouth, 1971).
- *FMR*: *Fī ma'ānī kitāb Rūṣūqā ay al-balāḡa fī al-ḥukūma wa-al-ḥaṣāba* (*Des significations du livre Rhétoriké, c'est-à-dire l'éloquence dans les affaires judiciaires et la rhétorique*).
- *FMR* Rémondon: D. Rémondon (éd. et trad.), "Al-aḥlāq wa-l-infi'ālāt an-nafsāniyya," dans *Mémorial Avicenne*, t. IV: *Miscellanea*, (Le Caire, 1954): 19-29.
- *FMR* Salem: Ibn Sīnā, *Kitāb al-maḡmū' aw al-ḥikma al-'arūḍiyya, fī ma'ānī kitāb Rūṣūqā*, éd. M.S. Salem (Le Caire, 1953).
- *IS*: *Al Ishārāt Wa-t-Tanbīhāt par Abī 'Alī ibn Sīnā*, éd. S. Donyā, deuxième impression (Le Caire, 1971).
- *LS*: Avicenne, *Le Livre de science. I (Logique, Métaphysique). II (Science naturelle, Mathématiques)*, trad. M. Achena et H. Massé. Deuxième édition revue et corrigée par M. A. (Paris, 1986).
- *MN* (*Maqāla fī al-nafs 'alā sunnat al-iḥtiṣār*): S. Landauer (éd. et trad.), "Die Psychologie des Ibn Sīnā," *ZDMG*, 29 (1875): 335-418.

- *N*: Ibn Sīnā, *Al-Nağāt min al-garq fī baḥr al-ḍalālāt*, éd. M. T. Daneche Pajub (Téhéran, 1985-6).
- *Rhét.*: *Aristoteles graece*, éd. I. Bekker (Berlin, 1831) pp. 1354a-1420b4; rééd. O. Gigon, Berlin 1960 et 1970, sans changement.
- *ŠB*: Ibn Sīnā, *Al-Shifā'*, *Logic*. V. — *Demonstration (Al-Burhān)*, éd. A. E. Affifi (Cairo, 1956).
- *ŠĠ*: Ibn Sīnā, *Al-Shifā'*, *La Logique*. 6 — *La Dialectique (Al-Gadal)*, éd. A. F. El Ehwany (Le Caire, 1965).
- *ŠQ*: Ibn Sīnā, *Al-Shifā'*, *La Logique*. IV — *Le Syllogisme (Al-Qiyās)*, éd. S. Zayed (Le Caire, 1964).
- *ŠR*: Ibn Sīnā, *Al-Shifā'*, *La Logique*. VIII — *Rhétorique (Al Khaṭābah)*, éd. M. S. Salem (Le Caire, 1954).
- *TA*: la traduction arabe de *Rhét.* telle que conservée dans BN, *Parisinus ar. 2346* (ancien fonds ar. 882 A), fol. 1-65^v.
- *TAL*: *Aristotle's Ars Rhetorica. The Arabic Version*. A new edition, with Commentary and Glossary by M. C. Lyons, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 1982).
- *Uy*: *Avicennae Fontes sapientiae ('Uyūn al-ḥikma)*, "Mémemorial Avicenne," V, éd. 'A. Badawi (Le Caire, 1954).

Topics and the Misnamed *Book of Poetic Gleanings* attributed to Aristotle and Alexander of Aphrodisias in a Medieval Arabic Manuscript

Fritz W. Zimmermann

D30, as the text in question is known to devotees of *Alexander Arabus*, concludes a series of ten short pieces attributed, not always correctly, to Alexander of Aphrodisias in the Istanbul manuscript Carullah 1279, a large codex of mixed contents from fifteenth-century Yemen.¹ No other copy has hitherto come to light. The title suggests a connection with Aristotle's *Poetics*, but it has been known for some time that our piece in fact relates to the *Topics*.² The purpose of this paper is to clarify that relationship, while indicating that the author apparently had recourse to Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. Unfortunately, the text is too poor in too many places to lend itself to simple translation. I shall therefore confine myself to a brief survey and a few ready observations.

- (1) Fol. 69^v20: «Here follows the Book of Poetic Gleanings (*kitāb al-fawā'id al-shi'riyya*) by Aristotle the Philosopher.

Translated by Hunayn ibn Ishāq.

Aristotle says: If you wish to differentiate between two things worth

¹ I am grateful to the authorities of the Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi in Istanbul for providing me with a microfilm. D30 was listed by A. Dietrich as item no. 30 in his survey of Arabic pieces of Alexander (*Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen*, 1964, p. 100), after F. Rosenthal's description of the codex (*Journal of the American Oriental Society* 75, 1955, p. 18, no. IX(10)). Both authors doubted the attribution to Alexander.

² R. Janko, *Aristotle on Comedy*, London 1984, p. 119n117; R.W. Sharples, 'Alexander of Aphrodisias: Scholasticism and Innovation,' *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt* (edd. W. Haase & H. Temporini), vol. 36.2, Berlin & New York 1987, p. 1192 (D30); R. Goulet & M. Aouad, art. 'Alexandros d'Aphrodisias', *Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques*, vol. 1, Paris 1989, p. 137 (38).

seeking and desiring, so as to know which is better and preferable, apply the following tests (cf. *Top.* 3.1 116a3). One of them is that what is more deep-rooted (*arsakh*) and long-lasting is better than what is not so (cf. 116a13), as joy that lasts is better than joy that is quick to expire. What is more likely to be chosen by men of probity and wisdom is better than what is not so (cf. 116a14); for example, what brings little benefit (*fa'ida*) but justice and honour is better than what brings much <of the former> without the latter.»

The first chapters of *Topics* 3 have a parallel in ch. 7 of *Rhetoric* 1, where the argument from durability is mentioned. Like the passage translated above, the extant Arabic version of the *Rhetoric* has *arsakh* for βεβαιότερον (1364b31),³ where the extant Arabic version of the *Topics* has *akhar thabātan*.⁴

Our text continues with the subject-matter of *Topics* 3.1-2. Passing over a few obscurities, I shall note the more obvious correspondences.

- 69*24: What is desired for its own sake is better than what is desired for the sake of something else (cf. 116a29).
- 26: What causes⁵ good essentially is better than what does so accidentally (cf. 116b1).
- 27: What is always good in all respects is better than what is sometimes good in some respects (cf. 116b8).
- 28: What benefits the superior, e.g. soul, is better than what benefits the inferior, e.g. body (cf. 116b11).
- 30: The end is better than the means (cf. 116b22).
- 33: What is desirable in both good and bad times is better than what is not (cf. 117a35).
- 34: Some things are better at some times of life than at others, e.g. chastity in youth (cf. 117a32).
- 35: What might suffice by itself, e.g. justice, is better than what never would, e.g. courage (cf. 117a37).

³ M.C. Lyons (ed.), *Aristotle's Ars Rhetorica: the Arabic version*, vol.1, Cambridge 1982, p. 37.6 (*Rhet.* 1.7 1364b31).

⁴ A. Badawi (ed.), *Manṭiq Aristū*, vol. 2, Cairo 1949, p. 533.14 (*Top.* 3.1 116a13). The example given at the end of the passage — "what brings little benefit" etc. — is not found in the *Topics*, but there is an interesting parallel in *Rhetoric* 3.16, where Aristotle advises saying things like "For I chose that; but if I got no benefit, it is better so" (1417a24-5; cf. 1.3 1359a3-5). The *Rhetoric* text distinguishes between the practically wise man and the good man (the φρόνιμος and the ἀγαθός 1417a26). The *Topics* recognizes the distinction by use of the disjunctive "or" (116a15), but "and" in the Arabic text obscures the distinction.

⁵ MS *ʿala*: read *ʿilla*.

- (2) 70⁶: «What is not commonly attainable is better than what is, e.g. virtue than wealth: for wealth may be obtained by the bad, whereas they have no share in virtue» (cf. 117b30).

Aristotle here gives no example. For once, our text has a close parallel in Alexander's commentary *ad locum*: 'Also, the good are more exclusively possessed of virtue than of wealth: for of wealth even the bad partake, but of virtue not at all.'⁶

A little later, the Arabic abruptly switches to the subject-matter of *Topics* 7.1:

- (3) 70⁸: «If there is a case of two things so seemingly alike as to be thought to be the same, and you wish to know whether they are or not, test the matter in the following ways. One is that you should test it by means of the contrary (cf. 151b31: ἐκ τῶν ἀντικειμένων): see whether the contrary of this is the same as the contrary⁷ of the other; otherwise, they are not the same (*huwa huwa*). For example, if <someone> says that courage (*shajā'a*) is the same as stamina (*jalad*) ...»

The example seems to have been imported from *Rhetoric* 1.7 1364b20, where the Arabic version has *shajā'a* and *jalad* for ἀνδρεία and ἰσχὺς.

70¹⁷: Test by means of inflexions (*taṣarruf*⁸ *al-ism*; cf. 151b30: ἐκ τῶν πτώσεων).

20: If A is the same as C and B is not, A is not the same as B (cf. 152a31).

22: If A and B differ in their accidents, they are not the same (cf. 152a33).

25: If A and B fall under different categories or genera, they are not the same (cf. 152a28).

29: If A and B do not both admit of more or less, they are not the same (cf. 152b6).

32: If they do, but an increase or decrease in A does not entail the same in B, they are not the same; e.g. greater love does not always mean greater sexual desire (cf. 152b7).

34: If A plus/minus C is not the same as B plus/minus C, A is not the same as B (cf. 152b10).

70⁴: If an attribute does not apply to A and B alike, they are not the same (cf. 152b25).

⁶ M. Wallies (ed.), *Alexandri Aphrodisiensis in Aristotelis Topicorum libros octo commentaria*, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, vol. 2 pt. 2, Berlin 1891, p. 255.20.

⁷ MS *al-qidd*: read *huwa qidd*.

⁸ MS *taṣf*.

- (4) 6: «Further, if either can be without the other, it is not⁹ the same» (cf. 152b34).

Our text here closely translates Aristotle. For once, the Arabic *Topics* is very similar, except that it has a different expression for 'the same' and adds a few words omitted in the Greek.¹⁰

- (5) 10: «In general, 'same' may be said in three ways (cf. *Top.* 1.7 103a7); either in respect of genus, as with piety and justice, because both belong to the genus of virtue; or in respect of form (species),¹¹ as with one line and another, because both are of a single form (species), and likewise one circle and another, and one red and another; or in respect of the individual, as when a single man or town is called by various names but said to be the same. It is in the third way that 'same' is soundly said,¹² because it is said of something that is numerically one (cf. 151b28-30; 152b30-2). Here ends Aristotle's *Book of Poetic Gleanings*, and with it the treatises. End of the philosophical treatises of Alexander of Aphrodisias.»

The second line of the subscription seems to contradict the first by implying that our piece is by Alexander rather than Aristotle. I take it that the implication is not intended. Just as the first line serves to close the piece opened by the inscription translated at (1) above, the second line serves to close the section opened by an earlier rubric at fol. 44^r17: 'Next: Treatises of the philosopher Alexander of Aphrodisias.' Inscriptions and subscriptions were often supplied or adapted by transmitters. Our section rubrics were presumably supplied by the scribe of the present manuscript. In opening the section at fol. 44^r17, he did not think, or bother to announce, that it was going to include more than Alexander. But the first line of the subscription speaks of 'the treatises' (sc. of this section) *without* attributing them to Alexander. Perhaps, then, we are to understand from the two lines together

⁹ Omitting the *wa-illa* of the MS (see next note).

¹⁰ *Top.* 7.1 152b34: ἐτι εἰ δυνατὸν ὅτιον ἀνευ ὁτιέπου εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἴη ταύτων.

D30: *thumma in kāna yumkinu an yakūna aḥaduhumā khilwan mina l-akhari [wa-illa] fa-laysa huwa huwa.*

Dimashqi: *wa-yunẓar ayḍan in kāna yumkinu an yakūna aḥaduhumā khilwan mina l-akhari fa-inna dhālika in kāna yumkinu fa-laysa humā shayʿan wāḥidan* — 'One should also see if either can be without the other; for if that is possible, they are not a single thing' (*Manṭiq Aristū* 3.679.9f. Badawi). Dimashqi's sentence seems to be a revised version of the line lifted *verbatim* by the author of D30 from the same source.

¹¹ MS *ṣanʿa*: read *ṣūra*.

¹² MS *alladhī yuqāl bi-l-ṣiḥḥa wa-huwa huwa*: read *huwa lladhī yuqāl bi-l-ṣiḥḥa huwa huwa*?

that the preceding piece of Aristotle concludes the series of treatises initially introduced as 'treatises of Alexander.' Such scribal ambiguities may account for some of the misattributions of the Graeco-Arabic tradition in general, and *Alexander Arabus* in particular.¹³ The seeming incoherence of the subscription should teach us not to be too baffled by the incongruities of the inscription.

If D30 were indeed by Alexander, we should expect to find more parallels, like that noted in passage (2), to his commentary on the *Topics*. The real author seems to belong to a later period. Most probably he wrote in Arabic. For D30 is essentially a catalogue of *topoi* extracted from *Top.* 3.1-2 and 7.1. Each *topos* is illustrated by an example or two. Most of Aristotle's own examples have been replaced, and the replacements tend to be less apt than the originals. That would suggest that the Aristotelian substratum of D30 was an epitome of the *Topics* largely shorn of examples. Some of the examples supplied by the author of D30 appear to be his own. If he had had full access to Alexander's commentary, he would presumably have followed it more often. But he does seem to have been familiar with Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. The striking parallels noted in passages (1) and (3) certainly go to show that he had recourse to *Rhetoric* 1.7 in the anonymous Arabic version that has come down to us.

In general, D30 is closer in style to the Arabic *Rhetoric* than to the rather younger Arabic *Topics* by Dimashqī (ca. 900) but not close enough to suggest that the translator of the *Rhetoric* himself produced either D30, or the underlying epitome of the *Topics*, or both. The agreement noted under (4) above suggests that Dimashqī, too, knew that epitome, which it is tempting to identify with the 'old version' recorded by the bibliographical tradition.¹⁴ As D30 shows no trace of the work of Dimashqī, we may take it to be older. Thus we are left to conclude that D30 was compiled before the time of Dimashqī, in Arabic, from an Arabic epitome of the *Topics*; that the author had recourse to the Arabic *Rhetoric*; and that he may have had limited access to Alexander's commentary on the *Topics*.

The title given in the inscription and repeated in the subscription has justly been described as a 'bizarre misnomer' by Richard Janko.¹⁵ There is no mention of poetry or poetics anywhere outside the title. But Janko's suggestion that ΤΟΠΙΚΑ may have been misread as ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΑ in the underlying Greek does not help if, as would appear, D30 is not a translation in the first place (though the underlying epitome of the *Topics* may have been). Besides, the word 'poetic' is not the only thing that is bizarre about the inscription translated at (1) above. The obscure *fawā'id*

¹³ For *spuria* among Arabic pieces of Alexander see Sharples (above, note 2) 1194; Goulet & Aouad (above, note 2) 139; Zimmermann, 'Proclus Arabus rides again', forthcoming in *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy*.

¹⁴ Ibn al-Nadīm, *Fihrist*, ed. R. Tajaddod, Tehran 1973, p. 309ult.; B. Dodge (tr.), *The Fihrist of al-Nadīm*, vol. 2, New York & London 1970, p. 600.

¹⁵ See note 2 above.

— ‘benefits’ or ‘insights gained from instruction’ — of the title is not explained by the single and unproblematic use of the singular (*faʿida*) a few lines later in the text. Again, we know that the text is not strictly by Aristotle; we have reason to doubt that it is strictly a translation; and we can tell from its language that it was not composed by the well-known translator Hunayn b. Ishāq (d. 873). It is hard to know what lies behind that fabric of inaccuracies. The original title would naturally have made reference to Aristotle and his *Topics*. Perhaps what now reads *fawāʿid* was once a word for *topoi* (usually *mawāḍiʿ*), though none occurs in the text itself. Alternatively, the original title may have been lost. For it is easy to see the transmitted text as consisting of nothing but two fragments from the interior of a larger composition.¹⁶ At all events, the present inscription can only be explained by a succession of scribal errors and inventions.

¹⁶ Note that in elaborating on *Top.* 7.1 152b30-2 (and/or 151b28-30) in passage (5), our author seems to have recourse to *Top.* 1.7, a chapter beyond the present scope of his text.

The Reception of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* in the Renaissance

Lawrence D. Green

Early Renaissance writers on Aristotle's *Rhetoric* knew very little about the background of the treatise, the context in which it was written, or the subsequent history of the document. In the Latin West there had been no sustained tradition of study or application of the *Rhetoric*, unlike the situation with the rhetorical treatises of the Roman tradition, or with Aristotle's *Organon* or the ethical treatises of the Peripatetic tradition. As a result, the treatise had a somewhat malleable quality. Standing by itself, without context or history, the treatise could be accommodated, either in whole or in part, to a number of competing theories. The isolated text not merely invited commentary but actually required commentary, and the text itself often proved useless for settling disputes on its own grounds since identical Latin translations were often understood in irreconcilable ways.

Renaissance views of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* were shaped by the complex of prevailing ideas, immediate needs, local arguments, personalities, and social interactions which made Renaissance scholars inclined to think about the *Rhetoric* in particular ways. In the present essay I want to describe a few of the ways in which different Renaissance contexts governed the early understanding of Peripatetic rhetoric. In Part One (I), I will delineate three strands of thought which prevailed at the time of the reintroduction of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* into the Latin West. The first strand was an inclination in the Latin West to see the *Rhetoric* as a precursor to the rhetorical theories of Cicero and Quintilian. The second was an inclination in the Byzantine East to see Aristotle as coherent with Plato. The third was an inheritance from the medieval period—an inclination to see Aristotle's *Rhetoric* as an adjunct to ethical theory or, sometimes, to dialectic. In Part Two (II), I will consider broadly what happened to these strands, both individually and in their interaction with one another. But the conflict and interplay of intellectual allegiances had effects beyond large scale overviews of the *Rhetoric*. In Part Three (III), I will consider how local needs and immediate controversies determined details of philology, textual emendation, and translation, and conclude by looking at some

Renaissance attempts to understand aspects of Aristotle's enthymeme.¹

I

Aristotle's *Rhetoric* was not a completely new text for the Renaissance. Writers in the Latin middle ages knew the treatise, primarily through the very literal translation of William of Moerbeke in the mid-thirteenth century, and nearly a hundred manuscripts of Moerbeke's translation are extant.² Moerbeke was at the papal court during the years that Thomas Aquinas was at the *studium curiae*, and the two Dominicans may have been spurs to one another's projects in Aristotelian studies.³ Around 1290 Giles of Rome, a Dominican disciple of Aquinas, prepared a commentary based on Moerbeke's translation, and while Giles's commentary circulated widely in manuscript, it was not printed until 1523, relatively late in the Renaissance recovery of the *Rhetoric*.⁴ And the partial translation, paraphrase, and commentary of Hermannus Alemannus was also available from the thirteenth century, although it did not circulate widely.⁵ But the Greek text was unavailable in the Latin West, commentary other than Giles's was sparse, and what there was

¹ The present essay does not attempt to deal with the extensive Jesuit studies of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, or with the place of the *Rhetoric* in the Jesuit *Ratio atque institutio studiorum*. Both of these still require major examinations, and their relatively late dates put them beyond the central focus of the present study.

² Also extant are a few copies of the *Translatio anonyma sive vetus* from the same period, but the *Vetus* did not circulate as widely as Moerbeke's translation. We do not have the Greek text for either translation; see Bernd Schneider (ed.), *Aristoteles Latinus XXXI, 1-2, Rhetorica* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1978), xxxii-xxxvii, and Schneider, *Die mittelalterlichen griechisch-lateinischen Übersetzungen der aristotelischen Rhetorik* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1971).

³ Walter Berschin summarizes how the Dominican "mission" in Greece fostered language learning and translation in the order; see *Greek Letters and the Latin Middle Ages: From Jerome to Nicholas of Cusa*, trans. Jerold C. Frakes (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1988), 255-63; revised and expanded from the original *Griechisch-lateinisches Mittelalter. Von Hieronymus zu Nikolaus von Kues* (Bern and Munich: Francke, 1980). For the relations between Moerbeke and Aquinas as they relate to Aristotelian study, and especially during the years they shared at the papal court (1261-65; 1267-68), see James Weisheipl, *Friar Thomas D'Aquino* (New York: Doubleday, 1974), 151.

⁴ Giles of Rome (Aegidius Romanus; Egidio Colonna; c. 1243/47-1316), *Expositio super tribus libris rhetoricorum* [c. 1290] (Venice, 1515). For discussion, see James J. Murphy, "The Scholastic Condemnation of Rhetoric in the Commentary of Giles of Rome on the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle," *Arts Liberaux et Philosophie au Moyen Age* (Montréal: Institute D'Études Médiévales, 1969), 833-41, and Brother S. Robert, F. S. C., "Rhetoric and Dialectic: According to the First Latin Commentary on the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle," *New Scholasticism* 31(1957): 484-98.

⁵ See William F. Boggess, "Hermannus Alemannus's Rhetorical Translations," *Viator* 2 (1971): 227-50.

viewed the *Rhetoric* primarily as an adjunct to Aristotelian ethical and political studies.⁶ The impact of this medieval Latin work upon Renaissance writers has yet to be studied in any detail, but, in general, few Renaissance scholars made any significant reference to these early Latin translations and commentaries.⁷

Aristotle's *Rhetoric* really enters into Renaissance consciousness in the wake of the great controversy in the fifteenth century about the relative merits of Peripatetic and Platonic philosophy, and understandings of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* were influenced by that controversy for over a hundred years. The controversy began at the Council of Florence in 1439, a council which the Byzantine Greeks had requested in an effort to reconcile the Greek and Latin churches, and perhaps secure Western support to prop up the failing Greek empire. One evening the Byzantine scholar George Gemistus Pletho delivered a lecture outside of the ordinary council proceedings in which he celebrated Plato, who was largely unknown in the West, by attacking Aristotle, whom Pletho thought was overemphasized in the West.⁸ Scholars in the Byzantine world knew very little about Aristotle's dialectical treatises, and were by turns befuddled and dazzled by what Latin logicians had done with those treatises. And while the Greeks had the text of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, it held no special place for them.⁹ Hermogenes, not Aristotle, was their major classical author on rhetoric. But the Byzantine debate on the ethical and metaphysical positions of Plato and Aristotle was sophisticated, of long standing, and unresolved. Pletho's lecture could

⁶ Besides Giles of Rome, the major commentators are Guido Vernani, John Buridan, and John of Jandun. See the census by Charles H. Lohr, S. J., "Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries," in *Traditio* 23-24 (1967-68), and 26-29 (1970-73).

⁷ Notable is the recent study by Pierre Lardet, "Les traductions de la *Rhétorique* d'Aristote à la Renaissance," *Traduction et Traducteurs au Moyen Age: Actes du colloque international du CNRS organisé à Paris. Institut de recherche et d'histoire des textes, les 26-28 mai 1986* (Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1989), 15-30; see note 41 below. For a more general view of medieval and Renaissance translation, see Brian P. Copenhaver, "Translation, Terminology and Style in Philosophical Discourse," in Charles B. Schmitt, et al. (eds.), *Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 77-110 (cited *CHRP*).

⁸ See Deno John Geanakoplos, *Greek Scholars in Venice: Studies in the Dissemination of Greek Learning from Byzantium to Western Europe* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962), 85-92, and now Geanakoplos, *Constantinople and the West: Essays on the Late Byzantine (Palaeologan) and Italian Renaissance and the Byzantine and Roman Churches* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989), *passim*. See also Paul Oskar Kristeller, "Byzantine and Western Platonism in the Fifteenth Century," *Renaissance Thought and Its Sources* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), 150-68. Pletho's lecture was known in the West as "De Platonicae et Aristotelicae philosophiae differentia"; the modern critical edition is B. Legard, "Le *De Differentiis* de Plethon d'après l'autographe de la Marcienne," *Byzantion* 43 (1973): 312-43, but the earlier edition of 1923 should still be consulted. C. M. Woodhouse has translated the lecture as "On the Differences of Aristotle from Plato" in *George Gemistos Pletho: The Last of the Hellenes* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).

⁹ Thomas M. Conley, "Aristotle's *Rhetoric* in Byzantium," *Rhetorica* 8 (1990): 29-44.

offer only a taste of contemporary Byzantine scholarship on Plato and Aristotle, with little sense of just how different the Greek context was from the Latin.

When this ongoing Byzantine debate was suddenly translated into the contentious Latin world, which had very different traditions and interests, it acquired theological, political, and personal overtones as scholars and patrons chose sides. Only two of the principal parties concern me here, George of Trebizond, who was a willing combatant on behalf of the Latin Aristotle against the Greek Plato,¹⁰ and Cardinal Bessarion, who favored Plato, but who sought to demonstrate the continuity of thought between the two philosophers.¹¹ Both of them were Greek émigrés in an alien Latin world, and both had personal agendas. Bessarion lived the life of a social insider, first in the Greek world and then in the Latin, and never abandoned his view of Platonism as a unifying force in philosophy and theology. He attended the Council of Florence in his role as the Greek Archbishop of Nicaea, and urged the union of the two churches. During the course of the council he was elected cardinal, and after the council he settled in Rome where he became a central figure at the papal court (even a papal contender) and a patron for many Greek and Latin humanists. After the Byzantine collapse he was named the Latin Patriarch of Constantinople and for years he continued to urge a crusade to recover Constantinople. George of Trebizond, in contrast to Bessarion, spent his life seeking patronage and security in the Latin West; indeed, for many years Bessarion patronized him. He came to Venice in 1416 at the invitation of Francesco Barbaro, and quickly realized that his own training in Greek rhetoric could be combined with the Italian interest in Ciceronian rhetoric. Trebizond established a spectacular reputation by introducing the rhetorical theories of Hermogenes to the West and by arguing that they were congruent with Ciceronian theory.¹² In his major work, the *Rhetoricorum libri V* (1433/34), he blended the two approaches, and then achieved equal fame by redacting Latin dialectic in his *Isagoge dialectica* (1439) to serve his rhetorical perspectives. For much of his career, even as he turned

¹⁰ See John Monfasani, *George of Trebizond: A Biography and a Study of his Rhetoric and Logic* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1976), 200 ff., and Monfasani, "Il Perotti e la controversia tra Platonici ed Aristotelici," *Res Publica Litterarum: Studies in the Classical Tradition* 4 (1981): 195-231.

¹¹ See Ludwig Mohler, *Kardinal Bessarion als Theologe, Humanist und Staatsmann*, 3 vols. (Paderborn, 1923-42; rpt. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1967), 1:46 ff., 339 ff. See also Henri Vast, *Le Cardinal Bessarion (1403-1472): Etude sur la Chrétienté et la Renaissance vers le Milieu du XVe siècle* (Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1878), 53 ff, 327 ff., and now Lotta Labowsky, "Bessarion," in *Dizionario biografico degli Italiani* (Rome: 1960-to date), vol. 9 (1967), 686-96.

¹² George of Trebizond (Georgius Trapezuntius; 1395-1484), *De generibus dicendi* (1420?) and *De suavitate dicendi* (1426). Both of these early works are in fact lengthy letters rather than formal treatises; the texts are available in John Monfasani (ed.), *Collectanea Trapezuntiana: Texts, Documents, and Bibliographies of George of Trebizond* (Binghamton, NY: Medieval and Renaissance Texts Society, 1984), 329-38; 225-34.

to other subjects, he strove to consolidate and maintain his position as the preeminent mediator of Greek rhetoric to the Latin West, and sought to repeat with Aristotle the success he had with Hermogenes. Trebizond's distaste for Plato began with his reading of the *Gorgias* when he started to make his way in the West as a rhetorician, and it intensified in later years, especially after his break with the Bessarion circle and his subsequent difficulties with patronage.

Shortly after the close of the Council of Florence in 1442, at which he was not an official participant, Trebizond began work on his translation of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*.¹³ We do not know what his Greek text was, but the story that it was loaned to him by Cardinal Bessarion seems unlikely.¹⁴ Trebizond finished his translation in 1445, and I shall return later to this translation. Some ten years later, in 1455, Trebizond began his vituperative assault on Plato, the *Comparationes phylosophorum Aristotelis et Platonis* (1457), which included a personal attack on Bessarion for supporting Plato.¹⁵ In the *Comparationes* Trebizond claims to have had a discussion with George Gemistus Pletho, in which that ecumenical champion of Plato supposedly told Trebizond that soon the religion of the entire world would be neither Christian nor Islamic, but pagan.¹⁶ Plato's inadequacy as a theorist of rhetoric, according to Trebizond, must be understood as part of Plato's overall failings as a philosopher, and Plato's intellectual inadequacy leads ultimately to a perception of God which is harmful to Christians.

What Trebizond says about Aristotle's *Rhetoric* in this intemperate treatise is as important for what it omits as for what it includes.¹⁷ His description of the *Rhetoric* makes Aristotle's treatise sound like the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, whereas some of the aspects of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* which we today think are most distinctive are never mentioned in his discussion—features such as the enthymeme, the realm of probability, and the three principal means of persuasion. Trebizond is astonished that anyone could prefer Plato's discussion of rhetoric to that of Aristotle. Plato

¹³ Trebizond may have begun his translation as early as 1442 while he was still in Florence; see Monfasani, *George of Trebizond*, 54-57, 57n.

¹⁴ See the discussion of Bessarion's copy of MS Parisinus graecus 1741 in Lotte Labowsky, *Bessarion's Library and the Bibliotheca Marciana: Six early inventories* (Rome: Edizioni de storia e letteratura, 1979), 14 ff.

¹⁵ Trebizond, *Comparationes phylosophorum Aristotelis et Platonis* (Venice, 1523; rpt. Frankfurt: Minerva, 1965); the titlepage of the 1523 edition carries an explicit attack on Bessarion. See also Mohler, *Kardinal Bessarion*, 1:358-60; Vast, *Le Cardinal Bessarion*, 338-39; and Kristeller, "Byzantine and Western Platonism," 158-60.

¹⁶ Trebizond, *Comparationes*, V6v: "Audivi ego ipsum Florentiae, venit enim ad concilium cum graecis, asserentem unam eandemque religionem, uno animo, una mente, una predicatione, universum orbem, paucis post annis esse suscepturum. Cumque rogassem, christine an machumeti? neutram inquit, sed non a gentilitate, differentem. Quibus verbis commotus, semper odi, et ut venenosam viperam pertimui." For a discussion of the likelihood of this encounter, see Monfasani, *George of Trebizond*, 39-40.

¹⁷ Trebizond, *Comparationes*, A4v-A6r.

teaches nothing about rhetorical invention, and offers no help with rhetorical *elocutio*. And Plato, for all his talk about poetry and fables, finally says nothing useful on the subject. Aristotle, on the other hand, opens the fount of poetry and the river of eloquence; he reveals the entire power of invention, and from the darkness he brings forth into the light the full copia of places and propositions. Aristotle places before one's very eyes the entire theory of how to dispose persuasive arguments, how to adjust them to different kinds of speaking, and in the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* (which Trebizond thought was by Aristotle) the details of usage are laid out.¹⁸ Trebizond distinguishes between the *res ipsa* of rhetoric, which is natural, and the *quality* of rhetoric, which is a matter of artistry, and Aristotle excels in teaching the latter. Not only does Plato lack all this, but in the *Gorgias* he teaches that there is no art, no rules, and no teaching—unless it be that of a hustler (*cauponaria*). As for defending Plato in this matter, only someone who is out of his mind or utterly depraved could do so.¹⁹

Cardinal Bessarion took exception, and he began to compose his response almost immediately. The Greek version was probably complete by 1459, and the Latin version was printed finally in 1469 as *In calumniatorem Platonis* some thirty years after Pletho's original address in Florence.²⁰ Bessarion's own agenda was, as it had been thirty years earlier, to unite the Greek and Latin worlds and to demonstrate the continuity of thought within the Greek intellectual tradition.²¹ His defense of Plato takes the form of explaining how Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is principally an elaboration of what Plato had originally said in the *Phaedrus*. Some of Bessarion's argument sounds familiar to modern ears, since Friedrich Solmsen's essay on the *Rhetoric* offers a similar argument.²² That seeming familiarity can mislead us, since Solmsen's context is nothing like that of the Quattrocento, and Bessarion's *In*

¹⁸ Trebizond, *Comparationes*, A4^v-A5^r: "Ubi de inventione rhetorica Plato docuit? ubi elocutionis praecepta tradidit? ubi poetas? (nam ea quoque res, ad dicendum summopere pertinet) fabularum ipse studiosus vigilantia et peritia sua instruxit? At Aristoteles et poetarum fontes aperuit et oratorum flumina, reclusit. Inveniendi enim vim omnem, mirabili vel locorum vel propositionum, quas maximas dicunt, copia, in lucem e tenebris protraxit, disponendi agendique rationem, plurimum ad persuadendum valere commonuit, diversa esse dicendi genera, eaque rebus accomodanda, non magis praeciando, quem dicendo prae oculis posuit. Mirum certe est, quem acuta gravique in rhetoricis utatur oratione. Ad Alexandrum vero, eadem fere scribens, facili suavique, non absque gravitate, ut principem decebat, dicenudi utitur stilo."

¹⁹ Trebizond, *Comparationes*, A5^v: "Quas ob res, nemo compos mentis, nisi velit ingratus atque pravus esse."

²⁰ Cardinal Bessarion (Joannes; Basilios; 1403-72), *In calumniatorem Platonis* (Rome, 1469), unpaginated; subsequent references are to the critical edition by Mohler, *Kardinal Bessarion*, vol. 2.

²¹ Vast, *Le Cardinal Bessarion*, 54 ff.

²² Friedrich Solmsen, "The Aristotelian Tradition in Ancient Rhetoric," *American Journal of Philology* 62 (1941): 35-50.

calumniatorem Platonis is the earliest articulation of this argument in the West.

Bessarion begins his argument, as might a lecturer today, with Plato's *Cratylus*. It is absurd to claim that Plato has, or should have, any concern for the petty linguistic details taught in elementary education.²³ Instead, Plato's discussion of natural and conventional nomination demonstrated to the ancients that the stylistic and figurative aspects of language were not superficial or decorative, but fundamental philosophical concerns. This same concern for the natural and the conventional is at the heart of Plato's *Phaedrus*, and all the best orators of Greece, before and after Plato, spoke in accordance with what he said there. The end of rhetoric is to lead to persuasion, and none of the standard machinery—the exordium, narration, division, confirmation, summary, peroration, exornation, and *elocutio*—none of it has much to do with speaking well or persuasively.²⁴ The real art of rhetoric lies in recognizing similarities and dissimilarities; in understanding what is good and honest and true, and what follows from those so that we can speak about things as they truly are; in being able to analyze and synthesize, and to adjust speech to the nature of the audience. And this, for Bessarion, is precisely the theory of rhetoric which Aristotle teaches at much greater length. In the *Rhetoric* Aristotle separates out both audiences and subjects according to suasive situations, explains in detail the characters of men and how the rational part of speech must be adjusted to those characters, and then teaches how to vary speeches according to different audiences and subjects. Aristotle follows Plato and Plato alone, and, as Aristotle makes clear at the beginning of the *Rhetoric*, none of the rhetoricians before him have examined any of this real art, but have merely engaged in fraud and judicial corruption.²⁵

The issue about Aristotle, as far as Bessarion is concerned, is not that of distinguishing Peripatetic rhetoric, since that is fundamentally the same as Platonic rhetoric. Rather, the issue is why Aristotle takes so much space to say what Plato says so eloquently in such a brief space. The answer is simple, if unexpected. Bessarion proposes the example of a Peripatetic philosopher engaged in a disputation. Someone proposes a syllogism which this Peripatetic does not wish to accept. This philosopher might contradict the major proposition, or perhaps the minor proposition,

²³ Bessarion, *In calumniatorem Platonis*, 33: "Nam formas, modos, figuras, quibus ambitus orationis perficitur, cuius rei cura imprimis ad grammaticos pertinet, si dixero Platonem tenuisse, ridiculum videatur."

²⁴ Bessarion, *In calumniatorem Platonis*, 35: "Quod enim maxime persuasionem inducit, quam constat finem esse rhetoricae, non exordium est, non narratio, non divisio, non argumentatio, non repetitio, non peroratio, non exornatio, non elocutio."

²⁵ Bessarion, *In calumniatorem Platonis*, 35: "Cum enim et auditores et res, quoad eius fieri poterat, divisisset, quibusque et de quibus suaderetur, qui hominum mores essent, quae cuiquam persuadendi rationes accommodarentur, diffusius explicasset, tum praecepit, ut varie ageretur et aliae aliis auditoribus rebusque orationes adhiberentur. Quapropter laudatur passim ab omnibus non alios in hoc rhetores, sed solum Platonem secutus, siquidem prooemiorum quoque artificium improbat quasi fraudem quandam orationis et iudicium corruptelam."

and then propose something to his adversary, who would proceed in turn. Such a disputation could drag on for a long time, yet, in the end, accomplish no more than Plato accomplishes with such efficiency in his dialogues.²⁶ Thus it is that Aristotle tries to anticipate and meet arguments in a syllogistic fashion, and this considerably lengthens his treatise.

For Bessarion, it is Plato's own activity as author of the *Phaedrus* which clarifies what will be merely systematic elaboration in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. First Plato brought together all those propositions to which his adversary would and would not assent, and then he used precisely as many words as he needed to convince this particular listener. There was nothing ambiguous or misleading in his speech, and he did not forget any power of speaking, or verbal splendor, or copia of thought, or systematic demonstration, whether born of native reasoning or from commonplace thinking or from example, that would seize even the multitude and grasp alike the learned and unlearned. Plato's dialogue demonstrates how to adjust a speech to an audience, and just one extra word would have shifted the *Phaedrus* from eloquence to loquacity. As part of this argument, Bessarion allows Plato to speak in his own voice, and includes several lengthy passages from the *Phaedrus* (261E-262C, 263C, 265C-267D, 269D-272B). Oddly enough, Bessarion's Greek manuscript of *In calumniatorem Platonis* includes more of the dialogue than he provides in his printed Latin translation.

George of Trebizond was no stranger to Plato's style; indeed, he admired it, and before his disaffection from Plato he had praised Cicero by calling him "another Plato."²⁷ In the *Comparationes* he tried to anticipate and deflect a response such as Bessarion's by arguing that Plato merely wrote according to his own nature because he had no grasp of rhetoric or any other arts. But Bessarion has a very sophisticated response to Trebizond, and one which shows a fine appreciation for Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. Of course Plato sounds the way he does, says Bessarion, because Plato is a philosopher exploring his subject philosophically for a philosophical audience.²⁸ And, indeed, as Trebizond should have realized, Aristotle himself will do the same in the *Rhetoric*, speaking in the character of a different

²⁶ Bessarion, *In calumniatorem Platonis*, 47: "Nam si quis etiam Peripateticorum, quod facere hac tempestate disputantes consueverunt, cum re aliqua proposita syllogismum protulerit, si ad eum, qui vel primae vel secundae propositioni contradixerit, respondere atque aliis syllogismis tum propositum suum tueri, tum adversarii rationes solvere voluerit, idque tamdiu fecerit, quoad solvendi obiciendique facultas detur, non modo non brevior, sed multo longior, quam apud Platonem sit, disputatio protrahetur."

²⁷ Trebizond, MS Vaticanus latinus 6292, fol. 142r: "ut solus alter Plato appellari meruerit"; quoted in Monfasani, *George of Trebizond*, 18n.

²⁸ Bessarion, *In calumniatorem Platonis*, 49: "'Unus, inquit adversarius, idemque semper est Platonis stilus, ubique sui similis, natura factus, non arte.' Fateor. Philosophus enim Plato erat et philosophiae verus ubique professor." Kohler locates Trebizond's phrase in *Comparationes* I. 4, using the Escorial manuscript. The 1523 edition of the *Comparationes* does not include this particular sentence, although Trebizond repeats the idea frequently.

philosopher for a different philosophical audience with different philosophical proceedings, but at all points Aristotle is still his master's pupil. When Aristotle calls rhetoric the ἀντίστροφος of dialectic (*converti cum dialectica*), he and his teacher are in agreement, as all the classical world realized. Bessarion concludes by showing at length how much even Hermogenes is indebted to Plato, how many times in Περὶ ἰδέων Hermogenes quotes from Plato, and the extent to which Hermogenes' theories of character, of *elocutio*, and of tripartite style in Περὶ ἰδέων draw directly upon Plato. These arguments about Hermogenes are aimed directly at Trebizond himself, since Trebizond earlier had established his reputation and gained patronage by presenting the Greek theories of Hermogenes to the Latin West.²⁹

This argument between George of Trebizond and Cardinal Bessarion puts the Renaissance recovery of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* into a highly charged context. We have here two Byzantine Greek exiles, living in Italy, arguing for the benefit of Western readers, in Latin (a foreign language for both of them), about two ancient Greek philosophers who were discussing language and argument as conducted within political communities that no longer existed. Both of these transplanted men assume that Aristotle's *Rhetoric* provides the criteria with which to evaluate Plato, Trebizond by showing what Plato lacks, Bessarion by showing what Plato anticipates. Trebizond has political and theological reasons for separating Aristotle from Plato, for latinizing Aristotle within the Ciceronian tradition, and for stressing the practical aspects of the *Rhetoric*. Bessarion, for his part, has political and theological reasons for bracketing Aristotle between Plato and Hermogenes in a seamless continuum, and for stressing the philosophical aspects of the *Rhetoric*. For both of these transplanted Byzantine Greeks, this argument about Peripatetic and Platonic rhetoric is merely a warm-up for their principal argument about whether Aristotle or Plato is more congenial to Christian theology, and this particular clash hardly settled the matter. The issue, in fact, seems to have dragged on until about 1530, roughly coincident with the printing of the last of the major recovered Greek treatises and with the death of the last of the exiled Byzantine scholars. But long after this original contest had been eclipsed, there still survived these two major lines of argument. Devoid of their original context, these positions no longer had to oppose one another; sometimes they intertwined or overlapped, sometimes they emerged in new local contexts, and sometimes they just provided background noise.

II

The Renaissance debate between the two Greek émigrés represents a change from the medieval Latin interest in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. Bessarion is sensitive to the issues of ethos, audience, decorum, the figurative aspects of language, and the

²⁹ Monfasani, *George of Trebizond*, 318-27.

suasive role of eloquence. Trebizond is sensitive to topical invention, copia of propositions, disposition of arguments, and to the different kinds of speaking. The medieval Latin interest, on the other hand, is focused almost entirely on the *Rhetoric* as an ethical treatise: in fact, of the nearly one hundred extant manuscripts of Moerbeke's translation, the great majority of them appear bound with what were considered Aristotle's major ethical treatises: the *Politics*, the *Nicomachean Ethics*, and the *Magna Moralia*. The interests in the *Rhetoric* as voiced by Bessarion and Trebizond do not seem to appear during the medieval Latin years. But this is not to say that the Renaissance interest displaced the medieval Latin interest in the *Rhetoric* as an ethical treatise. On the contrary, it provided the initial context for this debate among émigré Greeks, and indeed the earlier ethical interest was reinforced by the Quattrocento recovery of Roman rhetorical works by Cicero and Quintilian.

When George of Trebizond's translation of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* was received initially in the Latin West, it found a place within ethical and Ciceronian frameworks. Such a reception can be seen in the comments of Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini, the humanist who would later become Pope Pius II. Shortly after the publication of Trebizond's translation in 1445, Piccolomini advised a royal pupil of his to study the great authorities, that is, the rhetorical precepts of Cicero and Quintilian, "and particularly useful is Aristotle's *Rhetoric* which has just been translated into Latin." Here he will find how to praise and blame, to judge and argue, to understand the ways of men, and to shape language. By contrast, other writers are more seductive than instructive, as with one recent rhetorician who mixed Cicero's virtuous discussion with his own depravities, and Piccolomini urges his pupil "to drink from the source, not from the gutter."³⁰ Trebizond himself certainly presents his translation of the *Rhetoric* in the same spirit in which Piccolomini receives it.³¹ In his dedicatory

³⁰ Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini (Enea Silvio; Pope Pius II; 1405-64), *De liberorum educatione editus, ad Ladislaum Vngariae & Bohemiae Regem*, in *Opera quae extant omnia* (Basle, 1551), "Quod pueri docendi sunt in Rhetorica & Dialectica," 989: "Sunt ibi colores, sunt ornatus, sunt sententiae: vituperantur, laudanturque homines. Assunt iudicia, suasiones.... Regulae apud Oratores traduntur Ciceronem potissimum atque Quintilianum. Est & Aristotelis Rhetorica hoc nostro seculo in Latinum translata admodum utilis. In his te exercebis, caeteros fugito, qui seducere magis quam docere uideri possunt. Sicut his qui nuper apud Viennam nouam Rhetoricam edidit, in qua tametsi plurima ex Cicerone quae sunt uera atque utilia commiscuit, deprauatis tamen exemplis, & uerbis fecit, ut nec utilia sint, nec uera quae docet, fugiendus est hic, & abhorrendi si quae sint ei similes: Et in fonte fuerit potius quam in riuo potandum."

³¹ At the same time, Piccolomini clearly thought that it was possible to overdo the links between Aristotle and Cicero. Trebizond makes some passing references to Cicero in his own scholia to the translation of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and Piccolomini remarks in a letter dated January 4, 1446, "I don't know why Trebizond's translation mentions Cicero, since he hadn't been born when the *Rhetoric* was written, unless there were some Ciceros around even before Aristotle." Text and commentary in Monfasani, *Collectanea*

prologue, Trebizond promises that Aristotle will offer ethical insights to reward all readers, from the neophyte in human affairs to the expert: "For here, everything about the ways of men—in the variety of their ages and fortunes—everything is judiciously laid out, clearly explained, and suitably described, so completely that nothing is missing. Here we can peer into, not just the secrets of Nature (and Nature is the greatest philosopher of all), but even the hidden minds and private emotions of men—and do so harmlessly."³² As Trebizond did with his earlier treatise *Rhetoricorum libri V*, here he seeks to make yet another Greek rhetorician comprehensible to the Latin West, within the framework of prevailing Latin interests and perspectives. Not until this translation was published did he turn his attention to the debates which began at the Council of Florence, and then his Latin arguments with the Greek Platonist Bessarion turned on different issues.

But if Trebizond's Aristotelianism must be understood in its Latin context, so also must be Bessarion's defense of Plato's Aristotelianism. And the evidence suggests that not all of the Latin Platonists were enthusiastic about Plato as a rhetorician. Shortly after the printing of *In calumniatorem Platonis* in 1469, Bessarion sent a copy of his book to Marsilio Ficino, as he had promised to do, and with it a letter of transmittal addressed "to the Platonist Marsilio Ficino" (*Marsilio Ficino Platónico*). Bessarion is sending the book, he tells Ficino, "not only because of your own bent for Platonic teaching and your extraordinary interest in it, but also so that you may easily perceive—and read—what we have drawn from that source." Whatever eloquence there is in the work is borrowed from Plato, who can defend himself quite well, and Bessarion draws Ficino's attention to the *Phaedrus*, in which Plato "has pleaded his own case by his own powers and by the fullness and richness of his language."³³ Ficino responds by praising both

Trapezuntiana, 698: "In Rhetorica Aristotilis per Trapesondam translata invenio in exemplis Ciceronem nominari. Nescio cur id egerit Trapesondas. Nam cum ad verbum fieri translatione soleant ... nescio cur Cicero nominetur in Aristotelis operibus, qui nondum natus erat quando volumen editus est, nisi Cicerones etiam ante Aristotilem fuerunt."

³² Trebizond, *Aristotelis Rhetoricorum libri III* (Venice, 1523), 109: "Mirum enim est sic ipsum omnia de moribus hominum per diversas aetates atque fortunas prudenter invenisse, distincte explicasse, ornate conscripisse, ut nihil ab eo praetermissum esse videatur. nec secreta naturae solum, ut summus omnium philosophus, sed abditas quoque hominum mentes, motusque reconditos non iniuria percepisse putetur." Cf. Monfasani, *Collectanea Trapezuntiana*, 90-91; 206-208.

³³ In Mohler, *Kardinal Bessarion*, 3:543, epist. 64: "Superioribus litteris elucubratum opus nostrum et nuper editum in defensionem Platonis nos ad te missuros promissimus, cum ob ingenium tuum et Platonicae doctrinae studium eximium, tum ut, quid nos ex illo fonte hauserimus, facile perspicias et legas. Si quid enim in hac industria nostra vel eloquentiae vel bonarum artium cognitionis eluxit, si quid fuimus, id omne vel nos ab illo accepisse, vel ipsum sibi se defendendo suppeditasse facile existimari patimur et volumus. Quod nonnihil quoque ad illius laudem pertinere videtur, ut suis viribus, sua amplitudine causam pro se dixerit, alieno auxilio non egerit, voci tamen patroni locum reliquerit ac studio." The phrase *sua amplitudine* echoes the *amplitudo Platonis* of Cicero, *Or.* 1 *fin.*

Bessarion and the eloquence of his defense, but what Ficino concentrates on is that part of Plato which interests him the most, saying that "when our Plato discoursed on beauty in the *Phaedrus* with such insight and at such length, it was beauty of soul he sought from God, which he called wisdom and most precious gold." It was this gold which had become lost to men's eyes over the centuries, and even after Plato's gold had been recovered, there were still men (presumably George of Trebizond) who were upset by such bright rays of light; these men despised and even abused what they could not understand. "But you, Bessarion, the light of the Academy, speedily applied a most wholesome remedy for weak and dim eyes, so that Plato's heaven-sent gold would not only be refined and purified, but safe to the touch and to the eyes." Indeed, the time had now come, a time that Plato had foretold, "when the mysteries of theology would be purified by the most demanding discussion just as gold is purified by fire."³⁴

Bessarion and Ficino were talking past one another. Bessarion directs Ficino, not to the lore of Platonic philosophy, but to the issue of eloquence, and particularly to his translation of the *Phaedrus* (the only dialogue translated at length in *In calumniatorem Platonis*). Ficino, while appreciating the eloquence, looks directly through it to see the metaphysical aspects of the *Phaedrus*, and not the rhetorical aspects. Years later, after Ficino finally offers his own translation, his commentaries on the *Phaedrus* will stress these same metaphysical issues and all but dismiss the rhetorical issues.³⁵ If anything, Ficino simply did not want to know about the

³⁴ Marsilio Ficino (1433-99), in Mohler, *Kardinal Bessarion*, 3:544-45, epist. 65: "Plato noster cum in Phaedro non minus copiose quam subtiliter de pulchritudine disputasset, animi pulchritudinem a Deo, quam et sapientiam et aurum pretiosissimum vocat, postulavit.... Sed tu, Bessario, academiae lumen medicamentum confestim saluberrimum hebetibus et caligantibus oculis adhibuisti, ut iam aurum illud Platoni divinitus datum non modo defaecatum ac mundum sit, sed tractabile manibus et oculis innoxium. Hoc vaticinatus aliquando Plato fore tempus Dionysio inquit post multa saecula, quo theologiae mysteria exactissima discussione velut igne aurum purificarentur."

³⁵ Ficino, *In Phaedrum commentaria & argumenta*, in *Opera omnia, & quae hactenus extiterunt, & quae in lucem nunc primum prodire omnia* (Basle, 1561), 1363-86. It was Ficino who subtitled the *Gorgias* as *vel, de rhetorica*, and the *Phaedrus* as *vel, de pulchro*. The end of Ficino's own synopsis of the *Phaedrus* approaches the dithyrambic: "Ab exercitatione dialectica, rerumque contemplatione sublimium, tandem mentis sublimitas usque ad agendum efficax comparatur.... Concludit uero dialogum orationem, uotisque pulchritudinem animi a deo petentibus. In qua considera Socratem caeteris omnino spretis sola pulchritudine animi, id est sapientia esse contentum, ueruntamen indicare, hanc ipsum non tam humano studio, quam diuino munere comparari"; *Platonis opera translatione* [1483/84] (Lyons, 1548), 300b. Bessarion, by contrast, did not even transcribe, much less translate, the speeches on love in the *Phaedrus*. For Ficino, see Michael J. B. Allen (ed. and trans.), *Marsilio Ficino and the Phaedran Charioteer: Introduction, texts, translations* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1981), and Allen, *The Platonism of Marsilio Ficino: A study of his "Phaedrus" commentary, its sources and genesis* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1984).

rhetorical or Peripatetic aspects of Plato.³⁶ His own view of rhetoric is clear from his letters. In one letter he declares that the duty of an orator is "to have persuaded himself first of what he would urge upon others."³⁷ In another, Ficino expatiates on rhetorical efficacy with an audience:

Since you have read the Greek and Latin orators, I gather that you teach your students to remember always that an audience ought to be persuaded by what is right, and not by what is pleasing. For the speaker who urges what is just will persuade with greater ease and more success when he has Justice for his patron. Let them remember to be just men themselves, since a contemptible life condemns the speech. Deeds speak louder than words, and the one who most moves others is he who has most moved himself, but it grates horribly upon the ears when he sings one song while playing another. Divine Music is a true harmony of thoughts, words, and deeds.³⁸

If Cardinal Bessarion wanted to read Plato so that Plato would agree with Aristotle, then "the Platonist Marsilio Ficino" wanted just as strongly to have a philosophical Plato unsullied by Aristotelian rhetoric, and to have an ethical rhetoric that came straight out of Augustine.

Bessarion's sophisticated exegesis inaugurated the Renaissance procedure of explicating Aristotle's *Rhetoric* by drawing upon Plato whenever it seemed locally useful, while Trebizond's point of view about Aristotle, if not about Plato, blended well with the inherited Latin ethical interest and with the recovered Roman rhetorics. For a full century, Trebizond's translation was the principal Latin source for Aristotle's *Rhetoric*; it was the first translation to be printed (Paris, 1475-77), and

³⁶ Ficino here follows the early lead of Leonardo Bruni, who published the first Latin translation of the *Phaedrus* in 1423/24. Bruni celebrated the elegance of both Plato and Aristotle, but what he took from the *Gorgias* was a condemnation of rhetoric, and from the *Phaedrus* the mystical celebration of the contemplative man by divine fire. See the texts in Gordon Griffiths, James Hankins, and David Thompson (trans.), *The Humanism of Leonardo Bruni: Selected texts* (Binghamton, N.Y.: Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 1987), 157-59; 217 ff.

³⁷ Ficino, *Opera omnia*, 744 (to Cherubino Quarguagli): "Oratoris, quae alijs suasurus est, sibi iam ipsi persuasisse."

³⁸ Ficino, *Opera omnia*, 658 (to Lorenzo Lippi): "Qvonia[m] l[e]gisti Graecos Rhetores & Latinos, arbitror te ita discipulos tuos instruere ut semper meminerint non quod libeat, sed quod liceat auditoribus persuaderi debere. Nam qui quod iustum est suadet, facilius & felicius persuadet, quippe cum in causa sua iustitiam habet patronam. Meminerint se iustos esse oportere. Cuius enim uita non probatur oratio reprobatur. Opera uehementius quam uerba mouent, maxime mouet alios qui ipse movetur maxime, omnino autem offendit aures qui aliter canit ore, aliter pulsant lyram. Diuina Musica est rectus cogitationum, uerborum actionumque concentus."

was the one most frequently reprinted during the Renaissance.³⁹ By 1544 there had already been ten editions of Trebizond, only two of which appeared in Italy. The only other translation printed during that time was the medieval one of Moerbeke, and four of Moerbeke's five editions were printed in Italy. The implications of this apparent split in publishing preferences—Trebizond in the north, Moerbeke in Italy—have yet to be worked out in any detail; and both texts were tinkered with freely by editors and printers. Neither translation was particularly graceful by Renaissance standards. Moerbeke had translated the foreign Greek into his native Latin, proceeding *verbum ex verbo* and relying on the universal translucence of text. In 1445 Trebizond reversed Moerbeke's procedure, translating from his native Greek into his adopted Latin.⁴⁰ It was not until 1474 that a Renaissance Latin stylist produced an elegant translation, one which explicitly aimed to eliminate the "barbarous" Latin of the medieval period. It was done by Ermolao Barbaro, the grandson of the same Francesco Barbaro who had originally invited George of Trebizond to the Latin West. But Ermolao's translation, intended as part of a major project to embrace the Aristotelian corpus, was not printed until 1544, a full seventy years later, and then outside of Italy. It appeared interspersed with a complete commentary by Ermolao's nephew—Danielo Barbaro.⁴¹

The three strands which I have been delineating up to this point are all present in 1544, a full century after Trebizond's translation, when they rest uneasily side-by-side. In Danielo's commentary on Ermolao's translation of the *Rhetoric* we see an attempt to make Aristotle (1) coherent with the Renaissance Cicero and Quintilian, and (2) coherent with the Latin metaphysical Plato, all in the context of (3) the ongoing concern with Aristotle's *Rhetoric* as an ethical treatise. Danielo

³⁹ There were more than twenty-seven editions within the century. See the census in Paul D. Brandes, *A History of Aristotle's Rhetoric: With a bibliography of early printings* (Metuchen, N.J., and London: Scarecrow Press, 1989). Brandes should still be supplemented with F. Edward Cranz and Charles B. Schmitt, *A Bibliography of Aristotle Editions. 1501-1600*, 2d ed. (Baden-Baden: Valentin Koerner, 1984); with the inventories of Renaissance Latin commentaries by Charles H. Lohr, S.J., in *Studies in the Renaissance* 21 (1974), *Renaissance Quarterly* 28-33 (1975-80), 35 (1982); and with James J. Murphy, *Renaissance Rhetoric: A short-title catalogue on rhetorical theory from the beginning of printing to A.D. 1700* (New York and London: Garland, 1981).

⁴⁰ Berschin characterizes the shift from medieval to humanistic translation as that from *transfere* to *traducere*; see *Greek Letters and the Latin Middle Ages*, 275-80. The early humanistic notions about translation are explored by Hankins in *The Humanism of Leonardo Bruni*, 197-254.

⁴¹ Pierre Lardet has examined the progression in translation from the "barbarous" medieval Moerbeke, to the humanist Trebizond, to the elegant and literary Ermolao Barbaro; see Lardet, "Les traductions," note 7 above. The publishing history of these three translations, however, does not demonstrate as clear a progression in their reception. Moerbeke's translation was printed long after Barbaro's translation was available, while Barbaro's translation was not printed until very late, and then only six times in total; see the census in Brandes, *History of Aristotle's Rhetoric*.

presents a lengthy introduction to Ermolao's translation, in which he sets out a psychological framework for understanding the *Rhetoric*.⁴² That framework sounds strikingly like the description of the soul as elaborated by Marsilio Ficino in his *Theologia Platonica* back in 1469, in which he tried to reconcile the concepts of appetite found in Plato and Aristotle,⁴³ combined with his own discussion of the myth of the charioteer from the *Phaedrus*. Danielo Barbaro separates the powers of the soul into those of nature, appetite, and intellect. "Appetite," he writes,

is a kind of power in the soul that can either compel or incite someone to do anything whatsoever; either because the rational intellect demonstrates desirability of that thing, or because an irrational feeling demands that it be done. The rational intellect is where the Will [*voluntas*] is placed, while irrational feeling manifests itself in two ways—either it surges on waves of Anger, or else it is aroused by the enticements of Desire. So it is that a singular human being has two counselors—Anger and Desire, and in these are found both pleasure and pain. Reason tries to steer a middle course, yielding neither to Anger nor Desire; thus it is that Justice, the greatest of all the virtues, is situated in the Will [*voluntas*].⁴⁴

By focusing on "those counselors whom nature has placed in our souls, namely Intellect, Anger, and Desire,"⁴⁵ Danielo Barbaro is able to make Aristotle's *Rhetoric*

⁴² The following discussion is drawn from the fuller analysis in Lawrence D. Green, "Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and Renaissance Views of the Emotions," in Peter Mack (ed.), *The Significance of Renaissance Rhetoric* (Macmillan, forthcoming).

⁴³ Ficino, *Theologiae Platonicae, de immortalitate animorum* [1469], in *Opera omnia*, 108: "voluntas, quae est inclinatio mentis ad bonum." Ficino later specifies *voluntas* as the rational appetite corresponding to intellect; *Opera omnia*, 313: "sicut appetitus irrationalis sequitur sensum, sic voluntas quae est rationalis auditas, sequitur intellectum." For discussion, see Paul Oskar Kristeller, *The Philosophy of Marsilio Ficino* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1943), 257 ff.

⁴⁴ Danielo Barbaro (Danielus Barbarus; 1514-70), Ermolao Barbaro (Almoro; Hermolaus Barbarus; 1454-93), *Aristotelis rhetoricorum libri tres, Hermolao Barbaro Patricio Veneto interprete. Danielis Barbari in eosdem libros commentarii* (Basle, 1545), 3: "Animae uis quaedam appetens est, qua quidem ipsa fertur in aliquid, uel incitatur: sed illud aliquid, uel id intelligitur, quod ratio, et mens ostendit: uel id, quod sensus temerarius exposcit. In priori loco Voluntas est posita, in posteriori duplex Ratio: nam aut irarum fluctu aestuat, aut cupiditatum ille cebris commouetur. Hinc illud, quod homo cum unus sit, duos habet consultores, Iracundiam, et Cupiditatem: in quibus uoluptas inest, et dolor. Accedit ratio quidem media, quae alio nos modo mouet, quam uel ira: uel cupiditas. In uoluntate uirtutum maxime omnium Iustitia collocatur."

⁴⁵ Danielo Barbaro, *Rhetoricorum libri tres ... commentarii*, 5: "necesse est ut eos dicendo excitet consultores, quos in animis nostris natura posuit, et insigniuit: Mentem scilicet, Iracundiam, et Cupiditatem, quibus quasi nervis, quo uelit nos pertrahat, et deducat. Docendo igitur mentem mouebit, conciliando cupiditatem pertinget, concitando iracundiam exuscitabit."

resemble Roman rhetoric. "Teaching" is the end for the Intellect, and it is reserved for book 1 of the *Rhetoric*. "Excitation" is for Anger, and it is reserved for book 2, while "pleasing" is for Desire, and it is treated in book 3. Not surprisingly, an enormous amount of ingenuity is required to make these categories work at all. The effort relies largely on discussions of appetite and human *voluntas*.

But *voluntas* is not really a very good translation for Aristotle's word, βούλησις (1369a3), a choosing which comes before action. Renaissance *voluntas* is, as Paul Oscar Kristeller points out, more of an Augustinian notion than a classical one, and he suspects that when Marsilio Ficino defined the Will as "an inclination of the mind toward the good," Ficino went all the way back to Augustine for his inspiration. Perhaps so, but Ficino need not have gone back any further than the thirteenth century and the theological discussions prevailing at the time of the first Latin translations of the *Rhetoric*. The Vetus Translatio renders Aristotle (1369a2-4) as *est autem voluntas appetitus cum ratione (nullus enim sed quando arbitratur esse bonum)*, while Moerbeke at about the same time uses almost the same words.⁴⁶ George of Trebizond in 1444 offers much the same with *nam voluntas appetitus est boni cum ratione. nullus non aliquod vult, nisi cum bonum esse putaverit*, while Ermolao Barbaro in 1479 translates *voluntas quidem est appetitio boni, cum ratione coniuncta: quia nemo vult, praeterquam quod suspicatur bonum esse*.⁴⁷ I do not mean to suggest that in 1469 Marsilio Ficino took either his locution or his conception from the Latin efforts to understand Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, or that Ficino's notion of the soul relies upon Aristotle's discussion of human motivation in the context of judicial oratory. Rather, I want to stress the extent to which medieval ethical interests, Latin Platonic interests, and early Renaissance Ciceronianism conspired with and reinforced one another to prepare a colorable context within which Aristotle's *Rhetoric* could make sense, ranging from the larger framework with which to approach the entire treatise to the smaller details of text and translation.

Danielo Barbaro was hardly alone in his approach to Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, and we can see the same impulses at work in a variety of other materials in the Renaissance. At Oxford in the 1570s, the future puritan theologian John Rainolds lectured extensively on the *Rhetoric*, and was persuaded utterly by Bessarion's argument of a century earlier "that Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is patterned after the rhetorical precepts which were sketched in Plato's *Phaedrus*. This is evident in the work itself."⁴⁸ But when Rainolds reviews Aristotle's notions about ethos and pathos,

⁴⁶ Moerbeke: *est autem voluntas cum ratione appetitus (nullus enim nisi cum putaverit esse bonum)*, a formulation with which Giles of Rome concurs; *Expositio super tribus libris rhetoricorum*, E3^r.

⁴⁷ Ermolao Barbaro, *Rhetoricorum libri tres*, 257.

⁴⁸ John Rainolds (Rainoldus; Reynolds; 1549-1607), in Lawrence D. Green (ed. and trans.), *John Rainolds's Oxford Lectures on Aristotle's "Rhetoric"* (Newark: University of Delaware Press; London and Toronto: Associated University Presses, 1986), 96: "Bessario, librum 1. ut opinor in calumniatorem Platonis, hos libros ad imaginem praeceptorum

along with Aristotle's discussions about communal perceptions of the *summum bonum*, he contrasts them with Plato's views and finally excoriates Aristotle for his ceaseless pandering to the opinions and emotions of the dregs of society.⁴⁹ Like Danielo Barbaro before him, Rainolds relies on discussions of appetite and human *voluntas*, but seen this time through the humanist readings of Juan Luis Vives and the Protestant theology of Calvin: Aristotle's account of appetite fails to account for the corruption of *voluntas* by Original Sin, while Plato, without knowing about Original Sin, at least understood the common corruptions of judgment and soul.⁵⁰

Another set of school lectures given at Florence in the 1580s by the Jesuit Francisco Benci show a similar concern. The lectures are unusual in that Benci turns Aristotle's text inside-out in order to focus upon the psychology of the audience, or, to put it differently, Aristotle's doctrines of *ethos* and *pathos* are used to reorganize the entirety of the *Rhetoric* into a coherent Renaissance whole. Benci begins his lectures with book 2, chapter 15, where Aristotle speaks about the characters of various auditors, their ages, their worldly conditions, and so forth. It is in the context of this survey of character that Benci backtracks in order to cover the material on emotions in book 2, chapters 1 through 12. That done, Benci quickly rehearses the entire theory of the enthymeme in short scope, and ends his lectures with a detailed analysis of the enthymematic topics. All the other details of Aristotle's treatise either drop by the wayside, or else are mentioned only in passing.⁵¹

Benci may be the inheritor of the original medieval concern with the *Rhetoric* as an ethical treatise, but his own concern is hardly medieval. The characters and passions of men make Aristotle's entire theory of persuasive speaking comprehensible to Benci. And the same story seems to obtain in the north of Europe, where Nathan Chytraeus published his own lectures on the *Rhetoric*.⁵²

rhetoricae, quae traduntur apud Platonem in Phaedro, delineatos esse demonstrat. Quod res ipsa indicat."

⁴⁹ Rainolds's *Oxford Lectures*, 278-98; 290: "Aristoteles, impius existimatur, quod ex erroribus populi philosophiam animorum fingendorum collegerit, & ab optimis magistri Platonis institutis, contradicendi studio recesserit. Certe summum bonum ex ipsa quasi vulgi sentina corrogavit."

⁵⁰ Rainolds's *Oxford Lectures*, 348: "Nolo assentatorem; oratorem volo: aegrotis salutaria non suavia quaerenda. Irridentur a Platone in Gorgia lenones isti, uel Gnathones potius: ut in Phaedro, qui verisimile pro vero, asinum pro equo nobis obtrudunt.... Itaque ut Academici, cum aiunt secundum naturam vivere, summum esse bonum; in eo falluntur quod rectae sua natura naturae deprauationem ignorent.... Sed illud quod latuit omnes philosophos, Originis peccatum, inquinavit iudicia, voluntates deprauavit."

⁵¹ Francisco Benci (Franciscus Bencius; 1542-94), *In librum secundum rhetoricam Aristotelis*, Laurentian MS Redi. 13 (136). Benci's lectures are analyzed in detail in Lawrence D. Green, "Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and Renaissance Views of the Emotions"; see note 42 above.

⁵² Nathan Chytraeus (1543-98), "Ἠθικὴ καὶ πάθος, seu de affectibus movendis (Herborn, 1586).

Chytraeus's approach is less imaginative than Benci's in that he does not turn Aristotle's text inside-out, but it is just as tightly focused as Benci's. Chytraeus presents only book 2 of the *Rhetoric*, starting with chapter 1 to frame the discussions of both emotions and characters, and then he proceeds methodically to chapter 18, ending his lectures abruptly just as Aristotle turns to his discussion of enthymemes and topics.

III

I have so far been stressing the ways in which local needs and immediate arguments in the Renaissance shaped the overall understanding of Aristotelian rhetoric. But what I have been urging for the larger understanding also applies to the details of his text. The two levels, in fact, call one another into play. The Renaissance difficulties with the opening sentence of the *Rhetoric* are a familiar case in point. Aristotle declares that rhetoric is the ἀντίστροφος of dialectic.⁵³ Renaissance writers could not agree about whether this meant that rhetoric was *like* dialectic, or *opposite* to dialectic, or *interchangeable* with dialectic, or an *inversion* of dialectic, or a *mirror-image* of dialectic. Philological arguments were made on whether to read ἀντί in combination with στρέφω in the Latin sense of *pro* or *contra*. Appeals were made to several different authorities, ranging from Alexander of Aphrodisias to Cicero and to Averroes, and in each case the statements of the various authorities were taken out of context in such a way as to serve the local needs of the competing positions. Daniello Barbaro provides an interesting example of an attempt to steer between competing understandings and competing authorities. Daniello's uncle Ermolao Barbaro had adopted Cicero's reading of ἀντίστροφος as *quasi ex altera parte respondere dialecticae* (*Or.* 32.114). Seventy years later, Daniello glossed Ermolao's Ciceronian reading in an Averroist fashion by saying *Rhetoricam et Dialecticam similes esse*, and he used Abraham de Balme's translation of Averroes to refer to the two disciplines as *affinis*. Thus uncle Ermolao's translation seems to be going *contra*, while nephew Daniello glosses that same translation by going *pro*. Daniello draws some distinctions in an effort to reconcile these positions, *pro* and *contra*. He says that Alexander of Aphrodisias and Averroes both saw similarity by virtue of looking at the material of the two disciplines, while Cicero saw contrariety by looking at the form. Thus, for Daniello Barbaro, it's all a matter of how one chooses to look at the problem.⁵⁴

What really determined people's understandings of ἀντίστροφος was prior commitment to different positions on what constituted rhetoric and dialectic (and logic), and those positions shifted throughout the Latin Renaissance. One relatively

⁵³ For a fuller discussion of this issue, see Lawrence D. Green, "Aristotelian Rhetoric, Dialectic, and the Traditions of 'Αντίστροφος,'" *Rhetorica* 8 (1990): 5-27.

⁵⁴ Daniello Barbaro, *Rhetoricorum libri tres . . . commentarii*, 14.

late version of the controversy as it stood at that stronghold of Peripatetic studies in Padua shows just how divergent those positions could be. The two disputants were Jacopo Zabarella, the professor of logic and natural philosophy, and Antonio Riccoboni, the professor of rhetoric. Zabarella was trained in the Peripatetic thinking of Alexander of Aphrodisias but later was strongly influenced by Arab and, in particular, Averroist thinking which realigned all the Aristotelian arts and sciences.⁵⁵ Riccoboni was less methodical than Zabarella but, as William Wallace has pointed out, for Riccoboni the discipline of rhetoric has "ramifications with practically the whole of the university curriculum."⁵⁶ Both men struggle mightily to make sense of Aristotle's local use of ἀντίστροφος in the *Rhetoric*, and both do so in the context of larger understandings.

Zabarella argues, in Averroist fashion, that logic is the master art embracing dialectic, rhetoric, and poetics.⁵⁷ Both rhetoric and poetics are instrumentalities, but not of contemplative philosophy, nor of the arts, nor of moral philosophy. Instead, they are instrumentalities of human civic action.⁵⁸ In Zabarella's reading of both Plato and Aristotle, the end of rhetoric is persuasion to the good, while the end of poetry is moral correction and the purgation of emotion.⁵⁹ As Zabarella reads the opening of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, the excitation of emotions and the fineries of *elocutio* are not essential to rhetoric; they are, at most, accidents. What is essential to rhetoric is argumentation and argumentation alone. At this point Zabarella needs to distinguish rhetoric from dialectic, and he does so by rejecting the opinions of both Alexander of Aphrodisias and of Zeno the Stoic. Zabarella disagrees with

⁵⁵ Wilhelm Risse judges Zabarella to be "einer der scharfsinnigsten und klarsten Logiker aller Zeiten"; see Jacopo Zabarella (Giacomo; Jacobus; 1533-89), *Opera logica*, 3rd. ed. (Cologne, 1597; rpt. Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1966), i. See also Eckhard Kessler, "The Intellectual Soul," *CHRP*, 530-34, and Nicholas Jardine, "Epistemology of the Sciences," *CHRP*, 689-93.

⁵⁶ William Wallace, "Is Rhetoric an Art or a Science? Antonio Riccobono and Paduan Aristotelianism," address to International Society for the History of Rhetoric (Göttingen, 11 July 1989), 13.

⁵⁷ Zabarella, *De natura logicae* [1578] in *Opera logica*, 1.20c: "Dialectica solam disputatricem facultatem significet quae logicae pars quaedam est; logica vero totam disciplinam"; ...*Opera logica*, 1.86a-89f: "Caput XVII. quomodo Rhetorica sit pars Logica, & in quo differat a Dialectica"; ...*Opera logica*, 1.93a-96c: "Caput XIX. de Poetica, quomodo sit pars Logica."

⁵⁸ Zabarella, *De natura logicae* in *Opera logica*, 1.78b-79c: "Caput XIII. de Rhetorica, & Poetica, quod philosophiae contemplativae instrumenta non sint"; ...*Opera logica*, 1.79d-82a: "Caput XIV. quod Rhetorica & Poetica neque artium, neque moralis Philosophiae instrumenta sint"; ...*Opera logica*, 1.82f: "Sunt igitur Rhetorica, atque Poetica facultates instrumentales, quibus homo civilis ad agendum utitur, id est ad ciues bonos efficiendos."

⁵⁹ Zabarella, *De natura logicae* in *Opera logica*, 1.83e: "Rhetoricam aptam quidem esse persuadere tam bonum, quam malum; proprium tamen, & germanum eius finem esse iusta persuadere, non iniusta"; ...*Opera logica*, 1.84b: "Idem de Poetica dicendum est; eius enim scopus naturalis est utilitas, & morum correctio, & affectionum purgatio."

Alexander's claim that rhetoric and dialectic deal with the same subject matter. Instead, Aristotle's argument about ethics and politics makes it clear that dialectic treats of all materials, and that rhetoric treats only of human actions in civil affairs, a distinction reinforced by Aristotle's use of the word *persuadere*, which is comprehensible only in the sphere of civil action.⁶⁰ Zabarella also quarrels with Zeno's distinction between the open palm of rhetoric and the closed fist of dialectic; rhetoric is no less logical than dialectic, and rhetoric is able to clench its fist when the occasion warrants. When Aristotle says that rhetoric is the *παρομφής* of dialectic and politics, he means that rhetoric is a branch of that great tree of dialectic, that rhetoric is a child of that great mother dialectic, and its materials are those of politics.⁶¹

Antonio Riccoboni disagrees with Zabarella.⁶² Rhetoric, for Riccoboni, is not a part of dialectic, nor, for that matter, is it a part of ethics or politics. Instead, it has an independent status, adopting aspects of dialectic and of ethics only as they are relevant to rhetoric. Riccoboni agrees that Aristotle's *Rhetoric* does indeed deal with political matters, but Aristotle's definition of rhetoric is sufficiently supple for rhetoric to be exercised in many other disciplines as well, and Riccoboni shows how it can apply to scientific discourse and to homiletics. Aristotle never pretended to anticipate all the possible realms of rhetoric, and nothing in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* or in the *Organon* supports Zabarella's distinction between cognition and action as respective ends of dialectic and rhetoric. According to Riccoboni, all that Aristotle has in mind by his references to ethical and political treatises is that rhetoric is appropriately sensitive to the characters and emotions of men in civil affairs. As for Zabarella's claim that *elocutio* is not important in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, the entirety of book 3 disproves that claim; anything which affects human disposition is crucial

⁶⁰ Zabarella, *De natura logicae in Opera logica*, 1.92c-d: "Hac itaque responsione reiecta ego dicendum puto, per verbum [*persuadere*] distingui Rhetoricam a Dialectica: proinde Dialecticam sub illa definitione non contineri: quoniam in illo verbo insita est vis quaedam, quae actionem respiciat; dicimus enim alicui esse persuasum, quando eo ductus est ut ita agere velit; dialecticum vero disputantem non dicimus velle aduersario persuadere: quia non vult eum hortari ut agat, sed dicimus velle vincere, vel opinionem quandam rei in eius animo gignere; itaque persuadere est efficaci oratione ad agendum compellere, quod oratoris est proprium, et Dialectico non conuenit."

⁶¹ Zabarella, *De natura logicae in Opera logica*, 1.92f-93a: "dicitur enim apud Graecos *παρομφής* virgultum paruum arbori adnatum ex eadem radice; adnascitur itaque Rhetorica Dialecticae tanquam paruum virgultum arbori magnae: quia Dialectica aequè materiam omnem complectitur: proinde magna arbor est; Rhetorica vero in sola ciuili materia versatur: ideo virgultum paruum dicitur habita materiae ratione: propterea non est intelligendum, ut multi intelligunt, Rhetoricam ex Dialectica tanquam ex matre nasci: sed ex eadem radice, & ex eadem matre exorire, ex qua & Dialectica nascitur."

⁶² Antonio Riccoboni (Marcus Antonius Riccobonus; Riccobono; 1541-99), *Paraphrasis in rhetoricam Aristotelis, interiecta rerum difficiliorum explicatione, & collata ipsius Riccoboni multis in locis conuersione, cum Maioragii, Sigonii, Victorii, Mureti conuersionibus* [1587] (Hanau, 1606), 31 ff.

to rhetoric. More complex is Riccoboni's response to Zabarella on the issue of Aristotle's dialectical and analytical treatises; Riccoboni makes a distinction which Aristotle does not make, but which Riccoboni thinks is implicit in the *Rhetoric*, between what is "probable" and what is "persuasive." In one sense, the probable is the genus and the persuasive is a species of that genus. But not all probabilities are persuasive, because not all probabilities have the human degree of acceptability required for something to be persuasive. A persuasive is a probability that is probable to a great majority of men, many of whom have only an ordinary understanding of the subject at hand. And the majority of men grant a high degree of probability to those positions to which they are already inclined, that is, according to their characters and emotions.

At this point, it might seem that some writers in the Renaissance were very close to making the kind of argument which William Grimaldi and others have made in our own time about the unity of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* through the instrumentality of Aristotle's enthymeme.⁶³ But Riccoboni does not advance any such position, nor have I found any other Renaissance writers who do so. The closest I have seen to Grimaldi's perception of wholeness through the enthymeme comes through the unexpected mechanism of the methodical Renaissance diagrams of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* by Theodore Goulston, a physician who translated the treatise in 1606. Goulston claims in his preface that the enthymeme is a structure in which logical, ethical, and pathetic persuasives work upon one another reciprocally to create belief.⁶⁴ Goulston's diagrams of Aristotle's treatise foster this perception by trying to organize all of the *Rhetoric* in a visual and graphic manner, but having done so, Goulston subsequently treats the enthymeme as a formal structure and the three persuasives as discrete elements. Goulston is not at all unusual in his reversion. In general, Renaissance concerns for Aristotle's enthymeme are different from ours today, and I want now to draw to a close by looking at three textual problems involving the enthymeme; they entail the doctrines of truncation, of the σῶμα τῆς πίστεως, and the mental inadequacies of the vulgar crowd.

By the middle of the sixteenth century, Renaissance commentators were well aware of the complex history of the notion of the enthymeme, but relied upon the doctrine of truncation as an explanation of last resort. Daniello Barbaro, for example, rehearsed what Hermogenes, Cicero, and others said about the enthymeme, and observed that Aristotle's discussion of the enthymeme in *Rhetoric* 1.3 is not entirely

⁶³ William M. A. Grimaldi, S.J., *Studies in the Philosophy of Aristotle's "Rhetoric"* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1972); Aristotle, *"Rhetoric" I: A commentary* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1980); Aristotle, *"Rhetoric" II: A commentary* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1988); Jürgen Sprute, *Die Enthymemtheorie der aristotelischen Rhetoric* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1982); Thomas M. Conley, "The Enthymeme in Perspective," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 70 (1984): 168-87; and others.

⁶⁴ Theodore Goulston (1572-1632), *Aristotelis de rhetorica seu arte dicendi libri tres, graecolat.* (London, 1619).

consonant with his discussion of enthymematic commonplaces in *Rhetoric* 2.22. But when Daniello discusses the enthymeme in detail, it is approached as a truncated Aristotelian syllogism. So also with Antonio Riccoboni who, having come so far in his discussion of probability and inclination, subsequently reverts to formal modes of understanding the enthymeme which take their cue from discussions in logical circles.

Within this general Renaissance subscription to the enthymeme as a truncated syllogism there is an extraordinary variety. Once again, the larger understandings of Aristotle's treatise directly shape what the several commentators have to say about the details of the text, and the positions by Zabarella and Riccoboni hardly exhaust the possibilities. Zabarella even offers an etymology of the word *enthymeme* to support his view of it. The word comes from the phrase ἐν θυμῷ, "that is, in the mind, because the proposition which is omitted remains in the mind."⁶⁵ Zabarella's discussion entails several aspects of what we might be inclined to view as ethical and pathetic proof, but his larger framework will not allow him to see them as ethical or pathetic.⁶⁶ Instead, he places Aristotle's rhetorical syllogism firmly within dialectical proceeding. When an orator decides to truncate either the major or minor proposition, he eliminates whichever proposition his adversary already concedes, and instead focuses on the proposition which requires more attention to establish. But there is another reason to truncate the syllogism, and that is to flatter the audience with a *captatio benevolentiae*. To tell the majority only a few selected things makes them feel learned and erudite, since it is not worth saying that which the majority already knows.⁶⁷ But the orator must be certain that the omitted propositions are indeed well known by the majority, and the majority commonly knows that which they know in common. What they know in common is a result of the actions they take in the sight of one another, and hence the realm of civil affairs is appropriate for Aristotle's enthymeme. For Zabarella, the enthymeme is strictly an argumentative logical structure, hedged with

⁶⁵ Zabarella, *Tabulae logicae* [1579], 5th ed. (Basle, 1594), in *Opera logica*, 2.169: "Enthymema est syllogismus imperfectus constans ex verisimilibus, vel ex signis. imperfectus est quia deest ei altera propositio vel maior, vel minor, quae ut nota omittitur, unde etiam dictum est enthymema quasi ἐν θυμῷ, id est in animo, quia propositio, quae omittitur, in animo manet."

⁶⁶ Zabarella, *De natura logicae* in *Opera logica*, 1.88c-d: "necessarium ferme est, ut vel propositio maior, vel minor nota sit iudicibus, & concessa etiam ab adversario: nam si adversarius factum homicidium neget, maiorem admittit, in qua non est posita vlla altercatio: sed negat minorem: ideo sola minor ab oratore pronuntiatur, & corroboratur; quod si factum confiteatur adversarius, iuste tamen factum dicat, minorem concedet, maiorem negabit."

⁶⁷ Zabarella, *De natura logicae* in *Opera logica*, 1.88e: "vult enim per alterius propositionis omissionem laudare auditores, & ab eis hac ratione benevolentiam captare; eos namque significat expertos & eruditos viros esse, & qui multa noscant, quae ipsis enarrare non opus sit."

ethical and pathetic concerns. Aristotle's orator proves his point with *argumentum*, and surrounds his argument with *morata oratio* and *perturbationum commotio* to impel action.⁶⁸

The *locus classicus* for thinking about the enthymeme as a truncated syllogism is found at *Rhetoric* 1.2, where Aristotle says that the enthymeme is "a kind of syllogism, and deduced from few premises, *often from fewer* (πολλάκις ἐλαττόνων) than the regular syllogism" (1357a17; I use here J. H. Freese's representative translation).⁶⁹ Zabarella apparently was not troubled by this passage, but a great many of the Renaissance commentators had difficulty with it, since it raises questions about the number of parts in a syllogism, how many can be truncated in order to have an enthymeme, just what it is that is being truncated, and what happens when each is truncated. Pier Vettori, the magisterial editor and commentator of the mid-sixteenth century, initially avoided this entire problem in Aristotle's text,⁷⁰ but in his grand commentary on the *Rhetoric* he finally confronts it, and admits defeat.⁷¹ The difficulty is caused by *saepenumero* in the phrase *saepenumero ex paucioribus*; by definition the enthymeme has two propositions, while a syllogism has three, and since an enthymeme always has fewer propositions than does a syllogism, Aristotle's qualifying word *πολλάκις* is completely incomprehensible; as Marcantonio Maioragio puts it in his commentary a few years later, *saepe ex paucioribus fieri, quam syllogismus, non autem semper*.⁷² Vettori had no solution to this problem, but other commentators ventured ingenious solutions, none perhaps as desperate as that offered by Antonio Riccoboni. After a long analysis, Riccoboni concludes that the phrase "few premises" refers exclusively to the perfect syllogism,

⁶⁸ Zabarella, *De natura logicae in Opera logica*, 1.92e: "dicit enim persuasionem tribus modis fieri; argumentis, morata oratione, & perturbationum commotione; at certum est, moratam orationem, & affectionum commotionem non ita persuadere ut probent aliquid, & cognitionem rei pariant, sed quia ad id agendum inducunt, quod ab oratore desideratur; persuasio itaque hoc respicit, ut alios ad actionem trahat."

⁶⁹ John Henry Freese (trans.), *Aristotle. The "Art" of Rhetoric* (London: William Heinemann, 1926; rpt. 1959).

⁷⁰ Riccoboni complains in *Paraphrasis in rhetoricam*, 57: "Petrus Victorius in prima commentatione sua hanc rem non declaravit, nec attigit."

⁷¹ Pier Vettori (Piero; Pietro; Petrus Victorius; 1499-1587), *Commentarii in tres libros Aristotelis de arte dicendi* (Florence, 1548), 43: "Cur saepenumero ex paucioribus, quam primus syllogismus, constare tradat enthymema, diligenter quaerendum: hoc non perpetuum uidebatur: nec posse enthymema illud uere appellari, quod ambas propositiones haberet."

⁷² Marcantonio Maioragio (Marco-Antonio Majoragio; Marcus Antonius Maiorgius; Maria Antonio de' Conti; 1514-55), *In tres Aristotelis libros, de arte rhetorica, quos ipse latinus fecit, explicationes* (Venice, 1572), 33: "omnes enim aiunt in enthymemate semper alteram propositionem deesse, atque ideo vocari syllogismum imperfectum. quod si verum esset, profecto dixisset Aristoteles semper ex paucioribus constare, non autem saepe, nunc cum dicat saepe constare ex paucioribus, ostendit aliquando etiam ex totidem, aut fortasse ex pluribus constare."

while "fewer premises" refers to the enthymeme.⁷³ An orator may draw upon as many premises as he desires, and by the time he reduces them to merely "a few" he will have perfected his syllogism. But it is absurd to think that an enthymeme has as many parts as a syllogism, and while an orator is free to use a syllogism whenever he wants to, nothing will change the fact that it is still a perfect syllogism and not a three-part enthymeme. It is possible to think differently about this issue, but, as Riccoboni points out, to do so is "ignorant, arrogant, impudent, and contrary to nature, to enthymemes, and to Peripatetic doctrine."⁷⁴

Riccoboni's ungenerous remark indicates the frustration some commentators felt in coming to grips with one another's understandings and with Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. There was no disagreement at this point on how to translate Aristotle's text, and Riccoboni's own translation is notable only for the extent to which it is like all the others: *ex paucis, et saepe paucioribus quam ex quibus est primus syllogismus*.⁷⁵ Despite the sameness of the translation, there was no agreement on what the translation meant. Marcantonio Maioragio suggests that Aristotle's enthymeme could have as many propositions as a syllogism, but that a syllogism becomes an enthymeme when the order of the propositions is mixed up.⁷⁶ Riccoboni responds to Maioragio that dialecticians from Philoponus onwards have agreed that the order of propositions is irrelevant.⁷⁷ Another commentator expands on Maioragio's suggestion by adding the condition that the *material* of the enthymeme was contingent propositions. Riccoboni responds to this commentator that Aristotle

⁷³ Riccoboni, *Paraphrasis in rhetoricam*, 63-64: "enthymema vero syllogismus. Et ex paucis, id est, similiter contingit concludere syllogismo, et colligere ex paucis, et saepe paucioribus, quam ex quibus est primus syllogismus. Itaque illud, Ex paucis intelligimus de syllogismo perfecto, qui non tam saepe ab oratoribus usurpatur: et illud, Ex paucioribus, de enthymemate, quo saepe utuntur oratores. Nec discedimus a verbis Aristotelis. Nec illud absurdi admittimus, ut enthymema esse quandoque ex totidem dicatur, ex quot est syllogismus perfectus."

⁷⁴ Riccoboni, *Paraphrasis in rhetoricam*, 64: "Quae dubitatio ita explicatores torsit, ut alios adduxerit ad suam ipsorum hac de re ignorantiam consistendam, alios, et quidem arrogantiores, et impudentiores ad ea tradenda quae repugnare naturae, enthymematis, et Peripateticae doctrinae videantur."

⁷⁵ Riccoboni, *Aristotelis artis rhetoricae libri tres* (Hanau, 1606), 15.

⁷⁶ Maioragio, *De arte rhetorica explicationes* (Venice, 1572), 34: "cum enim movere animos velint Oratores in enthymemate priore loco ponunt conclusionem, quam addita ratione probant. illa autem ratio plerumque est minor propositio, ut iure interfectus est Clodius, quia fuit insidiator. dignus est supplicio Catilina, quoniam in patriam coniuravit. hoc est igitur quod ait Aristoteles, ex paucis enthymema fieri, quia maiori ex parte fit, ex una propositione cum ratione adiuncta."

⁷⁷ Riccoboni, *Paraphrasis in rhetoricam*, 58: "formam syllogismi vitare existimat Maioragius, & in enthymema pertransire, si conclusionis, & propositionum ordo convertatur. Tamen communis Dialecticorum opinio est, ordinem propositionum immutatum non immutare modum syllogismi. & Philoponus, grauissimus auctor, scribit, posse nos, vsu iam recepto praepone minorem maiori in hunc modum ..."

already has a theory of contingent syllogistic in the *Prior Analytics*. Other commentators, drawing upon Cicero's *De inventione*, argue that ratiocination can have three parts, or four parts, or even five parts,⁷⁸ and in this view the syllogism had enough parts to truncate it either to "a few," or even to "fewer premises." Riccoboni responds that Aristotle himself opens the *Rhetoric* using a six-part enthymeme self-reflexively to discuss the enthymeme itself as the *σῶμα τῆς πίστεως* of rhetoric. And there are other attempts to deal with this *locus classicus* in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. If you consider the *material* of argumentation, there are three ways to draw conclusions. If you consider the *form* of argumentation, there are two ways to draw conclusions, the rarely used perfect syllogism and the common enthymeme; but rest assured that any orator can use a syllogism.⁷⁹ And a careful analysis of a single "enthymeme" from Cicero's *Pro Archia* demonstrates a willingness to entertain propositions in enthymematic reasoning which cannot be accommodated within Aristotelian categorical syllogistic, thus complicating the problem of "few, or fewer premises."

The influence of ideological commitment extends past the details of local interpretation with Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, and even determines aspects of textual emendation. An extraordinary instance of ideologically driven emendation occurs with Aristotle's statement that the enthymeme is the *σῶμα τῆς πίστεως*. Since Renaissance writers disagreed about—or were puzzled about—the nature of Peripatetic rhetoric, the nature of the enthymeme, and the nature of proof, it should not surprise us that they were puzzled about this phrase. Again, there was very little disagreement about how to translate the phrase into Latin, or, for that matter, into Italian, but then no one seemed satisfied with any of the explanations of how the formal enthymeme could be the *body* of rhetorical proof. Commentators adopted Cicero's belief that Aristotle was speaking figuratively about the strength and vigor of the enthymeme. As Vettori explains, Aristotle calls it the *body* of proof because only the enthymeme can function as though it were the foundation of belief, and none of the other ways of inducing belief has as much power (*tantam vim*). Aristotle uses the word *σῶμα* because he wanted to show the strength (*robur*) of the enthymeme.⁸⁰ When Carlo Sigonio talks about the strength and vigor of enthymemes

⁷⁸ Riccoboni provides an example in *Paraphrasis in rhetoricam*, 60: "Quinque partitam ex propositione [major], propositionis probatione, assumptione [minor], assumptionis probatione, complexione [conclusion]."

⁷⁹ Riccoboni, *Paraphrasis in rhetoricam*, 62-63: "Itaque, si spectetur materia argumentandi, tria sunt genera concludendi, quorum tertium tantum Rhetoricae congruit. Si forma, duo sunt, quorum vnum rarius congruit oratoribus, nempe syllogismus: alterum saepius, scilicet enthymema. Neque enim dubitandum est, quin orator quandoque syllogismo perfecto utatur, quamvis non tam saepe quam syllogismo imperfecto, & enthymemate."

⁸⁰ Vettori, *Commentarii ... de arte dicendi*, 7: "Enthymemata autem probationem corpus appellat, idest solum, & quasi fundamentum faciendae fidei: quamvis enim alijs rebus fides fieri possit, nulla tamen res tantam vim habet.... Cupiens igitur Aristoteles ostendere

in his paraphrase of the *Rhetoric*, he speaks about them as providing the *sinews*, the *nervi*, of belief,⁸¹ and Alessandro Piccolomini in his Italian paraphrase expands on the same idea of a strong body with sinews.⁸² Almost all of the Renaissance translations and commentaries take this same approach, that is, they translate σῶμα τῆς πίστεως as *corpus fidei* or *corpus probationum*, and discuss that phrase in terms of *robur* or *nervus fidei*. There is one notable exception to this consensus: the French expatriot Marc Antoine Muret, who translates the phrase directly as *qui faciendae fidei nervus est*.⁸³ This free rendering ordinarily would cause no comment in an age of paraphrastic translation. But in this case it looks as though Muret actually emended Aristotle's text to agree with the desired Latin understanding. For σῶμα τῆς πίστεως Muret reads ῥῶμα τῆς πίστεως, thus confirming what the commentators had said all along.⁸⁴ Muret's inspired emendation was rejected by others as bad philology, but rejection of his faulty emendation called into question the entire tradition of understanding σῶμα as *nervus*, and thus Riccoboni, for one, engages in a new and lengthy analogy between the articulated elements of enthymemes and the parts of a body.⁸⁵

Since the Renaissance, translators and commentators have left the impression that Aristotle's enthymeme is a less respectable philosophical proceeding than Peripatetic syllogistic, or indeed, any syllogistic whatsoever. It is an impression that modern scholarship has been at pains to correct. But the *locus classicus* for thinking so is found in Aristotle at *Rhetoric* 1.2, 1357a3-4, where Aristotle supposedly claims that the auditors for an orator are "such hearers as are unable to take a general view of many stages, or to follow a lengthy chain of argument."

robur enthymematum, & imbecillitatem aliarum partium, eleganter, acuteque hoc uerbo usus est."

⁸¹ Carlo Sigonio (Carolus Sigonius; c. 1520-84) *Aristotelis rhetoricorum libri III* (Strassburg, 1570), 3: "Nos minus Latine probationes exprimi per Fides putamus, in quibus sonare nervi solent, quam per fidem, cum recte dicamus facere fidem, et non fides pro persuader argumentis."

⁸² Alessandro Piccolomini (Alexander Piccolomineus; 1508-1579), *Copiosissima Parafrase, di M. Alessandro Piccolomini: Nel primo libro della Retorica d'Aristotele* (Venice, 1565), 21: "de gli argomenti Retorici, da i Latini con vocabol greco chiamati Enthimemi, che sono il corpo, e'l nervo delle pruove, del far fede."

⁸³ Marc Antoine Muret (Marcus Antonius Muretus; 1526-85), *Aristotelis rhetoricorum libri duo* (Rome, 1585), 2. Muret did not translate book 3 of the *Rhetoric*.

⁸⁴ Muret, *Commentarius in primum et secundum librum rhetoricorum Aristotelis* (Ingolstadt, 1602), 191: "Legendum ῥῶμα, ut et in vetere libro legere memini. Eodem modo corrupta est haec ipas vox apud Plutarchum in Pelopida, in extremo. οὐ κατέσχε τῷ λογισμῷ τὴν ... καὶ τὸ θυμῷ παραδοῦς τὸ ῥῶμα καὶ τὴν ἡγεμονίαν τῆς περάξεως· vulgo σῶμα: male legitur. Idem autem repraehendit et Quintilianus in Rhetoribus aetatis suae."

⁸⁵ Riccoboni is outraged by Muret's emendation, but then goes on to defend the general idea; *Paraphrasis in rhetoricam*, 18 ff.

That, at least, is the modern translation of Freese, and it is representative of the post-Renaissance supposition that enthymemes are intended for the syllogistically handicapped, for people who, in Grimaldi's phrase, "are unable to engage in a long and subtly reasoned argument."⁸⁶ The Greek text does not actually mention premises or propositions, although it is a reasonable interpretation to understand that the crowd cannot take their premises from a long way off, that is, they cannot follow a long train of syllogistic reasoning, and there may be support for this reading later at 1357a11 (διὰ τὸ μῆκος).

But this is not quite what Aristotle's text says, and it is certainly not the way that many Renaissance commentators understood the passage. I cannot find any of them who think that truncated syllogisms are any easier to understand than complete syllogisms.⁸⁷ Nearly all of the Renaissance translators, starting with George of Trebizond, offered a version of Moerbeke's painfully literal medieval translation, and so shall I: Aristotle's auditors cannot look at many things at the same time, nor can they reason at a distance.⁸⁸ All of the commentators agree that this refers to men who are somehow limited, but they do not agree on the nature of the limitation, on whether it is a consequence of language, or the material of rhetoric, or general human inadequacy, or the specific inadequacies of unlearned auditors. Marc Antoine Muret thinks Aristotle means that men can only see what is immediately before their eyes, and that therefore they can only discuss that which is present to the eye, that is to say, physically or geographically present, but by extension temporally present.⁸⁹ Pier Vettori seems to agree, using the explanatory phrase *ab oculorum aspectu*, and Vettori acknowledges that the auditors are amateurs (*illud disciplinis non habeant*), but he does not suggest that auditors are inept with syllogisms.⁹⁰ Riccoboni takes issue with Muret, if not Vettori, since Aristotle's

⁸⁶ Grimaldi, "Rhetoric" I, 55.

⁸⁷ In the seventeenth century, very late in the English Renaissance, Theodore Goulston will suggest in a brief note that Aristotle has in mind "personas, qui nequeunt per rationes longinquas seu prosyllogisticas, rem assequi"; *De rhetorica*, 11n.

⁸⁸ *Rhetorica* 1357a3-4: ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀκροαταῖς οἱ οὐ δύνανται διὰ πολλῶν συνορᾶν οὐδὲ λογίζεσθαι πόρρωθεν. William of Moerbeke (13th c.): "inter tales auditores qui non possunt per multa conspiciere neque ratiocinari a longe"; in some MSS "sillogizare a longe". Compare George of Trebizond (1434), 110: "apud huiusmodi auditores, qui nequeant perplura conspiciere, nec procul ratiocinari"; Pier Vettori (1579), 49: "Et apud huiusmodi auditores, qui non valent per multa interiecta aspicere: neque ratione concludere e longinquis"; and Antonio Riccoboni (1606), 14: "apud eiusmodi auditores, qui non possunt ex multis contueri, neque ratiocinari longius."

⁸⁹ Muret, *Rhetoricorum libri duo*, 11: "apud eiusmodi auditores, qui quae procul sita sunt videre, et ex iis quae longe distant ratiocinari non queunt." Muret expands upon this idea in his *Commentarius in primum et secundum librum rhetoricorum Aristotelis* (Ingolstadt, 1602), reading οἱ οὐ δύνανται τὰ πόρρω συνορᾶν where Vettori and others read οἱ οὐ δύνανται διὰ πολλῶν συνορᾶν; Riccoboni objects to Muret's reading in *Paraphrasis in Rhetoricam*, 55-56.

⁹⁰ Vettori, *Commentarii ... de arte dicendi*, 42: "Vt materiam oratoris iam ostenderat,

very next sentence identifies the material of rhetoric as that which can have more than one outcome, and about questions in the past or in the future.⁹¹ Riccoboni thinks Muret's argument about temporal and geographical distance must be wrong on the face of matters, but having come so far, Riccoboni has no solution. He is just perplexed. He accepts Vettori's general notion about *ab oculorum aspectu*, but the details will not fall into place.

From the nature of these discussions, we can see that the issue for Renaissance commentators does not turn on the question of logical capabilities, in the sense of (a) the ability "to take a general view of many stages," combined with (b) the ability "to follow a lengthy chain of argument." The issue turns instead on the typical Renaissance concern for *enargeia* and *vivacity* of perceptions, in the sense of (a) the ability to take a general view of many things, that is, "to get the big picture," combined with (b) the ability to grasp things which are not immediately present. And, indeed, this is consonant with Renaissance understandings of the tasks of rhetoric in general, whether Peripatetic or Ciceronian. Despite the Renaissance preoccupation with dialectical concerns, they were not the only concerns to shape the detailed understandings of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. At some places in the text where we might expect dialectical concerns to come to the fore, the commentators surprise us—and it is a cautionary tale for understanding either the Renaissance or Aristotle's *Rhetoric*.

ita nunc personas apud quas agit: tradit enim officium ipsius esse ad huiusmodi auditores dicere, qui non adeo acuta sunt acie, ut possint cum multa interiecta sunt, pervidere: id enim διὰ πολλῶν [*Rh.* 1357a3] significare arbitror: quemadmodum enim oculis, si lyncie non sumus, cum solidum corpus interpositum est, longius penetrare non possumus: ita etiam mente, intellectuque, nisi valde perspicaces simus [1579 ed.: ac bonis artibus exculti], non possumus, quod nimis remotum, & multis rebus obstructum est, videre. In primo libro de rebus superis, cum de hominibus itidem hebetibus loqueretur, inquit. οἱ μὲν οὖν βλέποντες ἐπὶ μικρὸν: qui ea, quae prope sunt tantum cernunt: nec queunt procul posita spectare, translatis verbis ab oculorum aspectu, ad ingenij aciem: hic autem διὰ πολλῶν συνορῶν [*Rh.* 1357a3-4], ait. Loci igitur spatium in illis impediēbat, ne videre quaedam possent. in his non tantum interuallum, quam ea, quae in medio posita sunt [1579 ed.: manent], obstant: addit enim statim de interuallo. οὐδὲ λογίζεσθαι πόρρωθεν [*Rh.* 1357a4]. Non tamen hi natura huiusmodi esse accipiendi sunt: nec enim apud crassi tantum ingenij homines verba facere orator debet: sed quia excultum illud disciplinis non habeant: quae mentem acuunt, ideoque ne longinquiora cernant, et quae multis in medio constitutis tecta sunt, impediuntur."

⁹¹ Riccoboni, *Paraphrasis in rhetoricam*, 56: "Requiritur tamen in genere iudiciali, auditor praestantissimus, & idoneus tum ad intelligendam argumentorum, quibus vtuntur oratores, naturam tum ad omnes legum enodationes cognoscendas, tum vero etiam ad supplendum legibus, si oporteat. Sed dicendum est, licet tradatur ipsum iudicem talem esse oportere, plerumque tamen non esse, & idcirco, quemadmodum inferius dicitur, ab oratore supponi rudem, vt omnia facile, & persuasibiliter pertractentur. Consultamus autem, inquit Philosophus, de iis, quae videntur posse se vtroque modo habere: de iis vero, quae fieri non potest, vt aliter, vel facta sint, vel futura sint, vel se habeant, nemo consultat, sic existimans."

Modern scholarship has drawn freely upon Renaissance commentary and interpretation to help determine a correct text and better readings of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. Roemer, for example, took careful note of Muret's work (usually uncomplimentary) and Cope drew extensively upon Vettori (whom he generally trusted), while Kassel and Grimaldi are only the most recent to have had frequent recourse to the work of Renaissance scholars. But such reliance can have its dangers, since the congruence or lack of congruence between Renaissance and modern understandings may be illusory. Local needs and immediate controversies determined larger views of the *Rhetoric* during the Renaissance. Local needs also determined details of recension, philology, emendation, and translation. Their needs and controversies are not ours, and it is risky to appeal to their solutions without knowing their problems.

I began by describing several traditions which prevailed at the time of the Renaissance recovery of the *Rhetoric*. During the course of the Renaissance these traditions did not coalesce; if anything, the number of perspectives multiplied. Study of the treatise intensified, and study became more widespread, but no consensus emerged to match the understandings of Cicero or Quintilian. Perhaps, finally, the stakes were too high for any consensus to emerge. The great prestige of Aristotle in the Latin West, the vibrancy of rhetoric and rhetorical studies during the Renaissance, and the centrality of Aristotle to the inherited scholastic enterprise, together meant that a treatise on rhetoric by Aristotle faced more competing needs than any one treatise could be expected to satisfy. The perspectives were needed to elucidate a malleable and difficult text but, even more, Aristotle's text was needed to validate those perspectives.

Francesco Filelfo's Translation of the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*

David Marsh

In the revival of classical learning in Renaissance Italy, it is striking how slowly Aristotle's *Rhetoric* began to occupy a central position in intellectual discourse.¹ Nearly a century elapsed before the influx of Byzantine scholars and the efforts of Latin translators during the early Quattrocento, furthered by the rapidly expanding press late in the century, placed the *Rhetoric* on a footing with many of Aristotle's other works in a new post-Scholastic ascendancy. When in the 1420s the great Florentine chancellor Leonardo Bruni (1370-1444) made translations of Aristotle's *Ethics*, *Politics*, and the pseudo-Aristotelian *Economics*, he ignored the *Rhetoric*. A generation later, when the translator of the *Rhetoric* Ermolao Barbaro taught at the University of Padua from 1474-79, he only lectured on the *Ethics* and *Politics*. And the famed Aldine edition of Aristotle's *Opera omnia*, published in five volumes at Venice between 1495 and 1498, excluded the *Rhetoric*, which only appeared in Aldus' *Rhetores graeci* of 1508-09.²

With the *Rhetoric*, the reasons for such a delay may be sought in the interaction between the intrinsic focus of Aristotle's text and the extrinsic historical contexts in which it was revived. Indeed, by their very emphasis, the first two books seem to have discouraged the speedy diffusion of the work. In the opening of Book 1 and the second half of Book 2, Aristotle is largely concerned with the logical underpinnings of rhetorical persuasion, that is, with the art as a counterpart to philosophical dialectic. During the Renaissance, both dialectic in general and Aristotle's philosophy in particular had been placed in the service of the theology of the schoolmen and ecclesiastical councils. The emphasis on probability in rhetorical argument proved a stumbling-block to those committed to deriving infallible doctrines from scripture and the Church Fathers. Those who, like Lorenzo Valla, maintained the superiority of rhetoric as more universally applicable than

¹ See Lawrence D. Green's essay in this volume, Garin 1950, and Lardet 1989; on medieval versions, see Schneider 1971. Full references are given at the end of this article.

² Erickson 1975, 12.

dialectic found themselves in perilous conflict with the constituted authorities of the universities and the church.

In Book 2 of the *Rhetoric*, moreover, Aristotle develops a psychology of the listener as a "response" theory by which to gauge the efficacy of persuasive oratory. But the society of the early Renaissance offered few parallels to the public to which ancient orators addressed themselves. While humanism was largely fostered by men with legal training, from Petrarch to Salutati to Bruni, judicial oratory was hardly geared to a popular assembly or citizen jury.³ Deliberative oratory may have borne greater affinities to its ancient counterpart, at least in republican councils and curial conclaves. Indeed, in Italy the usual word for "ambassador" was the Latin *orator* or Italian *oratore*. But in a society tending ever more toward monarchical consolidation and courtly culture, it was epideictic which was to enjoy the greatest opportunities for putting ancient precepts to use; and studies of laudatory speeches written for civic celebrations, papal audiences, and funeral services indicate how widely epideictic flourished.⁴

Yet if Aristotle's *Rhetoric* was slow to enter the mainstream of Quattrocento humanism, the same is not true of a rhetorical treatise which was attributed to Aristotle during the Middle Ages and early Renaissance, namely, the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*. Today the work is generally ascribed to Anaximenes of Lampsacus (c. 380-320 B.C.), an attribution made by Piero Vettori in his 1548 commentary on Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and based on Quintilian's summary of Anaximenes' system (*Institutio oratoria* 3.4.9).⁵ The *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* consists of an introductory statement listing the three kinds of rhetoric as deliberative, epideictic, and judicial, each of which is divided into a positive and negative species. Deliberative includes exhortation and dissuasion, epideictic praise and blame, and judicial accusation and defense; and a seventh species, investigation (ἐξέτασις), may be applied to any of the preceding. (It was this division of rhetoric which led Vettori to identify the treatise with the work of Anaximenes as outlined by Quintilian.) The treatise then offers definitions, precepts, and examples for each of these categories, and proceeds to discuss various kinds of proofs, both verbal and circumstantial, and methods of anticipation or counter-arguments, with some discussion of style. The treatise concludes by prescribing the structure of speeches in each of the three kinds. And a partly spurious concluding chapter sweeps together a number of miscellaneous considerations on social topics related to oratory. In his study of the "systematic

³ Monfasani 1988, 175-76, confirms this view.

⁴ O'Malley 1979; McManamon 1989.

⁵ Quintilianus 1970, 1:137: "Anaximenes iudicalem et contionalem generalis partes esse uoluit, septem autem species: hortandi, dehortandi, laudandi, uituperandi, accusandi, defendendi, exquirendi (quod ἐξεταστικόν dicit): quarum duae primae deliberatiui, duae sequentes demonstratiui, tres ultimae iudiciales generis sunt partes." Edition in Anaximenes 1844 and 1966; life of Anaximenes in Wendland 1905; analysis in Fuhrmann 1960, 11-28. See also the essay by David Mirhady in this volume.

manual," Manfred Fuhrmann has characterized the work by concluding (in Lesky's words) "that the work does not present a true system of rhetorical theory, but sticks to individual precepts, and that its composition is largely controlled by association and antithesis."⁶

Like other manuals analyzed by Fuhrmann, including the *Auctor ad Herennium* and Cicero's *De inventione*, the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* probably owes its popularity in the West to its simple organization as a handbook.⁷ We should recall that Renaissance humanists were avid readers and writers of manuals containing pragmatic precepts and schemata which could be easily digested by students. Thus, in his *Rhetoricorum libri V* (ca. 1434), the most original and successful rhetorical treatise of the Quattrocento, George of Trebizond found Aristotle's study of human emotions of little value, but in his treatment of *inventio* borrowed widely from *Ad Herennium* and (in one instance) from the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*.⁸ For the beginning student of oratory, the treatise offers a one-book outline of the canonic five parts of rhetoric with few digressions and difficulties. Significantly, three Latin translations from the thirteenth century survive in manuscript. The complete version surviving in Vat. lat. 2995 has been ascribed by Grabmann to William of Moerbeke. The anonymous version extant in a codex at Urbana (Xf.881. A8.XL) lacks only the last three chapters of the text. And a fragmentary translation which contains only the letter to Alexander and the first paragraph of the treatise survives in some fifty manuscripts, including Vat. lat. 2083 (dated 1284).⁹

It is the fifteenth-century translation by Francesco Filelfo (1397-1481) which concerns us here. In 1428, Francesco Filelfo made a new Latin version, apparently based on a codex (Laur. 60.18) recently copied in Constantinople by George Chrysokokkes.¹⁰ In his *Satira* 1.10, Filelfo writes that it was the Florentine patrician Matteo Strozzi who urged him to complete the work.¹¹ But in his letter of dedication

⁶ Lesky 1966, 591-92.

⁷ Among other works, Fuhrmann 1960 discusses both the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* and the *Ad Herennium*, summarizing on p. 122: "Mögen sich, wie etwa ein Vergleich der Rhetorik des Anaximenes mit dem Werke des auctor ad Herennium erkennen läßt, die Inhalte bei den einzelnen Disziplinen erheblich gewandelt haben: Methode und Darstellungsform sämtlicher erörterter Kompendien stimmen in allem Wesentlichen überein."

⁸ For George's hostility to Aristotelian psychology, see Monfasani 1976, 270-70; for his use of *Ad Herennium*, see 272, 279-80; for the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*, 280n148.

⁹ All three versions are discussed in Anaximenes 1966, XI. The Vatican codex is published in Grabmann 1932 and discussed in Grabmann 1946, 116-19. For the Urbana codex, see *Aristoteles Latinus* 1939, 1:78-79, 245-46; and Kristeller, *Iter* 5:404. Garin 1950, 70 compares the incipits of two medieval versions with Filelfo's.

¹⁰ For the circumstances of Filelfo's translation, see Calderini 1913, 269-70, and Garin 1950, 69-71. For Harlfinger's attribution of Laur. 60.18 to Chrysokokkes, see *Aristoteles Graecus* 1976, 219 (Garin 1950, 69, calls it Filelfo's copy). For Chrysokokkes, see the *Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium* 1991, 1:453.

¹¹ Resta 1986, 14n22: "quidquid Stroza petisti/care mihi, facilis tibi sim cessurus amico;/munera cum primum liceat per publica nobis/totus Aristoteles causas armatus in

to Alfonso Cardinal Carrillo Alborno, papal legate to Bologna (1420-22) and founder of the Spanish college there, he writes that he initially undertook the translation at the request of church officials. (His account may reflect his hopes of a position in the papal Curia—an ambition that was doomed to fail.) Filelfo says that his initial reluctance to undertake a translation was only overcome by the urgings of Alberto Alberti, pontifical treasurer in Bologna and a link between the humanist and Cardinal Carrillo Alborno.¹² As a newer, more reliable version of an Aristotelian work, Filelfo's translation was soon in demand, and even today some twenty-five manuscript copies survive.¹³ With the advent of printing in Italy, it appeared in several incunabula editions of *Philelphi orationes cum aliis opusculis*, while the sixteenth century witnessed its inclusion in some thirty-three editions of Aristotle.¹⁴ In 1574, an Italian translation by one Matteo Franceschi was published by Jacomo Leoncini in Venice.¹⁵

The translation by Filelfo is noteworthy in several respects. Filelfo's translation represents the first ancient Greek rhetorical treatise translated in the Quattrocento.¹⁶ While roughly contemporary with George of Trebizond's influential *Rhetoricorum libri V* (ca. 1434), it antedates his version of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* by some fifteen years. Filelfo was an avid disciple of Aristotle, and owned a codex of the *Rhetoric*.¹⁷ Indeed, as a student of rhetoric Filelfo preferred Cicero's *De inventione* to the *Ad Herennium*, since it corresponds more closely to the system of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*.¹⁸ In translating the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*,

omnis/prodeat in medium, tractetque ferocia saevi/bella fori, populumque domet moneatque senatum."

¹² On Carrillo Alborno, see Strnad 1977. For Alberti's role, see Gualdo Rosa 1990, 277n10 (with bibliography), and Filelfo's preface in Appendix A. The beginning of the preface is cited in Resta 1986, 15.

¹³ Calderini 1913, 270n4, describes various occasions on which Filelfo sent copies of his work to friends and patrons. For a preliminary census of manuscripts, see Appendix B.

¹⁴ Of the incunabula, I have inspected the 1488 Brescia edition ("Brixiae per Iacobum Britannicum": Goff P-608); the 1491 Venice edition ("Venetiis per Bartolomeum de Zanis de Portesio": Goff P-609), and the 1492 Venice edition ("Venetiis per Philippum de Pinzis Mantuanum": Goff P-610). For a list of sixteenth-century editions, see Cranz 1984, 220.

¹⁵ Cranz 1984, 153, no. 108.595A.

¹⁶ For an introduction to Italian humanist translations 1400-1450, see Gualdo Rosa 1985, esp. 180, 188 on Filelfo's *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*. On Filelfo's nearly contemporary version of Plato's *Euthyphro* (1429-1434) and three of Plato's *Letters* (1440), see Hankins 1990, 1:89-95.

¹⁷ Resta 1986, 53-54: "Aristotele è stato il riferimento più costante e sfruttato del suo discorso culturale, a vari livelli." For Filelfo's manuscript of the *Rhetorica*, now Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, suppl. gr. 1285, see Omont 1901.

¹⁸ Resta 1986, 15n24, quoting ms. Triv. 873, fol. 29: "at in altera [scil. *De inventione*], illa quae longe magis viris eruditis mihi probatur, ab Aristotele in iis quae scripsit cum ad Theodectem tum ad Alexandrum regem et a Theophrasto caeterisque rhetoribus priscis, qui in ea facultate mirifice claruerunt, non discessit."

he worked hard to find accurate Latin equivalents for Greek rhetorical terms, and asked his friend Ambrogio Traversari to send him a copy of the *De figuris sententiarum et elocutionis* of Rutilius Lupus, a Latin handbook based on the treatise *Περὶ σχημάτων* by the Greek rhetorician Gorgias of Athens.¹⁹

Like George of Trebizond, Filelfo offers a critique of Quintilian. He objects that Quintilian uses awkwardly literal equivalents for certain Greek terms and proposes to find more idiomatic Latin expressions:

Verum ne id unum omiserim, nos a Fabio Quintiliano nonnullis in dictionibus interpretatione discrepasse, idque non inconsulto factitatum, ut quod ille δημηγορικόν verbum e verbo exprimens "contionale genus" [Quint. 3.4.1] et προκατάληψιν "praesumptionem" [Quint. 9.2.16] dixerit, nos usitatioris vocabulo "deliberativum" et "praecupationem" non absurde (ut arbitror) exprimere maluimus.²⁰

In so doing, Filelfo claims to follow the precedent of Cicero, Horace, and Jerome:

Nos autem et M. Tullii et Horatii Flacci et Eusebii Hieronymi, qui latinissimi et eloquentissimi extiterunt, testimonio et auctoritate freti, in id maxime studemus ut quae a graecis transferimus nihil aliud (quoad eius rei fieri possit) quam latinitatem sapiant.²¹

By naming these three Latin authors, Filelfo explicitly declares himself a successor of Petrarch, who in two epistles of 1360 had invoked the same writers when he envisioned an ideal translation of Homer.²²

If Filelfo follows Petrarch in criticizing Quintilian, he also follows him in censuring the self-styled "Aristotelians" of the schools. Repeating the critique of Scholastic disputations in Petrarch's celebrated epistle "Contra senes dyalecticos" (*Familiares* 1.7), he notes how the logicians fail to attain the eloquence of their vaunted mentor Aristotle.²³ Filelfo ends his preface by characterizing the Schoolmen

¹⁹ For Filelfo's letter to Traversari, see Resta 1986, 37; for the *De figuris*, its author, and Gorgias, see Rutilius Lupus 1970, XIII-XIV; text also in *Rhetores latini minores* 1863, 3-21.

²⁰ This passage is cited in Resta 1986, 37; for the whole text with translation, see Appendix A.

²¹ See Appendix A.

²² The two epistles are *Varia* 25 (18 August 1360, to Boccaccio) and the slightly later *Epistola ad Homerum*: see Gualdo Rosa 1985, 184-85. Gualdo Rosa identifies Petrarch's references to Cicero (*De optimo genere oratorum* 5.13-14, 7.23), to Horace (*Ars poetica* 133-34: "Nec verbum verbo curabis reddere fidus interpres") and to Jerome (Epistle 67, "De optimo genere interpretandi").

²³ Filelfo rails at Scholastics who fail "et loquendo et scribendo": see Appendix A.

as “completely uncouth and inarticulate” (*absurdissimi et infantissimi*). The second adjective echoes a passage in Leonardo Bruni’s *Life of Aristotle* (ca. 1428), in which the Florentine chancellor censures Scholastic philosophers for measuring Aristotle’s eloquence by their own inarticulateness: *desinant igitur isti ex infantia sua Aristotelis facundiam metiri*.²⁴ The priority of Bruni’s text seems clear. Bruni had begun his celebrated and controversial translations of Aristotle with the 1416 version of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. His etymological antithesis between the *infantia* of the medieval translations and the *facundia* of his own versions is essential to humanistic reform of the Peripatetic legacy. In Filelfo’s preface, by contrast, the branding of the Scholastics as *infantissimi* reads like a petulant afterthought borrowed by a novice translator for whom Aristotle was not always a central concern.

We are lucky in possessing a document which allows us to gauge Filelfo’s conscious intent of avoiding strict literalism. A codex in the Laurentian library in Florence preserves a Greek-Latin glossary which once belonged to Filelfo and which some consider his autograph.²⁵ A selection of rhetorical terms and their Latin equivalents (printed in Appendix C) reveals how Filelfo generally employed “dictionary definitions” in rendering Anaximenes’ treatise. A notable exception is his use of “deliberativum” for δημηγορικόν, for both Quintilian and Filelfo’s own glossary render the term as *contionalis*.²⁶ The noun “praeoccupatio” for προκατάληψιν (*Rhet. ad Alex.* 18) was probably suggested by the example of “praeoccupare” to render Greek πρόληψις in Rutilius Lupus, a text which (as already stated) Filelfo sought to consult when making his version of the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*.²⁷ While it seems less idiomatic than “praesumptio” (Quint. 9.2.16)

Cf. the paired verbs in Petrarca 1975, 272 (*Familiares* 1.7.8-9; italics added): “Aristotiles, vir ardentis ingenii, de rebus altissimis vicissim *et disputabat et scribebat*. ... Nichil illi tanto philosopho dissimilius homine nichil *scribente*, parum intelligente multumque et inutiliter *clamante*.”

²⁴ For Filelfo’s phrase, see the end of his text in Appendix A. For Bruni’s polemic, see Bruni 1928, 47; English translation in Bruni 1987, 291.

²⁵ According to Vincenzo Fera, the Greek-Latin lexicon is not in Filelfo’s hand, but an autograph letter in the fly-leaf of the codex indicates that he owned it: see Wilson 1992, 53, 172n20.

²⁶ For *contionalis*, see Quintilian 3.4.1, 3.8.14, 9.4.130, and Filelfo’s gloss in Appendix C. Cicero uses the adjective in a non-technical sense to refer to public assemblies (*Att.* 1.16.11; *Q. fr.* 2.5.1).

²⁷ Rutilius Lupus 1970, 29 (“Prolepsis”): “Hoc est, cum id quod aut in adversarii causa aut in iudicis opinione esse aut fore arbitramur contrarium nobis, *praeoccupamus* [italics added] dicere et cum ratione dissolvere”; text also in *Rhetores latini minores* 1863, 14. See also Lausberg 1973, 1:54 (§ 61.2) on *deliberativum* and *contionale*, and 1:425 (§ 855) on *anticipatio*.

The noun *praeoccupatio* is used in a purely grammatical sense by Bede, *De schematibus et tropis* (*Rhetores latini minores* 1863, 608): “Prolepsis, id est praeoccupatio sive praesumptio, dicitur figura, quando ea quae sequi debent ante ponuntur, ut in psalmis: ‘Fundamenta eius in montibus sanctis; diligit dominus portas Sion.’ Ante posuit ‘eius’ et

or "anticipatio" (*Carmen de figuris vel schematibus*), "praeoccupatio" is certainly no more awkward than Cicero's "anteoccupatio" (*De orat.* 3.205).²⁸

In rendering the peculiar category of ἐξετασις or ἐξετασμός, Filelfo chose the infelicitous "quaestio," which can refer to any debatable point in an argument.²⁹ Quintilian's "(species) exquirendi" (*Institutio oratoria* 3.4.9) is more precise. Later rhetoricians employ the cognate noun *exquisitio*, and medieval translations follow suit. In translating ἐξεταστική (*Topica* 1.2.101b), Boethius uses *inquisitivus*, and in translating Aristotle's ἐξετάζειν (*Rhetoric* 1354a5-6), William of Moerbeke uses Latin *exquiro*.³⁰

Although Filelfo worked from an inferior witness, his translation is generally accurate, if somewhat clumsy stylistically. When Remigio Sabbadini arranged humanist translators in four groups—from the most literally faithful to the most embellished or paraphrastic—he placed Filelfo in the "strictly literal" category.³¹ Yet as Gualdo Rosa has noted, Sabbadini (like later students of Renaissance humanism) based his judgments on the analysis of brief samples.³² A closer examination of Filelfo's "strictly literal" version of the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* reveals a marked tendency toward elegant variation in translating often repeated words and phrases, which are not uncommon in a manual of this kind. For example, when Anaximenes discusses expediency in *Rhetorica* 1.32-33, Filelfo varies his translation of συμφέρον (generally rendered as "utile") between "conducibile" and "utilitatis plurimum," while rendering συμφέρει as "utile est." In the same passage, the adjective καταφανές appears as both "perspicuum" and "clarum."

To conclude, Filelfo's translation of the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* demonstrates how Italian humanists of the early Quattrocento, despite Bruni's groundbreaking translations of Aristotle, were not prepared fully to embrace the philosophical and technical components of Peripatetic rhetoric. The *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* afforded them an easier approach to Greek rhetorical precepts, namely, a compendious handbook which could be assimilated to the tradition of Cicero's *De inventione*. Yet, like his contemporaries, Filelfo was more attracted to Cicero the orator than

postea 'cuius,' id est domini."

Filelfo's glossary renders προκαταλαμβάνω as "praeoccupo, praeuenio": see Appendix C.

²⁸ In Rutilius Lupus 1970, 96-99, Brooks provides a useful "Register of the Rutilian Figures and Their Designations in Other Treatises." For the *Carmen de figuris vel schematibus*, see *Rhetores latini minores* 1863: 68: "Anticipatio fit, contraria cum occupo verba."

²⁹ Lausberg 1973, 1:61-64 (§ 66-78).

³⁰ Lausberg 1973 1:382 (§ 772). For *exquisitio* in the *Schemata dianoeas* 28, see *Rhetores latini minores* 1863, 74: "Ἐξετασμός est exquisitio, cum res complures divisas cum interrogatione exquirentes singulis quae conveniunt adplicamus." For Boethius, see Aristoteles Latinus 1969, 7: "dialecticae. Cum enim sit inquisitiva..."

³¹ Sabbadini 1896, 135, cited by Gualdo Rosa 1985, 186.

³² Gualdo Rosa 1985, 187.

to Cicero the theorist, and his translation at times betrays a "rhetorical" impulse to embellishment and elegant variation which in fact runs contrary to the technical precision of the original.

APPENDIX A

Preface to Filelfo's Translation of *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*³³

Ad illustrem et summum uirum et clementissimum patrem dominum Alphonsum Sanctae Romanae Ecclesiae cardinalem, Francisci Philelphi praefatio in Aristotelis Rhaeticam ad Alexandrum regem.

Cum superiore anno Bononiae docerem, clarissime pater, quod ea in urbe nemini maioribus aut honoribus aut praemiis unquam contigit, coepere nonnulli et nobiles et magni uiri dare operam graecis litteris, quippe qui iam animaduertissent, si secus facerent, ne pro dignitate ad latinum eloquium eniterentur. Quare cum Aristotelis praecepta illa iis graece legerem, quae de ciuilibus causis ad Alexandrum regem cum pro auctoris more doctissime, tum ut semper disertissime scripta sunt, summis a nobis precibus contenderunt id efficerem ut ea latine loquerentur. Censebant enim prudentes uiri quod longe plus et utilitatis et ornamenti ex iis latinis a me factis (quoniam et illi latine loqui quam graece mallent) quam si graeca esse<n>t, assequerentur. Non enim eo graecas litteras tantopere omnes discere studemus quo iis apud Athenienses Bizantiosue utamur, <sed> ut illarum subsidio atque ductu latinam literaturam atque eloquentiam melius teneamus et lautius. Praeterea nescio quo pacto qui minus et diu et multum graecos codices pertractarint et sese illis totos dederint, nusquam incredibilem illum ac prope diuinum lactei graecorum eloquii leporem atque dulcedinem, neque apud oratores neque apud poetas neque apud philosophos percipiunt. Quo fit ut nostri fere omnes qui auris delinire concupierint, malint initio graeca latine quam eadem graece lectitare; ignorantes hi quidem et utilius admodum fore uolentibus graeca discere, ut graecae uoces graecique concentus illorum auribus die noctuque obstrepant et, quemadmodum grauitate latinos graecis ita nobis suauitate illos, et quadam quasi dictionis ambrosia et nectare mirum in modum antecellere.

Id igitur ita familiaribus a me illis efflagitantibus obstinatissime refragari coepi, tum quia uidebam rem a nobis peti cum sua natura difficilem (est enim in arte uerbum saepius e uerbo exprimendum, quod ne absurde fiat, laboris nonnunquam maximi, interdum autem propter sermonis uel dissimilitudinem uel angustias uoti est), tum quia non eo me pollere ingenio usuue intelligerem qui maiestatem Aristotelicae dictionis latinae interpretationis filo exprimere. Proinde nolebam aut ineptus apud aliquos aut temerarius iudicari. Sic igitur pro uirili parte refragantibus

³³ Text as in 1488 Brescia edition: "Brixiae per Iacobum Britannicum" (Goff P-608).

nobis clarus uir mihiq̄ amicissimus et tui nominis praedicator Alberthus, is qui per id temporis Bononiae quaestorem pro summo pontifice gerebat, idem coepit, quod illi antea consueissent, studiosissime a nobis contendere. Qui tametsi pro suo iure omnia apud me potest, eo tamen facilius persuasit quod unam hanc rem fore diceret qua praecipue gratificari mansuetudini tuae quirem. Aiebat enim te unum esse qui pro regia ista et innata tibi animi magnificentia generositatē et inaudito quodam splendore magnitudineque ingenii cum reliquis omnis illustris disciplinas insignisque uirtutes maximi penderes, tum hasce elegantioris artes in primis. Id mihi uir ille et amicus et grauis persuasit haud difficulter, utpote quem uera loqui non minus nosse quam uelle iampridem animaduertissem. Quod quidem cum aliis multis rebus de illo expertus sum, tum laudibus quas de tua felici et augusta illa Bononiensi legatione dies noctesque praedicabat. Eas enim ita ponebat ante oculos, ut nihil postea Bononiensium reipublicae acciderit, quod non multo ante impendere uel lapides ipsi prouiderint. Et profecto si tua sequi uestigia quibus ea res erat in manu uoluissent, neque ipsi excidissent neque tanta tamque praeclara urbs in tantas calamitates aerumnasque decidisset. Sed de his alias.

Cum hanc igitur traductionem non ingratam tibi futuram intelligerem, ut amicissimo homini morem gererem, id est ut me ipsum tuo nomini cum Albertho meo dedicarem, oblitus sum nostri. "Omnia uincit amor" [Verg. *Ecl.* 10.69]. Rem difficillimam et meis imparem uiribus sum aggressus. "Audentes fortuna iuuat" [Verg. *Aen.* 10. 284]. Potuit Homericus ille Ajax Hectora, quem neque Vlysses neque Nestor in praelium prouocantem excepisset, sola audacia et aggredi et singulari certamine superare [*Iliad* 7.66-312]. Potuit et Troias idem ab incensis iam nauibus fuis Achiuis omnibus arcere [*Iliad* 12.265-14.526]. Potuerimus fortassis etiam nos, etsi minus orationis Aristotelicae nitorem, at ipsa certe sensa latinis uerbis explicare.

Uerum ne id unum omiserim, nos a Fabio Quintiliano nonnullis in dictionibus interpretatione discrepasse, idque non inconsulto factitatum, ut quod ille δημιουργικόν uerbum e uerbo exprimens "contionale genus" et προκατάληψιν "praesumptionem" dixerit, nos usitatore uocabulo "deliberatiuum" et "prae-occupationem" non absurde (ut arbitror) exprimere maluimus. Sic et alia pleraque inueniri contigerit. Nam quamuis perdoctus ille quidem et acutus uir fuit, ueluti certe est, uoluit in nonnullis uerbis et rebus magis se sui quam Ciceronis similem dici. Nos autem et M. Tullii et Horatii Flacci et Eusebii Hieronymi, qui latinissimi et eloquentissimi extiterunt, testimonio et auctoritate freti, in id maxime studemus ut quae a graecis transferimus nihil aliud (quoad eius rei fieri possit) quam latinitatem sapiant. Proinde et hoc praesentis operis ad numerum c<h>aractera ac figuram pro uirili parte traduximus.

Suscipies igitur praesens hoc quicquid est munusculi, magnifice pater. Quod, si quidem auctorem ipsum tecum reputes Aristotelem, non te minus (e regia prosapia genito magnanimo principe) quam Alexandro Macedonum rege dignum existimes; si nostram uero in te obseruantiam, si nostram in Alberthum et in praeclaram omnem Alberthorum familiam dilectionem amoremque consyderes, et eximium certe id in

primisque deuotum. Caeterum si hisce te rebus delectari intellexero, efficies ut propediem huic quasi praeludio maiora fortasse quaedam ualentioraque certamina subnecteam. Interea uero hunc Aristotelem lectitabis; intueberisque magna ex parte quae a maioribus nostris de bene dicendi scientia et tradita nobis [ed. vobis] ac relicta sunt, ab Aristotelico fonte praecepta illa quaeque emanauisse. Qua quidem ex re eo magis eorum impudentia miranda est, qui cum se Aristotelicos dici uolunt, et loquendo et scribendo absurdissimi simul et infantissimi plane reperiuntur.

Translation

To the illustrious and noble gentleman, Most Clement Reverend Father Alfonso Carrillo Alborno, Cardinal of the Holy Roman Church, Francesco Filelfo's preface to Aristotle's *Rhetoric to King Alexander*.

While I was teaching in Bologna last year, most excellent father, which gave me the greatest honors and rewards ever enjoyed by anyone in that city, a number of noble and prominent men began to study Greek, for they had perceived that, unless they did so, they would strive in vain to achieve eloquence in Latin. When I lectured to them in Greek on Aristotle's rules for civil cases, which he wrote for King Alexander with his customary erudition and elegance, they pressed me with insistent urgings to make a Latin version of the work. They judged sensibly that they would derive greater benefit from this work in Latin than in Greek, since they prefer to speak Latin rather than Greek. Now, we do not all strive to master Greek letters for use in Athens or Byzantium, but as an aid and guide to attaining greater fluency and eloquence in Latin. And it also happens somehow that, when men peruse Greek books in a hasty and shallow manner and fail to devote themselves completely to their study, they never acquire the incredible and nearly divine grace and sweetness of Greek elegance, not from the orators nor from the poets nor the philosophers. Hence, most of our countrymen who desire to charm their listeners prefer at the outset to hear Greek works read in Latin rather than in Greek. They are unaware that it would be more useful for students of Greek to have Greek words and Greek harmonies fill their ears night and day; and that, just as the Latins surpass the Greeks in gravity, so they far surpass us in sweetness through the ambrosia and nectar, as it were, of their style.

I began by resisting the demands of my friends with great obstinance. For I knew that they were asking for something which is by nature quite difficult. The art of translating often requires rendering word for word, but avoiding absurdity in this sometimes requires great effort and, given the differences and limitations of language, on occasion can only be hoped for. I knew, moreover, that my talent and experience scarcely enabled me to express the majesty of Aristotle's style in the form of a Latin translation. And I was loath as well to be judged foolish or reckless by some critics. But while I was resisting these requests, Alberto Alberti, my close friend and a commender of your name who was serving as pontifical

treasurer in Bologna, began to press me eagerly to do what the others had been asking. By rights he holds great power over me, but he persuaded me even more readily by saying that this favor would prove especially gratifying to Your Clemency. He described you as a man born with regal magnificence and nobility, and possessed of an extraordinarily splendid and vast genius. He added that, while you highly value all noble disciplines and remarkable virtues, you rate the arts of eloquence above all. This friendly and weighty man convinced me without difficulty that this was true, for I had long since observed that he was both able and willing to speak the truth, as I found from experience in several other matters, including the praises which he sang of your successful and august embassy in Bologna. He described the situation so vividly that even the stones themselves could have foreseen well in advance any change in the Bolognese government. Indeed, if the men in power had chosen to follow in your footsteps, they would not have been removed from office, nor would this great and famous city have fallen into such great calamities and suffering. But that is not to our point.

Realizing that you would welcome this translation, I rather forgot myself in gratifying a friend, that is, in dedicating myself and my friend Alberto to your name. "Love conquers all." I took on a most difficult task, one greater than my strength. "Fortune favors the bold." In his boldness, Homer's Ajax was able to take on and defeat in a duel Hector, whose challenge to combat neither Ulysses nor Nestor had accepted. He was able to stand against the Trojans when all the Greek ships were on fire. Perhaps I too shall be able, if not to display the clarity of Aristotle's style, at least to convey his meaning in Latin.

There is one point I should not omit. In translating certain terms, I have departed from Quintilian, and done so intentionally. He translates *δημηγορικόν* literally as "contionale genus" and *προκατάληπιν* as "praesumptio." But I have used more common words and have chosen to render these terms (not absurdly, I think) as "deliberativum" and "praecoccupatio." The reader will find these and other examples. For although Quintilian was erudite and acute, as is obvious, in some of his words and notions he sought to preserve his own style rather than Cicero's. Following the example and authority of Cicero, Horace, and Jerome, who were the most idiomatic and eloquent Latin authors of any age, I strive as far as possible to make my translation consonant with good Latin style. Accordingly, I have done my best to translate the present work with an eye to rhythm, style, and metaphor.

Please receive this little gift, Magnificent Father, whatever its worth. If you consider its author Aristotle, you will think it no less worthy of you (a magnanimous prince born of regal stock) than of Alexander, king of Macedon. And if you consider our reverence for you and our love for Alberto and the entire Alberti family, you will think it excellent and devoted. Should I learn that you delight in such works, you will move me soon to supplement this exercise with works of perhaps even greater prowess. In the meantime, you will read this work by Aristotle and will witness how nearly all the precepts which our forebears have left us and handed

down concerning rhetoric derive from Aristotelian sources. One must wonder all the more at the impudence of certain men who wish to be called Aristotelians, when in speaking and writing they are completely uncouth and inarticulate.

APPENDIX B

Manuscripts of Filelfo's *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* A Preliminary Census

Bologna, Biblioteca Universitaria, ms. 2948 (Miscellanea Tioli), vol. 8, "Philelphi praefatio Rhetoricae Aristotelis," excerpt from Vatican Library, Ottob. lat. 1976 (Kristeller, *Iter* 1:20; see also *Iter* 2:420).

Florence, Biblioteca Laurenziana, Ms. 52.31 (Bandini 1774-77, 2:570-71; Garin 1950, 70n1). Bandini transcribes *incipit*, *explicit*, and brief excerpts from the codex.

_____, Ms. 90.54, preface only (Calderini 1913, 270n4).

_____, Ashb. 954 (885), mbr. XV (Kristeller, *Iter* 1:85).

_____, Biblioteca Riccardiana, ms. 159 (N II 18), cart. misc. XV, 230 fols., 108-166v, with preface (Kristeller, *Iter* 1:189).

Holkham Hall, 490, mbr. XV, 381 fols. 186-204v, with preface (Kristeller, *Iter* 4:47a).

Jena, Universitätsbibliothek, GB o. l., mbr. XVI, 50 fols., 2-50, with a preface, Inc. Clarissime [*sic*] pater quod in ea urbe (Kristeller, *Iter* 3:412b).

Milan, Bibl. Ambrosiana, B 161 sup. (Calderini 1913, 270n4).

_____, Bibl. Trivulziana, ms. 658 (Calderini 1913, 270n4).

Modena, Archivio di Stato, Letteratura, Busta 1, "Scritti letterari greci," s. XIV-XVI. misc., several fascicles: fasc. 3., no 1, "damaged" (Kristeller, *Iter* 2:540).

Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 382, fols. 1-29v (Calderini 1913, 270n4).

Naples, Biblioteca Nazionale, ms. XIV C 23, mbr., "fragm." (Kristeller, *Iter* 1:408).

Paris, Bibl. Nationale, Lat. 7810, n. 22 (Calderini 1913, 270n4).

Perugia, Badia di S. Pietro, CM 31, (Kristeller, *Iter* 2:53).

Pistoia, Archivio Capitolare del Duomo, 62, cart. misc. XV, 96 fols., 68-96v, "apparently fragmentary at the end" (Kristeller, *Iter* 2:75).

Ravenna, Biblioteca Classense, 182, cart. misc. XV, fols. 1-53 (Garin 1950, 70n1; Kristeller, *Iter* 2:81).

Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Chigi J V 153, mbr. XV (1430) (Kristeller, *Iter* 2:475).

_____, Chigi J VII 240 (Kristeller, *Iter* 2:476).

_____, Ottob. lat. 1267, cart. (and mbr.) misc. XV, 186 fols., 3-32, with preface (Kristeller, *Iter*, 2:429).

_____, Ottob. lat. 1976, mbr. (Kristeller, *Iter* 2:420).

- _____, Urb. lat. 306, fol. 214ff. (Calderini 1913, 270n4; Stormaiolo 1:272; Garin 1950, 70nl).
 Venice, Biblioteca Marciana, Marc. lat. VI 43 (Calderini 1913, 270n4; Kristeller, *Iter* 2:221).
 _____, Marc. lat. VI 118, misc. XV (Calderini 1913, 270n4; Kristeller, *Iter* 2:223).
 _____, Marc. lat. X 112 (Calderini 1913, 270n4).
 _____, Marc. lat. XI 5, cart. XV, 84 fols., 1-61v (Calderini 1913, 270n4; Kristeller, *Iter* 2:253).
 Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Cod. lat. 255, fols. 25-87v (Zippel 1979, 227n32).

APPENDIX C

Rhetorical Terms from Filelfo's Greek-Latin Lexicon

Florence, Biblioteca Laurenziana, Conv. soppr. 181, cart. XV, 159 fols., Filelfo's Greek-Latin lexicon, autograph.

<i>Greek</i>	<i>Latin Glosses</i>	<i>Fol.</i>
ἀπολογούμαι	respondeo defendo purgo scuso	17v
ἀποτρέπω	auerto dissuadeo	18v
δημηγορέω	contionor δημηγορικός	35
δικανικός	iudicialis	38
ἐγκωμιάζω	laudo per eloquentiam, ornate loquor	42v
ἐξετασμός	questio	51v
ἐπιδεικνύω	ostendo	54v
καταγορέω	conuitior accuso maledico	78
πρᾶξις	exactio	120
προκαταλαμβάνω	praeoccupo praeuenio	121
προτρεπτικός	instructius exhortatiuus	121
συμβολαῖον	comertium [sic] pactum conuentio	133v
ψεκτός	uituperabilis	154v

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La “Retorica” di Aristotele negli studi europei più recenti

Carlo Natali

Queste pagine intendono presentare alcuni aspetti del dibattito intorno alla *Retorica* di Aristotele svoltosi nei paesi europei a partire dalla fine degli anni '50; si tratta solo di 'alcuni' aspetti, e la scelta, molto parziale, vorrebbe suggerire al lettore la possibilità di ulteriori ricerche ed approfondimenti. Il campo della discussione teorica e storica sulla retorica in generale, e sulla *Retorica* di Aristotele in particolare, è così ampio e variegato, che sarebbe impossibile darne conto nello spazio di un breve intervento come il presente. La rassegna che qui si presenta è 'parziale' in senso letterale, cioè a dire, è delineata da un punto di vista di parte: chi scrive è per professione uno storico della filosofia, ed è interessato principalmente agli aspetti filosofici della moderna rivalutazione della retorica.

La rinascita dell'interesse per la *Retorica* di Aristotele è evidente se si prende come punto di paragone quanto scriveva, nel 1923, W.D. Ross, il grande patriarca degli studi aristotelici nella prima metà del secolo, editore e commentatore di molti testi aristotelici, dalla *Metafisica* alla *Fisica* agli *Analitici* e curatore della monumentale "Oxford Translation" di tutte le opere di Aristotele in Inglese. Nel suo volume intitolato *Aristotele*, ancora per molti versi una delle presentazioni migliori del pensiero di questo filosofo, Ross, a conclusione del breve paragrafo sulla retorica, scriveva:

«[La retorica di Aristotele] può sembrare una curiosa miscellanea di critica letteraria con una logica, un'etica, una politica ed una giurisprudenza di seconda qualità mescolate dall'astuzia di uno che conosce bene come giocare sulle debolezze del cuore umano. Per comprendere il libro è essenziale tener presente il suo scopo puramente pratico. Non è un'opera teorica su nessuno di questi argomenti, è un manuale per l'oratore [...] la *Retorica* ha ora meno vita della maggior parte delle altre opere aristoteliche [...] al giorno d'oggi gli oratori

sono, giustamente, propensi a fidarsi del talento naturale e dell'esperienza, anziché dell'istruzione e gli ascoltatori quantunque siano [...] facilmente trascinati dalla retorica, sono piuttosto vergognosi del fatto, e non molto interessati a conoscerne il trucco».¹

Segno di questo disinteresse era stato il fatto che dopo l'opera di Cope e Sandys² nessuno aveva più scritto un commentario continuo a quest'opera, trascurata quasi quanto i *Meteorologica*. Oggi al contrario vi sono tutti i segni di un rinascite interesse per la *Rhetorica* di Aristotele anche nel campo ristretto degli specialisti e degli aristotelizzanti. Questa rinascita di interesse è attestata, oltre che dalla pubblicazione di importanti monografie, a molte delle quali faremo accenno nelle pagine successive, dal fatto che dal punto di vista delle 'istituzioni' culturali (in senso lato) quest'opera viene oggi considerata degna di attenzione. E' iniziata la pubblicazione di un nuovo commentario continuo della *Rhetorica* in inglese, a cura di Grimaldi,³ ed è annunciato un commentario in tedesco, a cura di G. Bien, nell'ampia serie "Aristoteles Werke in deutscher Übersetzung" pubblicata dalla Akademie Verlag di Berlino. Uno dei più recenti Simposi aristotelici (Princeton 1-9.8.1990) è stato dedicato alla *Rhetorica*, con la partecipazione di alcuni tra i maggiori specialisti del campo,⁴ sia americani che europei.

Questo *revival* di interesse per la *Rhetorica* da parte degli specialisti non deriva da un'evoluzione interna del campo degli studi — a parte alcune eccezioni di cui diremo poi. Esso è stato influenzato piuttosto da una crescita di interesse per la retorica aristotelica in un ambito culturale più vasto, e che ha influenzato il ristretto ambito degli studi di storia della filosofia antica: la rivalutazione della retorica antica avvenuta alla fine degli anni '50 per opera di studiosi come Perelman, Gadamer, Barthes.

A differenza da quanto sembra avvenire negli U.S.A., in gran parte delle nazioni

¹ W.D. Ross, *Aristotle*, London 1923, tr. it. Milano 1982², p. 264.

² E.M. Cope - J.E. Sandys, *The Rhetoric of Aristotle*, with a commentary, Cambridge 1877 (reprint Hildesheim-New York 1970).

³ W.M.A. Grimaldi (S.J.), *Aristotle, Rhetoric I, A Commentary*, New York 1980, e *Aristotle, Rhetoric II. A Commentary*, New York 1988.

⁴ La serie di convegni triennali tra specialisti del pensiero dello Stagirita, detti Simposi aristotelici, iniziatisi alla fine degli anni '50, ha trattato successivamente i principali temi del pensiero di Aristotele (il rapporto con Platone, la dialettica, il metodo, la filosofia della natura, la dottrina della scienza) ed alcune delle opere più importanti (*Etica Eudemia*, *De anima*, *Metafisica*, *Analitici Secondi*, *Opere dubbie*, *Politica*, *Rhetorica*). Nel convegno di Princeton, i cui atti al settembre 1992 non sono ancora stati pubblicati, l'attenzione degli studiosi si è concentrata soprattutto sui capitoli iniziali della *Rhetorica* (Schlitrumpf, Mackenzie, Sprute), l'entimema (Burnyeat), la metafora (Laks), il rapporto con le opinioni, e quindi con l'etica e filosofia pratica (Halliwell, Most, Cooper), il rapporto con la dialettica (Brunschwig), le passioni e le emozioni (Aubenque, Nehamas), l'oratoria politica (Labarrière).

europee non esistono istituzioni analoghe agli Speech Departments americani: il che fa sì che la rinascita dell'interesse per la retorica si sia sviluppata soprattutto nei dipartimenti di filosofia e di letteratura, e porti chiare tracce di questa doppia origine. Infatti fin dall'inizio si può distinguere una rinascita della retorica legata ai problemi della dialettica, dell'ermeneutica e in generale della lotta tra metodo scientifico e pensiero umanistico, ed una rinascita della retorica legata all'ambito della poetica e della critica del testo. Come abbiamo già detto, in queste pagine noi ci occuperemo solo del primo aspetto, tralasciando il secondo, di grande importanza, ma del quale sappiamo meno. Inoltre, la rivalutazione della *Retorica* di Aristotele è più marcata nel campo degli studi filosofico-retorici, mentre è minore nel campo degli studi poetico-retorici. Ne può essere un buon esempio la posizione del "Gruppo μ ," il quale nel 1970 propose una rivalutazione della retorica nel campo degli studi letterari, proponendosi di "considerare la retorica non più come un'arma della dialettica, ma come uno strumento della poetica," e intendendo per retorica "la conoscenza dei procedimenti linguistici caratteristici della letteratura".⁵ Gli autori di questo gruppo non si rifanno direttamente al trattato aristotelico, ma quando parlano di retorica antica in genere si rifanno ad una manualistica molto più tarda (Lamy, Du Marsais, Fontanier, autori dei secc. XVII e XVIII).

Per opinione comune, all'origine della rivalutazione filosofica della *Retorica* di Aristotele in Europa stanno i nomi di Perelman e Gadamer. In due opere pubblicate quasi contemporaneamente⁶ questi due autori hanno sostenuto l'utilità di una riconsiderazione del ruolo della retorica nella nostra cultura, sia pure con argomenti diversi, e facendo riferimento a tradizioni, almeno a prima vista, molto lontane tra loro. Ed entrambi, in qualche modo, hanno legato questa rivalutazione della retorica al nome prestigioso di Aristotele.⁷ Già nel 1950 Perelman infatti scriveva:

Lo sviluppo della logica moderna risale al momento in cui, per studiare i procedimenti del ragionamento, i logici si sono messi ad analizzare il modo di ragionare dei matematici; è da una analisi dei ragionamenti utilizzati dalle scienze formali, le scienze matematiche, che risulta la concezione attuale della logica (...) Se questa analisi delle scienze formali è stata così feconda, non si potrebbe intraprendere una analisi simile nel campo della filosofia, del diritto, della politica e di tutte le scienze umane? Ciò non avrebbe per risultato il sottrarre l'argomentazione utilizzata in queste scienze a una assimilazione a fenomeni di suggestione — la quale cosa implica generalmente una qualche diffidenza, o una assimilazione alla logica che, nella sua struttura attuale, deve

⁵ Groupe μ , *Rhétorique générale*, Paris 1970, trad. ital. Milano 1976, pp. 14 e 36.

⁶ C. Perelman-L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, *Traité de l'argumentation. La nouvelle rhétorique*, Paris 1958, trad. ital. Torino 1966, 1976; H.G. Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode*, Tübingen 1960, trad. ital. Milano 1972, 1989^a.

⁷ Perelman, *Traité... cit.*, p. 5; Gadamer, *Op. cit.*, pp. 43-44.

necessariamente rifiutare questo genere di ragionamenti?

Per trovare una terza via teorica tra la dimostrazione logico-matematica e la pura suggestione irrazionale, Perelman si rivolge alla *Retorica* di Aristotele, e prosegue dicendo:

Avendo intrapreso, dunque, questa analisi dell'argomentazione in un certo numero di opere, specialmente filosofiche, e in certi discorsi dei nostri contemporanei, ci siamo resi conto, nel corso del lavoro, che i procedimenti che ritroviamo erano, in gran parte, quelli della *Retorica* di Aristotele: in ogni caso, le preoccupazioni di quest'ultimo si avvicinavano singolarmente alle nostre.⁸

Sia Perelman che Gadamer, sia pure con ragioni diverse, ritengono che sia necessario superare l'identificazione di retorica e persuasione, o "trascinamento," come diceva Ross. Entrambi allargano i confini della retorica fino ad includere in essa, in qualche maniera, anche il ragionamento pratico, e, in modi differenti, prospettano un'alleanza di ragion pratica e retorica, in opposizione alla razionalità formale e analitica del discorso scientifico. Entrambi vengono così ad attribuire a questa forma di razionalità retorica una funzione più ampia di quella tradizionalmente riconosciuta ad essa.⁹

Perelman infatti sostiene di voler «fondare una teoria dell'argomentazione che ci consenta l'uso della ragione per dirigere la nostra azione e influire su quella degli altri» (p. 5); a dire il vero in questa formulazione, ancora generale, si potrebbe anche vedere, più che l'identificazione dei meccanismi logici del sapere pratico e di quelli della retorica, l'indicazione di un uso pratico della retorica, come strumento per trasmettere in modo convincente i risultati del ragionamento etico e politico. Ma non è così. Perelman vuole riflettere su una serie di meccanismi argomentativi, comuni sia all'orazione propriamente detta, sia al dialogo, sia al monologo interiore, sia alla deliberazione ed alla scelta pratica:

Poiché d'altra parte anche la discussione con un solo interlocutore e persino la deliberazione intima rientrano in una teoria generale dell'argomentazione, si capisce come debba essere ben più ampia, rispetto a quella della retorica

⁸ C. Perelman, *Logique et rhétorique*, in "Revue philosophique de la France et de l'Étranger" (1950), poi in: *Rhétorique et philosophie. Pour une théorie de l'argumentation en philosophie*, Paris 1952; tr. it. in *Retorica e filosofia*, Bari 1979, p. 61.

⁹ Cfr. Perelman, *Traité... cit.*, p. 8: «Noi non miriamo infatti, come il maestro di eloquenza, alla pratica della persuasione, ma, come il logico, vogliamo esaminare il meccanismo del pensiero... Il nostro studio, che riguarda soprattutto la struttura dell'argomentazione, non insisterà dunque sul modo in cui s'effettua la comunicazione con l'uditorio».

classica, l'idea che noi ci facciamo dell'oggetto del nostro studio (p. 8).

E, più avanti:

Persino sul piano della deliberazione interiore esistono condizioni preliminari all'argomentazione: occorre soprattutto considerarsi quasi sdoppiati in almeno due interlocutori che prendano parte alla deliberazione (p. 16).

Articolando la sua posizione Perelman ha sostenuto che, invece di tentare di applicare la logica pura alle deliberazioni, come suggerisce J.S. Mill, è meglio considerare la deliberazione una specie di argomentazione retorica, e che l'analizzare le argomentazioni rivolte ad altri ci fa comprendere meglio la nostra deliberazione. Secondo Perelman nella deliberazione si distinguono una prima fase di riflessione, che può equivalere ad una discussione, ed una successiva ricerca di argomenti per difendere la scelta già fatta. Ma anche questa seconda fase, più legata al convincimento che alla scelta, secondo Perelman è utile al raggiungimento di una buona decisione, dato che serve ad intensificare l'adesione personale alla scelta fatta ed a proteggerla da attacchi inaspettati.¹⁰

Da parte sua Gadamer ha sostenuto che nella difesa, fatta da Vico, del *sensus communis*, si fondono sia «l'antica tradizione retorica che risale fino a Platone», sia «l'antica opposizione aristotelica di sapere pratico e sapere teorico, opposizione che non si può ridurre a quella tra vero e verosimile. Il sapere pratico, la *phronesis*, è un altro genere di sapere».¹¹ Come per Perelman,¹² anche per Gadamer, e per la tradizione che egli intende recuperare, si tratta di operare una rottura con la concezione della ragione e del ragionamento nata con Descartes.

In un saggio successivo Gadamer ha ribadito che la retorica non è semplice teoria delle forme discorsive e degli strumenti di persuasione ma è una forma di potere che, a partire da una attitudine naturale, può generare una matrice pratica; egli ha ricordato inoltre l'antica origine sofistica della retorica, al tempo di Protagora e Isocrate, quando essa, a suo parere, veniva insegnata come modo di formare una retta coscienza civica. Ermeneutica e retorica hanno in comune la rivalutazione dell'*eikos*, del verosimile, della capacità di convincere e spiegare senza potere addurre delle prove; ma si differenziano per l'importanza che assume nella retorica la mozione degli affetti, assente nell'ermeneutica. Infine per Gadamer la retorica costituisce una indispensabile mediazione che, sola, permette alla scienza di diventare

¹⁰ Perelman, *Traité... cit.*, p. 44: «Non si può infatti distinguere (...) nella deliberazione intima, una riflessione che può equivalere ad una discussione, e un altro aspetto di essa che altro non è se non una ricerca di argomenti in favore di una posizione precedentemente adottata?». Cfr. pp. 44-47.

¹¹ Gadamer, *Op. cit.*, p. 44.

¹² Perelman, *Traité... cit.*, p. 3.

fattore sociale di vita.¹³

Per il dibattito generale sulla retorica, estremamente ampio, svoltosi successivamente ai contributi di Perelman e Gadamer, qui ci limiteremo ad alcune indicazioni relative ad alcuni contesti culturali particolari.

Partiamo con il contesto italiano: nella discussione filosofica sulla retorica che si è svolta in Italia nei tempi più recenti riappaiono costantemente le due mosse tipiche della redenzione della retorica, cioè 1) l'ampliamento del campo della retorica al di là della persuasione vera e propria, e 2) l'assimilazione, se non proprio l'identificazione, di retorica e filosofia pratica, o ragionamento pratico, secondo le varie scuole. Sia negli atti di un convegno nazionale di filosofia tenuto a Verona nel 1983,¹⁴ sia in quelli di un convegno sulla retorica tenuto a Cattolica nel 1985¹⁵ si trovano molte affermazioni di questo tipo.

A Verona Berti, Raimondi e Vattimo hanno ricordato la confluenza di retorica e filosofia pratica avvenuta nel seno dell'ermeneutica gadameriana, per la quale le due forme di sapere costituiscono insieme un modello di razionalità pratica aperta e democratica, che si sottrae all'astrazione del formalismo scientifico.¹⁶ Berti sostiene che

Alla "nuova retorica" vanno indubbiamente riconosciuti molti meriti: anzitutto quello di fornire una valida alternativa alla cosiddetta "crisi della ragione" che è essenzialmente crisi della razionalità scientifica, riportando nell'ambito della razionalità ciò che altrimenti resta affidato alla pura "decisione" o alla pura "autorità" priva di giustificazione razionale, cioè il vasto e importante campo dell'etica, della politica, del diritto (...) un secondo merito della "nuova retorica" è poi quello di proporre una razionalità aperta, non costruttiva, "democratica" in cui si tiene conto del contributo di tutti e non si impone dogmaticamente niente a nessuno (...) infine un terzo merito che va riconosciuto alla nuova retorica è quello di non ignorare i condizionamenti storici, culturali, sociali anche ideologici, ma soprattutto linguistici della comunicazione e quindi della conoscenza (pp. 20-21).

¹³ H.G. Gadamer, *Rhetorik, Hermeneutik und Ideologiekritik*, in: *Kleine Schriften I*, Tübingen 1967, trad. ital. in *Ermeneutica e metodica universale*, Genova 1973, pp. 49-55.

¹⁴ AA.VV., *Linguaggio, persuasione, verità*, Atti del XXVIII Congresso Naz. di Filosofia, Verona 28.4-1.5.1983), Padova 1984.

¹⁵ G. Fenocchio (a cura di), *Le ragioni della retorica*, Atti del Convegno: "Retorica: verità, opinione persuasione" (Cattolica 22.2-20.4.1985), Modena 1986.

¹⁶ E. Berti, *Retorica, dialettica, filosofia*, in: AA.VV. *Linguaggio...*, pp. 19-36; vedi anche il volume più recente, *Le ragioni di Aristotele*, Roma-Bari 1989, pp. 166-167. E. Raimondi, *Retorica e linguaggio letterario*, in: AA.VV. *Linguaggio...*, pp. 83-99 e G. Vattimo, *Verità e retorica*, in: AA.VV. *Linguaggio...*, pp. 145-156.

D'altra parte, rileva Berti, a questi pregi si contrappongono dei limiti precisi:

- 1) la contrapposizione alla scienza, cui viene lasciato il monopolio del sapere teoretico;
- 2) la contrapposizione alla metafisica;
- 3) l'identificazione di sapere teoretico e sapere assiomatico-deduttivo logicamente formalizzabile.

A questi limiti Berti propone di ovviare a questi difetti attraverso una più stretta alleanza tra retorica e filosofia, in cui la retorica persuada delle verità che la filosofia ha trovato (pp. 25-26), riproponendo quindi un modello di lontanissima derivazione platonica.

Raimondi da parte sua sottolinea le connessioni tra la posizione di Perelman e la 'rinascita della filosofia pratica', posizione teorica diffusa soprattutto in Germania, e legata ai nomi di Gadamer, Ritter, Kuhn, Pöggeler e altri (pp. 94-95).

Vattimo infine ripropone ed amplia la posizione di Gadamer, attribuendo alla retorica-ermeneutica sia una verità sua propria, distinta da quella scientifica, sia una funzione di "orientamento etico" sugli usi e gli sviluppi della scienza, sia infine una *radicalizzazione* della natura essenzialmente retorica della scienza (pp. 149-151).

A Cattolica si è andati ancora più in là: alcuni hanno ripetuto la ormai tradizionale posizione di Gadamer,¹⁷ sulla funzione pratica della retorica, ma altri hanno addirittura suggerito, in modo molto brillante, di superare la tradizionale posizione, depositata ormai nel senso comune, per cui alla retorica spetta di trasmettere in modo convincente contenuti già dati, ed hanno proposto una retorica come *tecnica generativa*, cioè una retorica *euristica*, che 'arricchisca' il nostro senso comune.¹⁸ Anche da altre prospettive è stata indicata nell' *inventio*, nella capacità di trovare contenuti ed argomenti, sia la vera natura della retorica, sia il fondamento della sua moderna rivalutazione, sia, infine, il modo più fecondo di rileggere, oggi, la *Retorica* di Aristotele. Lasciando cadere il collegamento tra retorica e pratiche giudiziarie si propone di considerare la retorica come la "disciplina preliminare" delle scienze umanistiche.¹⁹

¹⁷ Fenocchio, *Op. cit.*, *Premessa* della curatrice, p. 7.

¹⁸ U. Eco, *Il messaggio persuasivo*, in Fenocchio, *Op. cit.*, pp. 11-27, in particolare p. 16, che rinvia a suoi saggi precedenti sul tema.

¹⁹ A. Plebe - P. Emanuele, *Manuale di retorica*, Roma-Bari 1988; questo volume, che non è affatto un 'manuale' nel senso corrente, come ad esempio il volume di Mortara Garavelli (B. Mortara Garavelli, *Manuale di retorica*, Milano 1989), ma una ridiscussione di tutto il campo retorico in una prospettiva originale, contiene osservazioni molto giuste e prospettive interessanti. Gli nuoce purtroppo una certa imprecisione nella lettura dei testi antichi e dei riferimenti: cfr a pp. 21-22 l'interpretazione di *adv. soph.* 12-13; a p. 24 l'interpretazione di *metaph.* 993b; a p. 31 l'idea, curiosa, che lo scritto di Alcimante,

Barilli invece, in un nuovo intervento, ha rivendicato al dominio della retorica l'intero ambito politico, quello giudiziario e quello estetico, come settori in cui la comunità degli uomini deve discutere ed argomentare in base a criteri più o meno probabili: anche in questo caso, come in Perelman, è da sottolineare l'ampliamento del campo delle tecniche retoriche in modo da includere nella retorica, oltre la filosofia pratica, anche la dialettica intesa in senso aristotelico, come tecnica della discussione razionale.²⁰

Abbiamo fatto riferimento fin qui a studi di carattere filosofico generale, dato che gli studi specialistici sulla *Retorica* di Aristotele di ambiente italiano, nella maggior parte dei casi non mostrano di avere subito alcuna particolare influenza da questo movimento di rivalutazione della retorica, e preferiscono affrontare lo studio della *Retorica* dal punto di vista storico, e da quello della genesi del pensiero di Aristotele. La problematica di questi studi non è lontana da quella di Solmsen:²¹ cfr. il saggio di C.A. Viano, frequentemente citato, il quale descrive le tappe attraverso cui Aristotele sarebbe passato, partendo da una posizione simile a quella del *Fedro* di Platone ('redenzione' della retorica attraverso la sua subordinazione alla dialettica) fino a giungere ad una posizione come quella delle parti più recenti della *Retorica*, con importanti osservazioni sul rapporto tra dialettica e retorica. L'opera di Aristotele secondo questo autore sfocia in una certa sterilizzazione della retorica, che perderebbe le sue caratteristiche più inquietanti per ridursi ad una attività innocua, non pericolosa per la vita politica della comunità, quindi non più una sfida all'ordinato governo della città.²² Questa prospettiva è stata ripresa più recentemente nel volume della Gastaldi;²³ secondo questa autrice la crescita recente di interesse verso la *Retorica* di Aristotele si deve all'ipotesi (attribuita soprattutto a Düring 1966) di considerare quest'opera come uno scritto giovanile, e quindi importante per la ricostruzione dell'attività del giovane Aristotele nell'Accademia; non si fa riferimento, in questo contesto, all'opera di Perelman e Gadamer. Questa autrice

Contro i sofisti, non ci sia pervenuto (è disponibile ora anche una ed. critica con trad. italiana, in E. Avezzù, *Alcidamante. Orazioni e frammenti*, Roma 1982, p. 8 e sgg.), etc. Di uno dei due autori, A. Plebe, è opportuno ricordare anche il precedente volume, *Breve storia della retorica antica*, Roma-Bari 1968, panorama sintetico della materia.

²⁰ R. Barilli, *Eloquenza, tecnologia, scienza della cultura*, in Fenocchio, *Op. cit.*, pp. 47-69, in particolare p. 52; in maniera più ampia questa posizione è argomentata in R. Barilli, *La retorica*, Milano 1979, pp. 15-17.

²¹ F. Solmsen, *Die Entwicklung der aristotelischen Logik und Rhetorik*, Berlin 1929.

²² C.A. Viano, *Aristotele e la redenzione della retorica*, «Rivista di filosofia» LVIII (1967), pp. 371-425.

²³ S. Gastaldi, *Discorso della città e discorso della scuola. Ricerche sulla "Retorica" di Aristotele*, Firenze 1981, in part. pp. 9-10. Della stessa autrice si segnala il lavoro più recente, *Aristotele e la psicologia delle passioni. Retorica, psicologia ed etica dei comportamenti emozionali*, Torino 1990, in cui un intero capitolo è dedicato al concetto di *pathos* nella retorica, e Pathe and polis. *Aristotle's Theory of Passions in the Rhetoric and the Ethics*, «Topoi» VI (1987), pp. 105-110.

appare piuttosto critica verso la riflessione di Aristotele, alla quale attribuisce ambiguità, elusività, ribaltamenti di posizioni, contraddizioni, atteggiamenti moralistici (pp. 13, 42, 44 e *passim*), e trova che la *Retorica* di Aristotele tende a sterilizzare il dibattito sulla retorica in una dimensione puramente ascetica e di scuola, tanto da allontanarsi dal reale mondo della polis ed a perdere la carica di progettualità e di "alternativa" che, invece, il *Fedro* di Platone, a suo parere, avrebbe avuto.²⁴

Al contrario A. Russo, in opposizione alle tesi di Ross citate all'inizio, nega che la *Retorica* di Aristotele sia da considerarsi un semplice manuale, ma vede in essa una filosofia scientifica dell'opinione²⁵ (p. 11); importante è lo studio di A. Pieretti,²⁶ che svolge una puntuale analisi della *Retorica* di Aristotele, e ne vuole ritrovare i condizionamenti derivanti dall'ambiente socio-culturale; secondo Pieretti, che in questo segue Russo, la *Retorica* di Aristotele si presenta come un grande inventario delle opinioni dell'Atene del tempo, un'esposizione critica delle condizioni dell'oratoria giudiziaria e deliberativa dell'Atene del sec. IV a.C., già segnata dalla crisi della polis, una teorizzazione a metà tra la descrizione neutrale dello statuto della retorica e l'elaborazione di una teoria generale dell'argomentazione, da una parte, e l'espressione di posizioni politiche moderate e parzialmente conservatrici. Il rilievo teorico di Aristotele risulta sostanzialmente storicizzato in questo studio, pur ampio e approfondito; anche i confronti con Perelman, frequenti e spesso importanti (cfr. ad es. p. 39), sono sempre su punti particolari e non si elevano

²⁴ In questo la Gastaldi mostra di seguire una linea interpretativa dell'etica e della politica aristoteliche sostenute principalmente da M. Vegetti ed altri autori; il principio generale di questa lettura, in estrema sintesi, è che con Aristotele il sapere pratico e retorico si allontanano dalla vita reale della città di Atene per rinchiudersi in una dimensione scolastica e di pura riflessione teorica; cfr. D. Lanza - M. Vegetti, *La crisi della città: ruolo dell'intellettuale e metamorfosi dell'ideologia*, in: AA.VV., *Aristotele e la crisi della politica*, Napoli 1977, p. 114: «Il Liceo si presenta fin dall'inizio radicalmente diverso dall'Accademia. Quel che vi si studia non ha come immediato destinatario la città, ma la scuola stessa». In questo senso Aristotele porterebbe al suo culmine un'opera di neutralizzazione del sapere e della figura stessa del filosofo, iniziata già con Parmenide (cfr. M. Vegetti, *Il coltello e lo stilo. Animali, schiavi, barbari, donne, alle origini della razionalità scientifica*, Milano 1979). Un approccio simile rispetto alla *Politica* è stato sviluppato da F. Calabi, *La città dell'oikos. La 'politica' di Aristotele*, Lucca 1984; per quanto riguarda l'*Etica Nicomachea*, si veda invece l'analisi, molto articolata e problematica, di M. Vegetti, *L'etica degli antichi*, Roma-Bari 1989, cap. 6: *Ricomposizione senza conflitto: l'etica di Aristotele tra società e natura*, pp. 159-217. Questa linea interpretativa non sembra condividere molto le letture che cercano in Aristotele elementi teorici utilizzabili nel dibattito filosofico contemporaneo; per una critica del "neorastotelismo contemporaneo" si veda *L'etica degli antichi*, *cit.*, pp. 210-214. E' una prospettiva critica molto utile in relazione agli eccessivi entusiasmi di certi frettolosi rivalutatori di Aristotele; e tuttavia il lettore mosso da interessi filosofici prova il timore che in questo modo qualcosa di importante possa andare perduto.

²⁵ A. Russo, *La filosofia della retorica in Aristotele*, Napoli 1962, p. 11 e sgg.

²⁶ A. Pieretti, *I quadri socio-culturali della "Retorica" di Aristotele*, Roma 1973.

ad un confronto generale delle due concezioni della retorica. Non abbiamo preso in considerazione qui la bibliografia italiana su Perelman, pur ampia e interessante.²⁷

L'ambito culturale americano è al di fuori dei limiti di questa panoramica, ma vorrei ricordare il fatto che studiosi come Grimaldi sostengono che Aristotele, nel momento in cui afferma che la retorica ha a che fare con il probabile e con il contingente, e chiama in gioco deliberazione e giudizio, ha posto la retorica sotto il dominio dell'intelletto pratico, piuttosto che sotto quello dell'intelletto speculativo. Grimaldi interpreta la *Rhetorica* di Aristotele come lo studio critico di ogni forma di discorso usato dagli uomini per comunicare con i loro simili, sia che l'argomento sia la filosofia, sia che sia la storia, la letteratura, la scienza politica. Scopo della retorica, secondo Grimaldi, è generare una comunicazione corretta e scevra da sovrapposizioni e confusioni,²⁸ e quindi la *Rhetorica* di Aristotele si occupa essenzialmente dei principi che sono necessari se uno deve produrre giudizi significativi in ogni argomento, nel modo che comunica più efficacemente questa conoscenza, e non soltanto al fine di persuadere. Si giunge così alla definizione di retorica come quella disciplina che, in ultima analisi, costituisce "an analysis of the nature of human discourse in all areas of knowledge". In questa prospettiva il ruolo della persuasione è decisamente sottovalutato, e messo in secondo piano, mentre viene sottolineata la funzione normativa della retorica come scienza della buona comunicazione politica ed etica tra gli uomini. E' una posizione che ritroveremo ancora, in vari contesti culturali.

Le posizioni di Gadamer e Perelman sono state riprese in Germania in una serie di studi recenti: oltre i saggi di Lossau e Papadimitriou,²⁹ la prospettiva di unificazione del campo retorico e del campo etico, a proposito di Aristotele, è stata sviluppata soprattutto da M. H. Wörner in un saggio recente.³⁰ Wörner parte

²⁷ Segnaliamo solo che lo stesso Pieretti è autore di uno dei primi studi italiani su Perelman, *L'argomentazione nel discorso filosofico. Analisi critica del pensiero di Chaim Perelman*, L'Aquila 1969.

²⁸ Vedi W.M.A. Grimaldi (S.J.), *Studies in the Philosophy of Aristotle's Rhetoric*, «Hermes Einzelschriften» XXV (1972), Wiesbaden 1972, p. 3, che afferma che la retorica affronta i temi di cui si occupa sotto la formalità della comunicazione: "that is to say with the intention of presenting the matter to another in such a way as to make accessible to the other the possibility of reasonable judgement" e: "in order to discover the most effective way in which to present the problematic so that another person may reach an intelligent decision". Per contro vedi J. Sprute, *Die Enthymentheorie der aristotelischen Rhetorik*, «Abh. d. Ak. d. Wiss. in Göttingen», Philol.-Hist. Kl. Nr. 124, Göttingen 1982, p. 56: "Die Aufgabe der Rhetorik besteht mithin in der praxisorientierten Erarbeitung eines Wissens unter Einschluß der Ursachenerkenntnis, das sich mit mehr oder weniger großen Erfolgsaussichten in der Praxis anwenden läßt, jedoch keine Erfolgsgarantie in sich trägt."

²⁹ M.I. Lossau, *Pros krisin tina politiken, Untersuchungen zur aristotelischen Rhetorik*, Wiesbaden 1981, ed E. Papadimitriou, *Ethische und psychologische Grundlagen der aristotelischen Rhetorik*, Frankfurt/M. 1979.

³⁰ M.H. Wörner, *Das Ethische in der Rhetorik des Aristoteles*, Freiburg-München 1990.

dell'idea che, fin dall'inizio la retorica si autocomprende come mezzo della ragione pratica, all'interno di una tradizione in genere chiamata umanistica (p. 15); ed egli intende rivalutare tale autocomprendimento, basandosi sul principio seguente: "*die Grundstruktur ethischen Handelns ist ... zugleich diejenige guten Redens*," dato che vi è un parallelismo chiaro, e non casuale, tra gli elementi costitutivi di un buon discorso e quelli di una bella azione. Con una visione non lontana dal dibattito sull'etica comunicativa in Germania, Wörner individua lo spazio precipuo della retorica nel dibattito intorno a cosa sia la vita buona in comune, che si svolge nello spazio pubblico di ogni società a regime democratico (pp. 21-22). Per Wörner, anche se in linea di principio la retorica estende il suo metodo a tutti gli oggetti, è la situazione del decidere-insieme quella su cui si concentra l'attenzione di Aristotele (p. 95). Quindi la retorica è collegata all'azione sia da un punto di vista ontologico-strutturale, in quanto il buon discorso mostra gli stessi elementi costitutivi e la stessa struttura di una azione lodevole, sia dal punto di vista della deliberazione, in quanto si basa sulle convinzioni correnti intorno al bene e al male, le stesse da cui si parte nel deliberare il comportamento pratico, sia del singolo che della comunità politica. Come per l'azione buona è necessaria la virtù nell'agente, così per un buon discorso l'oratore deve mostrare carattere etico e capacità di prendersi cura dei propri concittadini. La retorica in questo modo diviene mezzo di formazione civile, attraverso l'influsso del discorso retorico, che coinvolge l'uditorio non solo razionalmente, ma anche emotivamente, attraverso una vera e propria educazione sia del logos che delle passioni (pp. 358-362). Riprendendo una frase di Ritter,³¹ Wörner trova che la retorica, mezzo della ragion pratica, trovi il suo valore e il suo significato nel determinare uno spazio di comprensione e di discussione sul da farsi, e si elevi ad una *Sprachbildung und Sprachkultur*. Tale aspetto della retorica di Aristotele andrebbe recuperato, liberandolo dagli aspetti più legati all'epoca storica in cui essa venne elaborata, l'età del declino della polis.

Per sottolineare l'originalità della lettura data da Wörner, basta ricordare i punti principali cui giunge uno dei più reputati tra gli ultimi studi in lingua tedesca intorno alla *Retorica* di Aristotele, il saggio di Sprute sull'entimema, ma il cui primo capitolo è dedicato ad *Aristoteles' Verständnis der Rhetorik*,³² alla concezione aristotelica della retorica. Sprute, al contrario di Wörner, sottolinea la preminenza del sillogismo retorico sulle altre *pisteis* in Aristotele (*ethos* e *pathos*); insiste sul legame tra retorica e dialettica proprio in quanto entrambe le discipline si occupano dell'intero campo del logos umano e si situano, quindi, prima della distinzione tra filosofia teoretica, filosofia pratica e tecnica. Sprute non si mostra influenzato dai tentativi di ricondurre la retorica alla filosofia pratica, ma trova lo spazio della retorica nell'ambito della logica (in senso ampio), vista come *organon* di tutte le altre forme di sapere. La

³¹ J. Ritter, *Metaphysik und Politik*, Frankfurt/M. 1969, p. 114 = trad. ital. *Metafisica e politica*, Genova 1983, p. 93.

³² J. Sprute, *Op. cit.*, pp. 32-67.

retorica trae dalla dialettica molte delle sue strutture, e solo le dottrine del libro III, la *lexis* e la *taxis*, sono esclusivamente sue (pp. 54-55). Anche se Aristotele pone un certo collegamento tra retorica e politica, dato che la retorica può servire da disciplina ausiliaria della politica, è il legame con la dialettica, non il paragone con la struttura dell'azione umana. Anzi, l'elemento emotivo e passionale che Aristotele ammette nel discorso retorico, secondo Sprute, è studiato solo come *second best*, all'interno di una retorica non ideale, in una città imperfetta, nella quale il solo ragionamento sillogistico a partire da opinioni diffuse non basta a convincere la gente. La differenza tra gli studi di Sprute e Wörner non consiste solo nel fatto che il primo si occupa del sillogismo retorico, e il secondo dei materiali etico-politici presenti nello scritto aristotelico. Sono piuttosto due concezioni globali che vengono alla luce, nella comparazione di questi due studi recenti.

Nella pubblicistica di lingua francese più recente molte delle posizioni di Perelman sono rimesse progressivamente in discussione. Già nel volume pubblicato dall'Università di Bruxelles in memoria di Ch. Perelman, L. Couloubaritsis³³ ha obiettato contro il riavvicinamento fatto da Perelman tra dialettica e retorica, ma dal punto di vista di una migliore comprensione della natura della dialettica in Aristotele. Vi sono dei campi, come lo studio dei principi della scienza, che non sono aperti ad un trattamento retorico, rileva Couloubaritsis, e vi è tutta una parte della dialettica, la *peirastica*, o funzione critica, che consiste nel mettere in questione, giudicare e criticare i saperi positivi. Tale capacità, propria dell'uomo di cultura, e non del retore, secondo Couloubaritsis è tipica della dialettica, o di una parte di essa, ma non della retorica, la quale si rivela quindi un sapere meno esteso della dialettica, e perciò stesso, aggiungiamo noi, inadatta a svolgere il ruolo di metodo delle scienze umane, che ogni tanto le si vede affidato. Da un altro punto di vista B. Cassin³⁴ ha insistito sulla natura tecnica della retorica aristotelica ("La qualité de la rhétorique, bonne ou mauvaise ... dépend ... de la manière bonne ou mauvaise dont elle exerce sa technique," p. 29),³⁵ contrapponendosi alla posizione di Perelman — da questa autrice definita 'platoneggiante' — di un'alleanza tra retorica e filosofia, in cui da una parte la retorica sembra riassumere in sé l'ambito della filosofia, ma, da un'altra parte ciò avviene solo attraverso una trasformazione della retorica in "discorso indirizzato ad un uditorio universale". Ed a tale uditorio, ideale, viene

³³ L. Couloubaritsis, *Dialectique, rhétorique et critique chez Aristote*, in M. Meyer (ed.), *De la Métaphysique à la rhétorique, Essais à la mémoire de Chaïm Perelman*, Bruxelles 1986, pp. 103-117.

³⁴ B. Cassin, *Bonnes et mauvaises rhétoriques: de Platon à Perelman*, in: M. Meyer-A. Lempereur (edd.), *Figures et conflits rhétoriques*, Bruxelles 1990, pp. 17-37.

³⁵ La natura esclusivamente tecnica, anzi amoralistica, della Retorica aristotelica, contro ogni interpretazione eticizzante, è stata vigorosamente sottolineata anche da C.J. Classen, *Principi e concetti morali nella Retorica di Aristotele*, «Elenchos» X (1989), pp. 5-22; questo autore rileva che per Aristotele l'oratore deve essere tanto *dicendi peritus* da poter apparire anche come *vir bonus*, ma senza che vi sia davvero per lui bisogno di esserlo.

affidata la distinzione tra buona e cattiva persuasione, e la determinazione del valore degli argomenti adottati. Dal punto di vista di una retorica 'selvaggia', sofistica, operatrice di convincimento per sua forza interiore, la retorica aristotelizzante di Perelman appare ora troppo legata ad un quadro etico ed a contenuti accettabili da parte di un uditorio ideale dalle ascendenze lontanamente kantiane.

Quindi Perelman può essere criticato sia per una insufficiente considerazione della problematica filosofico-dialettica in quanto tale, sia per una eccessiva filosoficizzazione della retorica. Ciò mostra la natura di mediazione del suo tentativo, e la fecondità di esso nel generare le reazioni più contrastanti.

Non possiamo proseguire a lungo questa rassegna di posizioni. Ma ci pare interessante dare conto della lettura della *Retorica* di Aristotele recentemente offerta da M. Meyer, erede della cattedra di Perelman a Bruxelles. In un'ampia introduzione ad una traduzione francese dell'opera aristotelica³⁶ egli prende le distanze rispetto alla assimilazione di retorica e dialettica proposta da Perelman, come pure rispetto alla identificazione di retorica e poetica proposta da Barthes (pp. 37-40).³⁷ L'interpretazione di Meyer si articola intorno ad alcuni punti di forza: da una parte l'idea della problematicità, per cui "Les hommes discutent de ce qui fait problème" (p. 7), ed in ogni affermazione vi è una domanda nascosta; e la retorica ha una funzione di occultamento della problematicità sottostante ad ogni affermazione,³⁸ da un'altra parte l'idea della retorica come espressione della contingenza che caratterizza l'esistenza umana, sia dal punto di vista strettamente ontologico, per cui l'uomo è un ente che potrebbe anche non essere (pp. 9-18), sia dal punto di

³⁶ M. Meyer, *Aristote et les principes de la rhétorique contemporaine*, Introduzione ad: *Aristote. Rhétorique*, trad. de Ch.-E. Ruelle revue par P. Vanhemelryck, comm. de B. Timmermans, Paris 1991, pp. 5-70.

³⁷ Lo scritto di R. Barthes, *L'ancienne rhétorique*, Paris 1970, trad. ital. Milano 1972, fu uno dei primi tentativi di mettere in rapporto la semiotica letteraria e la *Texlinguistik* moderna con la retorica antica. Tra le varie funzioni della retorica infatti Barthes individuò anche l'essere una scienza degli 'effetti' del linguaggio, una classificazione di essi, ed una loro trattazione a livello di metalinguaggio.

³⁸ Più avanti Meyer afferma: "Il y a dans toute réponse une question qui se joue et que le locuteur suggère toujours au-delà de ce qu'il dit et du fait qu'il le dit" (p. 45). Questa teoria è stata sviluppata dall'Autore in un ampio volume intitolato *De la problématique. Philosophie, science et langage*, Bruxelles 1989, trad. ital. Parma 1991, in cui si recupera la dottrina, di origine classica, della filosofia come "domandare radicale" (p. 15). Una prospettiva simile era già stata avanzata, in un contesto culturale diverso, da alcuni studiosi padovani di filosofia, i quali, pur affermando che la problematicità filosofica è integrale, ed è elemento costitutivo di tutte le forme di sapere, tuttavia hanno collegato questa posizione alla affermazione dell'esistenza di un principio trascendente. Cfr., tra gli altri, M. Gentile, *Breve trattato di filosofia*, Padova 1974; E. Berti, *Studi aristotelici*, L'Aquila 1975, in particolare i saggi sul principio di non contraddizione, pp. 61-133 e *Le vie della ragione*, Bologna 1987. Una panoramica ed una discussione teorica di queste posizioni in C. Rossitto, *Riflessioni sulla struttura logica della filosofia. A proposito dell'odierna metafisica di tradizione aristotelica*, Padova 1982.

vista della parzialità e della passionalità tipiche dell'interazione umana. La retorica infatti è negoziazione di questioni particolari tra i singoli individui (pp. 19-20) ed esprime l'unilateralità dei giudizi passionali. Il tema della passione e dell'*ethos* è molto importante per Meyer, il quale si distingue proprio per questo dalle interpretazioni che mettono al centro della persuasione retorica il solo entimema.³⁹ Nella retorica è il soggetto reale che si esprime, con l'unilateralità data dalla passione, e Meyer dà delle passioni una interpretazione non lontana da quella stoica: la passione è in fondo un giudizio sbagliato, un rifiutare la connessione tra principi e conseguenze.

Non più metodo delle scienze umane, ma tecnica di per sé né buona né cattiva (p. 24), la retorica per Meyer, come per molti altri studiosi contemporanei, è legata al quadro politico democratico: "La *rhétorique* est la *méthode* qu'utilisent les citoyens des démocraties pour décider des fins comme des moyens" (p. 40).

Una questione centrale delle rivalutazioni contemporanee della retorica è quindi l'ampliamento del campo retorico in modo da inglobare in esso la dialettica, o il sapere pratico, o entrambi. Questa impostazione rivalutativa, e l'intenzione di affiancare, e insieme contrapporre, all'unica razionalità scientifica, varie altre forme di ragione, che permettano di non abbandonare al puro sentimento ed alle emozioni vasti campi della vita umana, come l'agire etico-politico e la riflessione estetica, hanno portato a quella che potrebbe essere definita come 'una politica delle alleanze' tra forme di razionalità vicine e in qualche modo assimilabili, quali la retorica e la filosofia pratica. In questa 'politica' prevale la tendenza ad unificare forme diverse di ragionamento, e a porre in secondo piano le relative differenze, piuttosto che a distinguerne le caratteristiche specifiche, e quindi la retorica e la filosofia pratica, in molti di questi contributi, vengono descritte in modo che i loro confini appaiono piuttosto sfumati.⁴⁰ Su questo punto si scontrano le proposte più costruttive, e le polemiche più aspre.

Non è possibile qui aprire una discussione su tutte queste materie, ma non vorremmo nemmeno limitarci alla pura e quasi neutrale funzione del dossografo; ci limiteremo dunque ad avanzare alcune obiezioni ad alcuni *trends* dominanti della moderna rivalutazione della retorica, ed indicare alcune vie di ricerca possibili.

Dal punto di vista storico, un elemento caratteristico della nozione tradizionale greca di retorica era il suo collegamento con l'idea della forza, della lotta e dello scontro. Mentre chi propone oggi una rivalutazione della retorica insiste sulla sua

³⁹ Al tema delle passioni Meyer ha dedicato una ampia panoramica storica, *Le philosophe et les passions. Esquisse d'une histoire de la nature humaine*, Paris 1991.

⁴⁰ G. Prodi, *La retorica e i suoi vicini*, in Fenocchio, *Op. cit.*, pp. 113-150, in part. p. 115, osserva giustamente che, nella discussione, i vari campi si sono come unificati, e sono rimasti alla fine solo due contendenti: da una parte, scienza, logica, discorso matematico, discorso dimostrativo, "modernitas" e simili; dall'altra retorica, discorso epidittico, "humanitas" e via dicendo.

“democraticità intrinseca,”⁴¹ molti degli autori antichi non sembravano pensarla allo stesso modo.⁴² La retorica era considerata un’arma, ed un’arma potenzialmente pericolosa, tanto che maestri di retorica come Gorgia e Isocrate insistono sul fatto che non è giusto considerarli responsabili del cattivo uso che i loro discepoli potevano fare del potere delle parole. Come notava giustamente all’inizio del secolo H. Gomperz, la formazione culturale impartita dai maestri di retorica era al massimo un *formales Bildungsideal*; ma il pubblico ateniese sospettava i maestri di retorica di qualcosa di peggio: non solo insegnare la capacità di parlare sia in difesa del giusto che dell’ingiusto, ma addirittura applicarsi a “rendere forte il discorso più debole,” cioè offrire armi all’ingiustizia.⁴³ Nelle rivalutazioni moderne della retorica — si ricordi la posizione di Grimaldi, per il quale la retorica tende a presentare “the matter to another in such a way as to make accessible to the other the possibility of reasonable judgement” — la sua natura agonistica, il suo stile combattivo vengono perse per un’etica della *fairness* nel discorso che nella sua storia la retorica probabilmente non ha mai avuto. In questo senso hanno ragione Plebe ed Emanuele, quando sottolineano l’aspetto combattivo della retorica, e fanno dipendere da esso una delle principali caratteristiche, la capacità di inventare argomenti e idee: è il tendere alla vittoria che stimola la creatività.⁴⁴

La retorica studia i metodi di convincere dell’opportunità di una soluzione già presa; la saggezza pratica e la deliberazione invece tendono a trovare, caso per caso, i modi di determinare come vivere. Per questa ragione Aristotele non pone la retorica come metodo del sapere pratico, essendo lo scopo della retorica il considerare i mezzi di convincimento, e non i mezzi per l’azione. Per trovare un’autorità cui far risalire l’identificazione di retorica e filosofia pratica, insieme ad una certa messa in ombra dell’elemento persuasivo ed agonistico, si deve ricorrere ad un altro nome, molto celebre ai suoi tempi, forse più celebre dei filosofi suoi contemporanei, ma la cui fama, dopo alterne vicende, è andata sempre più declinando, fino a farne un nome noto forse soltanto ad una cerchia di studiosi della cultura antica: Isocrate.⁴⁵ E’ in Isocrate che noi troviamo, finalmente, espressa a chiare lettere l’identificazione di retorica e sapere pratico sostenuta da molti degli studiosi contemporanei, fautori della rivalutazione della retorica:

⁴¹ L’espressione è di Barilli, *Op.cit.*, p. 17.

⁴² Cfr. ad es. Gorg. *Hel. enc.* 12 e 14; Plat. *Gorg.* 456c7-457b7; Isocr. *Antid.* 252-253 = *Nicocl.* 4; Aristot. *Rhet.* I 1, 1355a38-b2.

⁴³ H. Gomperz, *Sophistik und Rhetorik. Das Bildungsideal des eu leigen in seinem Verhältnis zur Philosophie des V. Jahrhunderts*, Leipzig-Berlin 1912, pp. 41-42.

⁴⁴ Plebe-Emanuele, *Op. cit.*, pp. 22-29 e 98-117: in queste pagine gli autori svolgono una critica alla posizione di Perelman, che, identificando retorica e dialettica e sottovalutando l’impegno a persuadere, minaccia di trasformare una forma di sapere dotata di grande forza innovatrice, in un “procedimento conservatore e mentalmente pigro” (p. 99).

⁴⁵ E infatti Grimaldi, *Op. cit.*, p. 12 e sg. riavvicina decisamente la posizione di Aristotele a quella di Isocrate.

Gli argomenti di cui ci serviamo quando vogliamo persuadere gli altri con le parole sono gli stessi di cui ci serviamo quando deliberiamo, e chiamiamo retori coloro che sono capaci di parlare davanti alla folla, e buoni consiglieri (*euboulous*) coloro che sanno discutere con se stessi nel modo migliore sugli affari.⁴⁶

In Isocrate il deliberare, sul modello di un celebre brano dell'*Iliade* (XI, 401-410) viene interpretato come un silenzioso discutere con se stessi servendosi delle stesse forme usate dalla retorica. La cosa non era sfuggita a un buon conoscitore della storia della retorica antica come Perelman, che oltre ad Aristotele cita anche questo passo di Isocrate nelle pagine introduttive del suo celebre studio sull'argomentazione.⁴⁷

Il fine della ricerca retorica quindi è diverso dalla ricerca etico-pratica. Ma il materiale attraverso il quale si opera parrebbe a prima vista lo stesso: le opinioni umane. Infatti sia la retorica che la saggezza e la filosofia pratica si basano su *endoxa*, opinioni notevoli. Nelle tesi contemporanee sulla rivalutazione della retorica il suo collegamento con la filosofia pratica è basato sull'appello alle opinioni. La presenza di tale appello, secondo i critici contemporanei è sufficiente per fondare una contrapposizione tra la sfera della discussione, dell'interpretazione, del convincimento e della scelta pratica, considerate come un tutto unico, e la sfera della scienza della natura, nella quale le opinioni notevoli non avrebbero alcun ruolo riconosciuto. L'appello alle opinioni in Perelman e in Gadamer è così un momento della più ampia e generale discussione intorno al metodo scientifico, alla sua razionalità, ed ai suoi, veri o presunti, difetti e limiti.

Tutto questo in Aristotele non ha riscontro. Prima di tutto, Aristotele ritiene che le opinioni notevoli siano adeguati punti di partenza della ricerca, e criteri di valutazione dei suoi risultati, non solo nel campo etico e retorico, ma anche nella scienza della natura.⁴⁸ Noi non troviamo in Aristotele la contrapposizione tra un sapere scientifico di tipo assiomatico-deduttivo, e un sapere retorico-ermeneutico basato sulle opinioni, ma, dal punto di vista dell'uso degli *endoxa*, le due sfere del sapere si comportano esattamente nello stesso modo, e si differenziano piuttosto per altri due parametri, il fine (conoscenza VS. azione) e l'oggetto (universale VS. caso individuale).

In secondo luogo l'uso delle opinioni nella *Rhetorica* è differente da quello che troviamo nelle *Etiche*, mentre l'uso delle opinioni nelle *Etiche* è vicino a quello che riscontriamo nella *Fisica*. A differenza dai trattati etici e fisici, il riferimento alle opinioni presente nella *Rhetorica* non costituisce il punto di partenza per una

⁴⁶ Nicoc. 8; il brano è ripetuto in maniera letterale in *Antid.* 256.

⁴⁷ Cfr. Perelman, *Traité... cit.*, p. 44.

⁴⁸ Cfr. *Phys.* 206a12-14; 211a7-11; *De caelo*, 279b9-12; *Metaph.* 993a31-b5; 995a25-b4; *E.N.* 1098b9-29; 1145b2-7; 1154a22-26; *E.E.* I 6 tutto; 1235b13-17.

indagine teorica, per una rimessa in questione ed un approfondimento del loro contenuto, ma serve agli scopi dell'argomentazione, e fa parte di una strategia di scontro, di vittoria e sconfitta (1355a23). L'approfondimento e la critica delle opinioni, che sono elementi indispensabili del riferimento teorico alle opinioni notevoli tipico dell'approccio aristotelico ai problemi dell'etica e della fisica, nella retorica non sono presenti perché potrebbero dare impaccio. Infatti se si deve convincere qualcuno a operare una certa scelta, può essere dannoso mettersi a discutere e riformulare le sue opinioni, come avviene nell'*Etica Nicomachea* e nella *Politica*. Cercare di dimostrare ad un ascoltatore che quando, ad esempio, egli ritiene che fine di un buon padre di famiglia sia ingrandire il proprio patrimonio, in realtà egli pensa il contrario, e cioè che la quantità di ricchezze vada limitata (*Pol.* I 9); oppure che quando loda l'*apragmosyne*, la tendenza a star lontano dalla lotta per il potere, in realtà egli loda la vita teoretica, e il comportamento di chi si dedica alla filosofia (*EN.* X 6-9), non è un buon modo per fargli accettare poi conclusioni ulteriori cui l'oratore tiene. Per convincere si deve invece dimostrare che quanto si propone di nuovo, non è inaudito, ma si accorda con una serie di *endoxa* che l'ascoltatore accetta come propri. Quindi l'approccio alle opinioni della retorica in Aristotele è legato allo scopo del convincimento, e non allo scopo dell'approfondimento teorico di problemi scientifici o della ricerca del bene umano. In Aristotele, non ci pare possibile, da questo punto di vista, l'alleanza tra retorica e sapere pratico proposta da Perelman e da altri.

L'elemento che ci appare maggiormente incerto, nelle discussioni contemporanee, è l'identificazione di forme diverse di ragionamento in una sola, confusa, congerie: Aristotele, in generale, è un pensatore che ha sempre avuto la preoccupazione di articolare con precisione, e di distinguere rigorosamente tra loro, le attività della parte razionale dell'animo umano.

D'altra parte ciò non comporta che Aristotele consideri le forme del sapere e della razionalità umana come *toto caelo* distanti e incommensurabili. Egli riconosce il fatto che l'uomo è capace di svariate forme di ragionamento, che la razionalità è multiforme, e insieme anche il fatto che tutti i vari tipi di razionalità sono basati su una struttura profonda comune, una struttura 'logica' che, in generale, possiamo chiamare 'sillogismo'. Nei vari tipi di ragionamento il sillogismo assume caratteristiche di volta in volta differenti, e si articola in vari modi: sillogismo scientifico, sillogismo dialettico, sillogismo pratico, entimema e via dicendo.⁴⁹ In altre parole per Aristotele si possono distinguere varie forme di razionalità, ognuna appropriata al proprio ambito e in esso sovrana, eppure non del tutto comunicanti

⁴⁹ La recente panoramica di Berti, *Le ragioni... cit.* fornisce tutte le indicazioni indispensabili al riguardo; cfr. anche T.M. Cren, *The Definition of Rhetoric According to Aristotle*, «Laval Théol. et Philos.» xii (1956), pp. 233-250, ora in: K.V. Erickson (ed.), *Aristotle: the Classical Heritage of Rhetoric*, Metuchen (N.J.) 1974, pp. 52-71, in part. pp. 58-60.

e incomparabili, proprio per questo elemento comune di base; è il contrario di quello che avviene nelle contrapposizioni moderne di scienza ed esperienza vissuta, di sapere matematico formalizzabile e di giudizio estetico o intuizione poetica.

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